



HEGEL'S *SCIENCE OF LOGIC*

A CRITICAL RETHINKING
IN THIRTY LECTURES



RICHARD
DIEN WINFIELD



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A Critical Rethinking in Thirty Lectures
Richard Dien Winfield

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For my fearless students

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Preface

The following text is based upon the lectures I gave in my 2009 Spring term Hegel class, attended by undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Georgia. I want to thank Graham Schuster for recording the class sessions and making the recordings available and Samuel Abney for transcribing those recordings.

Chapter One

General Introduction

I here invite you to engage in what should be the most challenging and exciting adventure awaiting any intellectual career. This is because we will be thinking through a great and truly unparalleled masterpiece of philosophy, Hegel's *Science of Logic*. It is an achievement of genuinely revolutionary significance that, since its appearance, has been almost always gravely misinterpreted or largely ignored.

The *Science of Logic* is a work that needs no introduction to a degree unmatched by any other. Paradoxically, Hegel presents a series of preliminary discussions to try to show why this is the case. That Hegel feels the need to offer such aids reflects his own awareness of just how radically novel is the philosophical project he here pioneers.

The purpose of our opening discussion is to give some inkling of what is unique about the revolutionary philosophical project whose first positive blow is presented by Hegel's *Science of Logic*. To do so, it is helpful to reflect upon the perennial predicament of philosophical investigation.

Philosophy can never be satisfied to follow the manner of other disciplines, which always address a given subject matter and, in so doing, take for granted the boundaries of their subject matter and their access to it.

Admittedly, such assumptions seem to be inevitable. If a particular science does not already have a predefined topic to address, it cannot be the particular science that it purports to be. It then has nothing determinate to examine and investigate. Accordingly, its inquiry always begins by confronting some predetermined, predefined area of study, whose broad definition is taken for granted from the outset. What seems just as inescapable is that the discipline in question must presume it has access to that subject matter. After all, if it does not have access to that topic, if it does not have already at hand a method for investigating it, it can hardly do anything.

Such disciplines thus address their subject matter by making two fundamental assumptions. One comprises an assumption regarding the content under investigation, namely, a taking for granted of the boundaries and character of what one is addressing. Only by so doing can one address physics, as opposed to mathematics, French literature, Hindi, or modern art. The other assumption involves the taking for granted of some approach, some method, some way of knowing what has been presupposed to be the topic under consideration. As a consequence of beginning with these two interrelated assumptions, everything one therefrom arrives at is relative to those assumptions that are the basis of one's investigations. Whatever is obtained remains conditioned by how the subject matter has been determined at the outset and equally conditioned by the method or approach that one relies upon from the start.

As a result, it would be folly to think that by operating in this manner, one could attain any absolute claims about whatever one is addressing. Not only can no characterization of the object claim to have any absolute character, but by the same token, the knowledge of it can hardly claim to be absolute. Rather, the putative object and the knowledge of it are both conditioned and relative. We here remain in the domain of opinion, an opinion that is relative to various assumptions about method and subject matter. Philosophers, however, cannot be satisfied with vapors of opinion, in the way in which our compatriots at universities in other departments seem to be. This puts us in the peculiar situation that precisely because we are not satisfied with playing around with opinions that are based upon analyses of given assumptions, we cannot take for granted what it is we are addressing, we cannot take for granted the content of philosophical investigation, nor can we take for granted philosophy's access to its subject matter, whatever that may be. In other words, we cannot take for granted what method or topic our discourse should have.

These questions of method and subject matter are themselves issues for philosophy to investigate. Instead of being settled before philosophy gets under way, these are matters philosophy has to adjudicate for itself. This burdens philosophy with a radical kind of autonomy that no other discipline can match.

On the one hand, we find ourselves compelled to exercise a negative freedom, in which we must liberate ourselves from bondage to any prevailing assumptions. Although we cannot simply accept them as given, we might come to accept them later in virtue not of their being given, but of their confirmation by philosophical investigation. To avoid dogmatic enslavement to unexamined assumptions, we must thus call everything into question.

Besides exercising this negative freedom of liberating ourselves from external authority, from external givens, from opinion, we also must exercise a positive freedom of having to establish, through our very own philosophi-

cal activity, whatever it is that we are going to endorse. Whatever we come up with regarding the nature of our subject matter, as well as whatever method or procedure we follow, has to be established through our own philosophical engagement. Philosophical thinking has to establish, in and through its own activity, *what* it is thinking as well as *how* it is to think.

Now, I have here mentioned thinking in conjunction with the recognition that philosophy finds itself compelled to call into question the givenness of both its content and approach, and in that regard, exercise an autonomy that no other discipline can possibly exercise without throwing off the shackles that make it a particular discipline and becoming philosophy. Philosophy, however, also seems always to employ thinking and make use of thinking to a degree unmatched by any other discipline. For philosophy makes use of thinking and thinking alone, engaging a thinking that somehow is able to generate through its own activity both what it is thinking about and how it is to think about what it is conceiving. This privileging of thinking is obviously something that cannot be taken for granted by philosophy. Philosophy must somehow or other deal with the issue of why it should rely on thinking and what type of thinking would have the kind of autonomy required for any attempt to go beyond the conditional, relative character of those disciplines that rely upon assumptions of one sort or another.

Socrates, as portrayed by Plato, presents us with the quandaries we here face. If we are not going to take for granted what we are to know or how we are to go about knowing it, we seem to have no resources at our disposal to determine what to address or what questions to raise. Our lack of trust in given assumptions, that is, our awareness of our own ignorance, seems to give us nothing other to do than turn to what putative knowledge others have advanced, where they deliver the content, where they present us with putative claims of what is true, and where we can then question what they put forward. In this sense, it is the given claims of others that determine the questions to be raised, because they are offering claims that we are in a position to call into question without having to be certain of anything of our own. We can engage in questioning them precisely because we do not have any givens to present having an authoritative character. Still, this questioning, obviously, is very limited. Through this interrogating of others, we can get them, as Socrates tells us, to recognize that they do not know what they thought they knew. We cannot do this by advancing competing answers, of which we have none. Rather, through our questioning we can show our interlocutors that they do not have sufficient resources of their own to justify the claims they make, by indicating that what they think count as reasons do not support what they are claiming, by exposing the inconsistencies in what they are affirming.

But what can that questioning provide us with? Can it provide us with knowledge about the truth or falsity of any of the views we are examining? It

might seem that if we want to address their truth or falsity, we have to know what is truly the case and be able to compare what we know with what they are putting forward. Our questioning itself only allows us to see if they have consistent grounds for what they are presenting, but we do not know thereby whether any of the grounds they offer are true or false.

So it seems that although our awareness of our own ignorance may perhaps provide legitimate intellectual grounds for embarking on a quest for truth, it leaves us at an impasse. We can question the claims of others, but that questioning can at most have a negative result. It can lead others to be aware of their own ignorance, but it cannot lead any of us to know what is true or even what is false. At best, we can see whether certain assumptions fit together or do not fit together.

The intent to go beyond this impasse has led thinkers to try to find something that is given which at the same time seems to be beyond all assumption. Once again, one is trying to get beyond the whole realm of opinion. One wants to locate that which is not simply a product of opinion, which is not itself relative to the choices and theoretical searches of individuals. Here we want to get at not what is a product of convention, or more generally, what is determined by anything else. Rather we want to somehow uncover that which is not relative to, conditioned by, posited by, or derivative of anything else, and in that regard uncover what could be said to not presuppose anything.

In other words, we would need to find what is not by convention but by nature, comprising what is given immediately in the sense of not being mediated or determined by something else or resting upon something else, but something that is ultimately fundamental, something which rests on nothing, something which could be that on which everything else rests. If we want to get at any content that is not relative or conditioned, and obtain any knowledge of it that is not relative or conditioned, we need to find something that is without qualification, that is not based on anything else, is not mediated by anything else, but simply is, immediately. In terms of the contrast of nature with convention, where convention is that which is determined by will, by the stipulations of natural agents, what we need to get at is not what is constructed by individuals but what is given immediately, by nature. And we will want to get at it in a way where we do not do anything to it, where we do not modify it, where we simply take it in immediately.

How could one describe the kind of cognition that attends immediately to what is immediate, that does not address an object that is determined by the knowing that takes it in? What is the kind of knowing that does not modify or construct its object, but merely contemplates it as it is given? Intuition is the accepted candidate. We intuit that which is given, and given in the privileged sense of being ultimately given, immediately given, not mediated by anything else. In intuiting it, we take our object in immediately, in no respect

modifying it or doing anything to it. In intuition, we take it in in a contemplative way, not constructing what we know but accessing what is given in a manner that is truly passive and thereby truly immediate.

We are all familiar with philosophers who have allegedly found that the only way to get to what lies beyond all assumption is by addressing that which is immediately given in the sense of what is ultimately first, is without further qualification, and serves as the first principle for everything else, which would rest upon it, having the derivative or mediated character opposed to its unique, nonderivative immediacy.

This becomes the common recipe for the approach in philosophy that begins by turning to what is without further qualification. Such philosophizing makes its beginning with ontology, an ontology that addresses what comes first, that searches for what is the first principle of all that is. This first principle as such can only be known immediately, because it cannot be known as something derived from anything else or produced from anything else. It will be known contemplatively, through intuition of that which comes first. From that first principle we can then derive what is determined by what comes first and thereby come up with the totality of the knowledge that is absolute, a philosophical wisdom that accordingly has two related characters.

On the one hand, this philosophical approach will involve an intuition of first principles, of that which is ultimate, of that which is immediately given. On the other hand, this philosophizing will then proceed to a deductive or derivative knowledge of that which follows from the intuition of what comes first. This approach, which makes ontology primary and follows intuition with derivative deduction, has seemed natural to legions of philosophers. But as their history shows, there is a problem with the approach that presumes that the way to go beyond assumptions is to immediately address what is, to do ontology as first philosophy, to intuit that which comes first. The very plurality of their ontologies suggests that the privileged character of being first, of being the first principle, of being what is ultimate and immediate, is something formal in character. Namely, what it is to be the first principle does not of itself indicate what content the ultimate immediate, or what comes first, should have. Instead, we find a whole panoply of different candidates for first principles advanced in unrelenting conflict by those who want to go beyond opinion by setting out to read off immediately the character of the given, doing ontology as the investigation to be first undertaken.

We find the Pre-Socratics proposing various physical and then mental characterizations of what comes first, followed by Plato, suggesting that it is the good which comes first and rests on no assumptions, and next, Aristotle, who presents notions of an ultimate primary substance, depicted as a self-thinking thought that somehow serves as an unmoved mover. The daunting question is: How can one establish which of the contenders is the real McCoy? When it comes to trying to figure out what it is that is ultimately

immediate, there seems to be an insurmountable problem. One cannot seek reasons that will determine what counts as first, for one cannot derive what comes first from anything else. One cannot provide grounds for why it is what is ultimate, because if one provided any, the privileged principle would cease to come first. It would now be derivative, and what we would be supplying as the reason or ground for its primacy would be something that really is primary to it. So it appears that one cannot look for any antecedent grounds or any reasons to determine which candidate for what ultimately is is valid.

It might seem that we could operate indirectly in perhaps two broad ways. One manner would be to say, "OK, we can certify that it is not water that is what is ultimate, but it is mind," by showing that everything derives from not water but mind. Now, to pull that off, what do we have to have at our disposal, and have at our disposal independently of knowing what comes first?

We need to have a means of inquiry for getting at what we would have to know in order to say, "Aha! This is what is ultimately first!" First of all, we have to be able to know about *everything* and not leave *anything* out, because we have to be able to certify, "Yes, we have shown that everything, without exclusion, rests upon or is determined by this privileged given, this proven ground." But how can we be in a position to know that we have exhausted the range of what is, if to know what is, we have to know what comes first, since everything else rests upon it and cannot truly be known unless we know it as coming from what comes first and how it is determined by what comes first? So, we already have to have knowledge both of what everything else is, as well as how everything else derives from what comes first. But how could we have that knowledge without knowing what comes first already, as well as that it is what comes first?

Now, a similar alternate tactic would be to say, "OK, we can validate our privileged first principle by trying to eliminate all other candidates for what is ultimate, by showing that they fail to be without a ground or to be that on which everything else rests." By excluding other candidates, however, do we thereby establish the truth of a different candidate? What would have to be shown in order to validate the truth of one candidate for what comes first by eliminating other candidates? Certainly we have to presume that we have exhausted all the other candidates. Thus, we have to know what all the other candidates are, and we also have to know that there is something like a principle of excluded middle, guaranteeing that if they are not true, then the remaining option has to be true. But with what right could we lay claim to such a principle of excluded middle if everything is supposed to rely first of all on this ultimate given, which has to be known before we can know *anything* else? It seems there is something paradoxical, perhaps self-defeating, about this entire quest to move beyond the field of opinion, beyond

assumptions, by finding some ultimate given, some privileged principle that can be held as what fundamentally is, which could be somehow known directly.

Now, one can step back and remark, on the one hand, that if no given content can lay claim to being ultimate on the basis of its content, on the basis of what it is, then it seems that its privileged status depends upon something else that determines it to come first. It might seem, in that respect, that maybe we have to look at not what it is, but rather at how what is is determined. On the other hand, one could see that in all these efforts to read off the character of the given, to begin by doing ontology, to begin by answering what is, one takes for granted that one's knowing is up to the task of revealing what is. Are we not taking that for granted every time we simply make any claim about what is immediately or make any claim about other things that derive from what is fundamental?

The recognition of that assumption—and the corollary recognition that no given in virtue of its content can claim to be ultimate—leads to a different strategy. This new strategy looks back at the attempt to do philosophy by beginning with ontology, by beginning with answering the question “What is?” by looking for what is ultimately given, as dogmatic, as not really critical of its own engagements. And so there is a demand for a critical philosophy, a philosophy that will not begin by making claims about what is, about the given. This critical, “nondogmatic” philosophy will not begin by making ontology first philosophy but will instead turn to investigate knowing to certify that knowing is sufficient to get at what is. Instead of beginning with ontology and beginning with an appeal to what is immediate, one is instead going to take a turn and address knowing and critique knowing. Kant, of course, is the great pioneer for this engagement of what comes to be called transcendental philosophy. He and all his followers attempt to get away from appealing to the given and answering the question “What is?” immediately, by instead turning to investigate knowing without making any direct claims about the object of knowing.

Now this might appear to be a vain enterprise. How can one turn to criticize knowing and evaluate the truth of knowing if one is not in a position to know anything about the object of knowing prior to an investigation of knowing? Inevitably you would think that if we are going to be in a position to criticize whether knowing is legitimate, we have to be able to compare its claims about its objects with the objects themselves. We have to have access to the objects and an immediate, unfiltered knowledge of the objects. We have to have precisely what has been cast into doubt, namely, the kind of knowledge that ontology presumes to enjoy.

In face of this difficulty, the only manner in which an investigation of knowing could possibly shed light on the validity of knowing is if somehow or other knowing determines the object of knowing. Only if knowing deter-

mines the object of knowing, only if knowing puts into the object what can be known about it, can we determine whether knowing has any objectivity, whether knowing gives us any knowledge of objects, by focusing on knowing itself without purporting to have a direct access to what is apart from knowing. If the structure of knowing determines the character of its object, then and only then can a critique of knowing, or a turn to investigate knowing first, shed light on whether knowing has any objectivity.

This strategy heralds a great shift in both the form and content of philosophical investigation. What now comes first is epistemology, that is, the investigation of knowing, not the knowing of what is but the knowing of knowing. And this knowing of knowing is one that is going to investigate how knowing determines the character of its object. That means that what is the object of knowing has a very definite logical structure. It is not going to be immediate. It is going to be mediated. Or another way of putting it is that the object of knowing is not going to be unconditioned. It is going to be conditioned. It has conditions and those conditions reside in knowing. They reside in the conditions of knowing by which knowing is held to determine the character of the object that it knows.

The object is thus in some respect constructed by knowing, where knowing takes an active role in determining what it knows. Cognition is no longer contemplative. It is no longer merely intuitive. It is engaged in constructing what it knows. But that means that what is knowable has the form of being something conditioned, something that has a ground, and that ground is the structure of knowing, however that be construed, which determines the character of its object.

As the example of Kant classically exhibits, this puts peculiar limitations on the field of what is objectively knowable. If what is objectively knowable must be conditioned, not unconditioned, must be determined from something outside itself, not from something within itself, certain key things become unknowable in principle. Namely, what here gets cast outside the scope of knowledge is whatever is unconditioned, whatever is not determined externally but internally, whatever is self-determined. This includes not just the free individual but the conditions of knowing themselves. They are not determined by conditions. They are the conditions that determine all objectivity. By holding knowing, however it be characterized, to determine what can be known, knowing itself becomes off-limits as a topic of knowledge. Because what is knowable is only what is determined by the conditions of knowing, these conditions cannot be objects of knowledge. They are the conditions of objects, the grounds of objects, but not knowable, that is, constructible, objects.

Accordingly, the question arises: How can the claims made about these conditions of knowing have any validity?

To begin with, the whole turn to investigate knowing was based upon the recognition that philosophy could not simply begin by reading off what is. There is something irretrievably dogmatic and suspect about doing that. But by turning to investigate knowing instead of beginning with ontology, by making epistemology instead of ontology foundational, by making epistemology first philosophy, are we not immediately turning to knowing and reading off what knowing is? However we characterize knowing, it is characterized in some way, with a particular content in need of validation. Kant will characterize knowing and the conditions that determine the object of knowing in terms of the structure of consciousness or, more particularly, self-consciousness. Others will characterize the transcendental conditions of knowing in different ways. Heidegger will characterize the structure that determines the object of knowing as the embedded being in the world of the engaged practical subject. Others will turn to language as the structure that determines what can be spoken of and how it can be spoken of. Others will advance the whole structure of interpretation, with all its historical givenness, as that which determines what can be known by any knower. In each case, claims are made about these conditions of knowing. They are described and characterized in a certain way. In other words, knowledge is propounded of what conversation is, of what language is, of what interpretation is, of what consciousness is. Furthermore, these various factors are then privileged and treated as determining foundations, which determine how objects are structured in order to be knowable. So, the turn to investigate knowing is just as uncritical about our knowing of knowing as dogmatic philosophy was uncritical about our knowing of what is. The critical philosophy immediately addresses knowing and reads off its character, with its various proponents doing so in different ways. Kant just stipulates the character of various structures of knowing—describing sensibility, understanding, and so forth without further ado.

Moreover, there is a difference between the cognition under investigation, which is a cognition of conditioned objects, and the knowing of the transcendental investigator, who is engaging in the knowing of knowing. That knowing of knowing is not investigated. The knowing it knows is what is being investigated. And the knowing it knows is not a knowing of knowing. It is a knowing of objects, objects that are conditioned.

Various transcendental philosophers have tried to escape this problem as it first surfaces in Kant, where Kant admits that the conditions of knowing, the structure of knowing that determines what can be known, is not itself an object of knowledge. It is something he characterizes as noumenal, as something that does not appear to knowing. Kant is not very reflective about whether that is a problem or not. But others who want to pursue foundational epistemology want to escape that problem by making the structures of knowing that determine what we can know something object-like, so that they

could be known just like the objects they condition. Instead of treating the determining conditions of knowing as a noumenal subjectivity, a pure consciousness that never appears in experience, they put that determining structure of knowing in the world and turn to language, an actual practice involving a plurality of individuals, or turn to the being-in-the-world of the subject, the concrete subject, immersed in care and practical relationships to the world in which it is involved.

Now, once you try to eliminate the distinction between the knowing that determines what can be known and the object of knowing by making them both equally worldly or object-like, a problem arises that Husserl, for one, exposes under the charge of psychologism. We cannot treat the conditions that determine how objects of knowledge are constituted as just another object. If these conditions are rendered just another object, how can they retain that Archimedean role of determining objectivity as a whole? They cannot just be an object among others, if they are really going to be the determining condition that renders objects in general what they knowably can be.

So whether the transcendental philosopher making epistemology first philosophy characterizes knowing as something outside objectivity or characterizes it as something in the world, as something worldly, the knowing of knowing is still problematic. Knowing remains just as immediately referred to, just as immediately taken in as the being that precritical ontology attempts to address.

Where then does philosophical investigation stand? It seems that, on the one hand, we have not overcome the hold of opinion, of assumptions, if we turn to what is and make ontology what comes first and read off the character of the given, seeking some first principle. On the other hand, we have not overcome assumptions by instead turning to knowing and reading off the character of cognition, treating it as the determiner of knowable objectivity. In both cases, we are making fundamental assumptions, we are presuming a foundation—a foundation in being in the appeal to first principles of ontology, a foundation in knowing in making a transcendental turn. We are either taking some given as being privileged, a first principle of being that is ultimate, or we are taking a determiner as privileged, a structure of knowing that determines objectivity.

It appears that philosophy succumbs to foundationalism by always beginning with some ultimate foundation. This foundation could be characterized ontologically. It could be characterized epistemologically. It could be characterized as the form of being. It could be characterized as the form of knowing. Either way, it is taken as ultimate and as simply stipulated, precisely because it comes immediately first.

This predicament has fueled the sails of a position that has invaded many disciplines, a position that is given its classic statement by Nietzsche and

then is taken up by what goes by the name of postmodernism. That position advances the notion that all discourse, all knowing, all attempts at anything normative in either theory or practice are always beholden to foundations, are always based upon givens of one sort or another. And these givens are themselves contingent. Whatever content they have, they are contingent upon being privileged by whoever privileges them. They may be privileged by someone individually or privileged by a group, communally. Once one recognizes this, one sees that those activities of seeking truth, of seeking what is right, of attending to what is normative and distinguishing between opinion and genuine knowledge and between custom and what is just, all these efforts really are nothing other than an exercise of will to power. Here we have individuals or groups putting forth something as a norm, as being universally valid, but they are putting forward something that is simply chosen by themselves, by an act of will, because it is not grounded in anything else. It is ultimately arbitrary, grounded in their assertion of it. And it is particular to them, it is relative to them and who they are. So, in this respect, what they are doing is advancing something that is relative to them in their particular character but treating it as if it were universally valid. They are positing it as a rule to which all others ought to submit. And that is really what goes by the name of rationality, because rationality, according to this position, is always making appeal to givens, to foundations, that are arbitrary. What we need to do is just recognize that that is what is going on. It is an exercise of a will to power. Once we recognize this and drop the pretense of masking what is going on, we can impose our norms without any excuses and shove them down the throats of others, rather than attempting to pretend that they have any validity. This consistent exercise of the will to power could be said to be the ideological recipe for fascism.

What is problematic about this whole position? Is it doing something that it has no right to do? Does its diagnosis of rationality as will to power undercut its very own complaints? In the end, it may be very much the case that insurmountable foundational dilemmas afflict the two approaches of dogmatic, precritical philosophy that makes ontology first and of transcendental philosophy that makes epistemology primary. The postmodern diagnosis of rationality as will to power itself takes for granted that rationality cannot be otherwise. It takes for granted that reason, rationality, is foundation ridden, always bound to privileged terms, privileged vocabularies, from which it can never free itself. Justification is assumed to always involve appealing to some ultimate ground, which as such cannot rest upon anything else but must be stipulated arbitrarily.

How can Nietzsche or his successor postmoderns know this with any assurance? Should not their own diagnosis be just another exercise of will to power, just as much based upon arbitrary assumptions as any other? Can it then possibly possess any legitimacy?

Now, is there any alternative to these three alternate strategies of pursuing ontology as first philosophy, turning to foundational epistemology, or deconstructing rationality as will to power?

There is a remaining option, which one can express negatively by saying, "Look, to go beyond opinion and arbitrary assumptions, we cannot begin our adventure by making claims about what is. We cannot begin with any pre-conception or determination of what we are investigating, nor do we have any right to begin our investigation with any privileged method or privileged foundation. We cannot begin by making any determinate claims about our own inquiry, determinate claims about what is, or objects of knowing. In other words, we cannot make appeal to privileged givens, we cannot make appeal to privileged determiners, or more generally, we cannot rely upon any foundations whatsoever."

Now, what does it mean in a positive sense to engage in a foundation-free philosophizing, neither a philosophizing that does ontology, in the sense of appealing to what is given and reading off the given, nor a philosophizing that makes epistemology, the knowing of knowing, foundational? What are we left with? What are we doing? You get a quick look at what this might be if you think about the problem of appealing to a foundation. If we take what is valid to be valid in virtue of owing its validity to something else, where its validity rests on a foundation, on something different from it, then a question obviously arises: What gives the alleged foundation its privileged position to confer legitimacy on something else? What gives it its privilege to play that role? Now, if it is really the foundation it cannot rely upon anything else, but if it owes its legitimacy to nothing else, it is a source of all legitimation. If it is going to be consistent, where can its legitimacy come from? If it is the condition, or the foundation, of all normativity, of all truth, of all right, where does its own truth or its own right to play that role reside?

Its authority must come from itself. To be consistent, the privileged foundation somehow has to be self-grounding. But that eliminates the distinction that foundationalism rests upon, namely, the difference between what confers validity and what possesses validity. Now it is one and the same thing that confers and possesses validity. Here instead of having something founded upon something else, we have something that is determined by itself. Apparently, when foundationalism is compelled to become self-referentially consistent, to pay its dues and deal with the validity of its own foundation, it must eliminate the divide that is the basis of foundationalism, that is, the very idea that justification be thought of in terms of the distinction between what justifies and what is justified.

We will have to see whether identifying validity with self-determination involves any foundational assumption of its own, namely that something could be self-determined in the first place. If this is not to be assumed, one must answer the question: How can something really be autonomous? How

can something not have a validity that resides in anything else? These questions have had a long-standing resonance when you think about the aspiration to which philosophy has continually laid claim, namely of being the freest of all sciences, as Aristotle put it,¹ precisely because philosophy cannot accept submitting to the authority of any other source of authority. How can it be autonomous, how can it be self-determining, how can it operate without resting on foundations, which, as such, comprise factors that are accepted without examination?

To clarify this question, we must explore how being merely given is different from being self-determined. For now, let me just present a clue that we are going to find very much under examination in what follows. If we think about something being self-determined, we are conceiving something that has this peculiar character: It is what it determines itself to be. This involves a process of determining where, peculiarly enough, what is determining itself cannot be, at the outset, something immediately given. Somehow, what it is is mediated by itself, by a determining process that resides within itself. Contrary to a given that simple *is* immediately, we are here dealing with something that, as self-determined, necessarily involves some kind of development, a development different from what happens when something determines something else, such as when a cause has an effect upon another entity. Here we have something with a different character that is very challenging conceptually. Nonetheless, it might very well lie at the core of the whole philosophical undertaking to the extent that philosophy requires an autonomy that no other kind of investigation can match. And insofar as philosophy always employs thought, we need to think about whether thinking has something about it that makes it peculiarly autonomous or self-determining, that is, whether conceptual determination has a character unlike (to speak in psychological terms) other kinds of mental contents.

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel is going to be inaugurating what can be called a foundation-free systematic philosophy, a philosophy that is going to achieve presuppositionlessness. The aspiration to do so is not really something new. All philosophers in some respect have sought to meet that demand. Hegel, however, recognizes that this cannot be done by first undertaking ontology, by simply appealing to what is given. He recognizes that it cannot be done by turning to investigate knowing, by making immediate claims about knowing. Hegel is adamant that it cannot be done by beginning with any predeterminations about what we are investigating or how we are going to go about investigating it. What, then, is philosophy going to be doing? This might appear to be completely paradoxical, and we are going to find as we get into Hegel's argument that the argument is unlike any argument to which we are accustomed. This is because Hegel's is not an argument that appeals to reasons and foundations as argument typically has operated—or at least the argument that is usually presented as the model of

reasoning, namely, formal logical argument. Such formal reasoning is plagued with givens, operating with premises and fixed operations, all of which are taken for granted, that is, all of which are stipulated.

Before addressing the positive development of Hegel's argument, a very few facts are worth mentioning to put in rudimentary perspective the place of the *Science of Logic* in Hegel's own career. Hegel published four books in his lifetime. Born in 1770, Hegel published his first book in 1807—the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a very long, difficult work, which you will find him describing in the introductory sections of the *Science of Logic* as being an introduction to presuppositionless science. That description has a very paradoxical ring to it. How could something be an introduction to something that has no presuppositions? It must be an introduction in a very peculiar way. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* has usually not been interpreted with an eye to its role as an introduction to presuppositionless science. It has instead been regarded as if it were itself a philosophical doctrine in its own right. You will see, however, by how Hegel briefly refers to it in these introductory sections, that it has a very different role to play. Rather than providing philosophical wisdom, it is paving the way for something that needs no introduction, and what it is that will need no introduction goes by the name of the *Science of Logic*, which Hegel published in three installments starting in 1812 (*The Logic of Being*), and continuing in 1813 (*The Logic of Essence*) and 1816 (*The Logic of the Concept*). Throughout his career, from his days teaching high school to his years as a university professor, Hegel worked continuously on all parts of what will turn out to be a system of doing philosophy without assumptions. Obviously we have to ask why Hegel would characterize as a “science of logic” this first part of a philosophical system that is not going to be appealing at the outset to the given or any determination of knowing.

The *Science of Logic* is, then, what comes first in this primary attempt at a systematic philosophy that has no foundations. The *Science of Logic* is not at all like any logic that has ever come under the name of logic. Still, there is something about it that connects it with every logic, a connection one begins to see when one looks at how Hegel addresses the project with which logic has always been grappling, a project, which, if sufficiently thought through, leaves us with what philosophy itself has to be doing to escape foundationalism.

Hegel offers us an introductory discussion called “With What Must the Science Begin?” which deals with the problem of how one can begin without assumption, without taking anything for granted, showing that what has to be done is precisely what happens when logic does what logic is supposed to be. Logic is a thinking of thinking, and in being the thinking of thinking, there is something very unique about logic that separates it from every other investigation that uses thinking. Once you recognize that logic is a thinking about

thinking, it is apparent that all other investigations diverge from logic by using thinking to think about something different from thinking.

Consider what position that puts them in. They are thinking not about thinking but about something else. That means that when they are thinking about something else, they are making use of a thinking that they are not investigating. They are making use of a thinking that they are not putting under scrutiny, because what they are putting under scrutiny is not thinking but something else that they are thinking about. There is a difference between the subject of the investigation and the object of the investigation, whereas in logic the thinking and what is thought about are one and the same. There is no distinction that can be drawn between the subject and the object, or one might say, between the form and content. This lack of distinction has very important ramifications for logic. What does it mean for logic to have this peculiar character, where it is a thinking about thinking and there is no difference that can be drawn between what logic is addressing and how it is addressing it? We are going to see that Hegel will contrast the thinking of logic with what he calls “consciousness,” using the latter term to address something familiar to us all, but specifically identifying it as a form of knowing always confronting an object distinct from its awareness of it, always involving a difference between subject and object.

Hegel maintains that this opposition of consciousness, this knowing that confronts something different from itself, bars the way to philosophy. The distinction between subject and object of knowing, characteristic of consciousness, must not be taken as absolute, must not be taken as definitive of knowing, because if it is, it is impossible ever to do philosophy. We will see how this is so in what follows.

Chapter Two

The General Concept of Logic

The *Science of Logic* contains two parallel introductions that Hegel offers in succession. The first is presented under the title “Introduction: General Notion of Logic,” followed by the other, titled “With What Must the Science Begin?”

The former section focuses on the general concept of logic.¹ Here Hegel shows in what way a very minimal, basic idea of logic requires logic to develop in the same way in which philosophy in general must proceed.

Hegel opens this introductory section by contrasting logic with other disciplines, and we need to consider how that contrast bears upon the more general question of how philosophy should operate. In looking at this, we want to take into account not only the distinction drawn between logic and other sciences but the difference between two ways of thinking about logic. One is the way of conceiving logic that underlies all thinking about logic. The other is a particular way logic has come to be construed from ancient times up to the present, where logic is held up as a formal discipline, concerned with investigating the thinking of any content whatsoever. Hegel will show that this latter formal construal involves certain assumptions concerning the nature of thought, assumptions that are shared by our everyday experience where we make use of our consciousness.

What Hegel wants to show is that the everyday framework of knowing, which is exhibited psychologically in consciousness, becomes pernicious to philosophy if it be regarded as the inescapable framework in which all knowing must proceed. This absolutizing of the standpoint of consciousness is tantamount to maintaining that all thinking is ruled by formal logic, insofar as formal logic is based upon those assumptions that are psychologically given in consciousness and govern how it deals with its objects. Hegel is going to draw these contrasts between logic and nonlogical disciplines and

between two conceptions of logic. In so doing, he is going to indicate how logic and, more generally, philosophy require overcoming what he calls the opposition of consciousness, which involves overthrowing the notion that that particular opposition is definitive of all knowing and all thinking. Hegel is going to point to how logic must presume the overcoming of that distinction, because there could not be any logic, properly speaking, as long as that opposition exists.

Then, in this connection, Hegel is going to point to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a work that he published in 1807, and which he here identifies as providing a kind of introduction to the *Science of Logic*, which, he equally maintains, needs no introduction. This obviously poses perplexities, and Hegel is going to comment briefly about what is going on in the *Phenomenology* so as to shed light on how it could have any introductory service to make.

Hegel begins the introduction subtitled “General Notion of Logic” by writing, “In no science is the need to begin with the subject matter itself, without preliminary reflections, felt more strongly than in the science of logic” (p. 43).² In no science is the need to begin *without* preliminary reflections felt more strongly than in the science of logic. “In every other science, the subject matter and the scientific method are distinguished from each other” (p. 43). How is that plausible? How are subject matter and scientific method distinguished from each other in nonlogical sciences, whereas in logic they are not distinguished? In what way might it appear that in logic, method and subject matter are not different?

Well, what does logic think about? It thinks about thinking. Logic thinks about what it does, because it uses thinking. Its method is thinking, and its object is thinking. There can of course be a merely descriptive logic that simply examines how individuals happen to think. If, however, logic is undertaken as a normative discipline, prescribing how we ought to think, where logic aims to determine valid thinking, what must be true about the thinking employed in logic, if logic is to uncover valid thinking?

Clearly, it has to be valid thinking as well, since otherwise the thinking under consideration will be invalidly thought and therefore will not be valid. Accordingly, there is a normative demand built into logic if it is to uncover what valid thinking is; in order to establish what valid thinking is logic has to be the valid thinking of valid thinking. Its method and its subject matter must coincide. Consequently, logic must be both normative and descriptive, since in prescribing what valid thought is, logic must *be* valid thinking.³

Now, in what respect do method and subject matter not coincide in any investigation that is not logic? How is there then a difference between the form and matter of the science? If we are not dealing with logic, we are dealing with nonlogical sciences, all of which still involve thinking. In every case, they are thinking not about thinking, but about something different

from thinking. So in all of these other disciplines, there is a difference between subject and object, between knowing and what is known, between method and subject matter, or between form and content. By contrast, in logic, all these terms are united. There are no such distinctions. Hegel points out that in these other sciences that think not of thinking, but of something else—geography, French literature, a particular religion, baseball, whatever—there is a difference between method and subject matter.

Hegel observes that in sciences that are not logical, where the scientific method is distinguished from the subject matter, “the content does not make an absolute beginning but is dependent on other concepts and is connected on all sides with other material” (p. 43). These other sciences do not and cannot make an absolute beginning because their content is dependent on other concepts and other material. A beginning is not an absolute but a relative beginning when it is relative to, dependent upon, conditioned by something else. An absolute beginning is unconditioned. In what respect do sciences that are not logical make a relative beginning? In what respect is their content dependent on other concepts and other material?

In order to know, for example, that we are addressing astronomy, as opposed to botany, we must have a prior knowledge that is expressed in concepts that capture what these different terms mean. If we are going to begin with a specific nonlogical subject matter as opposed to some other one, or as opposed to logic itself, we already have to presume the specific concepts that make it identifiable as what it is. What it is has to be at hand from the outset for our investigation to be a science of astronomy as opposed to a science of German literature.

As Hegel goes on to say, “These other sciences are, therefore, permitted to speak of their ground and its context, and also of their method, only as premises taken for granted which, as forms of definitions and such-like presupposed as familiar and accepted, are to be applied straightaway” (p. 43). They have to be accepted from the outset or we do not have anything to deal with, anything definite to study and investigate. This applies in particular to the method or thinking we employ, because if we are not going to do logic, we are not investigating the thinking we use to investigate our nonlogical topic. We are making use of our thinking without further ado, without putting it under scrutiny. We are employing it with the assumption that it is reliably usable, that we know what it is, as well as that it commands authority.

On both accounts, with regard to the content and the method, we are here operating with factors that, as far as this investigation is concerned, are taken for granted, are just presumed to be what they are and to be authoritative for our investigations. Now that should tell us that if we are really concerned with getting at truth and not at something relative to assurances, we cannot begin our quest for truth with a science that has this character of making not an absolute but a relative beginning.

In respect to the problems that are raised here, there is something special about logic. Logic avoids these difficulties, whereas any investigation that begins with what is not logical, any investigation that allows, as Hegel puts it, the subject matter and the method to be distinguished from one another, is going automatically to rest upon assumptions and therefore not be a candidate for what can provide us with truth without further qualifications, with where we have to begin in the investigation that might be philosophical if philosophy is trying to rise above a relative beginning.

Hegel goes on to point out, “Logic on the contrary,” unlike those disciplines in which subject matter and method are different, “cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection and laws of thinking” (p. 43). Logic cannot presuppose a method of any sort. Why not? Logic cannot *because* “these constitute part of its own content and have first to be established within the science” (p. 43).

Logic, this discipline that might purport to make an absolute, rather than a conditioned and relative beginning, cannot begin governed by any rules of thinking, by any determinate method, because it is concerned with establishing what valid thinking is. What method should be used is precisely what logic has to address and uncover and establish. It would be completely begging the question for it to begin with any method.

This might appear paradoxical if one remains locked into the mode of thinking that science always involves the distinction between method and subject matter. In that case, you always have to make use of a method that you take for granted, that is already there, and you presume it is usable. Here, however, we are dealing with an investigation that cannot begin with a determinate method because it draws no distinction between what it is addressing and how it is addressing it.

As Hegel points out, this applies just as much to its content as to its method. Whereas the investigations that draw a distinction between their thought and content, their method and subject matter, begin with both as given, here—where the difference between form and content, subject and object, subject matter and method, no longer holds—neither is given. Just as how we are to think has to be established through logic’s investigation, what we are to think, which is how we are to think, equally has to be established through the working out of logic. If we started with the content at the outset, if we began with a predefined topic, with, in this case, logical thought as something given, we would have nothing to do. We would, again, be begging the question.

So Hegel writes, “Not only the account of scientific method, but even the Notion itself of the science as such belongs to its content” (p. 43), because what logic is, what the science of logic is, is not something that logic can have ready made to build upon. If its content is at hand at the outset, logic has

no work to undertake, for logic is concerned with establishing what thinking is, or more properly, what thinking ought to be and what its science is to be.

This is something that is a matter of controversy for logic. That is why logic has to go out and figure out what it itself is. Logic has to determine what valid thinking is, which is equally how logic is to be operating. Logic has to employ valid thinking to get at valid thinking. Hegel thus goes on to say in the same sentence that not only does the scientific method as well as the notion of the science itself belong to the content of logic, but that the notion of what the science is constitutes logic's "final result" (p. 43). Why would what logic is be the final result of the investigation that logic comprises? Why would it be something that is achieved right at the very conclusion of logic investigation, rather than being something that is there from the outset directing that investigation and giving it a predetermined boundary?

Think of what Plato has his interlocutors say in the *Meno*. As Meno and Socrates there discuss how virtue is to be acquired, Socrates points out that we cannot turn to investigate how virtue is to be acquired, if we do not know what virtue is. Meno then jolts Socrates like a stingray, asking how could we obtain any new knowledge of what we do not know, because if we do not know what it is, how are we going to know where to look for it, how are we going to know how to look for it, and how will we even know we have found it if we were to stumble upon it?⁴ It seems that if we do not begin with knowledge, we cannot get anywhere. On the other hand, if we already have the knowledge, we cannot obtain it. Of course, Socrates responds by introducing his myth of reincarnation and learning as recollection,⁵ which only begs the question by leaving unexplained how the eternal soul obtains new knowledge in its earlier incarnations. The problem of the *Meno*, however, is something that logic resolves if it can begin without presuppositions and still arrive at new knowledge.

Logic, minimally understood in a very negative manner, is a discipline in which there is no distinction between subject and object, no distinction between form and content, no distinction between topic and method. This discipline cannot begin with any preconception of its method or subject matter, because these are what it has to establish, what it is attempting to know. And in order to know without qualification, it cannot already have any assumptions about what it is to know.

What kind of logic can we be talking about? Are we in any way addressing what goes by the name of formal logic, which thinks of thinking as being governed by rules and operations that apply to the thinking of anything whatsoever? The order or form of such thinking is indifferent to any content and is separate from the content, so that if we ask what such thinking thinks, we must look outside thought to find the answer.

One might say that this is the kind of thinking employed by all other disciplines, disciplines that begin not absolutely, but relative to all sorts of

assumptions concerning the boundaries of their subject matter and the thinking they are going to employ. We want to consider how logic can be a thinking of thinking in which form and content and subject and object are the same, and whether that identity means that we can no longer speak in truth of form and content, or, if so, in a very different way.

Since logic should not be structured by the kind of difference that applies to nonlogical investigations, both the what and the how of logic have to be completely undetermined at the outset, if logic is not to beg the question. Is Hegel not, however, already making a claim about the character of logic by saying that logic does not have this difference between its thinking and what its thinking is about?

This problem is bypassed in the general concept of logic insofar as it seems to bring us to the point of setting out on an investigation where, paradoxically enough, we are going to refrain from making any claims about what we are addressing and how we are going to go about addressing it. Still, one might say, "Look, are we not simply relying here upon some accepted meanings, including what it means to beg the question? Should we not refrain from relying upon any and if so, where does that leave us?" This is obviously an important question, and it also pertains to the remarks regarding what is to follow from logic's starting point and those concerning how the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is going to serve some kind of introductory role, despite the fact that we are dealing with something that needs no introduction.

Hegel proceeds to draw a distinction between the prevalent view of logic as a formal discipline and that of logic understood in the above minimal sense of not involving distinctions between form and content and thereby being an investigation that can make an absolute beginning. He draws this contrast, saying, "When logic is taken as the science of thinking in general, it is understood that this thinking constitutes the *mere form* of cognition" (p. 43). When Hegel speaks about "mere form," he is contrasting thinking as "mere form" with the content of thought. So here we are talking about a thinking that constitutes the mere form of cognition. The other part of cognition, the content, is that which really is of prime importance to determine whether cognition is true or not. Thinking here does not constitute the content but the mere form of thinking it, of the knowing of it. As Hegel says, "Logic abstracts," according to this view, "from all *content* and . . . the so-called second *constituent* belonging to cognition, namely its *matter*, must come from elsewhere" (pp. 43–44). So if we think about logic as a science of thinking in general, not a thinking of anything in particular, but a thinking that has no content inherently attached to it, a thinking that is empty of any particular content, a thinking that is really just a form, it is not going to provide any knowledge by itself, for such thinking cannot provide us with the content of what we know. Thus, "since this matter is absolutely independent

of logic,” logic understood in this way “can provide only the formal conditions of genuine cognition and cannot in its own self contain any real truth, nor even be the *pathway* to real truth because just that which is essential in truth, its content, lies outside logic” (p. 44). This is the view of thinking advanced by formal logic. What alone does formal logic provide us with and only with? What does it supposedly allow us to certify with regard to thinking? Nothing but whether thinking is consistent, something that leaves out of account whether what is consistently thought is true. Formal logic can certify only whether thinking is informed by the principle of identity or the principle of noncontradiction.

We can think of this formal thinking as being a deductive reasoning, which begins with premises and ends with derivative conclusions, which are thought to more or less reside in the premises. You just analyze what is there and pick out what is contained within the given premises, making use of given operations which basically do that, always governed by a principle of noncontradiction that finds what is given and nothing else.

This formal thinking always begins with given content, because thinking, as merely formal, cannot generate content. With no content inherent in it, such a thinking always begins with assumptions. It can certify what is contained in those assumptions or what follows from them, given that one starts with those assumptions and no other. It tells us nothing, however, about whether the assumptions, the contents in question, have any truth or falsity.

The prevalence of the view that this empty analysis is all that thinking is, is reflected in how formal logic is the one class philosophy majors are required to take in many philosophy departments today. In a sense, this practice pretends that formal logic gives thinking its pattern, that it comprises what thinking is about. Then, thinking cannot possibly get at truth. Thinking can only analyze givens and certify consistency according to certain stipulated rules.

These given contents that such formal thinking analyzes are themselves simply what they are. They have a fixed character. They do not become what they are not, which is to say, they do not transform themselves. Now, if the contents of thought have that character of being fixed, they are what they are and they are not anything else. They do not relate themselves to anything different from themselves. Accordingly, if different concepts are going to be related to one another, and if thought just consists in thinking concepts, then something outside of thought has to do the job of connecting different concepts. Because thought, as formal, is only capable of analyzing what is contained within given fixed contents, and each of these fixed concepts is related only to itself through the principle of identity, of noncontradiction, such thought has no means of its own to relate different terms. Something else has to be brought in to relate them, as well as to come up with them in the first

place. Here, we are dealing exclusively with contents that, given their fixity, can only be subject to external relations with one another.

Hegel proceeds to point out that this view of logic, which reigns supreme among those who think of logic as formal logic, is not really true of logic proper and rests on certain assumptions that bar the way to philosophy proper. As he writes, "In the first place, it is quite inept to say that logic abstracts from all *content*, that it teaches only the rules of thinking without any reference to *what* is thought or without being able to consider its nature" (p. 44). Logic has a subject matter of its own, for, as Hegel points out, "as thinking and the rules of thinking are supposed to be the subject matter of logic, these directly constitute its peculiar content; in them, logic has that second constituent" (p. 44). Logic does not just have form but also has content, a matter about whose nature it is concerned.

Moreover, the idea of formal logic has rested upon assumptions of the following sort. Namely, "Hitherto, the Notion of logic has rested on the separation, presupposed once and for all in the ordinary consciousness, of the *content* of cognition and its *form*, or of *truth* and *certainty*" (p. 44). Hegel associates truth with the content of cognition. Formal logic can only provide us with testimonies of consistency or inconsistency of given terms; form by itself can only provide us with what might be called certainty but not truth. Truth depends upon the content. Until now, the notion of logic, being understood as formal, has rested upon the separation of the content and form of cognition.

Hegel has just pointed out that this separation is precisely what is presumed by sciences that are not logical. Those sciences, which think about something other than thought, operate with this separation, whereas logic, as the thinking of thinking, does not. Until now, however, those who studied logic have treated logic as if it were like these other sciences, as if it rested on the separation of form from content, which is why they have treated thinking as being formal, as not involving any content. Nevertheless, even those who are doing formal logic have to admit that their logic is concerned with thinking. It is still a thinking of thinking, even if they construe thinking as being formal. That means that there is a matter, that logic is not purely formal as they purport.

Now, the assumption that cognition, or knowing, involves a separation between the content and form of knowing is something Hegel associates with ordinary consciousness. How does this separation fit ordinary consciousness? In what respect might ordinary consciousness operate under the assumption that there is a difference between form and content, between subject and object, between how one knows and what one knows?

Ordinary consciousness is a psychological phenomenon. When we are conscious, our awareness confronts what is given to us. We presume to address objectivity, an objectivity that is there. And we presume that objec-

tivity is objective, that it has a reality of its own, that it is what it is apart from our being aware of it. Otherwise we are not confronting anything objective.

Hegel accordingly observes, "First, it is assumed" when one presumes that cognition operates in this way, "that the material of knowing is present on its own account as a ready-made world apart from thought" (p. 44). That is, one presumes that the object of thought as something separate from thought, or the object of knowing as something separate from knowing, therefore has a reality of its own that is given apart from knowing, apart from thinking. Thus the knowing that comes to know it or the thinking that comes to think it "comes as an external form to the said material, fills itself with it and only thus acquires a content and so becomes real knowing" (p. 44).

We have seen already the problematic character of sciences that operate in this way. They are doubly conditioned, taking for granted both their subject matter and their way of approaching the subject matter, their method. Hegel points to how this separation of form and content is problematic when it is applied to cognition in general and thought of as being the situation of all knowing. He writes,

When the difference of matter and form, of object and thought is not left in that nebulous indeterminateness but is taken more definitely, then each is regarded as a sphere divorced from the other. Thinking therefore in its reception and formation of material does not go outside itself; its reception of the material and the conforming of itself to it remains a modification of its own self, it does not result in thought becoming the other of itself. . . . In its relation to the object, therefore, thinking does not go out of itself to the object; this, as a thing-in-itself, remains a sheer beyond of thought. (pp. 44–45)

How can that be the inevitable situation? Well, when you presume that knowing addresses an object that is given apart from knowing, cognition somehow has to make itself conform to the object in order to know it. Thinking does not yet have the content of the object. It has to form itself, modify itself, to acquire that content. In so modifying itself, however, thinking is still just dealing with itself. So the divide remains between the domain of thought and objectivity.

Insofar as knowing is operating just with itself, there is no way to certify that there is any inherent relationship between the modifications of knowing and what they are attempting to match. Cognition that accepts this opposition of consciousness as being the final situation of knowing finds itself confronted with an object that always remains a thing-in-itself. There are no resources to certify that however knowing modifies itself, it really lays hold of the object.

Note what Hegel is here connecting. He started with nonlogical science. He dealt with the opposition of form and content, of thinking and what is thought. This opposition was connected with formal logic, which construes

thinking in a way that presumes the same separation. This is next associated with the psychological phenomenon of ordinary conscious awareness, which stands over and against the world, confronting something given to it. Hegel then further turns to that modern philosophy in which reflective understanding takes possession of philosophy, identifying it as a philosophy that makes the opposition of consciousness the principle of all knowing.

Hegel speaks of this in contrasting modern philosophy with ancient philosophy (p. 45). Ancient philosophy, Hegel points out, did not quite accept this complete separation between thought and its object. Ancient philosophy regarded thought as having an inherent relationship to the true nature of things. One got at the nature of things only when one engaged in thinking them, rather than simply confronting them in their given, sensible appearance. The Ancients presumed that thought conforms to an object's true nature, but it is not clear that this identity was anything more than an assumption. By contrast, modern philosophy, Hegel maintains, makes the opposition of consciousness, of thought and objectivity, the principle of knowing. Embracing the banner of so-called reflective understanding, modern philosophy reduces cognition to the activity of "the understanding as abstracting, and hence as separating and remaining fixed in its separations. Directed against reason, it behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth rests on sensuous reality, that thoughts are *only* thoughts, meaning that it is sense perception which first gives them filling" (p. 45). As Kant would say, thinking is empty unless it gets filled with the matter of sensible intuition. What then are we left knowing? Given the separation between thinking and its contents, between subject and object, we are only in a position to know phenomena because we are only dealing with modifications of our own subjectivity, our own subjective cognitive apparatus.

Kant and those who follow in his footsteps do admit that what is known is only the realm of phenomena, only appearances, only that which is relative to our knowing. Hegel points out, however, that there is something absurd, something incoherent, about operating on these terms. As he writes:

Since this knowledge is self-confessedly knowledge only of appearances, the unsatisfactoriness of the latter is admitted, but at the same time presupposed: as much as to say that admittedly, we have no proper knowledge of things-in-themselves but we do have a proper knowledge of them within the sphere of appearances, as if, so to speak, only the *kind of objects* were different, and one kind, namely things-in-themselves, did not fall within the scope of our knowledge but the other kind, phenomena, did. (p. 46)

This is familiar Kantian doctrine: We can only know appearances; we cannot know things in themselves. But, Hegel writes, "this is like attributing to someone a correct perception, with the rider that nevertheless he is incapable of perceiving what is true but only what is false. Absurd as this would be, it

would not be more so than a true knowledge which did not know the object as it is in itself" (p. 46).

In transcendental investigation there is an examination of logical forms, and Hegel will speak both here and in the other introductory section, "With What Must the Science Begin?," about a logic that is not merely formal but transcendental, a logic which, as Kant formulates it, is a logic for thinking objects of experience. It is a logic that involves those categories and judgments that necessarily come into play connecting our representations so as to enable them to convey to us objective appearances. Kant is concerned first and foremost with trying to show how these concepts and judgments play a constitutive role in our awareness of appearances. Our having experience relies upon our employing these concepts. In the so-called metaphysical deduction of the categories, Kant simply sets before us a list of categories and a list of forms of judgment, telling us that he has found these in the history of logic—in particular, in Aristotelian logic. Kant does not provide any justification for what these categories and forms of judgment are, but is simply concerned with showing that our experience makes use of them and that they are ingredient in our being aware of any phenomenal objects.

As Hegel observes, "The forms of objective thinking, therefore, have been removed by this criticism only from the thing" (p. 47). That is, these transcendental categories and forms of judgments have no application to things in themselves; they only apply to objects as they appear to us. As Hegel points out, this critical philosophy, which wants to prevent us from directly applying these categories to things in themselves, leaves these forms in the subject as they were originally found. That is to say, this transcendental investigation does not consider these forms on their own merits and according to their own peculiar content but simply takes them as accepted givens. Hence, there was no question of providing an immanent deduction of them as forms of subjective logic. Kant's discussion makes bald use of these terms, introducing them without further ado in his so-called metaphysical deduction of the categories. He just declares that they are there to be found in the tradition of logic. Nowhere does Kant investigate them in themselves. The fact that they only apply to appearances should tell us that perhaps these are not true concepts or true forms of judgment. If they cannot apply to things in themselves but can only order appearances, they themselves cannot have the power to provide genuine knowledge.

Hegel pointed out, in connection with how thinking is characterized by formal logic, that the conceptual contents that are so thought have a fixed determination and are separate from one another, with the result that these thought determinations can only be connected through something lying outside of them.

The reason that thought determinations are considered merely subjective has to do with this fixity and atomism of their contents. As Hegel observes,

When they are taken as fixed determinations and consequently in their separation from each other and not as held together in an organic unity, then they are dead forms and the spirit which is their living, concrete unity does not dwell in them. . . . But logical reason itself is the substantial or real being which holds together within itself every abstract determination and is their substantial, absolutely concrete unity. (p. 48)

Formal logic deals with terms that, precisely because they are fixed and separate, require something outside of them to provide their unity. By contrast, logical reason proper is an absolutely concrete unity. Somehow, logical reason has a content inherent in it. The contrast being drawn suggests also that the contents in question are not going to be fixed and separate. Somehow the contents, the conceptual determinations that logic proper thinks—in a thinking that does not separate form and content—are going to be contents that will not just be fixed and separate from other contents, requiring something else to connect them. Rather, these contents will have a different character, so that thought can have something akin to organic unity. We will see in the course of logic how organic unity emerges from the determination of the concept. What we are going to get glimpses of, and here we are only getting anticipations, is that what logic thinks will be terms that develop themselves, terms that transform themselves, giving rise to something other than themselves. This will enable concepts to end up connecting themselves with other terms.

Why would that be the case if there is no longer a separation of form and content? Why would the content lose the rigid separateness that formal thinking externally manipulates? Why would such nonformal thinking no longer be a thinking of something given to it, but be a thinking that somehow emanates from itself? Because logic is thought thinking itself, it determines itself, rather than being determined by something outside itself. Whereas formal thinking requires an external subject to intervene because the contents of its thought do not connect and order themselves, logic proper contains a self-ordering content, a content that unites and orders itself.

Consider the predicament that logic falls into by not maintaining a distinction between knowing and its object, between form and content. Since it cannot begin with a determinate subject matter or a determinate form, somehow logic's own investigation is going to have to give rise to its form and its content. Both somehow are going to have to be produced through logic's own unfolding. Logic must somehow generate both its method and subject matter through its own resources, which, paradoxically, have no given form or content.

Hegel only speaks of the content of logic in a more determinate fashion at the very end of this introductory discussion, where he discusses the tradition of logic. Here, as he tells us, he is going to be anticipating things that he has

worked through and that we are yet to encounter. None of this anticipatory sketch can really be taken as a genuine argument. These are just preliminary pointers. In this vein, Hegel affirms that logic ends up falling into successive sections, whose division can be described in two ways. He first portrays logic as falling into two parts, which he calls the objective and subjective logics. He here distinguishes these very minimally in terms of two factors, being and the concept. The first part of logic, the objective logic, is characterized as the concept in the form of being, and the second part of logic, the subjective logic, is characterized as the concept in the form of the subject. Hegel then tells us that these parts have to be connected by an intermediary section, called the Logic of Essence. As a result, we now have a threefold division, and, as we will see, the logic will be divided into the Logic of Being, then the Logic of Essence, and finally, the Logic of the Concept.

These divisions consist of conceptual formations presented as if they somehow transform themselves, such that the Logic of Being gives rise to the Logic of Essence, from which the Logic of the Concept emerges. We are going to find the ordering of the subject matter appear in a way where what comes later can not appear earlier because it rests upon what precedes it. Its own specifications either incorporate or are generated by those that precede them.

A very basic way of differentiating these three spheres of logic is as follows:

The first part of logic, called the Logic of Being, deals with determinacies that are simply given or with determinacy without any further qualification. The determinacies of the logic of being do not have any ground. They are not on separate levels, where something is determined by something else. Instead, the terms in question are all equiprimordial, all equally given.

These terms of the Logic of Being are then followed by a second sphere of logic, the Logic of Essence, where, generally speaking, the contents or categories involve not just determinacy but determined determinacy, determinacy that is determined by some other factor. Here one will come across categories like essence and appearance, ground and the grounded, whole and part, substance and accident, and cause and effect, where we have a two-tiered structure, in which terms are determined by something else that has some primacy over them. You cannot get at that two-tiered structure of determiners and determined determinacies unless you already have determinacy. Determinacy itself has to be developed before you can conceive determinacy that is determined by other determinacies. Arising from the Logic of Being, the Logic of Essence will be addressing all of this, and we are going to see the different determined determinacies presented as if they somehow arise from what precedes them in the development.

The third and last part of the logic, labeled as both the subjective logic and the Logic of the Concept, is going to involve categories of self-determi-

nation. What will be specific to these determinations is that here, what gets determined and what does the determining are one and the same. Instead of having the two-tiered structure of the Logic of Essence, where some prior level of determinacy determines something derivative, the Logic of the Concept eliminates the difference between those levels. When what gets determined is the same as what does the determining, you have self-determination. Interestingly enough, this self-determined character is going to be linked with the concept.

What this way of dividing the material suggests is that the order of the subject matter is intimately connected with its content. The content can only be presented in a nonarbitrary way and in a very specific order, precisely because different contents rest upon or presuppose other contents that have to be developed before these others can be presented. Consequently, the ordering of the material is not something external to the subject matter. Rather, the very content of the subject matter is intimately connected with the form of its presentation, the order in which it unfolds.

Chapter Three

With What Must the Science Begin?

Hegel has emphasized the basic contrast between logical and nonlogical investigations in his introductory discussion, “General Notion of Logic.” Insofar as logic is a thinking of thinking, logical thinking is not different from what it thinks about. The method and subject matter, the form and content of logic, could therefore be said to be indistinguishable. The ordering and that which is ordered could be looked upon as being one and the same. By contrast, nonlogical disciplines, simply by not being logic, are marked by a difference between their thinking and what their thinking addresses. On the one hand, the thinking they employ has to be already at hand and is not scrutinized as part of their investigation, for their investigation is about something other than the thinking they employ. They therefore have to take for granted their method or the form by which they are ordering their material. On the other hand, the material they address has to have a predetermination simply to be something other than the thinking that addresses it, simply to be something definite to investigate. In both respects, the nonlogical discipline is making not an absolute but a relative beginning, relative to these two assumptions governing its defining situation—a method or form of thinking that is presupposed and a subject matter or content that is taken for granted.

Because logic does not operate with that difference—because in logic, as a thinking of thinking, there is no difference between method and subject matter, and because logic is concerned with establishing what thinking is and is thinking about—logic must arrive at what is both its method and subject matter as a result of its own labors. Moreover, logic is only going to be able to arrive at them if it does not begin with anything, with any preconception regarding how it is operating or what it is seeking. Logic is in the peculiar situation where it can be completely autonomous and completely responsible

for everything it achieves because it is not burdened by assumptions regarding its method or its subject matter.

What allows logic to have the autonomy that will permit it to make an absolute beginning and not be burdened by the limitations of any relative investigation is that it begins with neither any definite method nor any definite subject matter. Logic is going to begin, in effect, with no claims whatsoever regarding the knowing it is engaging in or the object to be known. Logic's ability to operate without any such claims is all predicated upon the fact that it lacks the opposition between thinking and what is thought.

With logic, we have this peculiar discourse that can make an absolute beginning because everything about it is up for grabs, is part of its own territory. So everything that is going to enter into its investigation is going to have to be established through its very own inquiry. Nothing about how it operates or what it is going to address will be determined by anything lying outside of the investigation. That indicates that logic is going to have to be free from external factors playing any determinative role. It is going to have to be self-determining, and it will be able to be self-determining because it operates without any givens regarding how it thinks or what it thinks.

Since what logic thinks is indistinguishable from its thinking of what it thinks and because both have no given determination at the outset, one can see that whatever contents arise are going to have a dynamic or self-determining character, just as the ordering of the discourse is not going to depend on anything lying outside of it. The subject matter is going to have to be just as self-ordering as the thinking that is going to be engaged.

What about the person doing the thinking? Does the persona of Hegel intrude as a given that cannot be denied a constitutive, foundational role? Note that it is one thing to speak about logic and how logic itself develops and another thing to consider how living individuals think through logic. These are two different topics and two very different investigations. One involves a psychological exploration of actual individuals, who obviously have all sorts of enabling conditions, including inhabiting a planet with an atmosphere blocking out lethal radiation while furnishing gases vital for life and happening to be distant enough from their sun to prevent incineration. They have to have had a certain amount of food or water so they do not starve or die of thirst and there have to be certain restrictions as to how much sensory stimulation they receive—and one can go on and on endlessly about all sorts of prerequisites for rational individuals to engage in thinking.

There are two things to observe about this. One is that all of those enabling conditions pertain to anything individuals may think, whether they are thinking through Hegel's logic, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, or the telephone book. In other words, these are enabling conditions of thinking no matter what one thinks. For that very reason, specifying enabling conditions leaves undetermined what distinguishes the true thoughts from the false

thoughts these conditions equally make possible. Enabling conditions provide no resource for drawing that juridical distinction. Moreover, it is impossible for that to be the case, because if one were to pick out any such conditions as being not just enabling conditions of thinking, of knowing, but epistemological, juridical conditions that determine what counts as true or false or objective or subjective, one would fall into insoluble dilemmas.

To begin with, one would be treating knowing or thinking as being conditioned by something or other. If knowing or thinking is conditioned by something or other, then the former is relative to that factor, putting in forfeit any claims of providing unconditioned insights about anything. On the other hand, in pointing out these conditions, one is purporting to do something that is unconditioned and absolutely true. One is saying, "Aha! I know for sure that this factor, which I know for sure has the characterization I am giving it, determines what we can know to be true or false." Somehow or other, that condition does not in any way prevent me from knowing in an absolute fashion what conditions thinking. If, however, it conditions my pointing to it, then my pointing to it is just as unreliable and relative as any competing claim, and I am certainly in no position to know whether or not there are any such conditions.

This dilemma pertains to any attempts to know determining juridical conditions, no matter how they be described, whether in terms of the structure of mind, of language, of historically given cultural formations, of power relations, of gender differences, and so on. The moment you pick out any such condition of knowing and ascribe to it any epistemological significance, you run into these kinds of absurdities, which are very effectively exposed by Hegel, in the junctures of this introductory discussion, and more recently by Carl Rapp in his brief "Theses for the Critique of the Post-Rational Critique of Reason."¹

This privileging of determining conditions of knowing is really just a form of *ad hominem* argument, where, instead of dealing with argument in its own right, one points to features pertaining to whoever is advancing that argument, as if what pertains to that proponent's description could possibly have any bearing on the truth or falsity of what that proponent has to say.

We have no need to deny that there are all sorts of things that make thinking possible by me or you or anyone else, be they *Homo sapiens* or intelligent creatures on other planets with other types of bodily chemistry. These enabling factors comprise all sorts of potential biological, physical, chemical, psychological, and cultural prerequisites, but none can possibly have any epistemological significance, for all leave completely undetermined what it is that makes one capable of distinguishing among the thoughts these conditions make possible those that are true from those that are not.

Rapp points out, following Hegel, that any time you try to impose limits upon knowing, you have to know in some respect what lies on the other side

of the boundary.² We are going to see, in the course of logical argument, why it is the case that in conceiving any boundary, one has to conceive something lying beyond it. One's knowing has to transcend the boundary one is imposing upon it, if one sets limits to it. With Kant, one sees this operating in two respects. On the one hand, he makes appeal to things in themselves, which he has to in order to be able to limit our synthetic knowledge to objects of experience, to how things appear to us given the structure of our cognitive faculties. On the other hand, however, he must also make claims about our cognitive faculties, which are not themselves objects of experience but conditions for the appearing to us of objects of experience. Kant ends up telling us a lot about what they are and how they function, providing putative knowledge about them. At the same time, the way he limits cognition prevents him from legitimately having any knowledge about these conditions, any more than he can have knowledge about things in themselves.

This is not just a problem peculiar to Kant. It is a problem that besets all attempts to uncover any conditions of knowing, not just as enabling conditions that remain completely neutral to the truth or falsity of the opinions they make possible, but as determining conditions that establish the validity of knowledge.

When Hegel points to how logic overcomes the opposition of form and content, of subject and object, of knowing and what it knows, he does not and need not deny that there may be all sorts of factors that have to be at hand in order for us to engage in cognition. What he does not do is single out any or all of these conditions and make the absurd claim that they somehow determine what we can know to be true. They have to be such as to leave that undetermined, and therefore they cannot impose any limitations. Rapp points out that whenever you try to make any such claims, you cannot help but make claims that require a knowing that does not allow itself to be conditioned, that itself has to transgress whatever conditions it is trying to impose on cognition in general.³ If you look at any of those legions of thinkers who operate in this way, you see that problem.

Hegel, having in his introductory discussion distinguished logic and non-logical disciplines, points out that logic has been misconstrued as if it were a formal discipline, where thinking in general is treated as if it were something beholden to an opposition between knowing and what is known, between thinking and the content thought. After all, if you construe thinking to be ruled by principles that apply to the thinking of any content whatsoever, the content of thought is not determined by the nature of thought but must derive from elsewhere. That means that thinking is conditioned by an independently given content, which more or less puts us in the situation of the kind of thinking operating in those nonlogical sciences that simply address a given subject matter with a thinking that itself has a given character.

As Hegel points out, in such formal thinking, which is schematized in formal logic, the contents, the concepts, or whatever, have a fixed content. There is nothing dynamic about them. They do not order or develop themselves in any fashion. They simply are what they are. If they are to be set in relationship to any other content different from themselves, it is going to be in virtue of something lying outside them. This formal thinking can jumble these contents around however it wants. That formal thinking, however, can only find the contents. It cannot generate any content, because there is no content inherent in its thinking. So, there is no way for such thinking to establish what its contents should or should not be, nor how they ought to be connected.

By contrast, if you consider a thinking that is not limited and conditioned in this way, that is not empty, then the thought determinations, the contents of the thought, are not going to have that same kind of rigid character, because they are not going to be subject to an external organization. If thinking and what is thought are one and the same, the ordering of the contents is going to be internal to them, so they will have something self-ordering about themselves. This will have important implications for what we are going to be encountering and for what is going to allow for there to be an autonomous reason, for there to be a philosophical investigation that is not conditioned, that does not have to rely upon assumptions, but whose conceptual determination is going to exhibit an autonomous character.

Somehow the contents of logical thought are going to be self-emerging and self-ordering. For that to be the case, they have to cease to be just what they are immediately, if they are anything immediately, and become what they are not and thereby connect themselves to what they are not, as bizarre as that may sound. This obviously goes against the familiar notions of thinking, which are so prevalent because, as Hegel points out, what may be psychologically familiar to all of us, as individuals having consciousness, is a standpoint that goes about navigating its way in a world that it takes to be given to it, confronting us with an independently determined character. That situation gets elevated to an inescapable principle of all forms of knowing by the kind of modern philosophy that reduces reasoning to a reflective understanding, which is reflective in that it is always reflecting upon a content given to it. This reflective understanding could be said to be heteronomous in the sense of not being self-determined but always taking on given determinations it finds elsewhere, and, in that respect, being caught in all the limits that that situation brings with it.

In the *Science of Logic*'s other introductory discussion "With What Must the Science Begin?," Hegel makes some paradoxical remarks about how logical investigation, resting upon the elimination of any difference between what thinking thinks and the thinking that thinks it, depends in some respect upon a prior investigation. Even though logic seems to be a discipline that

cannot possibly have any given determinations at the outset, and therefore can make an absolute beginning and be fully autonomous and self-responsible, this discipline, nevertheless, has been provided with an introduction supplied by Hegel in his earlier work, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. This seems paradoxical since, as Hegel pointed out in the discussion of the notion of logic, because logic does not come to investigate something apart from its thinking, its method is something it does not already have at the outset, nor does logic even have the very concept of itself at the outset. These both are going to be things achieved when logical investigation concludes. After all, what is this investigation doing? It is establishing what valid thinking is; logic should be the valid thinking of valid thinking. What logic is and what method it is going to employ are only to emerge at the very end. Nevertheless, Hegel insists that in the preliminary work, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, we start with a knowing that is determined in terms of the opposition of consciousness and, in the course of investigating its own claims, comes to the point of somehow eliminating its own constitutive opposition, thereby providing logic with its starting point and, in a way, supplying the concept of logic.

Hegel has told us that logic rests upon the overcoming of the opposition of consciousness, that its opposition of subject and object bars the way to philosophy. In what way does it? Or why can logical thinking not be engaged in, so long as knowing addresses an object determined in its own right, independently of knowing—that is, so long as knowing confronts some given and has to modify itself to fit what it confronts?

In that case, how can we know whether this “given” is not really a stipulation on the part of the knower, as opposed to what really is? How can one certify one’s access to the given, when any attempt to capture the given always involves modification of a part of one’s thought, which is presumed to be something entirely separate and independent of what it confronts?

Here we have a situation where knowing is conditioned and relative. There can be no escape from thinking about something given independently of knowing unless that opposition of consciousness is overcome.

In the introductory section concerning the notion of logic, Hegel points out, “In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, I have exhibited consciousness in its movement onwards from the first immediate opposition of itself and the object to absolute knowing. The path of this movement goes through every form of the *relation of consciousness to the object* and has the Notion of science for its result. This Notion therefore (apart from the fact that it emerges within logic itself) needs no justification here because it has received it in that work; and it cannot be justified in any other way than by this emergence in consciousness” (p. 48).⁴

On the facing page, Hegel tells us a little bit more about the “absolute knowing” with which this *Phenomenology of Spirit* concludes and which is going to allow for access to logic:

The Notion of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is nothing other than the deduction of it. Absolute knowing is the *truth* of every mode of consciousness because, as the course of the *Phenomenology* showed, it is only in absolute knowing that separation of the *object* from the *certainty of itself* is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty with truth. (p. 49)

Here truth is associated with the object that knowing confronts, certainty is associated with knowing’s relation to that object, and when knowing’s relation to its object is indistinguishable from its object, the distinction of form and content, of subject and object, is removed. That is how this absolute knowing is characterized. Why is it called “absolute knowing?” Well, it is no longer relative to any givens that confront knowing. There is no longer anything really distinguishable from knowing for cognition to confront.

Hegel can thus say, “Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness” (p. 49). Why? Because “it contains *thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought*. . . . This objective thinking . . . is the content of pure science” (p. 49). The terms that have here been presented comprise another way of talking about the situation of logic, where thinking and its object are one and the same. In “absolute knowing,” thinking does not stand over and against an object given apart from it. To the extent that it is a thinking of thinking, it could be said to be an objective thinking, because it itself is the object it is thinking.

There seems to be a paradox in that Hegel acknowledges the need for logic and, by extension, philosophy to operate without being burdened by a knowing that has foundations, that confronts something given, and yet, at the same time, he here talks about something that will serve as an introduction, something that will provide the concept of logic, even though logic must be such that it arrives at its own proper self-characterization as the very outcome of its labors. What can the *Phenomenology* present that could stand for the concept of logic?

Absolute knowing, which is a knowing with no distinction between subject and object, might be said, in a minimal way, to give a sense of what logic is, if logic is a thinking of thinking. But then, does this burden logic and, by extension, philosophy with an assumption?

William Maker attempts to show that this presents no insurmountable problem, that there can be a kind of introductory investigation that will pave the way for fully autonomous, self-determining thinking, which, as fully

autonomous thinking, is liberated from all external givens and all conditions. There can be an introductory investigation serving to introduce what needs no introduction, because, as Maker observes, this preliminary investigation has something self-eliminating about it, and it will serve its introductory role by eliminating something that must be eliminated before one can operate without presuppositions.⁵ Now, what would have to be eliminated in order to remove what prevents thinking from operating without assumptions or presuppositions? What has to be removed, or, more properly speaking, what has to remove itself, is the position that claims that knowing always has assumptions, always confronts a given, always has conditions. Obviously, that position is precisely what bars the way to a knowing that is going to operate without any conditions or assumptions.

So if the whole enterprise based on the assumption that knowing always has presupposed foundations undermines itself by driving itself to the point of removing the defining distinction on which it is based, then the door would be left open for that which takes nothing for granted. This service, Maker suggests, is just what Hegel is up to in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. We are not here going to look at that work, but I will just briefly point out that, in that work, Hegel puts forward, without making any claims about what knowing really is, the openly stipulated idea of knowing that defines itself as cognition of the given, a knowing that has a foundation, or a knowing that is structured in terms of the opposition of consciousness, a knowing that addresses something predetermined that counts as a standard of truth for its claims. This stipulated knowing then sets out to examine and test its truth claims without our doing anything (as we witness this quest) to determine the proceedings. We do not have to judge the knowledge claims put forward by the shape of knowing under observation, because it makes claims of its own and attempts to test and judge them on its own, using its own resources. The phenomenologist merely looks on without meddling in any way, for the subject matter under investigation can critique itself and, in the course of critiquing itself, becomes driven more and more to construe what it is knowing as something indistinguishable from its knowing of it, in order to arrive at truth. The self-examination of the stipulated knowing comes to a conclusion only when it finally eliminates the difference between knowing and its object, the difference on which its quest rests.

Well, this in a nutshell is what is going on in that work. It has a purely negative outcome. The outcome is one that is going to eliminate the position that presumes that knowing always has assumptions, always addresses something determined on its own, apart from thought. It warrants asking why we need such a preliminary investigation. Why can we not just begin without addressing something given? This question seems most pertinent in light of Hegel's parallel introductory discussion, "With What Must the Science Begin?"

This discussion does not specifically address logic, but it considers the general problem of how philosophy should begin and how philosophy can solve the problem. Hegel opens this discussion, writing:

It is only in recent times that thinkers have become aware of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty and also the possibility of resolving it has been much discussed. What philosophy begins with must be either *mediated* or *immediate*, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; thus either way of beginning is refuted. (p. 67)

Now, why would it appear that philosophy cannot begin with something immediate? Well, you have to ask, why would we have *this* immediacy rather than some other immediacy? It might appear that any time we begin with something immediately, without further ado, we face that dilemma.

On the other hand, if we begin with something that is mediated, we start with what is contingent on something else. It is grounded on something else, but we are not addressing that something else. So our “beginning” is not really a commencement, for it follows upon something that precedes it. If, however, we turn to that something else immediately, then we face the problem of addressing something immediately. Then the question is, once more, how do we know that it is what it is and why do we begin with it rather than something else?

So it may appear that we cannot begin at all. We either begin with something immediate or we start with something that does not really come first but is already dependent on something else to which we are just not paying attention.

As Hegel points out, philosophies, at least historically speaking, have traditionally put forward a fundamental principle, which does express a beginning. The principle is that which is primary, which comes before all else. The beginning that it expresses is not so much a subjective as an objective one, the beginning of everything. In this way, the principle has been advanced as a “particular determinate content—water, the one, nous, idea, substance, monad, etc.” (p. 67). Alternately, instead of treating the principle as something that could be thought of as one such existing objective entity, philosophers have taken the principle to refer to the nature of cognition, treating the first principle as being only a criterion rather than an objective determination. It might be “thought, intuition, sensation, ego, subjectivity itself” (p. 67).

When Hegel describes a first principle to be a beginning that is objective rather than subjective, he is indicating that such a first principle is not being advanced as the first thing that one thinks of in philosophical investigation. In fact, for those who are concerned with getting at the objective principle, or the objective criterion, *how* we get to it is not so important. What matters is

that we identify *what* comes first objectively, whereas how we begin in identifying that principle is really of secondary importance. That is just a subjective matter. What counts is getting at the objectively ultimate factor, whatever it may be. Here, Hegel observes, “the need to find an answer to the question, With what should the beginning be made? remains of no importance in face of the need for a principle in which alone the interest of the matter in hand seems to lie, the interest as to what is the *truth*, the *absolute ground*” (p. 67).

“But,” Hegel points out, “the modern perplexity about a beginning proceeds from a further requirement of which those who are concerned with the dogmatic demonstration of a principle or who are sceptical about finding a subjective criterion against dogmatic philosophising, are not yet aware, and which is completely denied by those who begin, like a shot from a pistol, from their inner revelation, from faith, intellectual Intuition, etc., and who would be exempt from method and logic” (p. 67) by simply coming to that absolute principle, whatever it may be, and not really concerning themselves with how they get to it and whether that really matters in any respect. “If earlier abstract thought was interested in the principle only as content, but in the course of philosophical development has been impelled to pay attention to the other side, to the behaviour of the cognitive process, this implies that the subjective act has also been grasped as an essential moment of objective truth” (p. 67).

It has been recognized that there is a problem, a problem that motivates the whole transcendental turn. We do have to pay attention to what we subjectively do as investigators, as thinkers, to the path we take. Is that path really reliable? Do we not have to concern ourselves with how we get to what we are certifying to be of ultimate truth? “This implies that the subjective act has also been grasped as an essential moment of objective truth, and this brings with it the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the principle” (p. 67). That is, since how we arrive at the truth is essential for determining what is ultimately true, the method cannot be held apart from the determination of what comes first; the form cannot be separated from the principle.

Uniting method with the content of what comes first obviously pushes us toward doing what logic seems to involve by thinking and overcoming the opposition of consciousness. If we regard the subjective act of philosophizing as being an essential part of objective truth, you cannot get at the objective truth apart from scrutinizing this subjective act. And “thus,” Hegel goes on to say, “the principle ought also to be the beginning, and what is first for thought ought also to be the first in the process of thinking” (pp. 67–68).

“What is first for thought ought also to be the first in the process of thinking.” If what comes first is not what is first thought, we face the problem of wondering about the warrant of thinking that leads to where we are

going. After all, how is that thinking itself going to count if it is not itself part of objective truth, if it is not itself true? Need we not be worried about the legitimacy and justification of the thinking that leads to the principle?

One might think that one is here employing a heuristic approach, in which, because we can begin neither simply immediately nor in a mediated way with any authority, we instead begin in a problematic way. We start with something that is merely a provisional device we employ that might allow us to arrive at what we are ultimately seeking. The results will show that we have gotten there somehow. Yet if we cannot regard how we are proceeding as legitimate, why should whatever we reach have any authority? Of course, there is also the opposite problem of how we can begin with any specific manner of proceeding that could be valid from the outset.

As Hegel points out, “To want the nature of cognition clarified *prior* to the science is to demand that it be considered *outside* the science; *outside* the science this cannot be accomplished, at least not in a scientific manner and such a manner is alone here in place” (p. 68). Any kind of thinking presented outside of science or prior to science is not scientifically developed. It has a questionable legitimacy, to say the least. So, when we are beginning to philosophize, we face the problem that we cannot begin with a certified form of cognition. There can be no precertified cognition to employ at the outset. But if science is not to rely upon uncertified cognition, then how is it to operate?

Hegel suggests that science can surmount this problem only by making a beginning that is logical, and he takes us back to considerations to which we were introduced in his other companion introductory discussion. He here characterizes pure logical thought as being thought that is “free and for itself” (p. 68). How do these features go together? First, what does it mean for thought to be for itself? Well, in logic, what is for logical thought is what it is thinking, since logic is thought thinking itself. Logical thought is thus for itself, being its own object.

How is the freedom of logical thought connected to this being for self, this self-reference of logic? As we have seen, when thought is for itself, it is not a thinking that is conditioned by a given subject matter that it is thinking about. It is not a reflective understanding, confronting something it takes for granted. That would make logical thought not free and self-determining but heteronomous, determined with respect to something else outside of itself. Also, if in logic thought is thinking itself, then it is also not making use of a thinking that is already established and given.

Logic involves instead the kind of thinking that is not going to take its canons from some set of procedures that it has not generated through its own labors. Logic is a thinking that somehow is going to determine itself. Logical thought will thus both be for itself and free. Hegel here associates this conjunction of logic’s freedom and self-relation with the outcome of *The Phe-*

nomenology of Spirit, where knowing that always has a foundation comes to the point of somehow having to equate its knowing and its object. This so-called absolute knowing is for itself and free, since, by overcoming the opposition of consciousness, its knowing no longer confronts any given by which it is conditioned or to which it is relative.

The resultant logical thinking thinks itself and in thinking itself it is determining itself. It is engaging in a thinking that does not yet have any predetermined character. By contrast, the thinking that is governed by formal logic is not self-determining. It has a given form and laws to which it is already subject. The beginning of philosophy comprises a different situation, where what is first put forward is also first in the process of thinking. That is what you have when you engage in a thinking of thinking.

What do we do when we start in this manner? Hegel characterizes the threshold from which we must begin in a particular way, writing that “pure knowing as concentrated into this unity has sublated all reference to an other and to mediation” (p. 69). It is not a thinking that reflects on anything, on any given. It is not a thinking that is mediated by any foundations or any conditions. That means there is nothing from which it is distinguishable. There is no relation. “It is,” Hegel writes, “without any distinction and as thus distinctionless, ceases itself to be knowledge; what is present is only *simple immediacy*” (p. 69).

Why does this logical situation, where we have entered the element of logic, where the difference between knowing and its object has been removed, cease to be knowledge? Knowledge in any determinate sense always involves some object and something that is going to correspond to that object. Determinate knowledge thereby involves some kind of relationship, of adequation. Admittedly, although the relationship between knowing and its object involves a difference, there is supposed to be unity between them. If the knowing is to be true, it has to be in some kind of conformity or identity with its object.

Here at the outset of philosophical investigation, however, we have no relation but rather a yet-to-be-determined something that has not yet gotten under way. All we have, Hegel says, is “simple immediacy.” In the absence of any determinate conditions, there is no given form to thinking, just as there is no given subject matter. We just have simple immediacy.

Hegel qualifies this “simple immediacy” by indicating that there is no other factor that could be said to be its ground or its foundation. Although this simple immediacy has resulted from the introductory phenomenological investigation that observes the self-examination of the construal of knowing that treats the opposition of consciousness as if it were the principle of knowing, this investigation has removed itself by eliminating its constitutive subject-object opposition. It is not there, for it has eliminated itself. It is thus not a ground that is still present, grounding what we have at the outset of

philosophy proper. We just have this removal, which comprises the absence of any determinate given to be addressed by any determinate standpoint of thinking or of any determinate form of thinking. So, even with the introductory service of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, we just have simple immediacy.

Nonetheless, Hegel now qualifies this simple immediacy. He writes, "Simple immediacy is itself an expression of reflection and contains a reference to its distinction from what is mediated" (p. 69). How does immediacy involve a kind of reflection, a reference or relation to something else? "Immediacy" is a negation of "mediacy," the prefix "im-" means "not"—"not mediated." If we really want to avoid that, a better expression is the following:

This simple immediacy . . . in its true expression is *pure being*. Just as *pure* knowing is to mean knowing as such, quite abstractly, so too *pure being* is to mean nothing but *being* in general: being, and nothing else, without any further specification. . . . Here the beginning is made with being which . . . is represented as having come to be through mediation, a mediation which is also a sublating of itself. (p. 69)

What is the mediation that has sublated itself, that has eliminated itself? It is that effort of knowing that presumes that knowing has foundations or assumptions or a predetermined subject matter, which has driven itself in the course of its own self-examination to the point of removing the distinction between its knowing and its object. How that has occurred does not fall within the provenance of logic, and we might want to ask whether we even have to bother with that "self-sublating mediation" to begin without further preliminaries. Here the first term, which is equivalent to the absence of any given, any given form of knowing, any given subject matter, is presented as "being." It is not being as an object of consciousness. Being as an object of consciousness is that with which *The Phenomenology of Spirit* begins, under the heading of what Hegel calls "sense-certainty." Here at the start of philosophy, of logic, we just have being. We do not have the relationship of anything to being.

Throughout the text, Hegel is going to be bringing in categories familiar from the philosophical tradition, appropriated at various stages along the way. To some degree, they are used in manners different from the way in which they are used elsewhere. Still, there is a relationship. If then logic is going to begin with being as its starting point, enabling philosophy to operate allegedly without foundations, without assumptions of any determinate being, is Hegel just reverting to ontology, reading off the character of being as first philosophy?

In this regard, it is worth noting how the attempt to do ontology always seems to present a daunting difficulty. First, philosophy might appear to require, following Aristotle, an investigation of being qua being, since being

comes first to the extent that everything involves being. For that reason, if one starts with something other than being, with something therefore mediated by being, it would not really be a starting point any longer. Being appears to come unavoidably first. Specifying what being is, however, then becomes an insurmountable problem, for it cannot be specified in terms of anything else. If one gives being any determinate specification, one ends up characterizing being by confusing it with a particular type of being. It turns out that being is such that it cannot be given *any* determinacy. It cannot help but be completely indeterminate, because the moment one attempts to give it any definiteness, one no longer has being, but some determinate being. Thus, being can be nothing but this simple immediacy, this absence of any determinacy of any sort. There is nothing that can be ascribed to being without conflating being with some specific being. Ontology, understood as the enterprise of specifying being, is a vain undertaking, for being is unspecifiable or indeterminate.

Accordingly, “Here,” Hegel writes, “the beginning is made with being” and “if no presupposition is to be made and the beginning itself is taken *immediately*, then its only determination is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such. All that is present is simply the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that we propose to consider thought as such” (pp. 69–70).

That is the situation we are in if we simply confront what logic is or what philosophy is, without any assumptions concerning knowing or the object to be addressed. We just have the being of indeterminacy. Being is just being, and if this is all there is at the outset of philosophy, philosophy to begin with is itself just an empty word. Being, after all, is not the same thing as the beginning of philosophy if the latter signifies anything determinate. Being is just indeterminacy. If it is going to be the beginning of philosophy, it will have to prove itself as such in virtue of what follows from this starting point.

That should indicate why Hegel feels the need to provide a kind of introduction that is ultimately saying no more than “I am introducing you to something that cannot possibly have any real introduction, because nothing is to be put forward that has any predetermined character.” Well, if you were just to confront “being” or “simple immediacy” or “indeterminacy,” you would not know what this signifies. Is this anything or the beginning of anything? Is this philosophy? Hegel’s introductory remarks invite us to at least take seriously something that cannot be provided with any sufficient preliminary grounding.

Following the tradition of ontology, being might be thought of as constituting the substrate of everything—a very concrete determination. Hegel will show, however, that there is nothing to be said about being. It is completely indeterminate. The moment you try to say something about being, you are not talking about being. You are talking about a particular being or a determi-

nate being, not being itself. Being is nothing, and it is what we are thinking when we are not thinking about anything given or not thinking in any particular way.

To clarify the utter indeterminacy of being, Hegel invites us to reflect on the idea of beginning without further qualification. If we are really beginning, we do not yet have what *is* beginning. What is beginning is not yet at hand. *What* is beginning will result from the beginning. You could even say that beginning is not even determined as a beginning, because at the start how do we know anything is going to begin from here? That it is a beginning is something that will only be subsequently established. This gives a clue as to how the beginning really is not just immediate. It ends up being mediated by what follows from it, because it ends up being determined to be a beginning only as a result of what, if anything, unfolds from it.

What is here said about beginning as such is completely parallel to what has been said about logic. As a thinking of thinking, with no given object or method, logic is only going to establish what it is in the course of its own autonomous development. Similarly, the beginning will only become a beginning of what it is a beginning of at the conclusion of the development of whatever it is that is unfolding. So, the beginning has a peculiar character that matches the predicament of logic. What is beginning is not yet at hand. A beginning, however, is not just nothing. It just as much *is*—there is something about to begin. Something determinate is to emerge, but it is not yet at hand. The beginning thus involves a combination of being and nothing, which is going to allow something to become—and what is going to become something determinate will not become manifest until we move beyond the beginning. Then the starting point will have proved itself to be the beginning of whatever it is that has constituted itself in this development.

What we now must address are the moves, if any, that follow from being. Obviously the question is, Can we get anywhere? And how can we possibly get anywhere without surreptitiously introducing given things or procedures or terms that should not be invoked?

Chapter Four

Being, Nothing, and Becoming

At the very end of the introduction concerning the concept of logic in general, Hegel points out that logic will have a twofold division into objective and subjective logics, so called. This is going to turn out to be a threefold division, for the objective logic is going to divide into a Logic of Being, followed by a Logic of Essence, both of which will be succeeded by a Logic of the Concept.

The Logic of Being is going to fall into three sections, the first of which addresses “determinateness as such,” or “quality.” This section is to be followed by what Hegel identifies as “quantity,” also spoken of as “sublated determinateness.” So you have quality, quantity, and then, thirdly, “qualitatively determinate quantity; measure.” In measure, you have quantity to which something qualitative gets associated. Something has a measure when its quantity is not indifferent to its quality in the way in which something may vary quantitatively without necessarily altering its quality. If something has a measure, there are quantitative limits to its maintaining its qualitative character.

Since measure involves a relation between quantity and quality, one can see at the outset why an account of measure is going to follow from an account of quality and quantity. We will have to see why quality should come first, before quantity.

In thinking about the broad divisions and their ordering, one must ask, why should the ordering turn out the way it does? In giving his preliminary divisions, Hegel is just pointing out what he knows by having worked out the argument. He recognizes that this preliminary division is not itself his argument and only serves to anticipate for the reader how things will turn out, which can be told by one who has already thought it through.

With regard to the first section of the Logic of Being, the part dealing with determinateness or quality, there are three subdivisions. The first is an account of being, which is followed by an account of determinate being, *Dasein*. Then a third part of the Logic of Being follows, called “being for self,” for which one might substitute “self-relation.” That is the threefold division that awaits us. We will have to see what if any rationale lies behind this division. Why would being come before an account of determinate being, and why should determinate being precede the account of being for self or self-relation?

Let us look at Hegel’s brief presentation of being, nothing, and becoming and then consider some of the major points in the accompanying remarks one and two.

“Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself” (p. 82).¹ What does Hegel mean when he says, “It is equal only to itself?” Well, being is not equal to anything else, and if it is not equal to anything else, it cannot be compared to anything with which it might have something in common. Being cannot have any kind of qualities that might be ascribed to a plurality of entities, qualities that could be shared by anything else. Being, as equal only to itself, cannot have any such qualities. There cannot be anything universal about it. Being cannot be thought of as having a genus or species, for that matter.

Is not excluding all such things tantamount to saying that being is equal only to itself? Can we then call being a set with one member? But can we call it a set at all? To do so already brings us into talk of a universal and an individual, which are determinate categories. We are here dealing, however, with something that is indeterminate, immediate. Immediacy goes along with “indeterminate.” Immediacy is not in relation to any other factor, unlike mediated being. Immediacy excludes any such terms, such as quality, class membership, or any kind of universality. All of these things have to be excluded.

Moreover, not only is being, as Hegel says, “equal only to itself,” it is also not “unequal relatively to an other” (p. 82). Being cannot be equal to anything, but why can it not be unequal to anything? To characterize being as unequal to anything would be equivalent to saying, “Being is the other of something else, which is distinct from it.” This would give being a character that sets it in relation to something else, which involves mediation, namely, invoking some mediating term by which being is what it is. You cannot speak of being as being equal or unequal to anything, because if being is really going to be indeterminate and immediate, it cannot be in relation to anything, either positively or negatively.

Furthermore, being not only has no relation to anything else, be it through shared quality or any difference, but, as Hegel goes on to say, being “has no

diversity within itself" (p. 82). Why must internal diversity be excluded just as much as any "reference outwards" (p. 82)?

Well, if being had any diversity within itself it would have a multiplicity of factors and there would be relationships. There would be mediation within it, and being would not be indeterminate. It would be very determinate in virtue of all of this.

As Hegel goes on to say, being "would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other" (p. 82). The moment we give being any kind of qualitative character, relating it to or distinguishing it from something else, or internally differentiate it, we would no longer be speaking about a starting point that is absolute, that makes no assumptions. We would instead be starting with a definite factor, specified in terms of all of these features that are simply taken for granted. Logic, as a thinking of thinking, however, has neither a determinate form nor a determinate content at the outset. Philosophy, as it makes its beginning, attempts to overcome foundations by starting with no assumptions concerning what it is or what it is knowing and accordingly has no determinacy at the outset. Being cannot have any external or internal differentiations and, as Hegel goes on to say, it "is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself" (p. 82). If being is pure intuiting, then it does not intuit anything determinate.

All of this talk about such various terms is preliminary, because none of them have really been addressed systematically. One can suppose what it means to have internal and external differentiation and so forth, but properly speaking, one does not yet have anything systematic or truthful to say about these matters. We are here making suppositions that only what follows from being can vindicate. We will see to what degree the ensuing argument can supply accounts that in some degree support what is here suggested. You might ask yourself whether the identification of the starting point as being really depends upon those intimations.

If we were to think, by way of anticipation, about self-determination in contrast to being, we would have to consider two things together—self and determination. Being does not have determination and being does not have a self. The determination of self-determination is something it gives itself. Accordingly, it does not have any given determination; self-determination has to generate its determinacy through some process of development, whereby it becomes what it is and what it is to be self-determining. Thus, it can only be self-determining in virtue of undergoing the development specific to being self-determined. The funny thing about being self-determined is that something that is self-determined cannot be what it is as self-determined if it already has any features at the outset, before it has determined itself to be what it is. Before it has determined itself to be what it is, self-determination

cannot be anything. We do not exercise self-determination *per se*, for we have a natural identity that we did not give ourselves. We have a body and a mind that both have characteristics that we have by nature, that are not a product of anything we have done, and without which we could not do anything. We have all these natural distinctions that are part of us, that already individuate us apart from any action we take. Nonetheless, on the basis of that given nature, we can further individuate ourselves through acts of will that we engage in, determining ourselves by giving ourselves types of agency that we do not have by nature, such as those conventional agencies of a self-governing citizen or a property owner or a spouse.

In all of these respects, you can see that with self-determination, we are dealing with something that involves much determination. So even if one might think that we are here witnessing the development of something that will turn out to be autonomous, that philosophy will prove itself to be the freest of all sciences, to be self-determining, not heteronomous, our start still cannot be made with self-determination. Self-determination cannot just *be*. It cannot be self-determined from the start, by nature.

So we are left with being—with just pure indeterminacy, emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited or thought. If thinking is at all present, it is only a pure thinking that has yet to think anything determinate. Just as there is nothing to be thought, there is only an empty thinking. Being, indeterminacy, is in fact neither more nor less than nothing. Being is nothing.

So Hegel maintains, “Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact *nothing*” (p. 82). What has Hegel offered us, for being to be nothing? How do we arrive at that identification? Does some other factor have to be introduced? Does some procedure have to be applied to being to transform it into nothing, or is being immediately nothing, with no intervening term or act? To say being is “immediately” nothing signifies that there is no third factor that has to be introduced to get us to nothing.

If you step back a moment and think about the predicament we are facing, or that logic or philosophy faces, the predicament of being fully self-responsible, this does not allow sticking in additional content or applying any procedure. This seems to leave us with nothing determinate, or being, leaving us to ask, how do we get anywhere else? How do we go anywhere? We cannot move beyond whatever being is, in all its emptiness, by introducing anything else. Inserting some second term would be completely arbitrary. What right can any other factor have to suddenly turn up in addition to being?

Since nothing can legitimately intrude on the proceedings, if you ask where we can go, the answer is that we cannot go anywhere. We cannot get to anything else. There cannot permissibly be anything beyond being, except another term no different from being, a term that crops up in virtue of nothing other than being. Paradoxically, this seems to be the only way that there

could be any second term—that the second term have nothing more than being and that it be at hand in virtue of nothing other than being and yet be a second term.

Should we not be looking for a reason for something to emerge from being? Such a reason would be something beyond being. Being, after all, supplies us with no reasons. Being is indeterminate. What would be the problem if we invoked a reason to arrive at something beyond being, given being's lack of resources? Well, any reason would just be some stipulation we sneak in there. There thus can be no reason for whatever follows from being. On the other hand, whatever occurs next cannot be different from what being offers, because difference would require some additional content.

Now, it turns out, Hegel gives us “nothing” as a distinct term. It so happens that there are words enabling him to express this second term. There is one word for “being” and another for “nothing.” “Nothing” will also figure philosophically and religiously, and it does so in ways that have a lot to do with precisely how Hegel is using it. What does Hegel have to say about “nothing,” this second term which follows from being and follows from being directly, without any intermediary?

“*Nothing, pure nothing*: it is simply equality with itself” (p. 82). We have heard that before, because Hegel said earlier that being is “equal only to itself.” Nothing is “complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content” (p. 82). Similarly, Hegel before had written that being “is pure indeterminateness and emptiness.” Nothing is “undifferentiatedness in itself” (p. 82). Hegel had equally said that being could not have any “diversity within itself,” let alone any diversity or “reference outwards.” Hegel hardly attempts to hide the familiar ring, observing:

In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or *nothing* is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are distinguished and thus nothing *is* (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition and thought itself, and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being. Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure *being*. (p. 82)

Being is nothing. Nothing is being. Each is immediately the other. Why is each immediately the other? They are not related to anything in virtue of any factor. They cannot be equated in terms of something they have in common. Even though they are described similarly, they are not being attributed qualities, because they both are devoid of quality. They are indeterminate. There is nothing that can connect them. Rather, their sheer absence of any determinacy makes each immediately the other.

Yet if this is so, how can they be distinguished as different terms? This seems to be the immediate problem. Have we gone anywhere and made an

advance to a second term? Or are we really just saying “being”–“being” or “nothing”–“nothing?” In fact, we are in a position where we cannot go anywhere. All we are and can be doing is restating the same indeterminacy and not making any move anywhere else.

If you were to ask why “being” and “nothing” are different terms, you would be asking for some basis of difference, some third factor that would differentiate them. The terms “being” and “nothing,” however, are such that there is no possibility of finding a means of differentiating them. In the next paragraph Hegel speaks of them being “absolutely distinct” (p. 83). They are not distinct relative to anything. There is no other factor in relation to which we can distinguish them, such as something one has and the other does not have, or something that they might share in common while being otherwise qualitatively distinct. None of that is available.

So again, the mystery might seem unfathomable. Are not being and nothing just identical without any difference? If you look back at nothing, nothing is presented in a way where nothing depends upon nothing other than being. Nothing requires nothing more than being to be.

That still leaves seemingly unresolved the issue of how one can meaningfully say that there is a distinct term, “nothing.” Of course, there are distinct terms in that we have distinct words, “being” and “nothing.” And we might even say that there are distinct concepts of sorts. These concepts of being and nothing figure, as Hegel will point out, in the history of philosophy. To begin with, there are those who present being as fundamental—the Eleatics and Parmenides in particular. What is it that Parmenides does that leaves him with only being, never allowing him to get to becoming? He fails to see any unity between being and nothing. For Parmenides, only being is. Nothing is not. There is no nothing. Nothing cannot be, only being is. On the other hand, ancient oriental thought, be it Chinese or Indian, makes appeal to nothingness as what is ultimately fundamental. Why should nothing be taken to be ultimately fundamental? Well, if you really want to get at what is absolute, you cannot deal with anything that involves specific differentiation or particular being. What is infinite cannot be identified with anything determinate, for this involves negation and limitation. The genuinely infinite cannot be limited by anything. It seems that it must be indeterminate. It must be nothingness.

The history of philosophy, however, also offers recognition that there is a development from being to nothing, a development made fundamental by Heraclitus. Here we have an acknowledgment that being emerges out of nothing and nothing emerges out of being. What Heraclitus recognizes as ultimate is that within which being and nothing pass into one another: becoming.

This might suggest that there is a passage from one to the other, that they are not immediately one another. What could such a passage comprise? Well,

it might seem that it takes time for something to arise out of nothing and to return to nothingness. But here we just have being that is nothing, nothing that is being, and that is all that has been presented. There is no intervening process and yet here we still have becoming.

What then is becoming and where does it come from?

Hegel writes, “*Pure being and pure nothing* are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being does not pass over but has passed over into nothing, and nothing into being” (pp. 82–83). What is the distinction Hegel is drawing by saying that “being does not pass over but has passed over into nothing?” Why does he not want to say that being passes over into nothing?

If there were a passage that being has to go through in order to become nothing, the relation between being and nothing would be mediated. It need not be mediated by time, for we can speak about logical passage, where terms are mediated by other terms, as in syllogism. The alleged passage would have at least some logical mediation. This, however, is precluded, for being and nothing by their very character cannot be mediated or stand in relation to anything. Being *is* nothing. It *has* passed into nothing. It is *immediately* nothing. Nothing has to be added for being to be nothing. Likewise, there is nothing that has to be added or done to nothing for it to be being. They both *have* passed over into nothing and nothing into being. “But,” Hegel writes, “it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately *vanishes into its opposite*” (p. 83).

This distinction that immediately vanishes appears most puzzling. Why does Hegel speak of the distinction of being and nothing being an absolute distinctness? How can being and nothing be absolutely distinct? The alternative would be that they would be relatively distinct. We have already seen why this cannot be the case. Being and nothing cannot be relatively distinct because they cannot be in any relation to one another nor to anything else. There cannot be some third factor by which they are differentiated, because there is no other determinacy that is legitimately available. So, if they are different, they are *immediately* different. And yet, in virtue of having immediate difference, a difference that cannot be allayed to any specificity, any further determinacy, they are equally inseparable. As Hegel will point out later in the remarks, it is only in virtue of this nonrelative, immediate difference that one has both being and nothing and can talk about becoming. You do not have becoming’s movement of being to nothing and nothing to being unless you have both this absolute distinctness and this immediate inseparability.

When you have both, you have something that is neither just being nor nothing. You have something that is the passed-over-ness of each term,

namely, as Hegel puts it, “this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: *becoming*, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself” (p. 83).

So what is becoming composed of? It just consists of the passageless transition whereby “being is immediately nothing and nothing is immediately being.” As Hegel will point out in some of the remarks, becoming is not change, because change involves something that undergoes alteration and can become something other. In becoming, however, there is neither something or other, but just being and nothing, or, as Hegel will point out later, when we get to his further analysis of becoming, ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be. Ceasing-to-be is being that is immediately nothing. Coming-to-be is nothing that is immediately being. That is not the ceasing-to-be of something determinate or the coming-to-be of something determinate. It is rather the sheer becoming that Heraclitus was proposing as what is absolutely fundamental. For Heraclitus, something was not becoming. You can never step in the same river twice. Nor would you be the same person stepping twice. There are no determinate somethings. There is just becoming.

If you look back on what follows from being, first there has been a succession where being gives us nothing in virtue of nothing but itself, and then, once we have being and nothing, we have becoming because becoming is constituted out of nothing other than what we are presented with, with being and nothing, which are immediately one another. No content has been imported from outside. No procedure has been invoked to add anything to the terms in question. There is no explanation to be sought. There is no reason for which to hunt. The emergence of nothing from being and being from nothing is something that immediately occurs and, in virtue of immediately occurring, we have becoming.

Still, if being and nothing are equally indeterminate, how do we go anywhere? In what sense is there any second term? On what basis can we have becoming? Are we not just stuck with being, as Parmenides would say, and all there is is being? We are never going to get beyond it. We are never going to get to becoming.

Think hard about what could only be the case concerning a second term, a second category. It cannot arise from being in virtue of something else. There cannot be a reason for it beyond being itself. Further, this second term cannot have a content beyond what being already presents. After all, how was nothing different? Only as absolutely distinct, because there is nothing in relationship to which it can be distinct from being. If that is the case and if nothing other than that can be the case, we are confronting becoming.

With being and nothing, being “absolutely distinct” is not different from being “not distinct at all,” which is why the distinguished terms are equally inseparable. By the same token, you could say that their inseparability is no

different than their absolute distinctness and that is what becoming presents us with, both of these relation-less contrasts together.

Hegel addresses the common perplexities that lead us to resist this sequence of being, nothing, and becoming. In various remarks, Hegel examines how the possibility of distinguishing being and nothing is called into question, how the possibility of there being any becoming is called into question, and how the possibility of moving from being to nothing is called into question.

In the first remark,² Hegel points to one of the erroneous assumptions that have led thinkers to fail to see how being can be immediately nothing, how nothing can be immediately being, and how both can be equally absolutely distinct. He describes this by pointing, first of all, to how nothing is usually opposed to something. If the “being” to which nothing is contrasted is considered to be something, then nothing cannot be immediately being. Unlike indeterminate being, something has specific determinacy. Something has specifications. It has relation to other and being in itself. It thereby has internal diversity, as well as equality or inequality with other things. There is no way that nothing can be something or that something can immediately be nothing. What something is not is other to it and that other is a determinate being and not just nothing. Hegel is warning us that when you think about nothing, do not think of it as opposed to a determinate being. Nothing, as indeterminate, cannot oppose anything, for what opposes something is an other with as much determinate being as something.

Now, the other side of this problem comes up in the similar discussion where Hegel speaks of the principle that from nothing nothing can become (p. 84). That principle might seem to preclude that being can come from nothing. What the principle is really maintaining is that nothing determinate can come from nothing. That claim does not apply to what we are looking at here, because here we are talking about nothing immediately having passed over into being—immediately. Nothing is not immediately something. Something is not immediately going to arise from nothing. But how do you prevent being from immediately arising from nothing?

This issue comes up in a somewhat different connection in Kant’s treatment of being in his criticism of the ontological proof for the existence of God.³ The ontological proof takes God as a being of which none more perfect can be conceived. If you concede that actual existence is better than hypothetical existence, you have to admit that God is actually in existence. Being is part of the concept of the Divine because if it were not, the Divine would be lacking something and cease to be perfect and infinite. Kant disputes this by claiming that being is not a predicate. Being cannot be considered a predicate of anything, which means being cannot be ascribed to something as part of its concept or definition. Conversely, the being or nonbeing of something in no way alters its concept or content. Kant uses the example

of a hundred coins, pointing out that there is a difference between its being or nonbeing. There is a difference because, Hegel points out, what is here at stake is the existence or nonexistence of something determinate. In virtue of being a determinate entity, something is in relationship to other entities and that relation to other entities is not at hand if it is nonexistent. To be in relation to other entities is part of its very being, is part of its very content. Something determinate, like a hundred coins, is what it is in virtue of all sorts of relationships, such as the heat of the atmosphere, chemical surroundings, recognition of a universal exchange value equivalent, and many other circumstances.

What does this have to do with the discussion of being and nothing? Why would Hegel want to be pointing out that, contrary to Kant, the being and nonbeing of something determinate are not equivalent and that therefore it does make a difference whether something exists? Hegel is attempting to show that being and nothing *are* inseparable. Being is nothing and nothing is being, whereas the being of something and the nonbeing of something are very different. Hegel is pointing out that to think clearly about being and nothing, you do not want to make the mistake of treating the being in question as the being of something determinate, just as you do not want to consider nothing as the nonbeing of something determinate. If you think of these categories in that relation, you are no longer thinking about being and nothing. You are thinking about something else: determinate being and the absence, or nonbeing, of something.

Hegel also criticizes Kant's account by pointing out that Kant is wrong to treat something finite, like a hundred coins, as if the relation of its being and nonbeing were equivalent to how something infinite has being or might not have being. The contingency of the being of something finite is specific to its finitude. Hegel writes that in finite things the "Notion is different from being, that Notion and reality, soul and body, are separable and hence that they are perishable and mortal," whereas "the abstract definition of God, on the other hand, is precisely that his Notion and his being are *unseparated* and *inseparable*" (pp. 89–90). that the concept and being of the infinite are not detachable, whereas the finite, in principle, comes to an end. We will have to see whether Hegel substantiates this claim in his development of the finite and infinite.

In the second remark, Hegel considers the "Defectiveness of the Expression 'Unity, Identity of Being and Nothing'" (pp. 90–93). Hegel's first remark has alerted us to the mistake of treating being and nothing as if they were more determinate than they really are. Now, in Remark Two, Hegel is concerned with our doing what seems to be the easiest thing to do, to just regard being and nothing as identical and fail to see that there is any difference between them. This concerns how there can be any talk of having moved beyond being, because it might appear that being and nothing are

indistinguishable, leaving us where we began. We cannot get anywhere because all there is is being. The beginning turns out to be the beginning of nothing and philosophy turns out to be an empty word after all.

The expression that Hegel has in mind is simply that “being and nothing are the same,” the assertion of the identity of these determinations. It might seem that nothing else is being asserted, but Hegel points out that, in fact, the expression “equally contains them both as distinguished” (p. 90). The expression says, “Being and nothing are the same.” It equates them, affirming “Being is nothing” or equally “Nothing is being.” In each case, being and nothing are equated, but as Hegel points out, each expression equally contains them as distinguished. How are they contained as distinguished?

The expression is a proposition relating two terms. The “is,” the copula, equates them, but at the same time, the proposition contains them as distinguished. Although the proposition is explicitly affirming their identity, it also exhibits a difference. They figure as distinct terms; otherwise, they could not be related. We are not just saying, “Being is being” or “Nothing is nothing.” We are saying, “Being is nothing. Nothing is being.” The proposition contains both their identity and their difference.

Hegel points out that this conjunction of identity and difference applies to judgment in general. Judgment will be discussed later on as a logical specification. If one treats judgment simply as a proposition in which you have a subject and a predicate connected by the copula “is,” then it affirms that one *is* the other. It seems to affirm their identity, or in the case before us, that being *is* nothing. Yet at the same time, it contains both terms in distinction from one another.

Nonetheless, there is something limited about how judgment contains identity and difference, which bears upon employing judgments to get at philosophical truth. The terms in judgment have their unity expressed or affirmed by the judgment in which they also figure as separate and distinct terms. As Hegel points out, the judgment fails to explicitly express their distinctness. “Being is nothing” makes explicit their identity. Of course, a judgment could make explicit their difference, as in a negative judgment that affirms that being is *not* nothing. Still, that would just make explicit one side of the relation without explicitly affirming the other. Where are both the identity and difference expressed? This is not explicit in judgment.

Where we do have expressed or manifest the immediate identity and immediate difference of being and nothing is in the dual movement constituting becoming. Becoming consists of that conjunction of their identity and difference. You do not have becoming unless the terms *being* and *nothing* are immediately distinguished and immediately at one with one another. You need both sides in order for there to be a being that ceases to be and is immediately nothing and a nothing that immediately is being.

This appears to involve a contradiction, leaving one to wonder whether Hegel is violating from the outset certain rules of logic, such as the principle of noncontradiction, on which any coherent thinking seems to rest. After all, according to Aristotle, one cannot say anything definite unless one can abide by the principle of noncontradiction.⁴ Something is, but it is not what it is not.

Being, however, is nothing and, at the same time, being is distinct from nothing. They are distinct, but there is nothing one can appeal to to account for their difference. They are, in that sense, inseparable, yet they are different terms. And the presence of their identity and difference is what gives us becoming, wherein one is immediately the other and the other is immediately its counterpart.

The contradiction might be removed if we could have being and stop being from being nothing. Well, can you stop being from being nothing? And, if so, how? And yet this nothing is different, and there is no reason that is available to account for its difference. We still have not come to something determinate. Becoming is not something determinate, even though it is distinct from being and nothing by containing them in their identity and difference.

We are going to see, as we work our way through what happens to becoming itself, that becoming will have as its outcome determinate being. Then we may be in a position to ask why there is something rather than nothing and to consider the very significance of that question.

Chapter Five

From Becoming to Determinate Being

The third remark¹ addresses problems that arise if being and nothing are regarded to be what they are in isolation from one another, as if they could somehow be held apart. Hegel begins by pointing out that the inseparability of being and nothing is constitutive of becoming.

This does not involve mistaking becoming to be a transition. Using the term “transition” as if it were synonymous with becoming could invoke temporality, but transition can also be thought of logically, apart from temporality. What “transition” implies is something intervening between being and nothing, whereby one is not immediately the other. Hegel insisted early on that strictly speaking, there is no relation between being and nothing—you have being and then being is *immediately* nothing. It is not as if being and nothing are somehow still standing against some persisting backdrop, where they remain in relation to one another. Rather, one gives way to the other. It is not apparent that the other is there. But there is still no intervening step by which nothing comes from being or being comes from nothing. If that were the case, then their emergence would be mediated by something else, but there is nothing at hand to mediate anything. There are no determinacies yet.

Here there is no place for thinking of any succession of categories as involving temporality. Temporality presupposes real determinations that are not logical in character and, in particular, time presupposes space. As Hegel argues in his *Philosophy of Nature*, time is the way in which space can be outside itself, from one moment to the next.² None of that is on the table here and, if we are to look ahead, the entire discussion of logic, whose character remains to be established, is going to set the stage for the determinacy of nature, which will involve logical determinacy but will add something more that is irreducible to logic.

In any event, Hegel is here trying to highlight the difficulties that afflict thinkers who have kept being and nothing from developing into one another. Parmenides is a prime example, for Parmenides is the thinker who regards being to be what is first and fundamental. Parmenides will have to address all sorts of things that seem to involve something other than being and try to show that they really are illusory, for being is all that truly is. Parmenides's take on nothing is that it is just nothing. There is just being in isolation from nothing and only being really is. What, then, occurs? What do we have? You cannot have any becoming, for to have becoming, you have to have nothing. Whether you regard becoming as coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be, neither trajectory is intelligible unless there is nothing and not just being.

By seizing upon being and regarding it as being by itself in isolation from nothing, there can be no progress beyond being. Being provides us with no resources for any further determinacy, because being is indeterminate. So if we somehow come up with something else, it would seem to be just constructed arbitrarily by us.

As Hegel points out, the same thing is true with Spinoza, who has the one substance be what alone is. Accordingly, there is no way it can create any relation to anything else. It is in utter isolation.

Hegel turns to Jacobi's polemical attack on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, where Kant makes appeal to various pure unities, such as pure intuitions of space and time and the pure unity of apperception, self-consciousness, the "I." How can any of these pure factors end up having any kind of internal differentiation? How can the pure unities of space and time give rise to any spatial or temporal differentiations? How can the pure spontaneity of pure understanding arrive at any concepts or judgments or anything determinate? In casting these doubts, Jacobi is assuming, Hegel points out, that being and nothing are entirely separable, are in complete isolation from one another. Only by assuming this, is Jacobi trapped in a situation where it seems unthinkable how the pure unity of space or the pure unity of time or the pure unity of self-consciousness could ever arrive at any kind of differentiation involving particular spaces, particular times, particular concepts and judgments.

Hegel links these abstractions of pure space, pure intuiting, and pure thinking to Indian classical philosophy, which affirms that the absolute is indeterminate and accordingly engages in the yogic practice of emptying one's mind of all determinacy, doing so by simply chanting "Om, om, om" endlessly and focusing on the end of one's nose, all so as to stick with indeterminacy (p. 97). This whole project aims at uniting with the ultimacy of nothingness by emptying consciousness of all content, eliminating the self, and thereby achieving nirvana. The subject, the particular subject, is ultimately regarded as illusory, because what is truly fundamental is just nothing.

ingness, indeterminacy. Accordingly, if one wants to get down to what is really true, one has to get rid of all content and just come to nothingness.

This whole approach simply lays hold of one of the indeterminate determinacies—in this case, nothing. One could just as well have seized upon being, as does Parmenides. All these approaches focus on being or nothing separately, taking being or nothing alone as ultimate and fundamental, ignoring that one cannot have being without immediately confronting nothing, just as one cannot hold onto nothing without confronting being, all of which brings us to becoming.

Hegel warns us not to think about nothing as if nothing were posited by or determined by being, nor to say that being is posited by or determined by nothing (p. 103). One should not invoke any kind of relationship like cause and effect or ground and grounded. It is a mistake to say that being is the ground of nothing or vice versa, or that being causes nothing, or that nothing is under the condition of being or that being is under the condition of nothing. No relationship can be invoked because in the beginning one does not have two coeval terms available to set in relation. A relationship involves having a plurality of terms that can be put or are in relation. Why is there not a relation when we speak about being being nothing and of nothing that is immediately being? One is tempted to use spatial metaphors and say, “You do not have a relation, because you do not have being and nothing side by side.” Or speaking in temporal terms, one might say, “You do not have being and nothing at the same time.” Since space and time are not here at stake, the proper thing to say is that being and nothing involve no logical categories of relation. If they did, there would be a third term in addition to being and nothing. At the beginning, however, there just is being, being that vanishes into nothing and nothing that vanishes into being. They themselves are not coevally present, as if they had some independent self-subsistence that allowed them to be relatable. Rather than being in any relation, Hegel suggests, being and nothing are to be found in becoming. Becoming will contain them as elements of its process. There they will be located in relation to one another, because there we have a third term, which is their relation. And what is that third term? It is just becoming—becoming, which is not something intervening between being and nothing, but just the vanishing of one into the other, the vanishing of the other into its counterpart.

Hegel clarifies the significance of this vanishing, writing, “What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being—does not pass over but has passed over—into nothing, and nothing into being” (pp. 82–83). We do not want to say “pass over” but “has passed over” because there is no passage in between being and nothing. Being is immediately nothing and nothing is immediately being. Nothing else has to intervene to get from one to the other, which means that one just gives way to the other, immediately. There is nothing keeping being from being supplanted by nothing and vice versa,

which is why, in having being and nothing, we have becoming as this two-sided process where being is immediately nothing and nothing is immediately being.

As Hegel will point out in the subsequent discussion, these two sides of becoming can be said to treat their component terms differently. In the one side that we might call coming-to-be, nothing is immediate and gives way to being. In the other one that we might call ceasing-to-be, it is being that gives way to nothing. Coming-to-be starts with nothing, which gives way to being, whereas ceasing-to-be starts with being, which gives way to nothing. That is the only way by which they are really distinguishable. Remember that the terms in question are absolutely different in that there is nothing by which one can relate or distinguish them in any way.

There is no need to add anything to being and nothing to have becoming. Being and nothing just directly constitute becoming. Yet with becoming, we have something that is not simply being nor simply nothing, but something consisting of this dual vanishing of one into the other.

Hegel's fourth remark³ helps set the stage for becoming by focusing attention on the failure to grapple with how being and nothing are not isolatable. Hegel here examines the kind of arguments that have been made down through the history of philosophy to show that it is completely incoherent to talk about either a beginning or an end of the world, that matter must be recognized to be eternal, and that there cannot be any becoming, any coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be. Hegel encapsulates the argument that is commonly made to support the claim that "It is impossible for anything to begin, either in so far as it is, or in so far as it is not" (p. 104). If something is, it cannot begin since it is already at hand. Alternately, if it is not at hand, it cannot begin because there is nothing there to commence. In nothing, there is just nothing, not a beginning. So if something is at hand to begin with, it is present and you do not have any beginning. But if it is not there, you just have nothing and from nothing comes nothing, *provided* you view these terms as duly isolated and separate. Similarly, nothing cannot cease to be. Nothing would have to contain being to cease to be. But nothing can neither vanish nor arise.

Hegel points out that at least this view is more consistent than our ordinary views, which regard being and nothing as completely separable and yet, at the same time, allow for talk of becoming. If you do separate being and nothing, then beginning or becoming is incomprehensible, because becoming involves being that is nothing, nothing that is being. And the beginning has the makings of becoming, if you think back on what we said about the beginning in "With What Must the Science Begin?" The beginning has the peculiar character that there cannot be a beginning unless, in some respect, there is something under way, but, on the other hand, you cannot have a

beginning unless what is getting under way is not still not at hand. But the beginning is not just nothing.

This consideration takes us to infinitesimals, which the various inventors of calculus had a hard time making sense of, even though they employed them. Hegel points out that infinitesimals are only in the vanishing toward zero. If they are not in their vanishing, they would have either a determinate magnitude or be zero. But an infinitesimal cannot be a determinate magnitude, for it would cease to be infinitesimal and be a specific magnitude like any other. On the other hand, an infinitesimal cannot be zero either, for then it just is no magnitude. An infinitesimal must somehow be on the way to zero but not yet there. It cannot be stuck in any specific quantity. On the other hand, it cannot be zero either. The infinitesimal has to somehow combine the being and nothing of quantity, which defies ordinary logic, at least formal logic, which wants to preclude that something can both be and not be.

Of course, all this would be unintelligible, if being cannot be combined with nothing. One might say, as we shall see, that ultimately there is no determinate thing that can fail to involve being and nothing. Analogously, if I am moving, the isolation of being and nothing must be overcome. The paradoxes that Zeno brings up reflect this, by questioning how one can possibly move from one point to another. If I am in motion, am I in a specific spot at a particular point in time? If I am in a particular spot and just in that spot at one moment in time, how can I be in motion? If I am in motion, I have to be leaving that location, while entering it at the same time. So long as I am moving, I am both entering and leaving the same place. To be in motion, I must be both in it and not in it. If you consider being and nonbeing as isolatable, you cannot possibly make sense of this and motion appears impossible. Of course, here we are alluding to becoming in various concrete applications—mathematical becoming, as one approaches the vanishing point, and motion.

Hegel's concluding remarks lay out the multiple aspects or moments of becoming. When Hegel uses the term "moment," he is not using it in a temporal sense. He is instead talking about the elements of something. What then are the elements of becoming, the moments of becoming? There are just two, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. Becoming, Hegel writes, is the "unseparatedness of being and nothing" (p. 105). In becoming, being and nothing are not held in isolation from one another. On the other hand, becoming is not a unity without their distinction. It is rather a unity that contains them as distinct and as unseparated. Both have to go together or you do not have becoming, you do not have any vanishing, you do not have "being is immediately nothing; nothing is immediately being." If you cannot get from one to the other or if they are separable, there is no coming or ceasing to be. On the other hand, if they are just the same, then you do not have any vanishings or emergencies. In fact, strictly speaking, you do not have any reiteration either.

Since each term is fully indeterminate, how can you mark off its first occurrence from a second occurrence? You would not have any repetition. You would just have being.

Yet, just on the basis of the indeterminacy of being, we have arrived at something that is more than being and more than nothing. We have arrived at something more than both of them with no other resources than being and nothing. No illicit additions need be invoked because becoming is constituted of nothing other than being and nothing, or more precisely, through the vanishing of each into the other. Being is immediately nothing; nothing is immediately being. Hence, “they are therefore in this unity, but only as vanishing, sublated moments” (p. 105). Hegel uses the term “sublated moments” here to signify “vanishing moments.” That is how being and nothing figure in becoming. What makes becoming possible is just that being and nothing immediately give way to one another. “They sink from their initially imagined *self-subsistence* to the status of *moments*, which are still *distinct* but at the same time are sublated” (p. 105). They are distinct but sublated. There would be no vanishing if there were not a distinction, but equally, there would be no vanishing unless the distinguished terms were equally inseparable.

Now, “grasped as thus distinguished, each moment is in this *distinguish- edness* as a unity with the other” (p. 105). How are they each a unity with the other? They are distinguished in an absolute way. There is nothing that makes them either equal to or different from one another. Precisely in virtue of this, one is immediately the other. “Becoming therefore contains being and nothing as *two* such unities, *each* of which is itself a unity of being and nothing” (p. 105). Here we have becoming turning out to have these two sides, ceasing-to-be or coming-to-be. Again, the only thing that distinguishes them is that one starts from being (ceasing-to-be, being that is nothing) and the other starts from nothing (coming-to-be, nothing that is being). So, Hegel can say, “Becoming is in this way in a double determination” (p. 105). Becoming contains these two processes, ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be.

First of all, we have these two sides. As Hegel notes, “Both are the same, *becoming*, and while they differ in direction, they interpenetrate and paralyse each other” (p. 106). How do they interpenetrate each other? How does ceasing-to-be get interpenetrated with coming-to-be, or how does ceasing-to-be immediately revert to coming-to-be and how does coming-to-be immediately revert to ceasing-to-be?

On the one hand, ceasing-to-be is the being that is immediately nothing and nothing is immediately being. We are back to being. Being’s vanishing has been canceled. On the other hand, nothing is immediately being. You have coming-to-be, but then coming-to-be just as much ceases to be, because the being that nothing arrives at just as immediately reverts to nothing. So we have a being whose vanishing into nothing vanishes. We have a nothing

whose vanishing into being vanishes. Or, we have a ceasing-to-be whose ceasing-to-be ceases and we have a coming-to-be whose coming-to-be does not come any longer and we are left with being and nothing.

As Hegel goes on to write, “The one is *ceasing-to-be*: being passes over into nothing, but nothing is equally the opposite of itself, transition into being, coming-to-be” (p. 106). So ceasing-to-be just as much is immediately joined with coming-to-be, but “this coming-to-be is the other direction: nothing passes over into being, but being equally sublates itself and is rather transition into nothing, is ceasing-to-be” (p. 106). Hegel adds, “They are not reciprocally sublated—the one does not sublate the other externally—but each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself” (p. 106). Ceasing-to-be is coming-to-be, coming-to-be is ceasing-to-be—and neither requires anything outside it to make it the opposite of itself. In virtue of what it is, each is its counterpart.

Hegel wants to resist speaking about becoming as if becoming involves something. Something is not just determinate being but a determinate determinacy, for something is distinguishable from something else. Therefore if we speak about *something* emerging, it emerges from something it is not, an other. Then we are not really talking about becoming. We are instead talking about change.

We are here on the verge of an attempt to account for determinacy. Philosophies that have failed to free themselves of assumptions or foundations have, for that very reason, been unable to account for determinacy because they always make use of some given privileged determinacy from the outset. They cannot account for it, since to account for determinacy, they cannot make use of determinacy or anything definite to explain what determinacy is. Then they would just be running around in circles, begging the question. The only way to account for determinacy is by using resources that are not determinate. That is what we are being led to, because Hegel is claiming that what results from becoming is going to be determinate being. We will have to see what that is, how it is characterized, and whether we should take seriously what is offered as determinate being.

Here we want to see what we are heading directly toward in the discussion of the sublation of becoming. Hegel is just noting what has occurred, what we are confronting. We have seen that the two sides of becoming have immediately reverted to their counterpart. The vanishing on both sides has vanished, leaving being whose vanishing has ceased and nothing whose vanishing has ceased. The process of becoming has thereby paralyzed and eliminated itself, canceling the vanishing of being into nothing and the vanishing of nothing into being.

We are not just left with indeterminacy. Rather we are left with being and nothing, and we are left with them and nothing else. What we have are being and nothing in conjunction with one another, and their conjunction or their

unity is not in any way mediated by anything else, for there is no other factor around that has either led to or produced this unity, nor is there something else on which this unity rests. So we have being and nothing *immediately* or in the form of immediacy. This is what Hegel explicates in his discussion of the “sublation” of becoming: “The resultant equilibrium of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is, in the first place, *becoming* itself” (p. 106). That is what becoming is, after all, “but this equally settles into a stable unity” (p. 106).

How can we have a stable unity resulting from becoming? Well, “being and nothing are in this unity only as vanishing moments” (p. 106). Being vanishes into nothing; nothing vanishes into being. Becoming, which is their double-sided vanishing “*is* only through their distinguishedness” (p. 106). Why does double-sided vanishing depend upon their being distinguished? If they are not distinguished, you cannot have the vanishing. You cannot have being revert into nothing or nothing revert into being. “Their vanishing, therefore, is the vanishing of becoming or the vanishing of vanishing itself” (p. 106), because their difference is being removed and the removal of their difference is equally being removed. The vanishing of ceasing-to-be is just as much coming-to-be, whereas coming-to-be is just as much ceasing-to-be.

“Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result,” and, Hegel goes on to say, “This could also be expressed thusly: becoming is the vanishing of being in nothing and of nothing in being and the vanishing of being and nothing generally; but at the same time it rests on the distinction between them” (p. 106). You do not have becoming unless you have both sides, which Hegel has been emphasizing throughout the remarks. But this makes becoming “inherently self-contradictory, because the determinations it unites within itself are opposed to each other; but such a union destroys itself. This result is the vanishedness of becoming” (p. 106). Becoming itself collapses. It paralyzes itself. It removes the very movement it involves. But, as Hegel says, we are not left with nothing, because if we were left with nothing, we would just be back with becoming, because nothing is being and being is nothing, and we are back where we started. We would be left with one of “the already sublated determinations, not the resultant of *nothing and being*” (p. 106). But here, we are dealing with what results from nothing and being, and what results from nothing and being is the unity of being and nothing, which has settled into a “stable oneness.”

“But this stable oneness is being, yet no longer as a determination on its own but as a determination of the whole” (p. 106). What is a whole that could be said to have being and nothing together in the form of being? Hegel calls it determinate being—in German, *Dasein*. As Hegel concludes, “Becoming, as this transition into the unity of being and nothing, a unity which has the form of being or has the form of the one-sided *immediate* unity of these moments, is *determinate being*” (p. 106).

Heidegger also uses *Dasein*, but he gives it a foundational role, letting it signify the human subject, understood as not a completely disengaged standpoint, but a subjectivity in the world, possessing a determinate worldly existence with cares and practical engagements, a concrete subjectivity that Heidegger takes to be epistemologically fundamental. Heidegger is doing a kind of transcendental philosophy, treating the condition of knowing or our access to being as this concrete standpoint of *Dasein*. In Hegel's discussion of the outcome of becoming, *Dasein* is just determinacy or determinate being without further qualification.

Our task, as we move on, is to make sense of both how we have reached a threshold that can meaningfully be thought of as giving us determinacy and why determinacy, as such, can plausibly be thought of in these extremely abstract terms. We face the proviso that if you are going to try to account for what is determinate being, you cannot make use of any determinate being in providing its specification. That is the difficulty. Analogously, in physical terms, we cannot account for space by making use of anything that is spatial, nor account for matter by making use of anything that is material.

We are faced with a daunting problem. How are we going to specify determinate being, given that it cannot involve anything determinate in its specification? The only resources Hegel puts before us as constitutive of determinate being are just being and nothing, in immediate unity. When we talk of determinate being, keep in mind we are not talking about something that is further specified. We are not talking about something that is contrastable with something else, because here we are talking about determinate being or determinacy in general. Something is not determinate being but *a* determinate being, a determinate being that is contrastable with a different determinate being, which, in that sense, stands in relation to an other and is not immediate in the sense in which determinate being is immediate.

We are going to be dealing with these perplexities in trying to see how determinacy or determinate being and, then, determinate beings, get to be determined. To help clarify what lies ahead, Hegel offers a remark on the word *Aufheben* ("to sublimate").⁴ Hegel points out that this German word happens to have two meanings that seem to be contradictory. One is to preserve or maintain and the other is to cause to cease, to put to an end. Hegel will here be using this term because what we are considering is something that combines both of these aspects. It involves somehow preserving something and yet, in another sense, putting an end to it.

Hegel explains what he has in mind here by indicating that what is specifically removed when something is sublated is its immediacy. Everything else about it is otherwise retained (p. 107). Hegel describes this dual process in another way, writing that "Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite. . . . In this more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a *moment*" (p. 107).

We have seen Hegel speak about becoming as a self-elimination involving sublation, where being and nothing become moments of becoming, of which they are components. By being components of a whole, they are no longer immediate. They now factor as moments of something, and in that respect, they are no longer just being and nothing in the way in which they were before. They have been transformed, even though they are retained. They have lost their immediacy and have become moments of something else. Moreover, it turns out, in this case, that they have entered into unity with their opposite. Through becoming, we have being and nothing together. Why that “unity with their opposite” would generally apply to something losing its immediacy remains to be seen.

One other term that comes up in this connection is an expression that you will see Hegel use very frequently. He will speak about becoming being the “truth” of being and nothing. You will find him also speaking about determinate being being the truth of becoming. Why employ the term “truth” here? Perhaps Hegel does so for the benefit of saying, “Look, in truth being and nothing are factors of becoming.” Well, it is true that that is what they end up being after all. They turn out to be components of this whole, which itself ends up turning into determinate being, or at least something Hegel calls determinate being. We will have to see in what follows whether that makes sense.

We are going to turn to a topic that can only be a problem for us if we engage in philosophy understood as a discipline that has to call everything into question, free itself of assumptions, and escape all foundations. Otherwise, how can we possibly take up the challenge of accounting for determinacy, when we will always be taking determinacy of one sort or another for granted? Hegel is not doing that. Instead, he is undertaking to account for determinacy, without making use of any determinate givens.

Chapter Six

Determinate Being

Hegel's introductory discussions point to characterizing philosophy as both presuppositionless science and logic. Now, we can begin to understand how the discourse we are thinking through might also be a theory of determinacy. A discourse that has to account for determinacy is one that cannot take determinacy for granted. Only presuppositionless science or logic can provide a theory of determinacy.

Undertaking a theory of determinacy is tantamount to theorizing without any specific assumptions. You cannot bring to bear any determinate resources, because if you do, you are just beginning with that for which you are supposed to account. You are making use of a presupposed determinacy to account for determinacy. This difficulty is what makes the question "Why is there determinacy?" or alternately "Why is there something rather than nothing?" almost nonsensical. To ask why ordinarily calls for a reason, and a reason ordinarily comprises a determinate ground, a determinate basis for what it is one is trying to explain. You cannot, however, answer the question of why there is determinacy by giving a determinacy as the reason. That is no explanation, but only an appeal to what needs an account. If you ask about determinacy with any understanding, you know that any account, any why, cannot invoke anything given. Rather, an explanation of determinacy will have to be an account of how, in the absence of anything given, in the absence of any determinacy, determinacy can be. Why is there determinacy rather than indeterminacy? Why is there something rather than nothing? It cannot be because there is something that requires something to be. That obviously begs the question and goes in circles. The explanation rather lies in what we have been following in the succession of being, nothing, and becoming. Namely, nothing cannot just be nothing. It cannot hold itself back

and leave us with indeterminacy. Rather, being and nothing engender becoming, whose own process gives way to determinacy.

Through being, nothing, becoming, and the internal collapse of becoming, we arrive at something that Hegel identifies as determinate being, and it consists of factors that are not themselves determinate. At least they are not supposed to be determinate, for that would involve a vicious circularity. The factors in question, of which determinate being is composed, are being and nothing. In composing determinate being, being and nothing do not figure simply as they do in becoming. Through becoming's cancellation of its own moments of coming and ceasing to be, being and nothing are now present together in the form of being.

Hegel's discussion of "Determinate Being as Such" (pp. 109–16)¹ is divided into three sections. The first is entitled "Determinate Being in General," followed by "Quality," and then "Something." To begin with, we have a discussion of "Determinate Being as Such," which does not yet bring in quality. We have to see if, indeed, quality is not yet present in determinate being as such, how we get to quality, and how we get from quality to something. To begin with, how is determinate being as such characterized?

It involves the unity of being and nothing, but there is something more that goes into it. Hegel adds one qualification: The unity of being and nothing is in the form of being. What might be considered the mediation of that unity, the internal collapse of becoming from which this unity of being and nothing results, has removed itself. The emergent unity of being and nothing is thus not in relation to anything, nor is it determined by anything. It is just immediately at hand, which is to say, we have being together with nothing, with no further factor intervening in their unity. Due to this immediacy, Hegel can describe the whole as having the form of being.

Granted that we have being and nothing in an immediate unity, with nothing else at hand to determine, qualify, or relate to it, why should this unity of being and nothing in the form of being have anything to do with determinate being? What is the difference between the being we started with and the being in which being and nothing are united? Well, here we indeed have a being that contains being and nothing. At the beginning we just had being and then we had nothing and then we had being that is immediately nothing, nothing that is immediately being, the becoming that encompasses both of these movements, which themselves paralyze one another. It is becoming's own internal collapse that brings us back to being and brings us back to nothing, but in an immediate unity comprising what Hegel now calls determinate being.

Determinate being cannot be characterized by any qualities. If you did introduce qualities, you would be introducing determinacies, but determinate being is just determinacy as such. To account for it, we cannot bring in what itself is a specific determinacy. Determinate being cannot be characterized in

terms of anything determinate—in terms of qualities, relationships, or other things that are qualitative.

Instead, we have something that is determinate in virtue of being and not being at once. What gives it this determinacy is not just being. It is rather being that involves what it is not. Only insofar as you have both indeterminate factors together, being *and* nothing, do you have the possibility of something determinate. Being without nothing is just being indeterminate; nothing without being is just indeterminacy as well. You cannot define determinate being any further, because if you do attempt to characterize it in terms of any definite determinacy, you are just going around in circles.

In determinate being, there cannot be anything either holding being and nothing apart or holding them together, for in either case we would already have something determinate to rely upon. We are going to see in the ensuing development that you have to have *relata* that are determinate to speak of any type of determinate relationship. Here we just have the immediate unity of being and nothing, about which nothing more can be said.

What can be said about determinate being? It is not just being and it is not just nothing, but we cannot specify it any further. If you ask yourself what keeps being and nothing together, the only answer is that nothing keeps them united. It is just being, nothing, their immediate conversion into one another, becoming, and the internal collapse of becoming that gives us being and nothing immediately together. We just have both. The “and” does not signify any determinate factor of its own. If we were to put anything more determinate in the equation, we could not be providing a specification of true determinate being, because we would be employing determinate being for the sake of characterizing something. We are not, however, characterizing *something*. We are characterizing instead *determinate being as such*.

Hegel takes us next to quality. He points out that we could have just used the term “determinacy” instead of “quality” (p. 111).² He suggests that we have quality as soon as we have determinate being. Here we are not talking about *a* quality, about any specific feature or property or anything of that sort. We are just addressing quality as such.

Where is quality located with respect to what determinate being provides, namely being in community with nothing, immediately? There are two sides to determinate being, although they are really not determinate. One is the form of being. The other is the unity of being and nothing. It *is*. This unity of being and nothing is what quality or determinacy is. Determinate being is the being of determinacy or the being of quality. And quality is just this unity of being and nonbeing.

Hegel says that we could have just spoken of this unity as “determinacy,” but he employs the term “quality.” We will accordingly use the term “determinacy” in a more general way. There are going to be many other determinacies that we will encounter, and they are each going to be determinacies that

are not just determinacy, so the term “quality” will be used to distinguish determinacy as such from other determinacies, such as quantity, existence, and so forth.

Quality as such cannot of course be accounted for in terms of any particular qualities or anything that depends upon particular qualities for its own specification, such as relations of qualities. Determinate being is determinacy that *is*, whereas the being of determinacy is determinacy in the form of being or quality in the form of being. Quality is immediate. Quality per se is not quality that is qualified in any way, that is mediated in any fashion. It just is.

Nonetheless, with quality on the table, Hegel sees fit to introduce two further terms, “reality” and “negation.” Here Hegel uses “reality” more or less as it figures within much of the philosophical tradition, where “reality” is used as a specific term distinct from “being,” “existence,” “actuality,” and “objectivity.” For example, Descartes employs “reality” in this sense in his *Meditations*, where “reality” has little to do with something having existence.³ It can be possessed by representations for which there are no objects, because “reality” only signifies the being of determinacy, which can be just logical or mental as opposed to material. In contrast, “negation” simply signifies the nonbeing of determinacy, the absence of determinacy. Hegel presents us with reality and negation as two aspects of quality or determinate being. It turns out that determinate being, which is quality, ends up involving both reality and negation.

Why does determinacy involve both reality and negation? Why does the being of quality go hand in hand with the nonbeing of quality? To begin with, determinate being seems to just present us with the unity of being and nothing that *is* or the unity of being and nothing in the form of being. Since this unity comprises determinacy or quality, determinate being appears to just involve the being of quality.

Hegel, however, offers reality, the being of quality, as if it were one side of something that has another side, namely negation. Where does this other side come from? What does Hegel offer as an explanation for how we move from determinate being’s unity of being and nothing that is in the form of “is,” which can be called quality that is or determinacy that is, to a conjunction of *both* the being of quality and the nonbeing of quality? Hegel offers a clue by mentioning how determinate being serves as a criterion for the one-sidedness of determinacy.

Hegel writes, “Determinate being, however, in which nothing no less than being is contained, is itself the criterion for the one-sidedness of quality as a determinateness which is only *immediate* or only in the form of *being*” (p. 111). The one-sidedness just is, but, Hegel goes on, “it is equally to be posited in the determination of nothing,” whereby it will be “posited as a differentiated, reflected determinateness” (p. 111). No longer is quality immediate or in the form of being.

Hegel is here inviting us to follow the development where, allegedly, quality ends up in the form of not just being but also nonbeing. There is something one-sided about quality just being, because quality should both be and not be. It should involve both reality and negation. Now, you might ask yourself, what would lead quality in the form of being to not just be but also not be, that is, present the emergence of two specifications that are correlative with one another, namely, reality and negation? Well, what happens and cannot help but happen to being? As we have seen, being cannot be stopped from being immediately nothing. Applied to the being of quality, we get, side by side, the being of quality and the nonbeing of quality. Here we have quality no longer just in the form of being, but in the form of the unity of being and nothing. We have quality both as being and not being, as reality and negation. After all, if quality is to have any possible specificity, it can only be in virtue of both what it is and what it is not. Quality could not be determinate unless there is something it is not. Otherwise, there is no determinate determinacy.

Thanks to reality and negation, we now have quality in the form no longer of being but of *determinate* being. If the being of determinate being or the being of determinacy is no longer just being but determinate being, what has quality become? What has happened to determinate being or determinacy if it now not just *is* but is *determinately*?

Determinate being has now come to be applied to itself. What happens when that occurs, when determinate being or determinacy *is* in a determinate way, as opposed to just being immediately? Well, there is now a *determinate* determinate being. It is what you might speak of as *a* determinacy or *something*. It is something in virtue of containing reality and negation, where the being of quality and the nonbeing of quality are irrepressibly attached. That allows determinate being to not just be but to be determinately, and to be determinately it involves both being and not being. By combining the being and nonbeing of quality, or reality and negation, determinacy can become a determinacy to which determinacy applies, which is to say *a* determinacy, as opposed to determinacy as such. *A* determinacy is *something*, a determinate determinacy.

The absence of negation, the absence of determinacy that negation comprises, is not just nothing. It has a determinacy that is. It is reality as well. By the same token, reality, by being a determinate being, cannot just be being with no nonbeing in some respect defining it. Reality is being that has nonbeing, that has negation. Reality and negation turn out both to be a unity of reality and negation. What is the unity of reality and negation? What does it provide us with? Something. It provides us with determinacy that is determinately, a determinate determinacy. So, it turns out that these two sides of determinate being, which as quality and determinacy involve reality and negation, are themselves determinate determinacies. We thus end up with

two somethings, or something and a determinate determinacy that it is not, an other.

How does something other emerge from something? There is nothing in between something and other to bring us beyond something. Yet, as Hegel explains, reality and negation are each themselves factors that contain their counterpart—negation involves reality, because otherwise it would just be nothing, while reality involves negation, since otherwise it would just be being. This ends up doubling into each of these elements the structure of the whole—the structure of the whole being something, a determinate determinacy that is determinate in virtue of having quality that both is and is not, quality that involves both reality and negation.

When these elements of quality, reality and negation, each end up being both reality and negation, then we have something and another something. To the extent that something is in relation to other, something has, as a part of its very own character, that relationship. Something is therefore going to be characterized as having being-for-other, being in relation to something determinate. Something, to be something, will be in relation to something else. It will have an other that its being something depends on.

The relation is that between something and other, which you could say is a minimum relation, where the terms in question are just a determinate determinacy and not further qualified. There are going to be all sorts of relations that will have different characteristics, relations where the terms in question will not be coeval in the way that something and other are coeval. Something does not have primacy over its other. The one is not the ground of the other, nor is something the cause of the other.

Generally, relation requires some *relata* that are in relation. In a way, the argument concerning something ends up showing that for there to be something there has to be something related to an other. Postmodernism has fixated upon this point, that the determinacy of anything depends upon a relation to what it is not. That is how things are what they are. They are what they are in virtue of being distinguished from what they are not, in being related to other.

Saussure, in linguistics, makes this the key to the meaning of terms.⁴ Terms have the meaning they have by being distinguished from terms they are not. And so there is this endless dissemination of meaning, where if you want to know what something means, you have got to look beyond it to something it is not. And if you want to know the meaning of that term, you have to look beyond it to what it is not, and this goes on and on without end. The presumption is that this provides some way of getting at meaning.

Hegel's argument, however, just addresses this basic contrast between something and other, where being a determinate determinacy necessarily involves contrast to what it is not. Something is, as such, in relation to an other, and the other is itself something that has its own definite character by

not being the something to which it is in relation. The other, to be something, has to stand contrasted to an other. What is that other? It is the something. So, something, to be something, cannot help but also be an other as well as something. Something is thus both something and an other, just as the other to be other must be something. Each of the terms that allow there to be something, something and other, plays the exact same roles. Both figure as something and also as other. Something is something vis-à-vis its other and is also the other of its other. Its other is also something, for which something is an other. So it turns out that these two terms, whose very own determinacy depends upon their contrast, end up having the very same character.

Here, where we first discuss something and other, do we have any further terms by which to distinguish them, such as saying that this is a something with a certain color or a certain chemical composition or a certain literary pedigree? Are we in a position to make any such qualifications? Not yet, because all we have are somethings. We are not yet in a position to talk about a thing with properties or something that has universal qualities. We just have something, a quality that is distinguished from other qualities. Something and other just figure in that very basic way, which all determinate qualifying factors themselves depend upon to be what they are.

It would be problematic to say that the constituents of determinate being are already determinate. That would mean that something is constituted by itself, introducing a vicious circularity, where determinacy is being built out of determinacy. That is the real puzzle in trying to make sense of determinate being, because you have got to make sense of it without employing determinacy. You have to employ what is not determinate to arrive at what is determinate, which could appear to be impossible for those who want to maintain that from nothing comes nothing.

The indeterminate factors that go into determinate being provide a stable unity of being and nothing. We thereby have a determinate being that is indeterminately, in the form of being. This means, however, that that indeterminate manner of its being is going to be subject to what happens to indeterminacy. With that the case, you can see that the argument is maintaining the absence of heteronomy or external introductions. That is, what occurs happens simply in virtue of what is on the table, and what is on the table winds up transforming itself, giving rise to new specifications that take us along.

With the being and nonbeing of determinate being, you have determinate being determinately. In other words, determinate being no longer just *is*. It is determinately. It is a *determinate* determinate being. Hegel uses the term “reflection” in this connection in the sense that determinacy reflects itself here in that it becomes determinate determinacy (p. 111). It exhibits the imprint of determinacy in its form of existence, combining reality and negation to be a determinate determinacy, not just determinacy as such.

Determinate being has being and nothing, and the immediate unity of being and nothing is spoken of as quality or determinacy as such. It warrants calling quality because there will be other determinacies. Determinate being is quality in the form of being, but as Hegel says, there is something one-sided about this, and it turns out that determinate being provides a criterion for getting beyond this one-sidedness. Once the being of quality gives way to the being and nonbeing of quality, Hegel introduces reality and negation. Reality is just one side of a twosome that involves reality plus negation. Reality is quality that it is, which is how the category “reality” is handled in the philosophical tradition, which contrasts reality to other terms like “existence” and “objectivity,” which involve more than the being of quality. “Being,” “reality,” “existence,” “appearance”—all of these terms have different logical meaning in Hegel’s treatment, and the meanings he gives them do find resonance in the way these terms have been used in the philosophical tradition. Hegel is not inventing these terms nor using them in an entirely novel way.

For example, negation is not nothing. These are two different terms. Negation refers to something that is negated, that it is other to, that it is absent from. Nothing is just indeterminate. Being is immediately nothing, but being is not immediately negation. Negation follows upon determinate being and requires quality, insofar as negation is not mere indeterminacy, but the nonbeing of quality, coeval with reality, the being of quality.

Here with reality and negation, there is being and nonbeing (of quality), rather than just being and nothing. Hegel does not retain being and nothing, because once you have being and nothing in a stable unity, they are no longer what they were to begin with. At the start, they were indeterminacies that could not be put together. One just became the other, gave way to the other. But here we have them together as a result of all the vanishing of their vanishing.

Keep in mind the major distinctions that Hegel has put here for us. Nothing and negation are different. Remember those various remarks where Hegel is dealing with those who find it difficult to understand how being and nothing could be united, which usually entails a failure to distinguish nothing and negation, because they treat nothing as if it were negation, as if it were an absence of something, an absence of determinacy.

Another thing to keep in mind, which lies ahead of us, is the distinction between reality and negation on the one hand and between something and other on the other hand. Even if reality and negation end up becoming something and other, there is a difference between reality and negation and something and other. Reality and negation are characterized in a very specific way. Negation is the nonbeing of quality; reality is the being of quality. In a way, negation is the nonbeing of reality and vice versa. This seems similar to

the contrast of something and other, for the other is what something is not, whereas something is what the other is not.

Strictly speaking, when we come to something and other, as you will see, we are not yet talking about an indefinite plurality, where we have something and many, many other different things. We just have the contrast of something and other, something and what it is not. These are very, very minimal terms. We are talking not about things with properties, but just about something and other. Something could be an object, an idea, a subject, a number, any determinate determinacy. The complete poverty of something and other must be kept in mind, because otherwise you are putting stuff in them for which no account has been provided.

It is interesting to see how the development proceeds, for it sheds light upon which terms really do build upon others and prevents jumping the gun dogmatically, asserting something that has not really been thought through.

Here are some guideposts for addressing the upcoming text. The subsequent argument might be said to get more difficult, because at every step along the way, it carries with it everything that has gone before. What follows from something has something on the table, together with everything else that preceded it. Although it is hard enough to make one's way through the initial moves, with every step forward there is more to think about, more to be carried along as one proceeds.

What follows is a development of the implications of what something is. There are going to be three stages. The first is just the minimal situation of something being in relation to what it is not, something else, an other. That is going to give each of the terms in relationship specific features that that relationship automatically carries with it. Hegel is going to point out that we have not just something and other, but also further specifications in each that they cannot help but have because they confront one another.

What that will involve will be something more than just quality and something more than reality and negation. It will involve, on the one hand, "being-for-other," a term Hegel will use to identify the relation to other that something automatically has. At the same time, there is going to be a contrasting character that something as well as the other will have. They will both have what Hegel calls "being-in-itself," because, after all, if they are in relation to one another, you cannot have only that relation; you must have something that is in that relation, something they have internal to themselves apart from the relation.

Those two sides of being-for-other and being-in-itself are going to end up becoming more determinate in virtue of the relation something and other have, and that is going to lead to a transformation in the relation of something and other, whereby something and other will each have what Hegel will call a "determination" and a "constitution." These terms will signify the emergence of something acquiring a *determinate* relation to other and a *determi-*

nate being-in-itself. Constitution will refer to that determinate relation to other; determination will refer to that determinate being-in-itself. New terms are needed, for, to begin with, we just have something and other, their relation, and also that which is in relation, and the relation has no further specification. Well, it ends up becoming more determinate and having that determinate character involves determination and constitution.

It will then turn out that determination and constitution end up somehow getting united in what can be called a "limit." Each something will have a limit, which joins together the relation something has to other with what it is in itself. A limit, after all, is the boundary where something both begins and ends. The limit is where something makes contact with its other, where it has this relation to its other, as well as where it ceases to have its relation to the other, all at that same juncture.

Limit is thus going to provide the basis for something being finite, that is, having as part of its very being a kind of determinate nonbeing, that is, a coming to a definite end at its limit. In virtue of having a limit, something has something determinately beyond itself. This is going to set the stage for being able to think of what is finite, which will then put us in a position to deal with what lies beyond the finite, the infinite.

That is where we are moving. The relation of something and other is relatively straightforward. Things get more difficult with determination and constitution. The task is to uncover how they arise and modify the relation of something and other.

Chapter Seven

Something

In the Logic of Being, something and other are considered as coeval factors. By contrast, in the Logic of Essence there is an underlying primary tier that determines or posits something else. In the Logic of Essence you have one level of terms that are determined by another level. The level that determines them posits them. The domain of essence comprises a framework whose specifications are determinacies determined by something that determines them. Throughout there is a split between a determiner and what it determines. Under this heading come up all kinds of two-tiered categories such as essence and appearance, ground and grounded, cause and effect, and a thing that has properties, comprising a substrate of determinations. A whole and its parts would be another example. It is no accident that this kind of split-level determinacy follows the Logic of Being, whose determinations are in relation to one another, but not in the kind of relationship where one determination posits the other, having primacy over it. You need to account for determinacy and for determinacy that is coeval with other determinacies before you can have a level of determinacy to set in relationship to another level of determinacy that it posits or mediates. In positing, what is posited is mediated by something else. One has two levels of determination, with one tier mediating the other tier. Neither can be or be thought without coeval determinacy at hand.

Later, in the Logic of the Concept, Hegel will deal with determinacy that is self-determined. What is self-determined is posited but not posited by something other than itself. It is self-positing, and that self-determined character will show itself to be constitutive of what the concept is and what the self involves.

Accordingly, when you see terms like “positing” or even the “concept” enter in within the sphere of the Logic of Being that we are addressing, you

want to ask: What is the significance of these terms? Are they being used as part of the argument? Or are they being used to reflect upon the argument from a vantage point that has already moved ahead and seen what becomes of these determinations?

What lies now at stake are the succession of determinations that Hegel presents as the rudimentary specifications by which something is determined. Hegel offers as a starting point something, which, as something, stands in relation to an other, to something other. We are here dealing with something *per se*, not *a* something that has been further specified on the basis of any additional factors. We are not going to be in a position to say, "We can identify something as something that has this character in virtue of some definite description that will be provided." That would be inappropriate, since if one were to make appeal to definite descriptions, those definite terms would already be something in themselves. We do not want to give something too concrete a determination and think that we are talking about substances or physical objects, both of which involve all sorts of very specific determinations that are already something. We just have something and because it is just a determinacy *per se*, there is nothing determinate within it to provide its definiteness. Rather, what provides it with its definiteness is its contrast to an other, and in that contrast to an other, the other is equally indefinite. What makes it the other of something is simply that it is not the something, that the something is other to it.

We are in no position to locate within something and its other any specifications that one has and the other does not have. We cannot pick out properties that set off the something from an other, for those properties would themselves be something. Thus, something is something to begin with only in virtue of not being an other. And that other is an other only in not being something. For this reason, it really does not matter, as Hegel says, whether you use one term for one and one for the other (p. 117).¹ We could have called the something "other" and the other "something." One is just what the other is not. We could thereby just point and say "this" to distinguish one from an other, but, as Hegel points out, "this" can apply just as much to something as to something else, precisely because "this" does not carry with it any further specifications (p. 117). It just designates something and does nothing more than that.

All we have is this very rudimentary opposition, where something is something in virtue of not being an other. Its specific determinacy resides in this opposition. As mentioned earlier, there are those who want to enlist this relation of something and other as the key providing for determinacy of all sorts, and in particular, for establishing any definite meanings. Namely, terms are what they are in virtue of being in contrast to what they are not, but what they are not is also thereby defined by what those terms are not. This type of contrast may provide the resources for distinguishing something and

other, but it does not provide any further differentiation. It does not allow for individuation.

Later on in the *Logic of the Concept* Hegel will offer what he considers to be required to provide for individuality. We are not dealing with individuality when we deal just with something and other. As Hegel points out in regard to something and other, something is also an other and the other is also something. Both end up having the same determination, for something is both something and an other just as the other is both an other and something.

The constitutive relationship of something and other renders each both itself and its counterpart. We do not have to depend upon any third party to show that something and other swap roles. In relation to its other, something is the other's other. It is other than the other. The other is something, in contrast to an other, but the other stands in contrast to it in such a way that something is the other's other. The relationship is such that something is other and cannot help but be other because something cannot be something unless it stands in relation to an other for which it is other, while the other is just as much a something, whose determinate determinacy depends on not being what another determinate determinacy is.

It is only their contrast to one another that distinguishes them. And yet, even though their contrast is alone what distinguishes them, for that very reason they both play the same roles but not at the same time in the same way. In other words, when something is something vis-à-vis its other, the other is not this something. Likewise, something does not figure as the something when the other is playing the role of something. It instead figures as something's other. At the same time, however, they both have that other role as well. They cannot help it.

Is there then anything to distinguish something and other? There was not anything to distinguish being and nothing, which is why they gave us becoming. Here we do have a determinate determinacy. We have something, which is not just quality in general, or determinacy. It is a determinacy that has a very determinate existence and that determinate existence is provided for by the fact that it is in relationship to what it is not. But what it is not is simply something that has its own meager definiteness by standing in relation to what it is not. There is nothing else available to further distinguish them.

Hegel ascribes to something and other the same dual character, which he identifies as the complementary aspects of being-in-itself and being-for-other. As Hegel says, "Being-for-other and being-in-itself constitute the two moments of the something. There are here present *two pairs* of determinations: 1. Something and other, 2. Being-for-other and being-in-itself. The former contain the unrelatedness of their determinateness; something and other fall apart" (p. 119).

It is that very apartness that allows something to be something and the other to be the other. Something cannot be something unless it is not what the

other is. They are apart in that very fundamental way. They are completely different. “But,” as Hegel goes on to say, “their truth is their relation; being-for-other and being-in-itself are, therefore, the above determinations posited as *moments* of one and the same something” (p. 119). Being-for-other and being-in-itself are the above determinations, namely something and other, posited *in* the determination of the something.

The something cannot help but incorporate the opposition that allows it to be what it is. If something can only be something by not being an other, it must both be something apart from the other and also be in relation to the other. It cannot be something apart from the other unless it is in relation to the other. So something must have being-in-itself, a being apart from its relation to the other, but it must also *be* in relation to the other. It must be other-related as well as be something apart from that to which it is related. Something, like its other, has to have this dual character of being other-related and having a being-in-itself separate from its relation to other. These two aspects go hand in hand.

Now, this applies to something *per se*. Hence, it applies to one something as well as to the other something. The two aspects have to be there for either something to be a something. Are we, however, here talking about an indefinite plurality of somethings? Hegel does not bring in any further plurality. We are not talking about one and many, for example. We are talking about something and other, a twosome. We are not talking about a threesome or foursome. The only resources we have, which provide for the twosome to begin with, are a determinate determinacy and what it is not, which, minimally speaking, is something else. It may turn out that that something else may end up, potentially, having all sorts of further differentiations within it, which might allow us, on either side, to speak of something ending up being a galaxy. But we just have something and other, each with being-in-itself and being-for-other. We also do not have anything in between them.

The two features in each of these contrasting, correlative entities, being-in-itself and being-for-other, are not as yet specified in any further way. Their other-relatedness is otherwise indeterminate, just as their being-in-itself is otherwise indeterminate. How can we say *what* that being-in-itself is, what character there is about it? It has no other character than being that which is in relation, that which something is in contrast to what it is not.

Where is Hegel going to be leading us with our current resources of something and other, each with being-in-itself and other-relatedness, being-for-other? These aspects, allegedly, are going to transform themselves into what Hegel will call “determination” and “constitution.” Then, something will no longer involve just being-in-itself and being-for-self, but something with determination on the one hand and constitution on the other. Then, Hegel is going to suggest that determination and constitution end up taking on the character of one another, whereby determination will end up being

like constitution and constitution being like determination. That will present us with what he will call “limit.” And limit will involve a series of specifications whereby limit will end up being what renders something finite. What we need to do, first of all, is to see how we get to—or at least, how Hegel claims we get to—determination and constitution, and then see what they are and how they next coalesce in the limit, and how limit functions, and how all of that is going to present us with finitude, with something being finite.

Hegel introduces us to what he calls determination by exploring how something, in being related to an other, ends up being at one with its relatedness. Hegel begins by pointing out that “the being in something is *being-in-itself*. Being, which is self-relation, equality with self” (p. 119). Those terms were used to describe being, which was not in relation to anything else, was not distinguished from anything else, and was just equal to itself and also not different from anything else.

Here, however, the being-in-itself of something is no longer immediate because it is mediated by its being for other. As Hegel says, being-in-itself “is only as the non-being of otherness” (p. 119). Even though being-in-itself is distinguished from the other and relation to it, being-in-itself is no less mediated by what it is distinguished from. If there were not that contrast of being and other, there would not be anything determinate that could have determinacy that is contrastable with that of anything else. The being-in-itself by which they each exclude the other is nevertheless just as much mediated by their relation to one another.

That relation is part of the something itself. The something itself contains its relation to the other. You might be tempted to think of the relation of something and other as being completely external to them, whereby they are what they are independent of the relation. But that is not really true, and it is not even true when we are dealing with that part of something that is what it is apart from its other, what it is in itself. What something is in itself is itself mediated by the exclusion of the other, by being in relation to the other. The relation to the other is thus in it.

Being-in-itself and being-for-other, the constitutive sides of something, are very intimately related and very intimately united. You cannot have one without the other. As Hegel writes, “Both moments,” being-in-itself and being-for-other, “are determinations of what is one and the same, namely, the something. Something is *in itself* in so far as it has returned into itself out of the being-for-other” (p. 120). Something “is *in itself* in so far as it has returned into itself out of the being-for-other” because it depends upon the relation to the other to be what it is. But the relation to the other has a negative character to it. Something is what it is in virtue of not being the other. So it does not coalesce with the other. It is distinguished from the other, and it is what it is in virtue of being distinguished from the other. In

that way, it has its being-in-itself. It returns to itself in virtue of its relation to its other.

Hegel does not apply the term “contradiction” to the relation of being-in-itself and being-for-other, for they do not undermine one another. You cannot have one without the other, any more than you can have something without its other. And because you cannot have something without its other, something and other cannot fail to have within themselves these two correlative sides of being related to something else and being something in themselves.

This leads to a further determination. Being-in-itself and being-for-other are, in the first instance, distinct. Something, however, involves both aspects, which are undividedly present in it. Hegel suggests that even though being-in-itself and being-for-other are distinct, they are equally in an identity. We have previously seen the emergence of identifications of being and nothing and of reality and negation. Something similar has occurred with something and other because by being distinguished from one another, they end up playing the same roles, each being both something and other. How does any such identification now apply to the being-in-itself and the being-for-other that characterize both something and other?

First, you cannot have being-in-itself or being-for-other independently of one another. Being-in-itself is mediated by the relation to other, from which it must distinguish itself to be what it is. By the same token, being-for-other depends upon the distinguishing of two somethings, which requires that each have a separate being-in-itself.

Still, in what sense are being-in-itself and being-for-other really to be spoken of as identifiable? Hegel writes in the last paragraph before “B. Determination, Constitution and Limit” that “being-for-other is, in the unity of the something with itself, identical with its in-itself; the being-for-other is thus present in the something” (p. 122). In what way is the being-for-other “thus present in the something?”

The being-for-other of something is what gives something its being-in-itself, since something cannot be in-itself apart from being other-related. By the same token, something cannot have its other-relatedness separate from its being-in-itself. These two are completely intertwined with one another.

Hegel now presents something more capturing the unification of these two features. He says, “The determinateness thus reflected into itself is, therefore, again in the simple form of *being*, and hence is again a quality: *determination*.” The being-in-itself that is the being-for-other *is*, and it is thereby what will be called something’s determination. Now, determination is going to be contrasted with constitution. Both are going to involve a kind of unity of being-in-itself and being-for-other, but there is going to be a different valence in how the terms are united.

The distinction harks back to the way in which Hegel distinguishes ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be, except now not in regard to being and nothing

but rather in regard to being-in-itself and being-for-other. Determination is spoken of as being that determinacy of something whereby its being-in-itself is a determination of its relation to other, with the emphasis put on how its being-in-itself determines or comprises its relation to other. By contrast, constitution is spoken of as being, once again, the unity of being-in-itself and being-for-other, but here the being-for-other impacts upon the being-in-itself of something.

To exemplify these determinations, Hegel speaks of the determination of man residing in rational agency. That determination will not be just the being-in-itself of humanity. It will be something that is present in how we relate to others and other things. The determination of man will be exhibited and assert itself in these relations. Nevertheless, there can be an entanglement of relations that could be regarded as contingent, which will not affect what we are or our being-in-itself. When Hegel exemplifies constitution, he refers to the predicament wherein one exhibits in what one is in oneself one's openness to external determination, one's relation to other things. That relatedness will be determinative of what one is in contrast to other things, while what one is in contrast to other things will equally determine how one relates to other things, without further specification.

Let us look at how these terms are identified. Hegel writes, "The *in-itself* into which something is reflected into itself out of its being-for-other is no longer an abstract in-itself, but as negation of it being-for-other is mediated by the latter, which is thus its moment" (p. 122). We saw the being-in-itself of something being mediated by its relation to other. That mediation is part of it. Hegel continues, "There is present here not only quality and reality, determinateness in the form of simple being, but determinateness in the form of the *in-itself*" (pp. 122–23). To begin with, when we have something and other, both distinguished from and in relation to one another, what they are in themselves has no further specification than being-in-itself as such. They simply are in themselves through contrast to what they are not. Now, there is a determinacy to being-in-itself. The being-in-itself is not in the form of being, but in the form of determinacy. Now, what gives it the form of determinacy? Remember, quality was determinacy. It is. Here we have being-in-itself in the form of determinacy, and this is what is supposed to distinguish determination from just quality or reality.

Determinate being is quality in the form of being or determinacy in the form of being, where quality or determinacy is just the unity of being and nothing. There is no reference to something and other. By contrast, here we now have determinacy that attaches to something in itself, which is mediated by its relation to other. Determinacy is here internal to something in its relation to other, and, as Hegel puts it, "determination implies that what something is in itself, is also present in it" (p. 123).

This term “present,” which our translator uses, refers to what in German is expressed in the term *an ihm*. “At it” would be another way of putting it, for it is what is present in its relation. This is the additional feature of determination, that here we have the determinacy of something that is present in its relatedness to other and it specifically involves that relatedness to other, because the determinacy of determination is only in that relatedness to other, a relatedness whereby something is what it is in itself. Determination is that determinacy in something that informs its relation to other.

Hegel points out that determination is not really recognized by those who speak of a thing in itself, as if something could be just in itself and not be in relation to anything else, as if something could have a determinacy in itself without having other-relatedness. Often Hegel notes that if we just have something being a thing in itself that stands apart from all relatedness to us, there cannot be anything determinate to know. We cannot really relate to it, whereas when we relate to an object, our knowledge of it is our relation to it. But a thing in itself is precisely what does not relate to us. It remains outside of any relation to us. In regard to Kant’s assertion that we cannot know what is a thing in itself, Hegel observes that such a thing in itself cannot be a determinate object since it lacks the other-relatedness it needs in order to have a determination (p. 121).

Hegel contrasts determination with constitution, noting that “the filling of the in-itself with determinateness is also distinct from the determinateness which is only being-for-other and remains outside the determination” (p. 123). Instead of having just an otherwise indeterminate being-in-itself and other-relatedness, we have in determination a being-in-itself that is also in relation to other and in constitution, an other-relatedness that also involves the being-in-itself of something.

Hegel characterizes the emergence of constitution in this way: “In the sphere of quality, the differences in their sublated form as moments also retain the form of immediate, qualitative being relatively to one another,” so that “that which something has *in it*, thus divides itself and is from this side an external determinate being of the something, which is also *its* determinate being, but does not belong to the something’s in-itself. The determinateness is thus a *constitution*. Constituted in this or that way, something is involved in external influences and relationships” (pp. 123–24). That is to say, something’s involvement in relations, its relatedness to others, is also a determination of it, a determinate side of something, just as its being-in-itself is a determinacy exhibited in its relatedness to other: namely, determination.

Something thus turns out to have the correlative sides of constitution and determination. Each involves further modifications of the two initial aspects of something, namely, that something has being-in-itself and being-for-other. Now, these two sides of something have each come to reflect the other to which it is in correlative relation. The determination of something is its

determinacy in itself that is mediated by its relationship to other, whereas the converse could be said of constitution. The constitution of something is its own determinate way of relating to other at the same time that it has a determination of its own that is mediated by its relation to other. The question is: Just how distinct are these correlative terms, and does their distinction hold up?

Hegel goes on to say that “something, in accordance with its determination, is indifferent to its constitution” (p. 124). They are not identical, at least at the outset, and the question is why they are not identical when they first arise.

Determination and constitution cannot just be; they also have to be distinguished, because the being-for-other, the relatedness, endemic to something, depends upon contrastable, distinguishable factors. Otherwise, there is no possibility of a relation.

The relation is a very minimal one. At the outset of determinate determinacy, the related factors are distinguishable only by not being what the other is. That gives what they are in themselves a very minimal character and also makes their relation to one another very minimal. It is an immediate relation, rather than one where something happens and gets done. But because these two sides are also coeval, they each reflect the presence of the other aspect, even though, at the same time, they are distinguished. The being-in-itself or what something is in its relation to other is mediated by its relation, although it still cannot be reducible to that relatedness, because there is something that is related to other.

The relation is not something that intervenes between factors that already have their distinct character. That would be akin to a mechanical relationship, where the relationship between things is such that it does not impact upon what they are. Here, by contrast, we are dealing with a relationship that is constitutive of what they are, unlike mechanical relationships that, to speak in physical terms, involve movements in space and time that refer to things in terms of their matter but have nothing to do with what kind of thing they are. With determination and constitution, we have a relationship that is part and parcel of the factors that are in this relation. They are such that they cannot be unrelatable, and this means that their relatedness cannot really be kept outside of what they are in themselves.

Hegel is going to suggest that determination and constitution, the forms in which being-in-itself and being-for-other acquire determinacy, really cannot be held apart from one another. Their distinction cannot be maintained, and they wind up being indistinguishable. When that happens, we have limit, where something and other are such that what distinguishes them is one and the same with what brings them together. Limit is just where something and other come together and are set apart. With this qualitative limit we have that common boundary whose conjoined and distinguished terms both begin and

end. At the limit, one ends and the other begins. At the limit, one excludes the other from its territory. At the same time, however, limit has them meet at the same point at which they exclude one another. Limit is what sets them apart, and what sets them apart from one another is what gives them their definiteness as well. Their determinacy depends upon it. In this way, limit is going to combine the characteristics that determination and constitution separately realize, before coalescing with one another.

Chapter Eight

Finitude

The discussion of finitude is divided into three sections—the first involving something and other and what that contrast implies; the discussion of determination and constitution, which ends up engendering limit; and finally, the discussion of the finite (pp. 116–37).¹ In the finite, two correlative categories arise. One is limitation, and the other is the ought.

The beginning of the whole discussion of finitude presents something and other, whose contrast arises after determinacy has become determinate through the being and nonbeing of quality, where negation and reality each end up combining negation and reality, yielding a determinate determinacy in contrastive relation to an other. There is no background against which this contrast plays. We are not talking about entities in the world, entities in a field of existence, entities in a spatio-temporal continuum. We are speaking about something and other in the most minimal sense, with nothing between them.

You simply have something and what it is not, and something is what the other is not. On that basis, however, both something and other have a dual character. They both have being-in-itself and being-for-other. On the one hand, they are separate from one another; they each have an intrinsic being, a being-in-itself. On the other hand, they are in relation to what they are not. They thus have a being-for-other, an other-relatedness. The contrast of something and other thereby becomes internal to each of these factors.

Something has both an intrinsic being, a being apart from the other to which it is constitutively in contrast, but it is also related to the other and the same thing is true of the other. To begin with, this being-for-other, this other-relatedness, is completely undefined in any other respect. It is completely immediate, just as the being-in-itself is completely immediate. There is no other factor mediating it. But these two terms are mediated, and they cannot

but be determinate. That is, something cannot help but have a determinate intrinsic being. It is something contrastable to an other, just as its other-relatedness cannot help but be determinate in character. To speak of there being a determinate being-in-itself, is to refer to what Hegel calls determination. Something has a determination, a determinate intrinsic being, and it also has a determinate other-relatedness, a constitution. These are qualities of something in function of its minimal relation to other.

Why does being-in-itself end up being a determinate determinacy in the form of being-in-itself, or a determination? There are two reasons, one of which Hegel chooses to emphasize. On the one hand, the being-in-itself of something, as well as the being-in-itself of other, is really predicated upon, or mediated by, its being-for-other. Something cannot have an intrinsic being apart from being contrastable with other. This is why Hegel will say that something's being-in-itself is not just immediately given; it is something itself contrastable within something from its other-relatedness, its being-for-other, at the same time that something, with the two sides of its determinate being, is in contrast to an other that has the same distinctions.

In order for something to have an intrinsic being, it has to be not its other. That is the minimal basis for having any being-in-itself. The being-in-itself, the intrinsic being, of something, is based upon its other-relatedness. The same thing, however, can be said about its other-relatedness. Something's other-relatedness depends upon there being something else to relate to as what it is not. So, these two sides of something, being-in-itself and being-for-other, are in relation to one another, are both different and yet in relation.

At the same time, the something has an intrinsic being that is different from the intrinsic being of its other. They cannot be the same. They have to be separate, different. By the same token, something's other-relatedness is different from the other-relatedness of the other, since they are separate entities. In this respect, both something and its other have a determinate being in themselves. They each have a determination. They also each have a constitution. They have a determinate being-for-other. These are the only features that they have as determinate entities that have a determinacy in their separation from what they are not and also have, as something definite, a definite relation to other.

Hegel goes on to try to show that the determination and constitution of something end up being at one with one another. They cannot end up being distinguished, even if to begin with they are distinct sides of each something. Hegel attempts to show that the determination of something is really no different than its constitution, and the constitution of something is really no different from its determination. After all, how are you going to distinguish them? The only terms available for distinguishing the determination and constitution of something are the characteristics that something has *per se*. It has a determinate intrinsic being. It has a determinate other-relatedness. We

have that much, but we do not have any further specifications. How then are these distinguished from one another, and can their distinction be maintained or does the determination of something end up being no different from its constitution?

What gives something a determinate intrinsic being is its contrast with other. Something cannot have its determinate intrinsic being apart from that relation to other. The determinate intrinsic being something has is really thereby determined by its determinate relation to other, its constitution. Alternately, its constitution, its determinate relation to other, is a function of its determinate intrinsic being, since there cannot be any relation to other without there being a distinct being-in-itself. Something's determinate being-for-other is a feature it has in distinction from the determinate being-for-other of the other factor to which it stands in contrast. This is a determination of something, that is, the constitution that it has is its determination, distinct from the determination that its other has. Its other has its *own* constitution. Their respective constitutions are something that they are in themselves, a being in themselves.

Hegel claims that when you have this equalization between constitution and determination, whereby they become united, what you have is a limit of something and other, or what could be called the boundary of something and other. Here we have a determination that combines what determination and constitution provide. In what respect does a limit, first of all, do what determination does—that is, give each a determinate intrinsic being apart from the other? A boundary excludes the other, and it thereby provides the territory that is the specific territory of something. What the something is, apart from its relation to the other, is what lies defined by the boundary. Of course, the very same boundary, the very same limit, does the exact same thing for the other. It keeps something out of its territory and allows the other to have a definite domain. So limit allows the other to be something determinate apart from something. It allows them both to have a domain of their own, and it enables that domain to be determinate, giving it determinate determination.

How does that very same boundary also give something and other a determinate being-for-other, that is, a constitution? At the same time the limit gives each their own domain and determines their separate domain, how does it equally provide for a determinate relation between them? Well, something and other are related by their boundary, by their limit, for they make contact at their boundary, at their limit. That is where they join together. Where one ends is where the other begins. This is their point of contact, and it is determinate. This is where they have their relation to one another, and it is the same point where they have their separation.

The boundary or the limit, giving them their determinate domain and their determinate connection at the same time in the same specification, is common to them both. You could say it is where both of them begin. Of course, it

is also where both of them end. So it might appear that what they are really lies beyond their limit. What each is seems to lie beyond their boundary. But if you enter the territory inside the boundary, you find not something and other, but just determinate being. You do not have anything more specific, because all specificity comes from the limit. It is only the limit that shapes the domains and allows them to be determinate domains.

We here might seem to be speaking in spatial terms, and we are probably more used to thinking about limits in respect to quantitative determinations. Hegel, however, is addressing *qualitative* limit, which simply comprises that shared specification that distinguishes something and something else, a determinacy from another determinacy, whatever they may be.

When you go beyond or inside the limit, all you have is determinacy that is not further qualified. The limit is what alone gives something its determinate intrinsic being, which involves its determinate relation to other. This is more or less what Hegel provides us with in the account of something and other, as something and other have determination and constitution. They have a determinate intrinsic being and a determinate other-relatedness. These are combined in the limit that something has that distinguishes it as well as connects it with what it is not.

Where do we go from here? Where does Hegel take us next, or, more properly, where does Hegel think the terms themselves get us? Hegel attempts to show how they lead us to finitude.

First of all, what is the difference between limit and finitude? Why should finitude be introduced as something distinct from limit? Hegel suggests that limit paves the way for finitude or, more precisely, that limit ends up generating finitude by passing over into finitude.

Limit combines two things in one. It combines the determinate intrinsic being of something with its determinate other-relatedness. Determination and constitution combine into one specification, limit. Limit is that in which something and other both come together and part ways. By contrast, negation, the nonbeing of quality, stands in opposition to reality, the being of quality. The nonbeing of quality that is negation is different from nothing. Whereas nothing is indeterminate, negation is the nonbeing of determinacy. It is "otherness." In the limit, something confronts otherness as something to which it is both joined and from which it is separated. In finitude, something else is going on, where one can no longer talk of limit, or *Grenze*. Finitude involves limitation, or *Schranke*, instead of limit, or *Grenze*.

Through limit, the contrast between something and other seems to have fallen away, because what lies beyond the limit is just determinate being. You do not find there the distinguishing definiteness, because the definiteness resides in the limit. The limit is what gives both factors their specific character, as well as their specific relation to one another. Yet, the limit is where each is what it is and also ceases to be what it is. Their very determi-

nate being, which is there in the limit, is also where their determinate being ceases. That termination is part of each of them. Their determinate ceasing-to-be or their own negation really does not lie outside them. It is instead internal to them. When something has a limit, its own intrinsic being or its own determinacy is at the very same time where it ceases to be or where it ends. In German, the term for “end” is also *Ende*, and the term for “finite” is *Endlich* and that for “finitude” is *Endlichkeit*. With finitude we are addressing how something, through its limit, comes to be in its very own being its own end.

We have a unity here of not just being and nothing, because we have something more determinate, namely something whose own determinate being is its own termination, its own end, its own ceasing-to-be in a definite matter. Something’s boundary turns out to be a self-limitation. Instead of there being a limit that depends upon the presence of something else for its definition, we now have something that turns out to be its own negation.

Something, now determined as finite, contains its own otherness, because the very determinacy of its own being is at the same time the determinate ceasing-to-be of itself. In that way something has limitation. It is not just limited by something else. It is limited by itself. Thereby it has limitation. As finite, something is not negating something else, is not the otherness of something else. Rather, it is somehow its own otherness. That is why the counterpart of limitation does not lie outside it. The counterpart of limitation is in itself.

What is that counterpart of limitation? Hegel offers us “the ought”—in German, the *Sollen*. This is an odd term, which ordinarily is applied to ethical matters. Hegel refers to its particular use in Kantian ethics (p. 136), which treats morality as something that is always nothing more than an ought, insofar as Kant, in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, maintains that doing what is moral really is something that we can only approximate, but never actually achieve.² Acting morally will always remain something to aspire to, yet somehow we can never quite do it. We are limited by our sensibility, our inclinations, and we are not pure wills.

Here “the ought” of something is the counterpart of limitation. Something cannot be finite, cannot have limitation, unless it contains something that is being put to an end by its defining limitation. That which is being put to an end is its ought.

Why use the term “the ought” for that which comes to an end in finitude? It is that aspect of the finite which is negated by its own limitation, which is inherent in the finite. The finite is inherently limited because here we have a limit that does not involve something else beyond it. Here limitation has superseded limit because the very determinacy of something is the end of its being, is its own ceasing-to-be. That which ceases is this other side of finitude. Still, why should this side be called “the ought?”

The finite has the character of having limitation built into it, instead of being bounded by a limit that depends upon something else. Having intrinsic limitation, there is something of the finite that is being limited by itself. Whereas something else had to be on the other side of the limit for the boundary to be a limit, here the ought comprises the other side of the finite that lies in internal relation to its limitation. Hegel writes, “This *in-itself* therefore, as the negative relation to its limit (which is also distinguished from it), to itself as limitation, is the *ought*” (p. 132). It is “the negative relation to its limit,” what is internally other to its limitation. Insofar as the finite is intrinsically limited, there is something in it that is intrinsically being contained by its limit, something that, apart from the limitation, *would* step beyond the limitation, but is prevented from doing so by the limitation to which it is bound.

The ought is endemic to the character of the finite. The finite has limitation. The finite does not need to be contingently restricted by something else. Its limitation is inherent within it. For that to be the case,

Something must at the same time in its own self transcend the limit, it must in its own self *be related to the limit as to something which is not*. The determinate being of something lies inertly indifferent, as it were, *alongside* its limit. But something only transcends its limit in so far as it is the accomplished sublation of the limit, is the *in-itself* as negatively related to it. And since the limit is in the *determination* itself as a limitation, something transcends *its own self*. (p. 132)

Something transcends its own self in that it is finite, and its very character is in its own being to cease to be. But that ceasing-to-be is the ceasing-to-be of something that is different from its ceasing-to-be. Yet it is something that, in being different from ceasing-to-be, is nevertheless negated by its ceasing-to-be. The ought captures both sides of this. The ought is something that is, but it is also something that is not.

At the very bottom of the page, Hegel emphasizes this dual side of the ought, writing, “What ought to be *is*, and at the same time *is not*” (p. 132). After all, if something were, we could not say that it ought, merely, to be. It simply would be what it ought to be. “The ought has, therefore, essentially a limitation” (pp. 132–33). Its being is tied up with its nonbeing.

“This limitation is not alien to it; that which *only* ought to be is the *determination*. . . . The being-in-itself of the something in its determination reduces itself therefore to an *ought-to-be* through the fact that the same thing which constitutes its in-itself is in one and the same respect a *non-being*” (p. 133). Limit was the enabling definer of something, which shapes it into something but at the same time brings the something to its end, its limit. Here we have limitation doing that, without reference to something other. Since limitation is internal to the finite, the finite has the character of being what is

inside its own limitation, what is in the form of an ought, because what it is in itself is something whose being consists in also coming to an end. That is its determination.

"Hence," Hegel writes, "as the *ought*, something is raised above its limitation, but conversely, it is only as the *ought* that it has its limitation. The two are inseparable. Something has a limitation in so far as it has negation in its determination, and the determination is also the accomplished sublation of the limitation" (p. 133). It is something other than the limitation, something within it, within the finite, that pushes it beyond it.

This will become clear if we look at where Hegel takes us from here. Where we go from here, odd as it may seem, is from the finite to the infinite. The infinite is going to be characterized as taking successive forms. To begin with, "the infinite is (a) in its *simple determination*, affirmation as the negation of the finite" (p. 137).

The negation of the finite could be said to be the nonfinite. After all, the "in-" in "the infinite" is just "nonfinite." The infinite as nonfinite is what the finite is not. Remember, the finite is not contrasted to an other in the way in which something and other were, because the finite had a limitation built into it. It had negation built into it. It did not have to depend upon something other to provide its defining negation. The defining negation lies within the finite.

If we want to speak about the nonfinite, we cannot talk about an other. An other would not be the nonfinite. Rather, an other would be another finite entity, bounded by a limit, and thereby ending up with limitation. The nonfinite is not just another limited thing. The infinite as the nonfinite is what the finite is not, and what the finite is not is not just another thing with a limit.

Hegel suggests that the infinite, minimally understood as the nonfinite, is something that emerges from the finite. How the finite would give rise to the nonfinite, the infinite, might seem just as mind-boggling as how something can come from being or how nothing can come from being. Nonetheless, Hegel presents us with a transition of the finite into the infinite, showing how the finite cannot help but engender the infinite in the sense of the nonfinite. Hegel presents the transition as being entailed in the way in which limitation and the ought operate.

It sounds like a variation on how we get to determinate being, where determinate being arrived on the scene when the ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be of becoming ceased to be. Here, the finite has built into it ceasing-to-be. The being of the finite is its own ceasing-to-be. It has its own limitation. That is where it ends. Its ending is in it, not outside. Its termination is not brought upon it by anything else. Since this intrinsic coming to an end is its own being, the finite cannot be surmounted unless that ceasing-to-be of the finite can be overcome. It can and must, for just as the ceasing-to-be and the

coming-to-be of becoming ceases to be, so the finite, in ceasing-to-be, terminates its own process of termination and yields the nonfinite.

The nonfinite should not have limitation built into it, nor should it have the counterpart of limitation, the ought. Nevertheless, the infinite as the nonfinite ends up generating what Hegel calls an “alternating determination” of the infinite with the finite. Hegel points out that this is a common way in which the infinite is construed, as being something that is what the finite is not. It is regarded as something apart from the finite, something that completely transcends the finite, something that is beyond the finite, like a separate domain.

If the infinite is a separate domain, there is some separating boundary between it and the finite. But then the infinite has a limit. Consequently, this nonfinite infinite ends up being an infinite that really converts into the finite. Yet, insofar as the finite comes to an end and converts itself into its beyond, we are led to another nonfinite, which converts into a finite because it lies beyond the finite. So, as Hegel points out, you have a series of finite, infinite, finite, infinite, and so on—an infinite that, because it lies beyond the finite, is bounded and limited and thereby finite, but the finite, insofar as it terminates itself, becomes the nonfinite, that which lies beyond the finite, and we have this unending alternation, which Hegel calls the “spurious infinite” (p. 139).

The series presents a “spurious” infinite since every time we have the finite and go beyond it, the nonfinite beyond is not really infinite, but just another finite, limited by something beyond itself. Each time, the nonfinite has a limit because it does not include the finite within it, but transcends the finite. Hegel is going to show that an infinite without limitation will arise from this one-sided “spurious infinite.” As he will note, the whole process of the alternation of the finite and the nonfinite is something that does not have anything lying outside of it (p. 148). Rather, the series itself does not have any finitude lying outside of it but contains the finite and simply stands in relation to itself. That will give us something that is not finite, without being just another finite.

As we will see, the self-overcoming of the “spurious infinite” will lead us to what Hegel will characterize as self-relation. When we speak about something that is self-related and in no way limited by anything else, we will be confronting the one, the one and only, which has no relation to other. But we are not yet there.

Let us look again at the transition of the finite into the infinite. This is one of the more difficult transitions, and it is also presented in a very concentrated way. What lies at stake is accounting for how the finite, in and of itself, gives way to the nonfinite or the infinite. The finite is not going to get beyond itself by simply having another finite beyond it. If you move from one finite entity to another finite entity, you just return to relations of something and other. The nonfinite is something different, and so the process

whereby the finite ceases to be must be different from the process whereby something ceases to be by having an other.

Hegel begins by writing, “The ought as such contains limitation, and limitation contains the ought. Their relation to each other is the finite itself which contains them both in its being-within-itself” (p. 136). What the finite contains is limitation and ought. They go together. That is what composes the finite. “These moments of its determination are qualitatively opposed” (p. 136). One point that Hegel emphasizes is that quality is really united with being, whereas quantity is something you can alter without it ceasing to be what it is. Remember, when we are talking about quality, we are not talking about a property of a thing, even though you may be tempted to think in those terms. Quality is not something that is possessed by some substrate. Quality is just determinacy, opposed to another determinacy.

Now, Hegel observes that limitation and the ought “are qualitatively opposed; limitation is determined as the negative of the ought,” the nonbeing of the ought, “and the ought likewise as the negative of limitation. The finite is thus inwardly self-contradictory; it sublates itself, ceases to be” (p. 136). The finite ceases to be in virtue of itself. It negates itself. What it negates is its ought, its being that is such that it is both there and opposed within what it is, not opposed externally. In this regard, the finite is self-contradictory. It undermines itself. The negative, its ceasing-to-be, is its very determination, “for it is the negative of negative” (p. 136). In ceasing to be, the finite is also canceling its limitation. Since the finite has its limitation built into it, in coming to an end, the finite negates its limitation, as well as the ought to which it is tied. Yet, “in ceasing to be, the finite has not ceased to be; it has become in the first instance only *another* finite which, however, is equally a ceasing-to-be as transition into another finite, and so on to *infinity*.” Oddly enough, the ceasing to be of the finite, whose being is a ceasing-to-be, is another ceasing-to-be that has being. It is just another finite, which, as finite, has the same process, engendering a sequence of the finite giving way to another finite *ad infinitum*. “But,” Hegel says, “closer consideration of this result shows that the finite in its ceasing-to-be, in this negation of itself has attained its being-in-itself, is *united with itself*. Each of its moments contains precisely this result; the ought transcends the limitation, that is, transcends itself” (p. 136).

Through the finite’s ceasing-to-be, it transcends itself. But that being of its ceasing-to-be is itself just another finite. As Hegel says, “beyond itself or its other, is only the limitation itself. The limitation, however, points directly beyond itself to its other, which is the ought; but this latter is the same duality of *being-in-itself* and *determinate being* as the limitation; it is the same thing; in going beyond itself, therefore, it equally only unites with itself” (pp. 136–37). In going beyond itself, the finite ends up uniting with itself. In ceasing to be, the finite stops ceasing to be since it returns to itself. What we

have here is “this *identity with itself*, the negation of negation,” which “is affirmative being and thus the other of the finite, of the finite which is supposed to have the first negation for its determinateness; this other is the *infinite*” (p. 137).

It is the other of the finite because the finite has negation of its determinacy as its being. The finite is the limitation of itself. It is being that is self-limited. But the very process of that limitation ends up not limiting itself, but just affirming itself. So it cancels its self-limitation and in that way we have the nonfinite, what is other to the finite, and that brings us to the nonfinite as the infinite.

Here you have a series as part of this account of the finite, a finite that gives way to another finite. Within the account of the infinite, there is another series. The basic difference between the two series is that in the latter “infinite” and “finite” alternate, not just one finite and then another finite. Now it is the infinite that turns into the finite that turns into the infinite that turns into the finite that turns into the infinite and so forth. Although a different sequence arises from the nonfinite, that sequence is parasitic upon the former sequence of finite and finite, where the finite only goes beyond its limitation to end up returning to itself. In the former, where the finite’s ceasing-to-be turns out to just affirm the finite, that very affirmation of the finite ends up not being the finite, which consists in ceasing-to-be, but the nonfinite.

In this way, the finite converts itself into the nonfinite, which sets in motion the second sequence. Through this passage, the nonfinite lies beyond the finite, and for that very reason it ends up being limited, having limitation, and turning into the finite. But the finite, as we have seen, renders itself the nonfinite, which becomes the finite, and so forth.

Hegel goes on to claim that the resulting series presents something that does not revert to either the nonfinite or the finite. If so, we have an infinite that does not have any limit, and what allows it to not have any limit is that it contains the finite and the nonfinite within it. The recurring sequence of finite and nonfinite as a whole does not have anything else beyond it. It cannot have anything else beyond it, and therefore it is just in relation to itself. As such, it comprises being-for-self or self-relation, which is going to turn out to be being-for-one or the one.

The one is that which is not in relation to anything else but is just the one all by itself. If the one is to have anything to be in relationship to, it can only be something that is the complete absence of anything else. Pre-Socratic metaphysics first made familiar the term that arises as the counterpart of the one: namely, “the void.” We will see how that enters in, leading to the one and many.

Chapter Nine

Infinity

If one takes seriously the idea that systematic logic or philosophy begins without taking any determinacy for granted and thereupon is able to account for the determinacy of something and other from which the finite engenders itself, one can then categorize finitude without first having to invoke the infinite. The infinite itself arises in virtue of the finite, because, as Hegel puts it, the finite ends up undermining itself, providing the negation of the finite required by the infinite. The finite's being resides in its ceasing-to-be, for it is that which has limitation. Therefore the finite ends up being that which cancels itself.

What results is not immediately the nonfinite, because the very canceling of the finite is itself finite. Nonetheless, as Hegel suggests, when the finite gives way to the finite, rather than the nonfinite, this provides an entrée to the arrival of the infinite. Although the finite's ceasing-to-be itself ceases to be, this just gives way to what is no different from itself. As Hegel writes, "This its result, the negative as such, is its very *determination*" (p. 136).¹ Since the finite's determination is its own removal, that very removal just resuscitates itself. So the finite, in coming to an end, has, as Hegel says, "only *united with itself*" (p. 136).

We have, in this finite that gives way to the finite, a finite that unites with itself, a finite that turns into a being that is without end. It becomes an endless being, which is to say, we have something now that is not limited, a being that does not involve its own nonbeing, its own negation. Here we have come to the infinite.

We now have something that is a completely affirmative being, a being without limitation, a being that does not have the finite within it. This infinite is like Jehovah or Allah, having this unlimited being apart from everything

finite, both to begin with and even when there is a finite that it creates and from which it stands apart.

The finite, in returning to itself, has turned out to be a being that is without end, without limitation—but by being without limitation, this nonfinite infinite lacks the finite. The finite is something beyond it, or, as Hegel points out, the infinite “is at the same time the *negation* of an other, of the finite” (p. 138). It is that which is other to the finite. We now confront an infinite that, precisely because it does not contain the finite, ends up being an infinite that is limited by the finite, an infinite that thereby becomes finite. Yet, because the finite, as we have seen, has a being that is its own end, it ends up giving way to this endless being, this being without end, this being without a limit, the nonfinite infinite, which, because it is a nonfinite infinite, is itself limited, is a negation of something outside itself. Thus we have this recurring alternation of the finite and the infinite.

Hegel’s account obviously bears upon the question of whether the infinite could be said to arise prior to the finite. On the one hand, the nonfinite infinite does not precede the finite. On the other hand, we are going to see that the infinite that does not oppose the finite also does not arise prior to the finite. This, the so-called “true infinite” (p. 148), will be shown to result from the alternating succession of the finite and the nonfinite infinite.

The true infinite so results by being what this whole process ends up comprising. As such, the true infinite does not have either the finite or the nonfinite outside it. It contains them in the process whereby they revert to one another. This containment is what sets the process in its entirety apart from both the finite and the nonfinite infinite.

It would be a mistake to identify the eternal with the true infinite. The duration of time is not the same thing as the reappearance of a determination. We can speak of a purely logical succession in distinction from a temporal succession. Of course, it is hard to lay hold of what exactly is the added element in temporality that determinacy in general lacks. That nonlogical element is something that Hegel does take up after he has worked his way through what will present itself as the totality of logical determination. On that basis, he will be confronting the minimal specifications of what is nonlogical, which in the first instance will involve spatiality and then temporality. Temporality will be something that spatiality entails, in the sense that, as Hegel argues in his *Philosophy of Nature*, temporality minimally comprises the way in which the totality of space can be external to itself.² Space involves points, which, in being external to one another, give rise to lines, which, in being external to one another, give rise to planes, which, in being external to one another, generate three-dimensional space. The totality of space, however, can only be external to itself from one moment to the next. That will give Hegel a way of specifying temporality, which will presuppose spatiality, contra Kant, who will just throw out space and time as forms of

pure intuition, as if they were completely independent of one another.³ Sometimes in Hegel's logical treatment of the finite, he speaks about how the finite comes to an end, as if that were to be thought of as a temporal process—and admittedly, Hegel does give examples of finite things that come to an end in time and of how death is inherent in finite life. Here, in logic, however, we are not in a position to bring in the nonlogical factors ingredient in temporal process, except for purely illustrative purposes.

The true infinite has emerged from the process of the spurious infinite, which as a whole consists in the recurrent alternation of the finite and the nonfinite infinite. In this flux, the finite and nonfinite infinite continually convert into one another, and, as Hegel point out, the finite ends up returning to itself, but not in the immediate way it did prior to the emergence of the nonfinite, where we had the finite giving way to the finite. Here, the finite comes back to itself as a result of its own negation, which is the nonfinite infinite. There is a negation of the negation that leads the finite back to the finite, but the process whereby the finite comes back to itself is now also the process whereby the nonfinite infinite comes back to itself. A nonfinite infinite reverts to the finite as a finitized infinite, because it has the finite outside itself, as a beyond, but then the finite comes to its end and ends up reverting to the nonfinite infinite, so the nonfinite infinite comes back to itself, but mediated by this negation of its negation.

Thus both terms, the finite and the nonfinite infinite, figure in this process as results of this negation of the negation. This will all happen in one and the same process. But what will be true of the process as a whole will not be true of what is internal to it, to either of the factors that are constituents of this process or, to use another term, are moments of the process, are elements of the process. What defines both the finite and the nonfinite infinite is that the finite has limitation and thereby has the nonfinite infinite as a beyond and the nonfinite infinite has the finite as a beyond. By contrast, the process that contains their sequence does not have either as a beyond because it contains them within itself. As Hegel puts it, they are pure moments of something to which they belong (p. 147). For that very reason, this process, which is a process and not something static, does not lack finitude or the nonbeing of finitude within itself. It has both and it has them both in separation from one another and as uniting with one another.

As Hegel points out, in this process, the uniting and separating of the finite and nonfinite infinite turn out to be inseparable (p. 146). It would be incorrect to say that what we have here is the unity of the finite and the nonfinite infinite, because we do not just have the unity. That would cause the process to stop. Instead, we have both their unity, where each turns into the other, and their separation, where each becomes different from what it was.

We thus have something that does not have the finite or the nonfinite as a limit, as a beyond. Hegel identifies this double process as comprising the true infinite because it does not have any intrinsic limitation. There is nothing about it that brings it to an end. There is nothing outside it. Its determination consists in that very process consisting in the finite and the nonfinite reverting into one another and not being either just separated from one another or united with one another.

What we are dealing with is something that can be spoken of as self-related being and that is ultimately what this true infinite is going to yield. By contrast, the “spurious” infinite, what in German is just the *Schlecht*, the “bad” infinite, is not really infinite because of its exclusion of the finite, which gives it a limit and renders it finite. The good, true infinite does not have a limit, but the good infinite does have determinate being, and the question is, What character does this determinate being have that allows it to contain negation without imposing upon the infinite any kind of limitation?

Hegel calls the determinacy of the true infinite “ideality.” Ideality, he explains, is the finite as it is in the true infinite, not an independent, self-subsistent being, but only a moment (pp. 149–50). The otherness of this distinct element has no independence. From where, then, is the distinction going to be drawn? Why is there not a complete lack of distinction, leaving just indeterminacy? Well, the process of the true infinite has components. We have the finite in the way in which it enters into the sequence with the nonfinite infinite and the nonfinite infinite undergoing its correlative transformations. Hegel points out that there is a certain resemblance here to what we encountered in becoming, where becoming had its constituents, being and nothing, in their immediate conversion to one another, with ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be (p. 150). Now, is there going to be something similar to what happened in the emergence of determinate being from becoming, where the parallel movements, ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be, became paralyzed through to the return of being to being and nothing to nothing due to the immediate reverting of nothing to being and being to nothing? Do we really have something similar here? After all, Hegel does speak about the finite as well as the nonfinite infinite figuring as results in this process. That is, they are in the process as mediated by the negation of their negation. In this way they are moments of the process, as opposed to factors that have independent being apart from one another and apart from the process in which they are incorporated.

“Being-for-self” is the minimal or immediate specification of what the true infinite ends up giving us. Being-for-self is going to be characterized as “being-for-one” or the one. It is the one and only because there is nothing else to which it can stand in contrast. There is nothing external to it, no otherness, no beyond.

The void is going to be this nonbeing of all otherness, the nothing that is specifically the nothing of the one, the minimal absence of anything that could set a limit to the one. Different kinds of terms or categories will come into play in dealing with this domain of being-for-self, where qualitative limitation has been transcended.

If the true infinite had no determinacy, it would be nothing or being. The infinite, in contrast to being or nothing, cannot be devoid of determinacy. What is distinctive about it is that the true infinite is devoid of any limitation because limit and limitation, as well as what lies beyond limitation, are contained within it. As such, they do not have any independence. This is why all of these determinations internal to the true infinite have the character of being what Hegel calls “ideal.” They are moments of it. They are not self-subsistent.

Hegel observes that “in this detailed example, there is revealed the specific nature of speculative thought, which consists solely in grasping the opposed moments in their unity” (p. 152). He has spoken of this before, opposing genuine reason to the thinking of the understanding. The understanding is characterized as holding things apart, and it holds things apart precisely because it takes the terms that it thinks to be fixed in character. They are what they are. They do not revert to what they are not and in that way unite themselves with what they are not and turn out to be both themselves and their other.

This contrasting of reason and understanding goes back to something we came upon briefly at the very outset. Hegel had pointed out how logic has to be self-determining. It cannot begin with given contents or with any given procedure that would be applied to such contents. Somehow, whatever is at stake must emerge on its own and order itself, and if anything is going to emerge on its own and order itself, then it will involve thought determinations that do not just have a fixed character, because if they have a fixed character, they do not go anywhere, nor do they generate anything. Somehow, thought determinations are going to have to become other to what they are and yet be at one with what they are not, in that way giving rise to something new, thereby extending and determining themselves. That lack of fixity, of subservience to the principle of noncontradiction, is basic to what happens in a presuppositionless development or to autonomous reason. It also may turn out to be basic to determinacy in general, when we come to understand how determinacy ends up being ultimately self-determining.

Here we have something akin to that development, in a very abstract way. What has occurred with the emergence of the true infinite and ideality is that the finite as well as the nonfinite have shown themselves to be elements of a process that itself is not delimited in the way in which they each are. Instead, the process of the true infinite is in relation to nothing other than itself

precisely because all determination, all distinction, all otherness is internal to it and does not stand outside.

The ideality of the finite and the nonfinite infinite within the whole process might seem to represent a form of holism. There is a lot of talk of holism these days, and often Hegel is spoken of as a chief representative of the holist bandwagon. What is distinctive about holism as a philosophical position is that it maintains that things have their determination only within a determinate general context. They cannot be what they are without making reference to the whole. The whole is taken to be given, and the terms referred to it are just found. This kind of holism figures in the theory of knowledge that maintains that we know things only by understanding them in terms of the whole, that we cannot know anything directly, on its own terms. The obvious problem with this approach is that the whole itself cannot be known in terms of anything else. The whole is somehow known directly at the same time that any kind of direct knowledge is denied by embracing the idea that things can only be known in some greater context. Here in systematic logic, or philosophy as it begins, we do not have a given whole. We do not start with anything given nor with a given context in which things are found.

Similarly, there are those who regard Hegel as bearing a lot of resemblance with Spinoza, who speaks of the one substance as what is infinite, without allowing the finite to lie outside the one substance. Everything is part of the one substance, just an accident of the one substance.⁴

Hegel himself will later address the category “substance” and indicate that, *contra* Spinoza, there is something very limited about it. Some of those limitations pertain to the discussion here. Although Spinoza does speak about determination involving negation, as Hegel acknowledges, Spinoza really does not show us why the one substance has to have attributes and accidents, let alone why it has to have the attributes it has. Consequently, Spinoza’s infinite one substance does not have inherent in it any real determinate specification of the finite. Spinoza sticks in all sorts of different determinations, but they are just stipulated.

Not surprisingly, Hegel notes, “Thinkers have often placed the essence of philosophy in the answering of the question: how does the infinite go forth from itself and become finite?” (p. 152). As we have seen, the infinite that does not have the finite within it becomes finite precisely because the finite is its beyond. The discussion here is somewhat parallel to the arguments Hegel makes against those who want to keep being and nothing apart. There is equally a tendency to think of the finite and the infinite as being completely separable, rather than seeing how they could be both separated and united. There are those who want to absolutize the finite by holding it apart from the infinite, as if that could be done, or, alternately, holding the infinite apart from the finite. It turns out, however, that by keeping them apart, you end up negating them. The infinite that is held apart from the finite has a limit, a

beyond, negating its own transcendence and rendering it finite. The finite that is left on its own comes to an end canceling its own limitation, rendering itself nonfinite.

In connection with the ideality of the true infinite, Hegel makes the claim that all philosophy is ultimately an idealism (p. 155). He points out that he is not talking about the subjective idealism found among some of his immediate predecessors, such as Kant, or among his contemporaries, such as Schelling. Both are really subjective idealists, in the sense that they regard all determinations to be relative to the knowing subject. For Kant, what is knowably objective is mediated by the subject of knowing. The structure of knowing determines the character of the object that knowing can know. Those "objective" determinations really do not have any independent subsistence, but fall within the identity of the subject and are internal determinations of it.

Hegel characterizes all philosophy as being an idealism but not a subjective idealism. This suggests that philosophical thinking is in some respect truly infinite, that it does not have something beyond it in the way in which the opposition of consciousness leaves its finite knowing confronting a given that has an independent subsistence. Philosophy, by contrast, involves a self-determining reason that is going to generate the determinacy of everything that it could be said to know, including, ultimately, the categorial determinacy of what is not logical, not merely thought. To what extent we are here engaged in knowing is something logic has yet to determine, for we have yet to deal with the category of knowing, which will come up in the *Logic of the Concept*.

That philosophy should involve idealism is connected with philosophical thought's lack of external limitations, its coming up with content or distinctions that are internal to reason. Does this mean that philosophical truth has no end? Well, there are different ways in which something could end. If something ends in virtue of itself, then you have to say it has a limitation. If it ends in virtue of something else, it has a limit, beyond which resides an other. Either way, the end in question does not achieve a genuine culmination, but only leads to a further alternation of the finite and the nonfinite. The true infinite is without limitation, but it contains the finite within itself. It is not just unlimited. This avoids the big theological problems plaguing those who portray the divine as just unlimited or as just infinite and not containing the finite. The God of Islam and of the Jews is an example of that kind of god, the Lord who opposes finitude. Whereas such a god does not contain finitude, the Christian Divine, portrayed in the doctrine of the Trinity, moves away from an infinite that has no finitude within it. With the representation of the Trinity, in which the Divine becomes a finite individual, religious imagery depicts an infinite that does not have the finite over and against it.

The true infinite now gives rise to what comprises the third part of the account of determinacy or quality. This third section addresses being-for-

self, which is going to exhaust the specifications of determinacy or quality and take us to the point where we arrive at a completely new dimension of determinacy, one that is going to presuppose what is here at stake. That new dimension is quantitative determinacy, and it will be important to see how and why quantity should follow from the being-for-self of quality.

When we encounter being-for-self and its initial characterization as the one, it is important not to regard the one as an integer, as a quantum, as something mathematical. Likewise, when we come to the one and many, which will be part of the discussion of being-for-self, we need to understand how this is different from a plurality of quanta. The account of quantity that will follow being-for-self can be thought of as a basic philosophy of mathematics. Mathematics is based upon quantitative determination, and the philosophical account of quantity will provide mathematics with its philosophical grounding.

To begin with, we need to direct our attention upon how a transition is to be made from the true infinite to being-for-self. Is the true infinite just immediately being-for-self? Or must something extra have to occur for the true infinite to turn into being-for-self, and, if so, what? With respect to the transition at issue, Hegel begins by noting that “ideality can be called the *quality* of infinity” (p. 150). If infinity just had ordinary quality, it would just be determinate being. Ideality is different from quality per se, but you could say it is a type of quality. It is the determinacy that infinity has, but there is something special about that determinacy. It is not clear that to speak of ideality requires bringing in the finite, the nonfinite infinite, and their flipping back and forth into one another. Hegel no longer uses those terms to identify ideality. Instead, he characterizes ideality as involving determinacy that has no independent or self-subsistent being but is only something internal to that to which it belongs. With ideality, we have determinacy that is completely internal to infinity, “but,” Hegel says, “it is essentially the process of *becoming*, and hence a transition—like that of becoming in determinate being—which is now to be indicated” (p. 150). Becoming collapsed and led to determinate being when the vanishing of being and nothing into one another itself vanished. Ceasing-to-be ceased to cease and coming-to-be ceased to come to be because the being that nothing immediately reverted to just as much immediately reverted back to nothing and vice versa, paralyzing their process. Here, by contrast, the two sides of the process are the finite becoming the nonfinite and the nonfinite becoming the finite. Insofar as each terminus reverts to its counterpart, we appear to have an analogous paralysis of both complementary sides of the process. The finite ceases to turn into the nonfinite and the nonfinite ceases to become finite, leaving a finite with the infinite, a finite with the nonfinite, immediately.

Hegel goes on to say, “As a sublating of finitude, that is, of finitude as such, and equally of the infinity which is merely its opposite, merely nega-

tive, this return into self is *self-relation, being*" (p. 150). We are left not with determinate being, the unity of being and nothing in the form of being, but self-relation in the form of being. Hegel is intimating that the finite has returned to itself by way of the canceling of the nonfinite into which it became, just as the nonfinite has returned to itself by way of the canceling of the finite into which it reverted.

On the one hand, there is the finite returning to itself, not immediately, but by having pushed aside the nonfinite infinite. It is a finite that has come back to itself by eliminating both its own coming to end as well as the nonfinite. On the other hand, there is the nonfinite that has canceled the finite and then returned to itself by eliminating what could be said to be its beyond as well.

Whereas the immediate conjoining of being and nothing provided the minimal threshold of determinacy, here the immediate conjoining of finite and nonfinite infinite provide the minimal threshold of self-relation. Hegel observes that "as this being contains negation it is *determinate*" (p. 150). The negation lies not just in the contrast of negation and reality in general but more specifically in the negation of both sides of process of infinity. There is negation, which involves something determinate, "but," Hegel goes on to say, "as this negation further is essentially negation of the negation, the self-related negation, it is that determinate being which is called *being-for-self*" (p. 150). Hegel earlier pointed out how both sides of the true infinite involved conversions that comprise negations of negation. The finite negated its negation by removing the nonfinite and reverting to itself, just as the nonfinite negated its negation by removing the finite and turning back into itself.

Hegel begins characterizing being-for-self, or self-relation, writing, "In being-for-self, *qualitative* being finds its *consummation*; it is infinite being" (p. 157). He now proceeds to flesh out wherein lies this "consummation." Being-for-self somehow comprises the consummation of quality. After all, this is the third section, the final section, the concluding section of the account of quality, determinacy. How does it bring closure to qualitative determination?

Well, "determinate being is sublated but only immediately sublated being" (p. 157). It is being with nonbeing, immediately, and nothing more than that. "It thus contains, to begin with, only the first negation, which is itself immediate" (p. 157). In nonbeing, there is no negation of anything else. "It is true that being, too, is preserved in it and both are united in determinate being in a simple unity, but for that very reason they are in themselves still unequal to each other and their unity is not yet *posited*." What are the terms that are still unequal to each other, whose unity is not posited? Is it being and determinate being? Is it being and negation?

In the sphere of determinate being, negation always fell outside the being of determinacy. So, for example, something had its negation in something else. As Hegel writes, “Determinate being is therefore the sphere of difference, of dualism, the field of finitude” (p. 157). Negation lies outside being. “Determinateness is determinateness as such, in which being is only relatively, not absolutely determined” (p. 157). It is relatively determinate because determinate being is determined in contrast to something else. By contrast, “in being-for-self, the difference between being and determinateness or negation is posited and equalized” (p. 157). What would it mean for that difference to be equalized?

With the overcoming of limitation in the true infinite, that which its being is in relation to and by which it could be said to have its determination is itself. It is self-related, not related to another. There is relation, though, and there is some kind of difference, although the difference has an internal character. In that way, there is an equalization between negation and being.

“Quality, otherness, limit—like reality, being-in-itself, the ought, and so on” (p. 157)—these are all the terms with which determinate being was characterized prior to the emergence of being-for-self. These are “the imperfect embodiments of the negative in being in which the difference of both still lies at the basis” (p. 157). In all these categories there was a difference between being and negation, which provided determination. “Since, however, in finitude the negation has passed into infinity, into the *posited* negation of negation, it is simple self-relation and consequently in its own self the equalization with being, *absolutely determined being*.” The negation of finitude was infinity. This involved negation of the negation, and it ended up involving self-relation, with an absolute rather than relative determinate being.

We will have to see what this amounts to, and we can look back at the so-called transition to try to understand why Hegel thinks we are left with merely being-for-self. Does it still involve reference to the infinite and the finite and their transitions?

Chapter Ten

Being-for-Self

Hegel has brought us to consider the process of the spurious infinite, into which finitude has led. As we have seen, the process itself has a character different than the terms that figure within it. The process as a whole is one within which these terms have their limitation and relation to other negated and end up figuring as elements of a process that itself does not suffer from the problems they have. The process turns out to consist of a continual negation of negation, where the emergence of otherness (negation) is immediately canceled. The determinacies that figure within this process end up relating just to themselves, returning to themselves by having canceled the negation that arises in virtue of what they are.

We thus have something that as a whole is not mediated by anything, that does not have limitation or relation to other. It still has determination, but of such a character that the negation its determination necessarily involves immediately reverts to the negation of its otherness. So we have something that is self-related, that, as Hegel maintains, has a determination that is not relative to something else. It is absolutely determined in virtue of this negation of negation. We find the first negation in the process of the finite and the infinite, in their alternation with one another. The return of each to itself by way of canceling its counterpart is the second negation, rendering the whole process a double negation, a negation of negation. The double negation here occurs on both sides, which truly are one and the same process. As a whole you thus have something that transcends all limitation, all relation to other, possessing its determination in virtue of this process of negation of negation. Once more, we end up with something that boggles the mind, if one remains bound to a thinking that is governed by the principle of noncontradiction.

Self-relation, the outcome of the true infinite, has to have some aspect of otherness for there to be a relation. That relating, however, ends up doubling

back on itself because its determination ends up being only its own determination. Even though self-relation is a relating to, it ends up relating back to itself, becoming something that is determinate without any abiding contrast to something else.

As Hegel points out, self-relation does not contain the whole slew of categories that have arisen from the development of determinacy (p. 158).¹ They now have been removed or supplanted by something that is not subject to a difference between being and negation. Up until being-for-self there has been a division between being and negation. This was exemplified by the separation of something and other, where the negation of something lay in something else. Even in limit being and negation are not completely united, even though limit is where something both begins and ends. With limit, where something ends, it ends because at that same point begins something else, which is its negation.

The internalized character of the determinacy of being-for-self leads Hegel to introduce a new term to capture its distinctive nature. The term in question is not “sublation” (*Aufhebung*), which has a much broader reach. Sublation always involves some term losing its immediacy by becoming mediated by something else. Rather, Hegel here speaks of “ideality,” which involves determinacy and negation or otherness, but an otherness internal to it. This ideality arises with the true infinite, since it overcomes all limit, which is imposed by any otherness that is external. The true infinite removes the external otherness afflicting the finite and the nonfinite infinite by containing both in their process of reverting into one another.

Hegel does at times refer to Spinoza in connection to ideality since, for Spinoza, there is ultimately just one being, one substance, which is infinite without confronting any external otherness. Hegel, however, will attempt to show that the way in which Spinoza characterizes this solitary infinite involves something worthy of the name substance. Since Spinoza’s substance indeed is not really in relation to anything else but its own accidents and the attributes of its own self, it is self-related. Nonetheless, the specific relation between substance and its internal differentiation involves more than being-for-self and can only belong to the Logic of Essence with its two-tiered framework of determiner and determined.

We do find Hegel referring to different philosophers who have taken individual categories and treated them as if they were what is fundamental and made them the first principle of everything. Doing that means that they are treating the category in a way that is different than Hegel. To treat a category as a first principle signifies that the category is not regarded as being the product of any prior development or category. Taking the category as a first principle is tantamount to treating it as presuppositionless, as the start of it all. By the same token, the mere fact that such philosophers make the category in question ultimate signifies that they also do not properly

acknowledge the development that follows from the category. That development ends up showing that the privileged category is not the final measure of everything, but may end up itself not only presupposing terms that go into its own constitution, but becoming a moment or a constituent of something more concrete and encompassing.

Throughout the *Science of Logic*, one sees Hegel referring to different philosophers who fixate on one of the categories, which, by being ripped out of the development, is always subject to a certain deformation. Something about the privileged category is not being properly construed, which is symptomatic of how they take it as something that could be considered ultimate and immediate and the last word.

We see that in the discussion of being-for-self. Hegel points to both a philosophical system and a philosopher as seizing upon self-relation and making it ultimate. The Pre-Socratic ancient Greek atomists, and Democritus in particular, regard being-for-self as a first principle by taking the categories of the one, the void, and the many ones separated by the void as being the ultimate constituents of everything. On this atomistic basis, everything is explained in terms of completely external relationships between these many ones, which are otherwise completely indistinguishable. There is no way to differentiate one atom from another. The atoms themselves are not susceptible to any change. They are inalterable. Whatever relations they end up in are completely extrinsic to them, having no bearing upon their own qualitative character. None of the arrangements that they fall into in any way alter their character, nor is there anything about them that requires they be in any relation to one another. In other words, their being does not depend upon their relation to other.

Hegel further suggests that the category of being-for-self is given a central role by Leibniz in his theory of monads.² We find being-for-self in the monads insofar as they are not in any way affected by their relation to other. Their relation to one another is completely external to what they are, and that is explained by the fact that they already contain within themselves any relationship they might have. In other words, the relation they have to others is completely ideal, for in the last analysis, it is just an internal differentiation.

There is a connection between how Hegel speaks of consciousness as exhibited in being-for-self and how Leibniz will speak of the monad as being something that is almost like a little self, which represents other determinations. Each monad is a window on the world that internally has a represented world as a moment in itself, while being otherwise closed to any world without. Even though consciousness involves an opposition to what is other than itself, it equally exhibits being-for-self. The opposition of consciousness involves a subject-object relationship. Even when one is conscious of something other, something not oneself, there is self-relation. As conscious, we

represent what we are aware of. In representing it, we have a determination of our own. Since it is our determination of our own consciousness awareness by which we have a relation to other, we are really relating to ourselves in confronting an object. At the same time that we are cognizant of something other, we are really just relating to ourselves. Hegel will point out later that because consciousness has both being-for-self and subject-object opposition, it will involve the categories of appearance and essence.

At the very end of his brief introduction to being-for-self, Hegel lays out the three stages in the whole development of being-for-self. He writes, "Being-for-self is first, immediately *a* being-for-self—the One. Secondly, the One passes into a *plurality of ones—repulsion*—and this otherness of the ones is sublated in their ideality—*attraction*" (p. 157). And then "thirdly, we have the alternating determination of repulsion and attraction in which they collapse into equilibrium," whereby "quality. . . passes . . . into *quantity*" (p. 157).

There are going to be three stages in the development. First of all, we have being-for-self, which could equally be called self-relatedness or self-relation, which ends up being *a* self-relatedness, *a* self-related being. Analogously, determinacy first began with determinate being, which ended up being *a* determinate being, something. Then we had a relation between somethings, between something and other. Here we also are going to begin with self-relation, being-for-self, which then becomes *a* being-for-self, *a* one, which itself generates a one in relation to other ones, a many. This succession, however, is going to involve something different than a relation to something other, because the terms in question are not really something. They are terms that are in relation to themselves. How can what is in relation to itself be at the same time in relation to anything else that would also be self-related? What form will that relationship take?

Hegel is going to portray it in terms of what he calls "repulsion" and "attraction," which are going to be, obviously, the inverse of one another. With repulsion, the one is becoming many, whereas with attraction, the many is becoming one. Hegel will show how the one becoming many and the many becoming one are really one and the same process. In turning out to be one and the same process, they are going to give rise to quantity. This is because quantity involves a unification of repulsion and attraction. That unification will be constitutive of quantity in the form of the connection of continuity and discreteness.

Essentially, this is what lies before us. The challenge will reside in understanding how self-relation can become not just one but a determinate one in relation to other determinate ones, while still retaining the character of being self-related. This will entail a very different kind of relation than that between something and other. Further, we will have to see how this whole process reverts to something worthy of the name of quantity.

To begin with, Hegel turns to being-for-self as such, and there is not much to be said about being-for-self. Here all we are dealing with is what “transcends otherness, its connection and community with other. . . . For it, the other has being only . . . as *its moment*; being-for-self consists in having so transcended limitation, its otherness, that it is, as this negation, the infinite *return* into itself” (p. 158). Hegel has enlisted all of the terms that we have just encountered, and the task is to see what happens as the outcome of the true infinite.

This first section, which is titled “Being-for-self as Such,” contains three subsections: “Determinate Being and Being-for-self,” “Being-for-one,” and then thirdly “The One,” all of which precedes the second section, “The One and the Many.” The second section, “The One and the Many,” has, again, three subsections. The first is “The One in Its Own Self,” which is going to lead us to another term called “the void.” Then we are going to encounter a relation of the one and the void, which is going to give rise to a plurality of ones, the many.

The ensuing development exhibits moves that parallel those of determinate being. There determinacy gave rise to a determinacy, which had negation and reality. Insofar as negation and reality both were determinate, we were led to a relation between somethings, something and other. Something similar will occur with the one and the void. Hegel will explicitly invoke reality and negation, and we will want to see how that connection works.

At the start of “Determinate Being and Being-for-self,” Hegel writes, “Being-for-self is infinity which has collapsed into simple being” (p. 158). Remember how the collapse occurred. Through the successions of the finite-infinite-finite and of the infinite-finite-infinite, each determinacy returned to itself by negating its otherness, coming into relation to itself by way of this double negation, whereby what resulted was no longer in contrast to something different from itself.

In that respect, what emerged was in the form of simple being. “It is *determinate* being in so far as the negative nature of infinity, which is the negation of negation, is from now on in the explicit form of the *immediacy* of being, as only negation in general, as simple qualitative determinacy” (p. 158). Why does this process comprising the true infinite take us back to immediacy, take us only to negation in general, as opposed to anything more specific? Characteristic of the entire development of being-for-self is that it involves something with an internal differentiation, but that internal differentiation is simple, such that being-for-self will be spoken of as the one per se, not a qualitatively distinguished one opposing others. For something to be the one per se, its ideality or internal determinacy can only be expressed in a negative way, even though this is its affirmative being. Being-for-self does not have limitation. It is not related to other. It has its self-related character

by having overcome relation to other, limitation. That is all that we have and there is not much more to say about it.

Hegel points out that determinate being is at the same time also a moment of being-for-self (p. 158). After all, we are not dealing with something that is indeterminate. Instead of reverting to being, we have determinacy characterized by having removed any determination by limitation. Being-for-self thus has determinacy, but this determinacy is such that it is only in relation to itself in this its determinacy. In other words, its determinacy is completely ideal.

To indicate this, Hegel now introduces the term “being-for-one” (p. 159). A determinate being owes its determinacy to what it is not, to its negation, what is other to it. Here, with being-for-self, that is not the case. Nevertheless, there is relation, there is determination, but somehow the other is in question. Self-related determinacy has a being-for-other that “is bent back into the infinite unity of being-for-self” (p. 159). It is an infinite unity because it has lost its limitation as well as any relation to other. It does not have any limit, so it is infinite. Nevertheless, it involves a relation, but its determinate being is present in being-for-self as a being-for-one. In that way, its relation is self-relation.

Being-for-one obviously departs from the being-for-other of something and other. Their relation stamped each with being-in-itself and being-for-other. Now, we no longer have relation to other and these correlative features of each determinate being. We have determinacy, but the determinacy is of a very special kind, resting upon the elimination of all relation to other and the categories that are based upon that, such as limit and limitation, the finite and the nonfinite. All of that has been superseded.

Being-for-one is how the resulting determination stands not as being-for-other, but as related to itself. In the first sentence under the title “Being-for-one,” Hegel tells us, “This moment expresses the manner in which the finite is present in its unity with the infinite, or is an ideal being” (p. 159). Being-for-one expresses how the determination of being-for-self is completely ideal. The negation that it involves does not involve limit or being-for-other. It rather involves being-for-one. At this juncture, Hegel adds something that might appear very perplexing. He writes, “Now though this moment has been designated as *being-for-one*, there is as yet nothing present for which it would be—no *one*, of which it would be the moment. There is, in fact, nothing of the kind as yet fixed in being-for-self; that for which something (and here there is no something) would be, whatever the other side as such might be, is likewise a moment, is itself only a being-for-one, not yet a one” (p. 159). The determinacy of what has being-for-self just has a relation to itself, which is the one. There is nothing else available. Why then does Hegel tell us that what being-for-self is related to is not yet a one, but only a moment?

When Hegel first characterized being, he emphasized how being is not in relation to anything else and has no division within itself. Here, self-related being has a relation, but it is not a relation to something else. Instead of being-for-other, it has being-for-one, whereby it is just in relation to itself. For that reason, the being-for-one is really just a relation to what is itself being-for-one, what is itself just a moment of the whole, as opposed to something that can stand as a one. As Hegel says, “What we have before us is still an undistinguishedness of the two sides which may be suggested by being-for-one” (p. 159). We have relatedness, but it is a relation of something to itself, and the rub is that there is a relation. It is, however, a relation intrinsic to it. It is not, however, the same as saying $A = A$, where A is *put* into equivalence with itself. Here we have something that by itself is such as to relate to itself, in virtue of not having a relation to other or a limitation or a limit.

The problem is to think of self-relation as both involving a relation and yet not being a relation to another. Normally you think of a relation as involving *relata* that are distinct, but here is a relation where the *relata* are not distinct and that is captured by this term that a determination is only in relation to one, not to anything else. As Hegel writes,

What we have before us is still an undistinguishedness of the two sides which may be suggested by being-for-one; there is only *one* being-for-other, and because there is only *one*, this too is only a being-for-one; there is only the *one* ideality of that, for which or in which there is supposed to be a determination as moment, and of that which is supposed to be a moment in it. Being-for-one and being-for-self are, therefore, not genuinely opposed determinatenesses. (p. 159)

Or as Hegel puts it farther down, “The one for which it is, is only itself” (p. 159). Insofar as being-for-self is in relation to itself, its determinacy has being-for-one, not being-for-another, and the one is being-for-self, because it has determinacy that does not involve relation to anything else. It has to involve relation, because you do not have any determinacy without negation.

Admittedly, when something relates to other, the other is a something to the first something as its other. They do both end up figuring as something and as other, occupying the same dual relationships, but they do that in alternation. That is, when something relates to its other, it is not something relating to something. It is something relating to an other, to its other. The other relates to it as its other, figuring in the role of something. But in order for them to be something, they relate to their counterpart as an other, not as something.

By contrast, being-for-self is an entity that is only in relation to itself to begin with, not to something that may have a similar structure. Moreover, when we come to consider how something that is self-related can relate to

another something that is self-related, the relation will take a different form from how something and other relate to one another. It will involve the relation of one and many, and we will have to see how this relation is different.

In other words, when something and other end up figuring both as something and as other, and in that respect exhibit the same structure, that is something for us, that we observe. It is not a removal of the difference and otherness that they each contain. But here we have something that relates to its determinacy as being something in which it only encounters itself.

Hegel now turns to what he calls the one, and we want to see how we get to the one, as well as to what we are arriving. Hegel reaffirms, "Being-for-self is the simple unity of itself and its moment, being-for-one" (p. 163). Being-for-self has a determination, which is being-for-one since it is just in relation to itself. Its quality is being-for-one. "There is before us only a single determination, the self-relation of the sublating" (p. 163). Remember, the sublating comprised the removal of dependence on other for determination. So, "the *moments* of being-for-self have collapsed into the *undifferentiatedness* which is immediacy or being, but an *immediacy* based on the negating which is posited as its determination" (p. 163). We no longer need to refer back to the alternation of the finite, the infinite, and so forth. We have come through their sequence to that which is determinate without involving relation to other, and it is immediate. It is immediate because if it were not immediate, it would have to be in relation to something or determined by something. But there is no longer any other. What is here immediate, however, is not just being. It is self-related being. It is what has the quality of being-for-one. What makes the self-related being the one is that it has a form of immediacy. As Hegel writes, "Being-for-self is thus *a* being-for-self," because it is "an *immediacy* based on the negating which is posited as its determination. Being-for-self is thus *a* being-for-self, and since in this immediacy its inner meaning vanishes, it is the wholly abstract limit of itself—the one" (p. 163), *a* one.

Now, what is the difference between being-for-self and "*a* being-for-self?" You might think that it means that we are now dealing with a particular one that stands in relation to others, but it most emphatically does not, even though it is immediate. Nevertheless, the one has a kind of determinacy. Something also emerged as a determinate being that was not just determinacy but determinate determinacy, quality not just in the form of being, but involving being and nonbeing, reality and negation. Hegel speaks of the one as being "*a* being-for-self," but "*a* being-for-self" cannot be in relation to anything else if it is the one. It is the one and Hegel speaks of it as being "the wholly abstract limit of itself." It is the limit of itself because it is not limited by anything else. There is not another one to which it stands in relation,

making it a being-for-self related to another being-for-self. It has its definiteness simply in virtue of itself, so it can be just “a one.”

Nonetheless, we are immediately introduced to a series of moves that eventually lead to a plurality of ones, the one and the many. This path takes us through three successive stages. The first is “The One in Its Own Self,” the second is “The One and the Void,” and the third is the “Many Ones.” Hegel gives us an encapsulation of what will follow. We start, he notes, with the one, where being-for-self has a form of immediacy. “In its own self,” he writes, “the one simply is” (p. 164). It is immediate. It is not in relation to anything else, nor is it determined or limited by anything else. “This its being is neither a determinate being, nor a determinateness as a relation to an other, nor is it a constitution” (p. 164). The one does not have any constitution because it has no relation to others. By the same token, it has no determination, for determination and constitution go together, as correlatively determinate renderings of being-for-other and being-in-itself. Moreover, the one is not capable of becoming an other. It is unalterable because alteration involves becoming an other and the one is something that has no possible relation to other. The one, however, is not indeterminate like being because it has a relation to its own self. Being does not have a relation to its own self. Being may not be related to anything else, but we do not find in it a relationship and a being-for-one. Being is just indeterminate. This is what allows Plato to expose the perplexities of identifying being and the one in his dialogue *Parmenides*.³

The one, unlike being, “has difference in it, a turning away from itself to an other; but this movement is immediately turned back on itself, because . . . there is no other to which the one can go” (p. 165). The one has relation, but the otherness of what is in relation is immediately canceled. What then is left in the one? All that there can be is the void. As Hegel explains,

In this simple immediacy the mediation of determinate being and of ideality itself, and with it all difference and manifoldness, has vanished. There is *nothing* in it; this *nothing*, the abstraction of self-relation, is here distinguished from the being-within-self itself; it is a *posited* nothing because this being-within-self no longer has the simple character of something but, as a mediation, has a concrete determination; but as abstract, though it is identical with the one, it is distinct from its determination. This nothing, then, posited as *in the one*, is the nothing as the *void*. The void is thus the *quality* of the *one* in its immediacy. (p. 165)

There can be nothing in the one but the void, because otherwise relation to other would reenter and cancel the self-relation. In the one, all determinacy is ideality, completely internal to it, and “the void is thus the *quality* of the *one* in its immediacy.”

Determinate being just had determinacy in the form of being. That determinacy was just quality that is, but the form of being is immediately the form of nothing, leaving the being of quality, reality, together with the nonbeing of quality, negation.

Does something similar go on here? We had being-for-one in the form of being, as immediate. Does that immediately present us with the nonbeing of being-for-one, nothing in a particular form that would comprise the void? The nonbeing of being-for-one must not be a determinate something, an other. Reality and negation ended up being somethings in their own right, because reality could not help but have negation, just as negation could not help but have reality, insofar as it is a positive determinacy. Now the nonbeing of being-for-one's quality cannot just be nothing, since nothing is just indeterminate. We are dealing with something more specific, but something that cannot just be an other. The reason why Hegel employs the void is basically the same reason why the atomists employ the void as that which lies outside their atoms. To put it bluntly, there is nothing as well as no something in the void. The void is precisely what is devoid of any determinate being that could confront the one as an other and render self-relation relation to other. The characterization of the void is that it excludes anything determinate. That exclusion is its own determination. The void is the negation of something determinate that does not itself comprise another something. This allows it to remain internal to the one, rather than putting the one in a relation to other. If one asks what could possibly be "other" than the one, it has to be something that would not set the one in relation to anything else. What does that is that which excludes anything other, namely, the void.

Hegel first of all characterizes the void as the nothing that is in the one. As he writes, "This nothing . . . posited as *in the one*, is the nothing as the *void*. The void is thus the *quality* of the *one* in its immediacy" (p. 165). Nonetheless, he then goes on, in the discussion of "The One and the Void," to contrast them in a way that presents the void as something to which the one stands in a relation that is no relation. Hegel says, "The one is the void as the abstract relation of the negation to itself" (p. 165). A relation of the negation to itself is not the relation of something to it. It is the relation of the exclusion of something to it. "However, the void as the nothing is absolutely distinct from the simple immediacy, the also *affirmative* being of the one, and since they stand in one and the same relation, namely, that of the one, their difference is *posited*; but as distinct from the affirmative being of the one, the nothing as the void is *outside* it" (p. 165).

Just as reality and negation gave determinacy the form of determinate being, so the contrast of the being of being-for-self with the void gives self-relation determinate being. As Hegel writes, "Being-for-self determined in this manner as the one *and* the void has again acquired a *determinate* being" (p. 165). Being-for-self, to begin with, was ascribed just immediacy, being.

Now, it acquires determinate being in the same way that determinacy acquired a determinate being, namely, by having both the nonbeing and the being of its determinacy. What can comprise the nonbeing of being-for-self, of the one? It cannot be something else, but can only be the void, which excludes everything else while at the same time being different from the one.

Hegel speaks of the one and the void as moments of being-for-self that allow it to have determinate being, just as reality and negation enable determinacy to have a determinate being. "Being-for-self determined in this manner as the one *and* the void has again acquired a *determinate* being. The one and the void have negative relation to self for their common, simple base" (p. 165). They both have this negative relation to self excluding otherness. The One does it in the form of being, and the void does it in the form of nonbeing, which together allows that same relation to now exist in a determinate fashion, in a way that each is and is not.

"The moments of being-for-self emerge from this unity, become external to themselves; through the *simple* unity of the moments, there enters the determination of *being* and the unity thus reduces itself to being only *one* side" (p. 165). Being is only one side because being immediately presents us with nothing. If you have something in the form of being, you will also have it in the form of nonbeing and thus you will have it in a determinate way. You will have determinate being. Hence, the one "is confronted by its other determination, the negation as such, likewise as a determinate being of the nothing, as the void" (p. 165).

Reality and negation themselves allowed determinacy to be determinate, a determinate determinacy, something, but they themselves each turned out to be determinate, engendering something and other. Here, also, we have the one, which initially had the void within it as the way in which negation figures in it, but it also has the void figuring as a counterpart. Hegel is going to follow out how this turns into an opposition of ones to one another. He writes, under "Many Ones: Repulsion," that "the one and the void constitute the first stage of the determinate being of being-for-self" (p. 167). Being-for-self is determined by having both being-for-one and the void as aspects of itself. "Each of these moments has negation for its determination and is at the same time posited as a determinate being" (p. 167). They are distinct from one another. "According to the former determination the one and the void are the *relation* of negation to negation as of an other to its other" (p. 167).

Now Hegel draws a contrast that harks back to reality and negation. He writes, "The one is negation in the determination of being, and the void is negation in the determination of non-being" (p. 167). Reality is the being of quality, and negation is the nonbeing of quality. Here we have something very similar, except it involves a particular kind of negation that is constitutive of being-for-self. "The one is essentially self-relation only as related *negation*, that is, it is itself that which the void outside it is supposed to be.

Each, however, is also *posited* as an *affirmative* determinate being” (p. 167). They each have pretty much the same kind of relation. They are both the basis of their own determination in this negation of negation, in which they exclude otherness.

They each comprise another determinate being of the same sort, and what we are really left with is the becoming of many ones. The void ends up being another one. How, then, can there be a relation between ones? If they are retaining the character of being one, they cannot be related to one another. So even if somehow they are present, they have to avoid falling into any contact or relation. They cannot come up against each other and have a limit, where what they are is defined by what the other is. They must repel one another, and in repulsion we have the kind of relationship that one, what is self-related, can have to another such entity. Repulsion is a negation of relation to other, a negation of any limit where they would come together and be defined by one another.

What alone can fall between them as part and parcel of this repulsion is the void, the absence of anything other at their respective boundaries. The void will intercede, because when you have a relationship between entities that are going to remain completely self-related, their relationship has to be one that negates the relation to one another that would give them any constitution or determination or would give them a limit, where they are just as much defined by the other.

Although the term “repulsion” might appear to be something physical or spatial, it should be thought here in a purely logical way. It can even be thought to apply to separate self-related categories. There is a void separating them, and this makes them retain a character where what they are is in no way dependent on what lies on the other side.

Hegel is going to make an argument that this implication ends up bringing the ones all together, but that this attraction just as much entails separating them out. When you have both repulsion and attraction together, what results is quantity, with its combination of continuity and discreteness.

Chapter Eleven

The One

Our task is to trace the moves that take us through what Hegel identifies as the completion of quality, as well as the completion of being-for-self. With being-for-self, we no longer have reference to the finite and the nonfinite. We have reference to what became of the infinite, in that here we are dealing with what does not involve limitation or relation to other, but ideality, which is how the true infinite retains its content.

The internality of ideality may seem to involve self-determination, but self-determination will arise thematically first when we come to the logic of the concept and we have to grapple with why that is the case. Properly speaking, we are here only dealing with self-relation, not self-determination. Self-determination may involve self-relation, but it involves more, and that more will have to do with what determination involves and what being determined involves, as opposed to simply being related and being in relation.

Determinate being contains determinacy immediately, whereas ideality involves determinacy that is mediated by the overcoming of all externality, all relation to other. Hegel speaks in the very beginning of the discussion of being-for-self about how determinacy and being were separated, because what provided determinacy, negation or otherness, was external to the being that was determinate in virtue of the negation. Now the negation is brought inside entirely, and that internality is what comprises ideality. It involves a determination of something without reference to any otherness by eliminating any relation to other. It is internal determinacy.

When all determinacy is inward, then we have just being-for-self with no being-for-other. Insofar as the true infinite has eliminated all beyond, all relation to otherness, it is simply being-for-self. The terms “nonfinite” and “finite” no longer really apply. The minimal term that follows from ideality is “being-for-one.” Unlike being-for-other, being-for-one characterizes what

is determinate solely in virtue of itself, solely in relation to itself. Because it is only in relation to itself, its determinacy consists of being-for-one, which is being-for-self in the sense that there is nothing else to which it stands in contrast.

Being-for-one is not really distinguishable from what could be called the one. Being-for-one is a relation to, but what is related to is the same as the relation, so there is just being-for-one. You do not really have a division of terms like you did with determinate being, where you have a relation to other together with being-for-other and being-in-itself. Here, we just have being-for-one.

For this reason, being-for-self is simple. There is no contrast within it. It is just being-for-self. It is just this oneness, without further qualification. It is, however, a oneness that is immediate, and being-for-self thereby has the one-sidedness that introduces determination. This oneness or being-for-self cannot help but turn out to be determinate. The being-for-one that it is in the form of being follows the kind of development by which the one-sided immediacy of determinacy gave rise to the determinate determinacy of something. The being-for-self that is just being-for-one or oneness ends up becoming a determinate oneness in virtue of the kind of contrast that is the only kind of contrast that a determinate oneness could have without forfeiting its being-for-self and reverting to something. We have the being of being-for-one and the nonbeing of being-for-one, just as determinacy had reality and negation.

The one is the affirmative being of being-for-self. The nonbeing of that affirmative being cannot be a something, for that would reintroduce being-for-other, which the one excludes. Since the one cannot owe its character to not being something else, the nonbeing of the one is not negation, the nonbeing of determinacy, but the nonbeing of the negation of the negation. Remember that being-for-self is self-related by having overcome the relation to other. The other is its negation. The overcoming of that negation is the negation of the negation. Here we have just the absence of the one, but an absence that does not bring in something. It is an absence of the one that just as much excludes there being a something.

The absence of the one is a nothing that excludes something other being there, because the one cannot stand in relation to or be contrasted with an other. The nonbeing of the one is thus the void. Accordingly, the one is one aspect of being-for-self and the void is the other aspect of being for self, just as reality and negation were the sides contained within determinate being, enabling determinate being to acquire a determinate being of its own. When being-for-self becomes determinate, it has these two sides: the one and the void. They are not just being and nothing, for they themselves are determinate.

Hegel proceeds to show that the contrast of the one and the void, with its distinctive determinacy, engenders many ones. The resultant many are not a plurality of somethings, but a plurality of *ones*, of self-related entities. Hegel suggests that what leads from the contrast of the one and the void to a plurality of ones, the many, is that the void turns out to have the same structure as the one. Insofar as the void turns out to have the same structure as the one, to be nothing other than the one, we have the one and another one, which might appear to be a twosome. Hegel instead speaks about there being the many as if what emerges from one and the void is an indefinite plurality. Why would the conversion of the void into another one lead to not just one and one but indeterminately many ones? If indeed each one is determinate, it is in contrast to a void, and that void itself is equivalent to the one it opposes. Hence, we have this extending move from one to an indefinitely plural many.

What makes it plausible for the void to be no different than the one is that the void cannot be in relation to something because the void, like the one, excludes the presence of something other. The void is the absence of any something, and the void is not just nothing because the void is what alone opposes the one. The void is that which is in relation but at the same time cannot be in relation. The void excludes all relation to anything else. It is thereby just like the one. The void is another one.

This excluding of relation characterizing each of the many comprises what Hegel calls “repulsion.” It would be a mistake to think of repulsion here in spatial or material terms. In his *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel will speak about how these categories apply in the nonlogical, concrete context of matter in space and time. In this connection, Hegel will critique Kant’s account of the material forces of attraction and repulsion¹ and how they play a constitutive role in matter,² a critique that we will also encounter in a remark in Hegel’s logical discussion of attraction and repulsion as such.³

Here in logic we do not have spatial relations. We do not have time, we do not have matter, nor anything incorporating them. We are not speaking of natural forces. You want to be clear why we are not here speaking about forces in general. In Hegel’s discussion of Kant’s account of attraction and repulsion, Hegel will point out that Kant does speak of them as forces. That presupposes that repulsion and attraction are really different from one another and presupposes that there is some third factor (namely, matter) that they are exerted upon. Here, where all that is at stake is the logical determinacy of the many, none of this is the case.

On the one hand, a kind of becoming occurs here where the one becomes many. The one has a nothing, the void, and they pass over into one another. Thereby the one becomes many, with each one engendering a series of ones. This becoming many of the one is identified as repulsion. More precisely, Hegel speaks of it as a first form of repulsion, because once we have it, a second type of repulsion will enter in. This first type of repulsion is that by

which the one gives rise to many ones from itself, where they immanently emerge from it (p. 170).

If there are to be many ones, rather than many somethings, they must retain their self-related character and avoid being determined by any relation to other. Even though the plurality of ones introduces a kind of relatedness, the relatedness has to be such that the factors in this relationship are no less canceling it, preventing themselves from being bounded by their counterparts and submitting to a limit. To maintain themselves as ones, they have to have a peculiar kind of relationship that is a negation of all relationship, that is the prevention of any contact, of there being any limit. This requires that the ones can neither be in continuity with one another, where there is nothing between them, nor have anything determinate between them. They must have nothing but the void between them and ensure this by repelling one another. Thanks to repulsion, the void is that in which their plurality is located. The void is that which precludes anything determinate coming into contact. The void in which the ones find themselves is what provides their repulsion from one another. They cannot be a plurality of *ones* without maintaining a void between one another.

The first form of repulsion consists of the one engendering or turning into a plurality of ones, where you have a move from the one to the many, where the one repels other ones from itself. Once this first repulsion occurs, a second form of repulsion immediately arises consisting in the repelling relation between the many that have emerged. Hegel calls this second repulsion relative, in contrast to the first, which in some respect is absolute (p. 176).

What is relative about this new situation of repulsion where the many maintain themselves in opposition to one another? The many cannot be bounded by one another as are something and other. The many ones have to keep themselves apart. They have to keep themselves unrelated. They have to possess the kind of repulsion where a void remains between them. What is relative about this situation that was not the case with the first form of repulsion, whereby the one became many? The second form of repulsion is relative to the given existence of the ones. Those ones have arisen because of the first repulsion, whereby the one, or being-for-self, engendered a plurality of ones.

Now, we have the second repulsion of the many, relative to their given, emergent existence, and Hegel is going to argue that what the many do, as ones, to one another and to themselves, is something that just as much unites them into one (pp. 176–77). This uniting of the many into one, which is the reverse of the move from the one to the many, comprises attraction. Attraction, as Hegel points out, presupposes the many separated by the void. Indeed, the very being of the many is equivalent to having ones that repel one another as opposed to coalescing into one. As many, they maintain their

separateness. Attraction, as the coalescence of the many into one, obviously takes as its starting point a plurality of ones that are repelling one another.

The repelling is mutual and reciprocated. It is not as if any one has a privilege or difference in the way in which it repels any other. All of these ones are indistinguishable in terms of what they do to one another. We are not in a position to ascribe to them any qualitative distinctiveness. If they were qualitatively differentiated, they would be reduced to something and other. The many, however, are ones, which have a simple character consisting in their being-for-one. They have no other filling. They are all just one.

They are simple not in virtue of just being, but due to having excluded any contrastive determination between themselves and something else. In that sense, they are simple. They are one, and every one is a one just like the others. This is crucial to understanding how repulsion converts to attraction. Precisely because every one is not only completely indistinguishable but also operates in precisely the same way, repulsion cannot keep its ones apart.

What each one does to exclude any relation to other is repel the others just like every other one is doing to it. There is really no difference. In effect, the way they keep themselves apart ends up removing any distinction between them. The way the repelling many relate to one another eliminates any basis for maintaining any contrastive difference. As Hegel observes, we really just have one determination, the one.

Accordingly, the many, doing what they do to be many, just as much become one. Attraction is just this becoming one of the many. Therefore, the second kind of repulsion, reciprocal repulsion, where there is a void interspersed between ones, just as much entails attraction. We thus have a repulsion that gives way to an attraction. Although this repulsion and attraction seem to be separate, where one comes first and is followed by the other, Hegel proceeds to show that actually they both presuppose one another to begin with (pp. 173, 176).

We have already seen how attraction presupposes repulsion, since there can be no many to coalesce unless a plurality of ones repel one another. How does repulsion presuppose attraction? As Hegel points out, repulsion actually contains attraction (p. 175). Just as the many must be kept apart in order for them to become one and involve attraction, so repulsion has nothing to repel unless the ones offer some resistance to their instantaneous dispersion.

Hegel will speak of the one that is the product of attraction as the one one, the one that is a result of the negation of the many (p. 174). It is the one in which the many have coalesced, and that makes it the one that is a product of attraction. The one from which the first, original repulsion arose is not a one that is a result of the attraction of the many. It is the one out of which the many arise. Yet, if you just have repulsion by itself or, as Hegel says, abstract repulsion, the repelling immediately cancels itself (p. 174). The emergent ones would cease to be in any kind of repelling relationship, because unless

there is some kind of attraction keeping them so that they still have to be repelled, repulsion comes to an end. Without attraction, the ones would instantaneously disperse to infinity. Repulsion, however, involves not only the removal of relation but also its own relation. Repulsion is a relation, for not only is there a void between the ones, but they are all in the void. That is something common to them. It is a common relation.

The same situation applies to attraction. Unless there is repulsion in attraction, attraction does not occur. You just have immediately the one one, instead of the move whereby the many *become* the one. On both sides we have a process that depends upon the presence of the other. Repulsion is the keeping apart of the many, not just the apartness but the keeping apart, and likewise the keeping together, the unification of the many. Attraction is the coalescing of the many into one, not just the one one, and thus likewise involves their being kept apart. So repulsion and attraction both require the presence of their counterpart for their own operation.

Hegel has presented an attraction that presupposes a repulsion and then gone on to point out how both repulsion and attraction, in their distinction from one another, actually end up containing one another as well as presupposing one another (p. 176). They end up being united with one another. That is where this process is driving, to a unification of attraction and repulsion, which will lead to what turns out to be the minimal determination of quantity.

It is important to recognize that when we are dealing with something and other, there are just these two terms. There is just a determinate determinacy and what it is not, and these are the only specifications that are at hand. We have no way to allow for anything more, such as a third factor or a domain of existence within which something and other are located. Here, by contrast, there is talk of the many, and Hegel is not confining the many to just one and one. There is no reason to remain with a twosome. The void, in being what the one is not, is just as much what it is not, a one. Since each one equally involves its nonbeing to be determinate, an indefinite pluralization of the many results. Once they have arisen, there is a situation in which the many ones face each other in an all-sided repulsion, in which no one has any special privilege. You might be tempted to cling to that original one that was there before all the rest, but how can it be in any respect identifiable? That origination is gone and not carried over, for the many ones are not distinguished in any fashion.

One might also wonder whether the void can persist without becoming another one. Although the void immediately converts into a one, the one just as much generates the void. You have to have the void with the many because the ones have to be devoid of relation to remain self-related. When Hegel speaks about attraction and repulsion, he speaks about the ones being in the void, since otherwise all there could be is the one one.

Is there a plurality of voids, or just the void in which the many repel and attract one another? To have a plurality of voids, there would have to be some means of distinguishing them, but the void is just the exclusion of any such thing. So we have the ones in the void. Atomistic thinking operates in these terms, although atomistic thinking tends to ignore how attraction and repulsion have any intrinsic connection to their atoms. One can apply these terms to physical things, if there is something about what is physical that is not qualitatively differentiated. Of course, an atomistic conception that tries to think of the physical in those terms regards its atoms as colorless, tasteless, and so on—that is, devoid of any “secondary qualities.” It is not clear, however, how one can generate from the one and the many all the different kinds of physical reality that would enable it to be the universal principle of nature.

Regarding the void, Hegel is going to argue that, as a result of attraction and repulsion ending up intrinsically at one with one another, we are left with ones that are in continuity with one another (pp. 177, 185). That is, they no longer have a void between them. Nevertheless, they are ones. They come up against one another but in such a way that there is nothing between them, and yet they are not in any respect qualitatively distinguishable.

We have at one and the same time continuity and discreteness. Discreteness lies in the fact that we still have these ones, but they are also in continuity with one another. There is nothing separating them, nothing intervening between them, no void between or encompassing them. There is nothing keeping them apart, yet instead of coalescing into one and becoming one one, they remain a plurality without any void. This combination of continuity and discreteness is what constitutes quantity.

This contrasts with Leibniz’s monads, which are not in continuity with one another or in any relation to one another. Thus, for Leibniz, space is just as ideal or subjective as it is for Kant. It is the form of representation of the monad, because the monad is not in any actual relation to anything else. It just represents, and in representation you remain related to yourself, because representations are your own determinations, even if they convey something allegedly objective.

With quantity, Hegel will argue, we have a kind of determination that is indifferent to quality (p. 187). So, for example, a field can be in different sizes and still be a field. Its qualitative character is not altered. It would have a different quality if the field turned into a forest. Questions regarding species and being one of a kind involve more than just quality, because when we speak of quality, we are not speaking about universality. We are speaking about something much more minimal. Universality is a determinacy that has to be very further specified in order to distinguish it from particularity, or from substance, or from essence, or from all sorts of other things. When we are talking about quality, we mean quality *period*, or determinacy *period*, without further differentiation.

With quantity, Hegel will be dealing with something the specification of which is indifferent to quality, and it is going to involve, minimally speaking, continuity and discreteness. Here being-for-self is pushing toward that to the extent that the many ones are not determined by their contrast with others. Even though, to begin with, that requires that they keep apart, it turns out that their very keeping apart from one another just as much ends up leading them to undergo attraction. This does not signify their complete coalescence, because it turns out that attraction just as much contains repulsion. You cannot have one without the other. Repulsion and attraction turn out to be, ultimately, one and the same. When that emerges, what we have are ones that are discrete—that is, they are not just collapsed into a single one, but on the other hand, they are in continuity with one another. Quantity consists of this unity of discreteness and continuity.

This is a good time to ask: What is the philosophy of mathematics? Where does it properly arise? And to what degree is there a philosophy of mathematics that is not part of mathematics? To some degree the philosophy of mathematics has to do with accounting for what mathematics takes for granted. Mathematics takes things for granted, and for this very reason it is not philosophical. You might ask, what does mathematics take for granted? If you do mathematics, you know you are dealing with quantitative relationships of one sort or another. You are not concerned with investigating what quantity is, because you are not doing mathematics unless you already have quantity on the table. Instead of accounting for quantity, mathematics is rather concerned with discovering the relationships that quantity entails.

Now Hegel is going to give an account of quantity itself. What we have been looking at in the repulsion and attraction of the many ones is an answer to why there is quantity, just as Hegel's account of being, nothing, and becoming provides an answer to why there is determinacy. Quantity itself is going to eventually get conjoined with quality once again, as there is going to be a quantitative relationship that ends up being united with quality, namely measure.

With measure, quantitative determination is equally qualitatively significant. When something has a measure, its very being is attached to a certain quantity so that, in contrast to the field, it cannot increase or decrease without ceasing to be what it is. To begin with, however, quantity is going to be that which is indifferent to quality.

It is important to consider why being-for-self, or the one, is not at the outset to be thought of as a unit of quantity. Admittedly, one might go about numbering the ones, the many, but the many as such has no determinate quantity. Quantity is not here at issue, and one of the reasons it is not is that the many are separated by a void, unlike the units that comprise quantity. Even though units are discrete, there is nothing separating them, as units,

from any other unit. We can go about counting them and determining their magnitude in their continuous aggregation.

To arrive at the continuity of the units of quantity, two things have to be accomplished. On the one hand, the void has to be removed, but, on the other hand, this has to be achieved without coalescence into the one one. Although the void must be eliminated, there cannot just be attraction. You cannot have continuity if you get rid of repulsion and simply have attraction. Continuity involves there being many, but many that are not separated by a void. Continuity involves their immediate contact without rendering them qualitatively distinct. The units of magnitude are in no way distinguishable from one another.

Hegel's remark on "The Kantian Construction of Matter from the Forces of Attraction and Repulsion" (pp. 178–84) provides a concrete way of seeing how repulsion and attraction are bound up with one another. Hegel is addressing a construction Kant makes in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Nature*. Kant's masterwork, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, was intended to be an introduction to a system of metaphysics, and that system of metaphysics was going to have two parts, a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of freedom. Kant did write both of these afterward, although it is no accident that what he presents in those works is already largely foreshadowed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The reason why that is the case is that if you take the transcendental turn and try first to focus upon knowing without making claims about what is, the only way you can secure the objectivity of knowing is if the structure of knowing determines the object of knowing. In that case, investigating knowing will inform you of the basic character of the object of knowing or, generally speaking, nature. So in the *Critique of Pure Reason* one finds in the principles of experience more or less everything that Kant will draw out in more detail in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Nature*. There he gives an a priori discussion of matter, attempting to show that you cannot account for matter as Descartes did, by identifying matter with extension, because then there is no void. Everything becomes stuffed full of matter, and motion takes the form of vortexes, because things can only move by displacement and rotation. Kant observes that empty space cannot be distinguished from filled space if matter is identified with space, as Descartes does. Instead, there must be a dynamic conception of matter, where matter fills space by forcing everything else from occupying that space. Kant claims that this is inherent in experience, insofar as we feel the resistance of objects. We touch them, and their resistance tells us that there is a force of repulsion operating.

Kant treats that force of repulsion as more basic than the force of attraction, and he distinguishes repulsion from attraction in a variety of ways. He speaks about the force of repulsion as if it acts on a surface, by contact, whereas the force of attraction operates at a distance, like gravity. Kant does

point out that both are required to have matter, because if all there is is repulsion, things would disperse to infinity, leaving nothing tangible. The dispersion of matter has to be held back in some way. Nevertheless, Kant still distinguishes them, as if they were separate and had different unities.⁴

Hegel questions this idea that the force of repulsion can be understood not only as being separate from the force of attraction, but as having different features, such as only acting by contact on a surface. Hegel points out that “reflection on the statement that parts in contact are in contact only in so far as they hold themselves *apart*,” that is, that they repel one another, “leads directly to the conclusion that the force of repulsion is not merely *on the surface* of matter but within the sphere which was supposed to be only a sphere of attraction” (p. 183). Otherwise, each body of matter would collapse into a point and lose the surface by which it makes contact. As Hegel observes,

Kant assumes further that “through the force of attraction, matter only occupies space but does not fill it”; and “because matter through the force of attraction does not fill space, this force can act across empty space since there is no intervening matter to limit it.” . . . Here, then, matter is supposed only to *occupy* a space but not to *fill* it. There it is repulsion, if we stop at the first determination of matter, through which the ones repel one another and so are only negatively related to one another, here that means, by empty space. Here, however, it is the force of attraction which keeps space empty; it does not fill space by its connection of the atoms, in other words, it keeps the atoms in a negative relation to one another. (p. 183)

In order for attraction to operate at a distance, rather than by contact, it must involve repulsion to keep the attracted bodies from making contact and then coalescing.

We see that Kant here unconsciously realizes what is implicit in the nature of the subject matter, when he attributes to the force of attraction precisely what, in accordance with the first determination, he attributed to the opposite force. While he was busy with establishing the difference between the two forces, it happened that one had passed over into the other. Thus, through repulsion, on the other hand, matter is supposed to fill a space, and consequently through repulsion the empty space left by the force of attraction vanishes. In point of fact repulsion, in doing away with empty space, also destroys the negative relation of the atoms or ones, that is, their repulsion of one another; in other words, repulsion is determined as the opposite of itself. (p. 183)

In other words, if internal repulsion enables bodies to fill space, repulsion must do so by eliminating any void within, signifying that the parts of each body cease to repel one another and rather attract one another enough to make continuous contact.

In order for a body to repel another body from occupying its space, attraction is just as much required. We see this physically represented and experience it in the cohesion of bodies. In order for a body to be able to repel another, both must have sufficient cohesion to keep each together as a discrete body. The necessary cohesion can be thought of, as Hegel points out (p. 182), in terms of having the force of attraction separate out distinct bodies of matter. Thus for matter to repel, it must equally have cohesion or attraction.

Chapter Twelve

Quantity

Quality emerged once becoming reverted to the unity of being and nothing in the form of being. Quality, the being of that unity, engendered negation and reality by undergoing the same transition that being undergoes. This led to determinacy acquiring a determinate being of its own, entailing the contrast of something and other.

With being-for-self resulting from the process of the finite and nonfinite infinite, the one emerged, excluding all qualitative difference and thereby containing nothing in itself. It is just one, and therefore has a void within it together with its own affirmative being. Since these two aspects of the one turn out to be equivalent to what the one itself is, one gives rise to another one, producing the many. Ones, however, are only in relation to one another in the manner of not having any relation. They only confront one another in the void, which is the absence of any relation between them. That signifies their exclusion of any relation to another. But, as Hegel has pointed out, the void, which prevents the ones from bounding one another, from being determined in respect to their relation to one another, is also something common to them all. Although the one first repels itself, producing the many, which then engenders a mutual repulsion of ones in a void, this just as much reverts to an attraction, because there is nothing distinguishing them, nothing really keeping them outside one another. They all have a common determinacy. They are all in the void. They are all one. They do not have anything inside them to distinguish them. Both repulsion and attraction, however, turn out to presuppose and contain one another. Repulsion cannot repel unless attraction counteracts a dispersion to infinity, just as attraction cannot attract unless ones are separated thanks to repulsion.

The unity of repulsion and attraction leads to quantity, where the ones do not collapse into one one but, on the other hand, have no void between them.

They are both together and discrete. We have a combination of oneness and many in virtue of how repulsion and attraction not only presuppose one another, not only contain one another, but also convert into one another. Once that happens, quantity arises, with attraction and repulsion having become converted into coexisting features of continuity and discreteness.

Hegel, by way of anticipation, described the Logic of Being as having three parts. With the emergence of quantity, the first part, Quality, has been concluded. The second part, which now begins, goes under the heading of Quantity insofar as it will develop quantitative determinacy in its own right. The third part, Measure, will follow since measure involves determinations that combine quality and quantity. Quality and quantity must both be accounted for before measure can be determined.

Now we are addressing this intermediary section of the Logic of Being. We will work our way through its broad developments so as to get toward the beginning of the Logic of Essence. Once more, we find a threefold division into three sections: the first involving quantity in general, the second involving quantum, and the third involving quantitative relation.

At some point, we may want to ask ourselves why logical development seems to involve threesomes. Should a quantitative determination like that possibly have methodological significance, even if we may happen to find things divided in such a way? The concluding section of the Logic will shed light on this issue.

In any event, we have quantity, then quantum, and finally quantitative relation, whereby we find ourselves in a whole new domain, measure, which is going to involve quantity that is no less qualitative. Then we are going to see that measure ends up exhausting the determinations of the Logic of Being and brings us to the point where the Logic of Essence begins.

The division of quantitative determinacy into quantity, quantum, and quantitative relation has some parallels to the way in which qualitative determinacy became divided. Quality was divided up into a section on being, then determinate being, and finally being-for-self.

The difference between quantity and quantum parallels that between being and determinate being, for quantum is determinate quantity. In this connection Hegel points out that it is a mistake to treat quantity in general as if it were equivalent to magnitude (p. 186).¹ In contrast to quantity as such, magnitude is a determinate quantity. Magnitude has a determination. It is a specific quantity, whereas quantity is just quantitative, per se, without further qualification, without further limitation. Hegel begins with quantity, which is not yet a magnitude. Quantity is just quantitative, just as determinacy is just qualitative without being a determinate determinacy, involving something and other.

Quantitative relation, which will be spoken of also as ratio, is going to involve magnitudes in relation. Quantitative relation is a quantitative deter-

mination that consists of a relation of magnitudes or quanta. This indicates the general plausibility of the general ordering of Hegel's account. You first need to have quantity before you can have a determinate quantity, and you need a determinate quantity before you can speak about relations of determinate quantities.

Under the heading of Quantity, prior to the discussion of quantum or magnitude, Hegel addresses pure quantity, the quantitative, or quantitative determinacy in general. What is quantity as such? What does it consist of? Determinacy in general consists of the unity of being and nothing that simply is. Similarly, quantity unites two factors, continuity and discreteness. In their unity, continuity and discreteness comprise quantity. When you have discreteness that is equally continuous and continuity that equally entails discreteness, this continuity is just not determinacy. It involves something that flows beyond itself into something that is indistinguishable from it. The resources for this are provided by the unification of repulsion and attraction, by which continuity was prevented from being bounded by discreteness. Now, in quantity, they are interconnected and cannot be found apart.

That which involves discreteness and continuity in unity with one another is what is quantitative. With respect to this unity, with respect to quantification, there is no qualitative differentiation. We are dealing with quantitative determinacy because on these terms we determine something solely in regard to being homogeneous, where qualitative differences drop out or are indifferent insofar as they do not prevent something from being treated as in continuity with itself.

With quantity, we are dealing with something that is indifferent to limits in two respects. It is indifferent to any limitation within itself, as well as in respect to anything outside itself. Quantity is indifferent to quality in that the being of what is simply quantitative is not undermined by moving beyond any particular limit. Something can be increased or decreased quantitatively without ceasing to be what is, whereas when a qualitative limit is transgressed, something becomes something else. Land, instead of getting indifferently smaller or larger, turns from being a field into a swamp or a forest. By the same token, even though what is quantitative has to have distinction within it, the differentiation within it is indifferent to any limits by which something is distinguished from something else. The interior of quantity is continuous, but you cannot have continuity unless there is some kind of differentiation of what is homogeneous.

Continuity involves an overflowing of one thing to something beyond it, which, however, is homogeneous or no different from it. There must be this divisibility of the homogeneous for there to be continuity. Otherwise, there is nothing continuing from one to another. Continuity implies, however, something in which there are not qualitative boundaries, because then you will not have the absence of a void between discrete factors. You only have continu-

ity where something pushes beyond itself to something that is indistinguishable but nevertheless retains the difference of being another one, another discrete element. The one and many provide the homogeneous, yet discrete elements needed for continuity, for a one is not determined by what it is not, yet it is still distinguished from other ones.

The immediate conjunction of discreteness and continuity thus fills quantity with homogeneous elements, which, as homogeneous, are in continuity with one another but, nevertheless, discrete, insofar as they comprise ones that do not have a void between them. What holds for quantity in general does not yet involve any specific magnitude. It concerns what holds true of magnitude in general, of any magnitude: the simple conjoining of discreteness and continuity.

Hegel adds something more that is analogous to what he had to say about determinacy being the unity of being and nothing that was in the form of being. Namely, he characterizes pure quantity as being in the form of continuity (p. 187). What does it mean for quantity to be in the form of continuity, and why is it in that form?

Hegel has spoken of quantity's conjoining of continuity and discreteness being immediate. If that unity were not immediate, some other factor would be mediating it, determining it to be what is. Neither how quantity has arisen nor how quantity is composed involves reference to anything else grounding its unity. Quantity is what it is just in virtue of containing the simple conjunction of discreteness and continuity.

Quantitative determinacy as such is not in relation to anything else that would bound it or qualify it. Quantity is thus continuous with itself, with no definite magnitude bringing closure to its expanse. Insofar as quantity is in the form of continuity, it spills beyond itself without having any limit. Quantity keeps on going without any interruption.

Nonetheless, Hegel claims that quantity is also discrete (p. 187). Why must quantity also be in the form of discreteness? It appears that quantity can just extend continuously, even though, in doing so, it combines both discreteness and continuity, since you cannot have continuity unless there is something that is continuous with its divisible homogeneous self. Just because continuity involves discrete homogeneous ones that have nothing separating them, quantity is a quantity of those homogeneous units. So quantity is just as much discrete quantity as continuous quantity. In following this through, Hegel leads us to determinate quantity, and he does so in a way that parallels how determinate determinacy arose in virtue of reality and negation each being determinate. Similarly, Hegel points out that discrete quantity and continuous quantity each contain the other. In their distinction from one another, they are determinate vis-à-vis one another; they limit one another by being different (p. 201). Yet how does a limit apply to quantity?

Hegel's discussion of "Continuous and Discrete Magnitude," which leads to "Limitation of Quantity," provides an answer. Hegel claims that the way in which continuous and discrete magnitude limit one another renders them the same (p. 201). This is because quantity can only be limited in one way, given its complete indifference to qualitative distinctions. For continuity to be limited, it must end somewhere. At that terminus, however, what begins cannot be qualitatively distinct, but only another continuous quantity with a discrete quantity comparable to that of its counterpart.

What makes quantity determinate, rendering it a quantum, is this mutual limitation, where one continuous quantity ends where another begins. Determinate quantity is limited continuity, and it obtains a name, just as determinate determinacy becomes something and an other. That name is number (p. 202). A determinate quantity, a magnitude, is a number. What does number consist of and how does it allow quantity to be limited without bringing in any qualitative distinctions?

Number has to incorporate what quantity, pure quantity, has. Number must have continuity as well as discreteness, but number has them in a way in which their unity exists in a form that is determinate and thereby contrastable to other such unities in a purely quantitative manner. We have quantitative, as opposed to qualitative, differences when we have determinate quantities. We have determinate quantities when we have number and not just quantity in general.

Number is what a quantum or magnitude turns out to be. It involves discreteness and it involves continuity, but in such a way that it has a limit that can distinguish it from other quantities. That limit is going to be composed entirely out of the resources of quantity itself.

Of what then does number, any number, consist? In a sense, number consists of ones, but the ones now figure in ways specific to how they are contained in number. Namely, the "ones" out of which number is composed are *units*. Each of the "ones" in number is a unit, but being a unit signifies that there is a limit to the units belonging to number, that their continuity with one another is not without a boundary that gives the number its determinate magnitude. The limit cannot reside in something separate from them. The units are all the same. There are just ones, homogeneous and otherwise indistinguishable. Their continuity is nonetheless somehow limited, and it is limited by something that gives the number its own unity, that makes the number one, but, in making the number one, does not turn the number into just a one. Rather, the limit of the number gives it a determinate magnitude.

The limit specific to number, which relies on nothing but its units, is the *amount* of those units. Number is a determinate magnitude by being an amount of units. The amount of units of the number is the limited continuity of these units. Nothing separates the units from one another, but their amount is that aspect of determinate continuity, where the flowing beyond itself of

one unit does not go on indefinitely. It stops, and it stops in virtue of the number itself. The number does not have to be contrasted with something else to be the number it is. The number limits itself through its own amount.

Take the number three. Three has three units in it. However those units are otherwise characterized, they are homogeneous with one another, and there is no need to look outside them. You just need to count up what is in the number three to get its amount.

The number is thus a determinate quantity that has discrete elements which are in continuity with one another. Their continuity has a limit. It comes to an end at a certain point. That is the number's amount.

Hegel points out how number, or quantum, ends up having two varieties, extensive and intensive magnitude (pp. 217–21). One might think that the distinction of these varieties is similar to the division between discrete and continuous quantity. The distinction is different, however, because discrete and continuous quantities are species of quantity in general, but not quanta. In a sense, numbers result immediately in extensive quantity, because in extensive quantity, you have a magnitude that has a plurality of units within it, a plurality that exhibits continuity. Extensive quantities would thus be what numbers have by containing a plurality of units.

Intensive quantity, or degree, is different. We speak about murder in the first degree, twenty degrees centigrade, fifth-degree Freemason, or whatever. Hegel claims that intensive quantity lies in any and every extensive magnitude. Every extensive magnitude converts itself into an intensive magnitude once you recognize that its units are one and the same. In a sense, the plurality gets collapsed, and one has the amount without having to deal with the plurality. Degree immediately presents the determinate magnitude, canceling out the discrete aspect. No plurality lies within degree. Instead, the plurality lies outside of it. Intensive magnitude is simple. It is intensive because, as simple, it does not contain an extension of plural units. Degree still involves a plurality, but this plurality is outside each degree. So there is a fifth degree, in between the sixth and the fourth degree. Or if you take first, second, third, fourth, and fifth degree, you still have a plurality, but it is external to each intensive magnitude.

Although magnitude figures in these distinct ways, they nevertheless convert into one another. Whatever is fifth could also be five. Five is the fifth number. The twentieth degree centigrade contains twenty degrees or a certain length of mercury or a certain amount of molecular motion, just as any extensive magnitude can be converted into a degree by putting it between the other magnitudes straddling its amount.

It still might appear that intensive magnitude has something irreducible about it, since it seems to have a kind of qualitative character, insofar as degree does not have plurality within it but is distinct from other intensive magnitudes. Degree is not like the units inside a number, where every unit

makes it a hundred just as easily as any other one. When there is the scale of degrees, each is different from the others. A ninety-ninth degree is different from a hundredth degree. There is a difference, but it is a specific quantitative difference, whose entire distinction can be identified quantitatively, with indifference to quality. The key point is that the series of intensive quanta is one whose differences are quantitative differences, as opposed to qualitative differences. Different degrees of temperature are all readings of temperature. With degrees, we are dealing with differences of that which is itself homogeneous, indifferent to quality. There are not qualitative differences that make one degree figure differently from the next degree. It is only a quantitative difference, which remains in continuity with the other degrees.

In this whole discussion, there are no applications of quantity to what is not quantity. Nonetheless, one might consider what would be susceptible of being quantitatively determined and what use quantitative relations can have. Generally, what is quantifiable must have homogeneity and elements that fall outside one another (either spatially in extensive externality or temporally as changes of state in intensive externality). These requirements apply to the quantitative relations so far at issue. We will see whether measure changes that, because in measure we are going to be dealing with quantitative relations that are equally qualitative. Then it will be appropriate to ask whether there are any limits to what can have a measure. Some philosophers want to say that everything has a measure. Right now, however, we are dealing with just quantitative and mathematical determinations, not yet involving anything more.

Quantitative infinity enters in as a result of what is at hand, once magnitude becomes determinate. Quantity that is a determinate magnitude is finite quantity because it has a quantitative limit. This is expressly evident with degree, for degrees are such that the quantity they have is bound up with quanta beyond them. Each degree has its determinacy as, for example, 100th, only insofar as there is a 101st degree. Likewise with a 101st degree, there cannot help but be a beyond and a beyond in each direction that is equally another magnitude, which has its own beyond which is itself another quantity.

Here we have a specifically quantitative infinite. The qualitative infinite first involved the alternating contrast of the finite and nonfinite. Should we analogously characterize the quantitative infinite in terms of alternating terms of the quantum and the nonquantum, the magnitude and the nonmagnitude? The nonmagnitude is itself a beyond that is equally another magnitude, which cannot help but have its own beyond, generating a quantitative series that goes on forever. This comprises a spurious quantitative infinite, because every beyond turns out itself to be another finite quantum.

One might expect that the process of the spurious quantitative infinite will result in a quantitative parallel to what happened to the bad qualitative infi-

nite when it redeemed itself by yielding the “true infinite,” which engendered being-for-self. What we are led to, however, is ratio or quantitative relation.

This result is not without some parallel to what was encountered when being-for-self emerged from the true infinite. There both the finite and the nonfinite returned to themselves in a process of negation of negation, where the other of each term had its otherness canceled, leaving us with something that is related to itself. Here we have quantity that ends up going beyond itself but ends up returning to itself, because its beyond turns out to be just another quantity like itself.

What does this have to do with ratio? Ratio involves a relation between numbers or magnitudes. It is itself a magnitude that consists of a relation of magnitudes. For example, the ratio of three to four has its own magnitude. Given the magnitude of the ratio, it is indefinite what are the other terms that are in the ratio’s quantitative relation. Any ratio is open to innumerable substitutions for the numbers it relates. An infinite number of different terms can serve as the numerator and the denominator and comprise the same ratio. If the value of the ratio is two, for example, you can have four over two, six over three, and so on. In each case, what determines what one quantum will be in the ratio is the other magnitude to which it stands in the ratio’s determinate quantitative relation.

Hegel claims that here we have a qualitative relationship entering in, even though ratio is a relationship of numbers, of quanta (p. 314). Why would he characterize their relationship in ratio as having a qualitative side to it, when the related numbers just figure as quantities and not as anything other than numbers? They are not magnitudes of different kinds of things. They remain just as homogeneous as before.

The magnitude of the ratio, which is determinate, has its quantity in virtue of numbers that may freely vary so long as their relation provides that same ratio. In this respect, the magnitude of the ratio is indifferent to what each of its component numbers are, but not indifferent to their relation to one another. At the same time, the magnitude of each of its component numbers depends on an other, namely its counterpart in the ratio. This introduces a qualitative dimension lacking in the relation of units to one another inside a number. They do not have any relationship that could in any way be qualitative, for all the units of a number are completely indifferent to one another. It does not matter which is which—they all function in the same way. The units of a magnitude do not play any distinguishing role. They all figure as parts of the number in exactly the same manner. Inside the ratio, something different goes on. Even though the ratio leaves in some respect indefinite what the specific numerator and denominator will be, once you have one the other one is determined by it and vice versa.

Hegel proceeds to consider different types of ratios—direct ratios, inverse ratios, ratios of power, and the like, all of which is going to set the stage for

something of a different character, namely measure (pp. 315–25). In measure, quantities are bound up with quality. We need to see how that could be possible, because there seems to be an intrinsic indifference of quantitative determinacy to qualitative difference. After all, the defining character of what is quantitative is that it figures as homogeneous, as not qualitatively differentiated.

In moving to the discussion of measure, Hegel will be bringing us to the threshold of a whole new dimension of categories or determinations. This impending domain of the Logic of Essence turns out to contain the categories that are privileged by much modern philosophy. They are the categories that become fundamental if one regards everything as having a foundation or a ground, as Leibniz affirms in his principle of sufficient reason. This is because the Logic of Essence is going to present us with determinations of that which is determined by something else. These determinations are going to involve a two-tiered structure, where something is privileged in regard to something else that it will determine. In the Logic of Essence, we will be dealing with determinations that are mediated by something which has a primacy over them.

Essence provides the categories for conceiving this. Essence itself will be that which underlies appearance. There will be ground and grounded, cause and effect, substance and accident, whole and parts, and existence in which things with properties are mediated by one another. All of this is going to somehow be made possible by what happens at the end of the determination of measure. By extension, it is something that would not be possible without the prior development of everything that goes under the heading of being, including quality, quantity, and measure. Without those determinations at hand, one could not possibly think the categories that come under the Logic of Essence.

A basic way of thinking about how the Logic of Essence will depend upon the Logic of Being is that the Logic of Essence construes being as mediated, whereby the whole domain of being is grounded on something else. Essence will minimally arise as that which mediates being, and being, as mediated, will now be something different in character from immediate being.

It is important to think back as to why, when we just dealt with being, determinate being, being-for-self, the one and many, and the different forms of quantity, we did not dispose of any of the kind of relationships that we are going to encounter when we move from Measure to Essence. In turning to think through measure, we must keep our eyes out for how the development will allow the totality of being to be mediated by something else, introducing the distinction of levels characteristic of the Logic of Essence.

Chapter Thirteen

From Measure to Essence

Hegel indicates what is involved in moving from the Logic of Being to the Logic of Essence, writing as follows: “The logic of being is completed when a category arises from which there can be no transition to a new determination.” Obviously, Hegel does not mean that there will be no further categories arising after this point. Rather, the threshold of the Logic of Essence is reached when a category emerges from which no transition to another can occur. In referring to transition Hegel is speaking about the way categories or determinacies in the Logic of Being give way to one another. In so doing, Hegel is distinguishing how categories make their appearance and disappearance in the Logic of Being from how terms emerge in the Logic of Essence as well as in the Logic of Concept.

Consequently, when Hegel describes how we will come to a category from which no further transition is to be made, he is anticipating not that no further categories will arise, but rather that they will henceforth emerge in a manner different from how transitions operate in the Logic of Being—that is, different from how qualitative determinations give way, different from how quantitative determinations give way, and finally, different from how determinations of measure pass over into others.

In the Logic of Essence we do not find transitions but something else. Determinations here emerge by being posited. By contrast, in the Logic of the Concept, terms will arise neither by making a transition from one to another nor from positing. Hegel will speak of a different process that he will characterize as development. Determinations in the Logic of the Concept will develop themselves, rather than pass into another or be posited by something else.

These differences in the form of the logical exposition have to do with the nature of the terms in question. The character of the determinacies in the

Logic of Being mandates that they will come and go in transitions, passing over from one into another. They cannot arise through positing because all terms in the Logic of Being are equiprimordial, deriving their determination from contrast with one another. Positing will be central to everything in the Logic of Essence, because there what is at stake, broadly speaking, is determinacy that is determined by some source of determinacy. That source of determinacy is not itself determined in virtue of its contrast with other coeval factors, in the way in which something and other are determined, nor is it going to be specified in the way in which quantity is determined, in indifference to quality, nor as a measure. The source of determination will be determined in virtue of what it posits. It still will be determined as a positor, as a determiner of determined determinacy, as a source of determinacy, so the determinacy that will be encountered will be determinacy that is mediated by that which is its source or determiner.

In the Logic of Being we have come upon three different types of determinacy: qualitative, quantitative, and determinacy that involves both quality and quantity. Closure will be achieved when we reach a determinacy that can no longer pass over into something of these types. What Hegel will offer as the culminating category of measure is an infinite series of alternating measure/measureless terms that as a whole contains within itself all qualitative, quantitative, and measure determinacies. The whole process of this series comprises that in which all of the determinacies of being reside in a movement that successively cancels the immediate being of every one. Insofar as its process is that which underlies them, it is no longer a determinacy *of* being. Rather, it is that which mediates them. It is that which renders them all no longer immediately given but determined by that which spews them forth as elements of its encompassing process. Precisely by rendering all of being its moment or its component, that process will not be something that is itself any of the preceding determinations.

Hegel proceeds beyond being to the Logic of Essence through these concluding moves of the account of measure. Measure has arisen as the third part of the Logic of Being. Measure follows from quality and quantity precisely because it involves determinacy that is both qualitative and quantitative. Measure, in the first instance, is an immediate unity of quality and quantity. It is a qualitatively specific quantum, something in which quantity is bound up with quality without further qualification.

The ensuing discussion of measure is presented in three chapters. The first presents "Specific Quantity," the next offers "Real Measure," and the third delineates "The Becoming of Essence," which focuses upon what happens to "absolute indifference."

"Specific quantity" presents the qualitative quantum as it is immediately given. By contrast, "real measure" involves "The Relation of Self-Subsistent Measures," and these relations will take various forms. When Hegel talks

about real measure, the emphasis is on measure that is determinate, whereas specific quantity merely comprises measure per se. Just as determinacy as such becomes a determinate determinacy in the contrast of something and other, so measure becomes real in relations between measures, relations between specific qualitative quanta.

The specific quantum contains quality on the one hand and quantity on the other. Although they are immediately united, they are also distinguishable. Due to this distinguishability, the specific quantum presents a duality that presents a quandary to those who are baffled by whether the removal of one hair makes one bald or whether the removal of a single grain of sand from a heap makes it cease to be a heap. If you keep on plucking your hair, you will eventually become bald, just as if you remove one grain of sand after another from a pile, you will finally have nothing left. Yet in both cases of the head of hair and the heap of sand, the qualitatively defining quantity is indefinite.

This problem arises from the two sides of measure. With measure, we are dealing with quantity that is no longer indifferent to quality, but has quality associated with it, and with a quality that depends upon quantity for its qualitative character. One commonly speaks about something gradually altering its quality through a gradual increase or decrease in some quantitative dimension. This construal focuses purely on the quantitative dimension, yet qualitative change is not just quantitative. It is something different. When water freezes, the qualitative change does not happen gradually. It happens all at once. There is a sudden transformation. There is nodal alteration as the degree of temperature changes. This nodal transformation is built into measure, Hegel points out, given that measure involves an immediate conjunction of quantity and quality (pp. 367–68).¹ On the one hand, because quantity is continuous, it points beyond itself and is subject to alteration. There is always a quantity beyond it with which it is continuous. On the other hand, measure imposes some limit to how much the specific quantum can undergo an increase or decrease without altering its quality. At some point there is a limit.

These two sides go together, and their conjunction is exhibited in all those examples of heaps and heads of hair that may appear mysterious. The nodal alteration is bound up with the very character of measure, due to the nature of quantity and quality. There is an aspect of indifference that cannot be completely eliminated, but on the other hand, there is a limit in measure, where something at a certain point will lose its quality, ceasing to be what it is when a certain quantitative threshold is reached.

Once the measure relationship applies to quantities and presents a rule for them, a specific quantum can serve as a standard for measuring other things, whose quantities have a qualitative side different from that of their standard of measure. We end up with relations between different measures, and Hegel

follows out how the ensuing relationship between measures involves a distinct kind of infinity, consisting in an infinite series that is different from the unending qualitative series of finite, nonfinite, and finite, and from the infinite quantitative series of continuous quanta (pp. 371–74).

Now we have a relationship between measures that involves a series endemic to the relation of measure. It is rooted in the way in which, when we are dealing with measure, its quantitative side is always subject to an increase or decrease, while at a certain point, at a certain juncture, at a certain nodal point, there is a qualitative change and no longer just a quantitative change. At that point we move beyond the measure to what is its negation: the nonmeasure, the measureless. This measureless will be measureless insofar as it is a quantitative determination that is not connected to the quality that has been left behind. Yet, for this to be the case, the quantity must be tied to another quality. Thus, the move beyond measure into the measureless turns out to be a move to another measure, which itself is subject to the same quantitative alteration that will push it beyond its qualitative limit, to another measureless, which will turn out to itself be another measure.

This infinite process of measures, which Hegel presents as endemic to measure relations, allegedly pushes the whole domain of being beyond itself, and our task is to understand how that is the case. What is at stake is the emergence of a certain kind of infinity that is not spurious. The emergent consummation of measure relations is not just a continuation of one measure going on into another measure but something this process brings with it that is not just reducible to the terms of measure and quantity and quality that fall within it.

Hegel introduces the process in question as something leading to what he will call “absolute indifference.” He describes this under the heading of “The Measureless” (p. 371), and he points out that here we have a kind of infinite that is very different from what we have encountered before. Insofar as this process involves measures that are pushed beyond themselves to a new measure, we have quantitative alteration giving rise to a new quality and measure, which itself gives rise to quantitative alteration because of its accompanying quantity. The new quality is bound up with a quantity as part of its measure, which is subject to alteration in virtue of its very own continuity. That gives rise to a new quality once again, and we have quality arising from quantity, quantity arising from quality, and this process itself vanishing, because each factor leads back to itself. In the process as a whole, every term ends up being mediated by and produced by the same movement into which it enters. Every element of quantity and quality is thus posited by the movement in which they figure. Hegel describes this as a process in which both quantity and quality are converted into one another and, through being converted into one another, end up returning to themselves (p. 372). Here measure, which has a quantity bound up with quality, gives rise to quantitative changes that

engender a new quality tied to quantity, which then gives rise to further quantitative changes that alter it and produce a new measure. As Hegel writes:

The transition of the qualitative, of one specific existence, into another, is such that all that occurs is an alteration of the specific magnitude of a ratio. Hence the alteration of the qualitative itself into the qualitative is posited as an external and indifferent change, as a coming together with itself; moreover, the quantitative, in being converted into the qualitative, into that which is determined in and for itself, sublates itself. This unity which thus continues itself into itself in its alternating measures is the truly persisting, self-subsistent material substance or thing. (p. 372)

The key point is that although the process is one that contains measures passing over into one another, making a transition into one another, the process as a whole does not alter. It remains that which is at one with itself through the procession of these different measures. Thus, as Hegel notes, “What therefore is present here is one and the same thing which is posited as the perennial substrate of its differentiations” (p. 372). We have here a “transition of the qualitative and the quantitative into each other” that, as Hegel writes, “proceeds on the basis of their unity and the meaning of this process is only to *show* or to *posit* the *determinate being* of such a substrate underlying the process, a substrate which is their unity” (p. 373).

The emergent process is that within which measure relations and quantity and quality operate as moments. “Consequently,” Hegel concludes, “the measures and the self-subsistent things posited with them are reduced to *states*. The alteration is only change of a *state*, and the *subject* of the transition is posited as remaining the *same* in the process” (p. 373). Here is a movement that is itself an entity of a particular kind, one which does not itself stand in any relation that is quantitative or qualitative. Rather this substrate contains qualitative and quantitative determinations that are continually produced as a result of its process and have their immediate being canceled, passing over into something else.

What we thus have is something that could be said to be, as Hegel initially puts it, absolutely indifferent to all of its component determinations of quality, quantity, and measure precisely because it is that in which they are continually being superseded (p. 375). It is continually superseding them, yet it consists of nothing other than that process of superseding them, the process by which they come to be, the process of their becoming. For this reason, they figure within it as only a state of, a condition of its being.

How does this outcome serve as “the becoming of essence”? Hegel offers his explanation in the chapter of that name, writing:

What has thus been determined as qualitative and external is only a vanishing determinateness; quality as thus external to being is the opposite of itself and as such is only the sublation of itself. In this manner, the determinateness is still only posited in the substrate as an empty differentiation. But it is just this empty differentiation which is indifference itself as a result; and indifference is thus concrete, a mediation-with-self through the negation of every determination of being. As this mediation it contains negation and relation, and what was called state is its immanent, self-related differentiation; it is precisely externality and its vanishing which make the unity of being into indifference and they are therefore *within* this indifference, which therewith ceases to be only a substrate and *in its own self* only abstract. (p. 375)

Measure has generated a process into which measure has absorbed itself, a process in which measures cancel themselves, moving beyond themselves only to return to measure, letting their own vanishing vanish. This process contains the determinations of quality, quantity, and measure as mere states of itself, states mediated by this encompassing process. Why would this provide closure for the Logic of Being and take us to something beyond everything in this first categorial arena? How are we now contending with what is no longer characterizable simply qualitatively or simply quantitatively or as a qualitative quantity? Why do we have something that requires new categories to be or be thought?

The emergent process cannot be reducible to any of the terms it contains precisely because it contains them all with further qualification. You cannot use categories of quality, quantity, or measure to categorize what involves them all in an additional relationship, a relationship that takes the totality of their relations and renders them internal differentiations of something that robs them of their immediacy by being their underlying mediation.

What we have is both their determinations and that which generates them without having any further character. Hegel points out that this is precisely what essence has always been understood to be (p. 379). Traditionally, essence is construed as what underlies being. You arrive at the essence of being by somehow getting at what being really rests upon. Being has an essence insofar as it is mediated by something else, without which it cannot be.

Typically, Hegel observes in introducing essence, when knowing seeks the truth of being beyond what is immediately given, it attempts to penetrate being by going behind it to its determining source (p. 389). It is understood that underlying being is something else on which it depends. Cognition here presumes that being has a ground, that it has a foundation, that there is a privileged essence mediating what appears to be. Essence is here treated as what is ultimate, and if essence is what is ultimate, being is just an appearance of essence, something whose presence is really not immediate, because it is grounded on something else. Being's immediacy is illusory. It is just

appearance. Instead of taking being in its immediacy, as just being what is, we here understand being to be just a show of what underlies it.

As Hegel notes in his introduction to the *Logic of Essence*, this way of getting at essence seems to depend upon an external assumption and an external reflection that addresses being and then tries to look for something serving as its basis (p. 389). The presumption is that somehow we get at essence by starting with being, or what is given, driven by the conviction that truth must lie somewhere else, that we just cannot take what is given as being what is true. We have to understand it as being mediated by something else. We have to look for its source.

One might think that we are already doing this when we start with being, because, when we begin with pure being, it might appear that we make this start only on the basis of a preliminary abstraction from the manifold concreteness of appearances. We somehow have to remove that manifold to get at pure being, which thus would involve a kind of negation. We would be removing all the mediations of the manifold, and that seems to be what it means to begin with what is immediate.

Hegel warned us, however, that when we start with being we are not engaged in any such abstracting and negation. This is why he instructed us to call our starting point “being” rather than “immediacy.” He pointed out that immediacy was a term of reflection, in that immediacy involved negating mediation, removing mediation, that is, reflecting upon something given and then abstracting something from it (p. 69). The starting point of logic, being, must on the contrary not presuppose any act of abstraction or any reflecting.

Essence is ordinarily arrived at by those who maintain that we cannot just take the given as primordial and authoritative; we have to look behind it. Hegel is presenting a very different arrival at essence. We do not arrive at essence through any external reflections on the given. Rather, essence arises as a result of what being itself is. Being ends up negating its own immediacy and making a transition into what negates the immediacy of being, rendering it mediated or relative to something else that underlies it. Here in the *Logic of Essence*, we are dealing with determinacy that is relative, that is mediated, that is posited by some determiner of its determinacy.

To avoid misunderstandings, Hegel pointedly contrasts these two ways of conceiving essence (p. 390). The way employing external reflection thinks of essence as being only a thought, a reflection that presumes that being has some ground or foundation. Essence thereby arises as something that is through an “external, abstractive reflection,” something that “is for an other, namely for abstraction” as well as “in general, for the simply affirmative being that remains confronting it” (p. 390). If we arrive at essence in this way, essence gets construed as something that does not exist in and of itself. It exists in virtue of two things: the presence of being and the presence of the abstraction that has reflected upon being and moved behind it to something

else. “But,” writes Hegel, “essence as it has here come to be, is what it is, through a negativity which is not alien to it but is its very own, the infinite movement of being. It is being that is *in itself and for itself*; it is absolute *being-in-itself* in that it is indifferent to every determinateness of being, and otherness and relation-to-other have been completely sublated” (p. 390).

Why would Hegel characterize essence as being an “absolute being-in-itself”? Being-in-itself figured earlier as one aspect of something, a determinate being. On the other hand, something involved being-for-other. Essence does have a determinacy. After all, essence is not going to be the same thing as being. Essence is not indeterminate. It has a determination in its own right, and it is here characterized as absolute. It is absolute insofar as essence has emerged as indifferent to every determination of being, including every qualitative determination, every quantitative determination, and every qualitatively quantitative determination or every measure determination. Essence is indifferent to all of them, as opposed to being determined by them, because essence has reduced them to moments of itself, which it determines, rather than the other way round.

These determinations of being no longer have any independent being of their own, any immediate being of their own, any self-subsistence. Their self-subsistence has been removed, because they have turned out to be states of the process constitutive of essence. By being mediated by essence they have lost their self-subsistence. Essence does not stand in relation to them as separate entities, incurring a relation to other. Essence just has a being-in-itself that is absolute, not relative. Yet, as Hegel writes, essence “is not only this being-in-itself; as mere being-in-itself it would be only the abstraction of pure essence; but it is equally essentially *being-for-self*; it is itself this negativity, the self-sublating of otherness and determinateness” (p. 390).

How does essence involve being-for-self? Hegel associates essence’s being-for-self with “this negativity, the self-sublating of otherness and determinateness.” The otherness and determinateness that is negated, that has its self-subsistence removed, is the totality of quality, quantity, and measure determinations. All of the specifications of being have had their immediacy or self-subsistence removed by becoming states of essence, which now posits or mediates them by being that of which they are now the appearance.

Essence is in relation to itself by how it renders the determinations of being mediated rather than immediate. Essence’s own being consists in a positing of being as mediated, as no longer self-subsistent, as being the show of essence. Hegel will use the term “reflection” to refer to essence, because essence is reflected in the determinacies that are posited by it. Its own character as what determines these determinacies, as what mediates them, is reflected in them because they are not self-subsistent. They are expressly determined by essence, and it is in that sense that “reflection” will figure in the unfolding of the Logic of Essence.

Hegel nevertheless begins by describing essence as being at first indeterminate. With the self-engendered closure of being, we just have essence without further qualification. "Essence as the completed return of being into itself is thus at first indeterminate essence" (p. 390). Essence is indeterminate in that it is nothing other than the utterly unqualified positor of the determinations of being. It is simply that which mediates them, that which posits them. Essence does not yet have any further character than that. You could say this is the most minimal specification of essence. As Hegel proceeds to write, "Absolute essence in this simple equality with itself has no determinate being" (p. 390), because all contrastable determinacy resides in the being that has relinquished its own self-subsistence and resolved itself into a process that is just simply that which mediates being.

Essence is going to obtain further determination only in virtue of what it posits. As essence develops, the character of what it posits is going to alter together with the character of the positing. Accordingly, the positor, which essence comprises, will become further determined. Hegel characterizes, by way of anticipation, the basic stages of this further determination of essence through its own positing, as follows: "At first, essence *shines* or *shows within itself*, or is reflection" (p. 391). To begin with, essence is going to shine or show within itself because determinacy is going to be essence's own determination. Instead of being immediately given and enjoying self-subsistence, determinacy is now determined by essence such that it is essence's own determination. Essence's own determination thereby consists in positing determinacy. That is essence's own determinacy. The positing of determinacy is the show of essence, or, as Hegel says, reflection. The determined determinacy will reflect essence's positing of it rather than being something immediately given or self-subsistent.

"Secondly," Hegel writes, essence "appears" (p. 391). We will have to grapple with comprehending the difference between essence merely shining or showing within itself and essence appearing.

Thirdly, Hegel notes, essence "*manifests itself*" (p. 391).

So we have three different ways in which essence allegedly presents itself in the determinacy that it mediates. First of all, it shines or shows itself. Secondly, it appears. Thirdly, it manifests itself. Hegel now gives this three-fold division a further characterization. First, he writes, we have essence "as *simple* essence, essence in itself, which in its determinations remains within itself" (p. 391). Then, secondly, we have essence "as emerging into determinate being, or in accordance with its Existence and *Appearance*" (p. 391). So, first, we are going to have essence in a comparatively indeterminate fashion. Then we are going to have essence in the way in which it will have determinate being, and that will allow us to speak about essence appearing and the determination of essence being an existing appearance. Finally, we are going to have "essence that is one with its Appearance," suggesting that essence's

manifestation will be a determinacy in which essence is self-related or has being-for-self. Essence will then be at one with its appearance, “as *actuality*” (p. 391).

In all of these stages, there is a distinction that will prove to be crucial in demarcating the logical spheres of essence and of the concept. Namely, even though essence is always what it is in virtue of how it determines what it determines, there still remains a distinction between essence and its show, essence and its appearance, and essence and its actuality. Essence will be in virtue of determining something, which will not have self-subsistence but owe its being to essence. Nevertheless, the very fact that a distinction is drawn between determiner and what is determined presents an abiding tension. Essence can never quite fully manifest itself so long as there remains a distinction between what determines and what is determined.

In the Logic of the Concept that difference is going to be eliminated because there what is determined and what does the determining will be one and the same. With this equalization, the determination will be *self-determination*. In the Logic of Being, we were dealing with immediate, given determination, where the factors involved are all on the same level. In the Logic of Essence, we are going to be dealing with determined determinacy, where there are two tiers of determinacy. There is a source that determines what is determined and there is a domain of what is derivative of something else. In the Logic of the Concept, we will have self-determination, and that will end up being associated with universality, for reasons that we will have to explore.

Now let us consider how the opening section of the Logic of Essence is laid out. The three divisions of the Logic of Essence will successively present essence as reflection within itself, essence as appearance, and essence as actuality. Hegel points out something that will be decisive at the start. He notes that “essence issues from being; hence it is not immediately in and for itself but is a *result* of that movement” (p. 393). If essence were “in and for itself,” it would owe its being to itself and not be in relation to anything else. Essence, however, has emerged as a result of a preceding development, consisting in the transitions that being has undergone.

For this very reason, if we take essence “at first as an immediacy, then it is a specific determinate being confronted by another such” (p. 393). What does it confront? It confronts the determinations of being from which it has arisen. Accordingly, at the very outset, essence is determined in some respect in terms of the contrast of something and other. Essence must thus be to start with something essential opposed to unessential determinate being. Essence will therefore have its initial specification in the contrast between the essential and the unessential.

Essence, however, will not just be in relation to what is unessential because, as Hegel writes, “essence is being that has been sublated in and for

itself” (p. 393). The being that confronts essence, which is the being from which it is arisen, no longer has any self-subsistence. Thus “what confronts it is only *illusory* being” (p. 393)—an illusory being, which is only a show of essence, because it is really just essence’s own positing. Insofar as it is essence’s own positing, essence is reflection, for essence is in relation to itself as manifest in what it has determined. Essence will take the form of determinations of reflection, and when essence becomes reflection into itself, it will convert into ground. This is the initial itinerary that awaits us as we follow the successive positings of essence.

Chapter Fourteen

Essence

Hegel develops the opening sections of the Logic of Essence in a seemingly different way in his *Science of Logic* and in his *Encyclopaedia Logic*, which condenses the argument into a study guide for accompanying his university lectures. This disparity raises the question: In what degree is there a single necessary development? Might multiple routes be followed? How are we to look upon Hegel's own achievement, given that we do find discrepancies in his various attempts to work out systematic logic?

The *Science of Logic* came out in various installments, and Hegel, late in life, began revising the whole work. In the prefaces and introduction, he points out that his own efforts may warrant revision and certainly could be improved upon. Alas, Hegel died before he got any further than revising the Logic of Being, which he did publish in a new version late in life¹ and which is the version all subsequent editions of the *Science of Logic* contain. The Logic of Essence and the Logic of the Concept that we are left with are the same unrevised texts that Hegel gave the world in 1813 and 1816.

Once Hegel finally got a job teaching in a university after years of instructing high school students, he ended up each year lecturing on all aspects of philosophy, presenting what he took to be the resolution of the problems in all the different spheres of philosophy. Hegel worked year in, year out on this systematic encompassing task and presented his results in lectures year in, year out. He did publish different versions of his chapbook study guide to his philosophical system, and the compendium of the latest version appears in three volumes, the first of which is the *Logic* of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, followed by the *Philosophy of Nature*, and then by the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

The *Encyclopaedia* is organized into numbered paragraphs. Some of them have remarks that follow, which are in larger type, and then there are sections

in very small type, which sometimes go by the name of additions or *Zusätzen*. Editors of one of the first editions of Hegel's complete works compiled these additions from notes his students took from different years of his lectures on these topics; the editors compiled them without indicating from what year individual additions and their parts derive. Now scholars in Germany are beginning to publish the lecture notes of students from different years, providing a further resource for exploring the differences in Hegel's formulations.

In any event, what is striking is that there is a big discrepancy between how the logic is developed in the *Science of Logic* and in the *Encyclopaedia* version of 1830, which seems to be Hegel's last word on the subject in its entirety. In the *Science of Logic* the development of the first part of the Logic of Essence takes place in three chapters. The first chapter is titled "Illusory Being." It has three parts: "The Essential and the Unessential," then "Illusory Being," and then "Reflection." This chapter is followed by a second chapter titled "The Essentialities or Determinations of Reflection," which is subdivided into three parts. The first part is "Identity," the second is "Difference," and the third is "Contradiction." Then follows the third chapter, "Ground," which is subdivided into three parts addressing successive forms of ground: "Absolute Ground," "Determinate Ground," and "Condition."

By contrast, the *Encyclopaedia* version of *Logic* introduces the doctrine of essence in three brief introductory paragraphs and then begins with a section titled "A. Essence as Ground of Existence," which opens with a discussion titled, "The Pure Principles or Categories of Reflection," the first of which is "Identity."² The rest of the *Encyclopaedia* treatment of the Logic of Essence more or less conforms to what you find in chapters 2 and 3 of the *Science of Logic*. In other words, Hegel in the *Encyclopaedia* version has seemingly left out entirely what he addresses in chapter 1 of the Logic of Essence in the *Science of Logic*. In the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, he appears to suggest that the Logic of Essence can begin straightaway with identity, whereas in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel does not introduce identity until he has worked through what goes under the heading of chapter 1, with its three different stages of first the contrast of the essential and the unessential, then illusory being, and finally reflection.

Could both treatments be right? Are there two alternate routes, or is one or both of them wrong? Can the Logic of Essence begin straightaway with identity? Is that really where we have arrived when the Logic of Being achieves closure? Is identity what essence, minimally speaking, is? Or, rather, does identity itself depend upon other more rudimentary, more primary determinations of essence?

If we take seriously the project of a systematic logic, can there possibly be valid alternate routes? Can the material be ordered in different ways? If one could alter the itinerary or if there were multiple itineraries one could follow,

would the contents then be arbitrary? Or would it rather be that the content is nonarbitrary, but the ordering or form or method of exposition is arbitrary? Either way, the possibility of different routes bears upon the relationship between form and content or ordering and content. It leaves them separate and separable. Then, the content does not order itself. Its ordering depends upon something outside itself. The thinking of logic and what logic thinks become distinguishable. In that case, however, philosophy would be a vain or an impossible enterprise. Think back to the considerations at the very beginning of the *Science of Logic* about what happens if philosophy were to be dealing with a subject matter that is different from the thinking that brings it into play. That means the thinking that philosophy uses is not itself under scrutiny, but just taken for granted. In that case, philosophy cannot help but be dogmatic. If different orders of presentation of the material were possible and there were a separation of form and content, logic could not be a thinking of thinking. Its thinking would instead be of something different from itself. That difference is precisely what logic, as a science, is denying and overcoming. So, if there is to be such a logic, it had better have a nonarbitrary order of development, or alternately, the content has to be such that it cannot be ordered independently of what it is. In other words, the content must be such as to develop itself or order itself, so that the basis for moving from one term to another lies in the terms themselves and nowhere else.

So, if we are going to take Hegel's project seriously and, by extension, take logic and philosophy seriously, we want to see not whether there can be optional routes (which would be impossible if there is to be logic and philosophy), but to figure out which route is the real McCoy.

What might, perhaps, remove some of the discrepancy is that in section 114 of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, Hegel does mention the contrast of the unessential and the essential.³ So to some degree he is here not excluding something that he takes much bigger pains to develop in the first part of the first chapter of the *Science of Logic*'s treatment of essence.

To address the issue in a serious way, it is necessary to examine the development in the *Science of Logic* and see what rationale lies behind it. On the one hand, we need to consider what reason we have for taking seriously the *Science of Logic*'s claim that essence, in the first instance, is something that does not involve identity but involves a series of different relationships, beginning with the contrast of the essential and the unessential. On the other hand, we then need to investigate to what degree these developments are required in order for identity to come on the scene.

The categories of essence have tended to be privileged by those thinkers who want to regard what is as having a foundation or a ground, and they have also been privileged, as it turns out, by those who have also tended to look upon the ground of objectivity to reside in the structure of cognition—that is, thinkers who have made a transcendental turn. It is no accident that preemi-

nent among the categories Kant uses to categorize objectivity are those that we here encounter in the *Logic of Essence*. After all, if objectivity is going to be determined by the structure of knowing, that means that knowable objectivity is determined by something other, or is generally speaking, conditioned. That identification of objectivity with determinations that come from the *Logic of Essence* has some pretty fateful consequences, because it means that knowable objectivity has no room for what is not determined by something else. Broadly speaking, it leaves no room for freedom or, more generally, subjectivity. Contingency need not be excluded, and Kant does consider contingency to be bound up with the kind of necessity that is at work in experience. Everything is contingent insofar as the spatial-temporal determination of all objects is necessitated by conditions that are themselves contingent upon further necessitating conditions in the same predicament. Contingency and external necessity go hand in hand with one another, but freedom, subjectivity, beauty, and life are all precluded. There is basically only room for mechanical reality or mechanism. That makes it hard to think about the objective reality of self-consciousness or of morality. It will thus be important to see to what degree categories of essence do not have the final word. If they did have the final word, we would be stuck in the throes of foundational determination, which has its slogan in Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason.

The principle of sufficient reason—that everything has a ground or is determined by something else—is given universal empirical validity by Kant.⁴ Everything we experience, everything we know objectively, is allegedly subject to that principle, which again means that we cannot experience anything that is free, anything that is alive, anything that has the kind of organization of a work of fine art.

With the question of the finality of the categories of essence awaiting eventual resolution, we need first to clarify how essence is properly to be determined. Essence as a whole comprises the logical sphere within which determinacy is mediated, where determinacy is determined by something that determines it. So, the sphere of essence encompasses all those categories that involve a determiner and what it determines, with a distinction drawn between the two. The *Logic of Essence* will address all of those two-tiered relationships like ground and grounded, cause and effect, whole and parts, thing and its properties, essence and appearance, and so forth and so on. As we have seen, Hegel characterizes the domain of essence as being one in which determinations are relative to something else.

Essence emerges as the outcome of what the categories within the *Logic of Being* have done to themselves. Measure relations come to form an infinite series whose process as a whole is at one with itself by mediating the totality of the determinations of quality, quantity, and measure. It is simply that which mediates the domain of being, that which renders it something

that no longer has self-subsistence. Essence to begin with is that which is at one with itself, in relation to itself, by rendering the determinacy that it determines something that is not self-subsistent but mediated—mediated by something that lies completely outside of its own domain.

Hegel characterizes how essence makes its debut in terms of the contrast of the essential and the unessential. This initial characterization reflects that what essence is is determined by the fact that it has emerged from being. How does that emergence render essence something that comes forward as the essential standing in relation to the unessential? This initial contrast seems to put the essential and the unessential on the same level. The essential is one factor and the unessential is another, and they appear to owe their character to their contrast with one another. This seems, as Hegel himself points out, to take us back to the relationships of determinate being, for essence, as the essential in relation to the unessential, has taken on the character of a something, which is what its other is not. In just this sense, we have something that is essential and something else that is unessential.

Nevertheless, we are not just addressing something and other. We are addressing the essential and the unessential. That specific contrast indicates that even though they are presented as if they were on a par with one another, as if one were outside the other, as if there were a limit between them, there is still something very different about their character. The unessential is something that is determined by what is essential. It is posited or mediated by it and not the other way around.

The essential has, as Hegel says, being in and for itself (p. 394).⁵ It is related to itself. It has a determinacy in itself. It does not depend upon standing in contrast to something else, because we have left behind the categories of quality, as well as of quantity and of measure. Why, then, is there an application of a contrastive relationship that harks back to something and other to essence and what essence determines or mediates?

To shed light on this, Hegel turns to how the skeptics treat what the dogmatists considered to have genuine reality or self-subsistence (p. 396). Through their suspension of judgment, the skeptics want instead to treat what the dogmatist had taken to be as merely a domain of phenomena. The ancient skeptics reduced all alleged being to phenomena by pointing out that what was taken to be real was actually relative to different standpoints, different conditions, and so forth. All the tropes that the skeptics use to show that we have to suspend our judgment and not make claims about what is immediately expose how what we take to be immediate is actually mediated and relative to various factors of one sort or another. When you recognize that what is taken to be is mediated, rather than immediate, you treat it as just a phenomenon. Similarly, Hegel points out, the subjective idealists such as Kant took what dogmatic philosophers or naive realists considered things in themselves to be mere appearances (p. 396). They are appearances because

they are mediated by the subject of knowing. They are how things appear to me, given my cognitive faculties, so what I am dealing with in experience are just appearances, not things in themselves. Things in themselves are immediate, but appearances are mediated by and relative to my perspective or the perspective we share, which Kant identifies as consciousness in general. In both ancient skepticism and subjective idealism, Hegel observes, a shift is made from what is taken to be immediately to what is now deprecated as appearance or mere phenomena (p. 396). This shift only changes one thing. It does not alter the content, but only its status or form, namely whether the content is taken as immediate or mediated.

The same thing is true with regard to essence and the content with relation to which essence is essence. The content is now mediated by essence, but the content is not something that essence's mediation has generated. The content is something given. It is the same content provided by the determinations of the Logic of Being. They are still there. All that has happened is that they are now posited or determined by or relative to essence. Essence's role as that which mediates them has a very formal character. The content that essence mediates is still external to its mediation. It is still something given to it and, in that regard, it has a kind of otherness.

That otherness exists not as a truly self-subsistent other that has a being apart from essence. It comprises the content that essence mediates, a content that, for that very reason, does not merely have the self-subsistent being that would allow it to delimit essence and make essence just something else in a relation of something and other. Nevertheless, it still is a content that has an externality or a givenness that is not really produced by the mediating process that essence involves. So in that regard essence, even though it mediates this content, stands in contrast to the content as something other to it, as something it is not, as the unessential vis-à-vis essence as the essential.

Even though there is this difference, even though the positing by essence does not determine the content of what it mediates, the unessential is rendered through its own contrast with the essential something that can be called "illusory being." How are we to understand this move from the contrast between the essential and the unessential to illusory being? To begin with, there is unessential given determinacy that confronts essence, insofar as essence's mediation of it has not created or generated it. Nevertheless, in positing that given content, essence renders that content something null. The erstwhile unessential is just something within essence's own process. Even if it has a given content not generated by essence, it still lies within essence's act of mediating, and in that regard, it expressly has no self-subsistence. That means that the being that, in the first instance, is the unessential contrasted with the essential, is illusory being. It is illusory being because it is really a show. It is a show of essence itself, because it is not something lying outside

essence. It is not something that is independent of it. It is that being through whose mediation essence is at one with itself.

As Hegel writes, "Since the unessential no longer has a being, all that remains to it of otherness is the pure moment of negated determinate being; illusory being is this *immediate*, negated determinate being in the determinateness of being, in such wise that it has determinate being only in relation to an other, only in its negated determinate being" (pp. 395–96).

The unessential has its determinacy in relation to essence, which gives it its determinacy not just by being what it is not and providing the limit for its identity. Instead we are dealing with something that has no independent subsistence. It is merely a posit of essence, and for this reason it has a being whose putative immediacy is illusory. Its determinacy is something it has in relation to essence, which is not merely something other in respect to it.

Indeed, what is posited by essence has a side that is independent of essence, the side that made it, in the first instance, something unessential. Namely, it has a given content, but the content is no less robbed of any independence by the way in which essence relates to it. Because the unessential turns out to be illusory being, essence is related to itself in what it posits. It is not relating to an entity with the self-subsistence of something other. For this reason, Hegel suggests, essence will turn out to be a determination of reflection (p. 399). Reflection here should not be confused with any of its real instantiations, as if reflection logically speaking were a certain kind of mental activity constitutive of consciousness or a physical relation of light. In each of these examples, the logical relation shows through, for that which is reflected in consciousness or in physical reality encounters its own determination in that to which it relates.

Illusory being comprises reflection insofar as essence's own positing is exhibited in what is illusory. As illusory, illusory being has the character of being posited. It is positedness, a posited being, determinacy that is mediated not by another determinacy like itself but by something that does not exist side by side with it, separated by some limit, some boundary. What posits it is on a whole different level, which prevents positor and posited from being on a commensurable plane. What is illusory is illusory insofar as it reflects the positing or the mediating on which it depends.

Essence is in virtue of reflecting itself, being through what it posits. Essence is going to comprise a series of different forms of reflection, each resulting from the positing of the preceding form. In each case, the reflection is going to involve something that is going to somehow turn essence back upon itself, and this can occur in different ways. All will involve something distinct from essence, whose distinction will just as much manifest the determining of essence.

Hegel thinks through three different kinds of reflection: positing reflection, external or presupposing reflection, and then determining reflection.

Determining reflection is going to bring us to what Hegel will call the essentialities or determinations of reflection. At that point, essence, and one could also say reflection, becomes determinate. The different determinacies of essence, the different essentialities, turn out, interestingly enough, to be identity and difference, opposition, and contradiction.

One might ask why essence is not yet determinate until this juncture. What is both perplexing and difficult about the whole matter is that essence is a determiner only in virtue of what it determines. Essence's own determination depends upon the determination it posits. Nonetheless, essence is something that is in and for itself. It relates to itself and is not determined by standing in contrast to anything else. It is determined in virtue of what it mediates. Since essence's own character depends upon mediating something, as the character of what it mediates takes on different forms, essence's own character will take on different forms as well. This is evident in the different forms of reflection.

The first form is positing reflection. Admittedly, all reflection is positing, minimally speaking, since essence always posits something and reflects itself in the positedness of what it posits. What allows essence to be at one with itself is that it mediates a determinacy that reflects its determining of the determinacy.

Always, however, there is a discrepancy, in that what is posited has something about it that is not determined by essence itself. It has a content that the positing has not itself generated but simply renders something mediated by essence. Essence thus has to presuppose the content that it posits, because its positing always operates with the distinction between determiner and determined that will only be eliminated when, in the *Logic of the Concept*, determinacy becomes self-determining. Essence deals with something that remains different from the determining by which it is mediated. After all, essence's positing cannot mediate what is mediated unless there is a distinction between the two. In the domain of essence, to be mediated is different from being the mediator, even though what is mediated reflects essence. In order for something to be posited, it cannot be the same thing as the essence that posits it. It has to have a derivative character different from the determining character of essence. The very nature of positing is bound up with there being this difference between positor and posited, or between determiner and what is determined. We see that difference at play when essence arises, in that essence takes given determinacy, determinacy that is immediate, and renders it mediated, affirming itself as just that which mediates determinacy. In virtue of that givenness, the posited determinacy is the unessential and essence is the essential. Since, however, the unessential is still determined by essence and does not have any self-subsistent being, it is illusory being. As such, it is also something in which essence's determining is reflected, but the reflecting in the first instance is just positing reflection, since the mediating

performed by essence is indifferent to the content it mediates. To say that something is posited and in its positedness reflects the determining of its determiner does not otherwise specify what content it has. The very positing of essence accordingly involves presupposing something determinate to posit, because the positing does not generate the content of the posited.

Consequently, positing reflection turns out to be an external reflection or a presupposing reflection. It is external insofar as it is a reflection that reflects itself on the basis of something given. This factor reflects essence even though it has a given content, which thereby comprises a presupposition of essence's reflection.

External or presupposing reflection then turns out to be actually a determining reflection. This is because essence just as much mediates the presupposed content, which is at hand in virtue of the reflecting that essence is engaged in. The determinations of content are essence's own determinations, after all, since otherwise there would be no reflection.

Thus we have a determining reflection. What is posited reflects in its content its determining by essence because there is nothing else genuinely independent to be manifest. That which is distinguished from essence's mediating as that which it mediates is still distinguished from essence, and in this respect, essence repels itself from itself. It does so, however, differently from how the one ends up repelling itself and producing the many. Here in essence there is a difference in level between essence and what it mediates, whereas each one has an identical self-related character, causing repulsion to revert to attraction. Essence retains a primacy over that in which it reflects itself, a primacy that is absent in the ones, all of which are on a par. That parity is why the relationship of ones remains within the field of the Logic of Being.

As determining reflection, essence gains its determinacy by having itself reflected in a determining way in what it posits. That allows essence to become determinate. What essence posits in a determining manner reflects a positing that is no longer formal, no longer indifferent to the content of what it mediates. As determining reflection, essence manifests itself in the content, gaining a determinacy it could not possess so long as the content was something given. Determining reflection thus enables essence to have a differentiation reflecting its positing, a differentiation in which essence is at one with itself. This provides a determination of essence worthy of the title of identity to the degree that identity involves a kind of self-relation where there is a differentiation that remains completely internal. What is identical remains at one with itself in its own differentiation.

What is posited in determining reflection reflects essence as essence by exhibiting the lack of self-subsistent otherness of its content. This makes explicitly manifest what was already implicit in determined determinacy being not just unessential but illusory, being completely relative to essence.

That allows essence to be reflection, to confront itself in what it determines, even though there is still always some distinction between what it determines and itself. That abiding distinction is why essence is reflection as opposed to self-determination. When you are reflected in a mirror, the mirror is not you, but only reflects you. What is there in the mirror is relative to you, but still it is not you.

Although essence presupposed the content of what it mediates, this presupposing is something essence does. It is a presupposing and as such it gives itself its own presupposition. Because essence provides its own presupposition, it is really responsible for it. That way, essence can count as determining what reflects it in all respects. Thus what reflects it is its determination. Nonetheless, there is still a distinction between essence and what it determines, and that is what presents the difficulty in dealing with each of the different stages of the Logic of Essence.

All along the way, there are terms where one is relative to something else that reflects itself in this other term. Reflection is not a relationship where what is reflected and what allows for the reflection are on the same level. There remains some divide, whether we are talking about essence and illusory being or ground and grounded or a thing and its properties, and so forth. There is going to be a distinction, and yet, at the same time, there is going to be a relativity of something to something else. There is some difference, but there is relativity to the difference. That is the basic difficulty.

We are not dealing with the kind of relationship you find between something and other, where there is a limit, where the terms are on a par, where their determinacy depends upon one another in a way that is equiprimordial, where neither one has any primacy over the other. Here in essence we have the kind of relationship where something is derivative of something else, something is relative to something else, something is founded on something else, something is caused by something else. The odd thing is that all of these relationships involve a determinacy that is only what it is by being reflected in what gets determined by it, and yet there is still a separation between what it determines and itself.

Chapter Fifteen

Essence as Reflection within Itself

Hegel makes an important general remark on the entire Logic of Essence in the section on determining reflection, writing: “In the *sphere of essence*, *positedness* corresponds to determinate being. It is likewise a determinate being but its base is being as essence or as pure negativity” (p. 406).¹ Determinate being already contained negation, not only because determinacy contained being and nothing in the form of being, but insofar as the being of quality, reality, could not be determinate without the nonbeing of quality, negation. With being-for-self, the negation in relation to other was itself negated, providing a determinacy that involved negation of negation. Here in essence we have a further level of negation. The mediation of the totality of the determinacies of being by essence removes or negates the immediacy of those determinations, which already contain negations of their own.

Since the determinacy we encounter in the Logic of Essence is in the form of positedness, it involves negation in a dual way. As Hegel writes, “Positedness stands opposed, on the one hand, to determinate being” (p. 406). In the first instance, determinacy as such is not posited. Determinate determinacy involves negation, but the negation by otherness of something is coeval with it, since each factor is on the same level. In essence, by contrast, determinacy or being has become mediated, having lost its self-subsistence through its very own workings. The sphere of quality, quantity, and measure turns out, through nothing other than its own specification, to be mediated by that which mediates being, which is essence. In that way, determinacy is rendered positedness. Positedness stands in contrast to determinacy, which still has immediacy, whereas positedness is determinacy that has lost its immediacy, becoming a derivative domain that has its basis in that which determines it.

Positedness, however, is not just contrastable to determinacy. Hegel writes, in the same passage, “Positedness stands opposed, on the one hand, to

determinate being, and on the other, to essence, and is to be considered as the middle term which unites determinate being with essence, and conversely, essence with determinate being” (p. 406). Positedness stand contrasted or opposed to essence in the latter’s role as the positor of positedness. You cannot have positedness without a positor. Positedness is determined determinacy because it is determined by a determiner. Conversely, essence cannot be the positor it is without the posited. What is posited is thus connected to essence in such a way that determined determinacy does not confront essence as something other. If it did, essence would become entirely qualitatively determined and be absorbed as just another factor in the domain of the Logic of Being.

Essence first emerges as the mediator of given determinacy, removing its form of immediacy without generating its content. This baptizes essence as the essential in relation to the unessential. This contrast expresses how these entities in a certain respect face each other as something and other, because even though the unessential no longer has self-subsistence, it retains a kind of otherness in having a given content composed of the categories of being. They are still there. As Hegel pointed out, this contrast of the essential and the unessential was taken as fundamental by the ancient skeptics, who warned that what philosophers always tried to affirm as being immediate and unconditioned should rather be regarded as just phenomenal because it is relative and thereby conditioned and mediated (p. 396). The phenomena retain the exact same content that everything had when the dogmatic philosophers treated what is as if it were immediate.

An analogous embrace of the contrast of the essential and the unessential is made by the “subjective idealists” (the term Hegel uses to speak of thinkers like Kant), who condemn the “dogmatists” who claim to know things in themselves, reading off the character of what they are (p. 396). We cannot do that, says Kant, because what was taken to be things in themselves is really just phenomenal appearance. The appearances, however, still have the same given content that had been ascribed to things in themselves.

The aspect of givenness that confronts what mediates being results in essence initially coming forward as the essential versus the unessential. We are not talking about something and other here, however, because the essential and the unessential are not on the same footing, even if, in one respect, they do stand in a kind of external relationship. They only warrant being the essential and the unessential if the essential has a primacy over the unessential consisting in being that which ultimately mediates it or robs it of its independent being. This is why the unessential turns out to be illusory being. Illusory being, precisely in being something posited, reflects its determining by essence.

Essence relates to itself and not to something else in the positedness it confronts, which is just illusory being. Essence reflects itself in what it posits

and thereby is reflection. Essence is at one with itself, but it is not self-relation like the one. The one, by excluding otherness, gives its determinacy the form of ideality. In both the one and essence there is self-relation as well as determinacy. In essence, however, determinacy has been rendered not just ideal, but posited. By the same token, the self-relation of essence is not that of a one relating to the void, but self-reflection.

Essence's reflection is going to end up reflecting itself and complicate matters further. That is, essence will end positing its own positing. Although what is posited reflects essence, there has to be something there against which essence reflects itself. What is there, however, has to have the peculiar status of being something that is as much there as not independently there, as being something that is positedness.

To begin with, Hegel points out that "positedness," by itself, "is not yet a determination of reflection; it is only determinateness as negation in general" (p. 406). Positedness is going to become a determination of reflection only once mediated being, as illusory, makes manifest its mediation by essence. Then, the reflection that essence involves transforms itself from being a reflection that simply posits presupposed determinacy to being a reflection that determines what it posits insofar as the given content of determined determinacy depends upon essence for its show.

Essence's own determining is manifest in the aspect of positedness that negates the subsistence of being. Through that, essence reflects itself as determiner. Because, to begin with, essence presupposes the content it mediates, essence's reflection is external. Nonetheless, the externality of essence's reflection rests on the presupposing of content that is performed by essence. In this sense, essence is actually supplying itself with what it acts upon. What is mediated cannot be there independently. What essence determines is a determination of its reflection rather than a determination of something else. This is essence's own determination, and that is how essence is what it is. Essence is at one with itself in terms of the content that it posits, whose negated independence exhibits or reflects essence. As Hegel observes, "*By virtue of this reflection-into-self* the determinations of reflection appear as free essentialities" (p. 406). The positedness or the determined determinacy that essence determines reflects essence. Therefore it reflects the determining of essence. It reflects the reflecting of essence.

Consequently, we now have what Hegel describes as free essentialities, the specific determinations essence obtains in virtue of its own reflection (p. 409). As Hegel notes, there are still "two sides which at first are distinguished from one another. First, the determination is positedness, negation as such; secondly, it is reflection-into-self" (p. 407). The inner reflection of essence shows itself to be an "immanent determining" (p. 407). It is an immanent determining in that it is achieved by means of essence, through essence. The determination "is *positedness*, negation, which however bends

back into itself the relation to other, and negation which is equal to itself, the unity of itself and its other, and only through this is an *essentiality*” (p. 408). So we have two sides. First, there is the positedness, “which bends back into itself the relation to other.” The positedness does not relate essence to an other since the negated immediacy reflects essence. Secondly, essence’s negation is equal to itself. By negating the immediacy of what it posits, essence is at one with itself, relating not to something other but only to its own constitutive determining differentiation.

Even though the positedness reflects essence, it is still distinct from the reflecting in which essence engages. This distinction will have to be maintained so long as determinacy is determined by a determiner, even if essence is a “unity of itself and its other.” Essence unites both its determining act and what it determines, such that essence does not confront some coeval independent entity. This ultimately implies that the determinacy that is determined by essence is something that also determines essence. That is, essence obtains its own constitutive character in virtue of what it determines.

Let us look at how this plays out in the initial determination of the essentialities or determinations of reflection. Here we have reflection that is determinate, and because it is determinate reflection, it comprises determinate essence. An essentiality is a determinate essence.

Analogously, determinacy gave way to a determinate determinacy, something. Being-for-self led to the one, which ended up involving the relation of the one and the many. Quantity paved the way for specific magnitude or quantum. Now we have the positing of essence giving rise to determinate essence or an essentiality. The plurality of the essentialities will involve different forms of essence, different forms of reflection. They are not going to owe their character to something given apart from essence. They are not going to be contrasted to things that simply are forms of being. They are instead going to be contrasted to other reflections.

Hegel opens the discussion of the essentialities by remarking, “Essence is at first, simple self-relation, pure *identity*. This is its determination, but as such it is rather the absence of any determination” (p. 409). This is the first invocation of identity. It is simple and it involves self-relation. It is pure, and there is an absence of any qualifying determination. Our task, as we consider identity, is to try to figure out how it is different from being, how it is different from just something, how it is different from quantity, and finally, how it is different from being-for-self or the one.

Here we are considering identity per se, not the identity of something that has further determinations. Nonetheless, how is this different from what we encountered in addressing something per se? Did not something have an identity? Did not magnitude have an identity? Did not the one have an identity? If identity only becomes thematic here at this juncture in the Logic

of Essence, identity must be such as not to apply to any category we have yet encountered, and we have to figure out how that could be the case.

The same thing is true of what comes next: "Secondly, the proper determination is *difference*, a difference that is, on the one hand, external or indifferent, *diversity* in general." "Difference," to begin with, is, in German, just *Unterschied*. "Diversity," which difference entails, is *Verschiedenheit*. Diversity involves likeness and unlikeness, *Gleichheit und Ungleichheit*. This diversity is going to be supplemented or supplanted by "opposed diversity" or "opposition," *Gegensetzung*. Opposition will involve the relation of positive and negative. Then, thirdly, there is contradiction, *Widerspruch*, which involves what results from opposition, where the way positive opposes negative ends up setting them in contradiction, into a self-eliminating relationship, whereby they go to ground.

In the long remark (pp. 409–11), Hegel points out that these categories of identity, difference, and opposition can be put in the form of propositions that are asserted to be valid for each one. For example, the category of identity can be transformed into the proposition that everything is self-identical. Likewise, difference can be turned into a principle of difference, according to which everything is different from everything else, that there cannot be two different things that are indiscernible. Opposition can be associated with the principle of the excluded middle, according to which, things are either what they are or what they are not. The category of ground, which will result from the contradiction incipient in opposition, can also be transformed into the principle of sufficient reason, according to which everything has a ground, a reason, or condition sufficing for it being what it is.

Chapter Sixteen

From Reflection to Existence

Hegel presents difference as something entailed by identity. Identity is not abstract. Identity is not just something being what it is, because something is what it is and that does not involve identity, at least not in the sense in which identity figures as a determination of essence. Identity contains something that is not found in any of the determinations in the Logic of Being. This is expressed in the formula $A = A$, which Hegel refers to as an expression of identity when it is turned into a principle (p. 413).¹ If $A = A$ is an expression of identity, self-relation is not going to be sufficient to express what identity is. We have self-relation in the domain of being, in the one. The one, however, lacks what allows us to speak of the one having an identity. The one may have being-for-self and the void, but it lacks the inner differentiation or unity in difference comprising identity. Identity or sameness is different from oneness. Identity indeed involves self-relation, but the self-relation of self-identity is a form of self-reflection. Identity involves a reflection of what is identical with itself. So far as there is reflection in identity, there is some determinacy that reflects that which is at one with itself or in relation to itself by means of its relation to this content which serves just to return it to itself.

So identity involves a kind of difference or differentiation, but one that is an internal difference. Something can only be self-identical if it has an internal differentiation in which it is in relation only to itself. That internal differentiation providing self-identity diverges from how something has being-in-itself or how something has determination in contrast to its constitution. Both being-in-itself and determination are tied to relation to other, either as being-for-other, or more determinately, as constitution. In the internal differentiation of identity, contrast with a coeval other is supplanted by reflection, which is lacking in all of these other terms. Even though you have self-relation in the one, the one lacks an internal differentiation.

With identity we thus have difference as well. Hegel describes this difference as, to begin with, an absolute difference. As absolute difference, of course, the difference in identity is not a relative difference. It would be relative difference if it had its character in relation to something else, but it does not. Difference is here absolute because it is something wholly internal to that which reflects itself in it.

Difference is thus contrastable with and only with identity. Hegel takes us to diversity by thinking through how identity is at one with itself and reflected in its internal differentiation (pp. 416–18). Absolute difference is distinguished from identity and nothing else. As such, absolute difference is identical to itself in being different from identity in just the same way that identity is at one with itself in being different from absolute difference. We end up having two factors that are both reflected into themselves in their difference from one another. We have diversity.

When we have diversity or variety, we have factors to which the terms “likeness” and “unlikeness” apply. These terms require the basic framework of the *Logic of Essence* to the extent that likeness and unlikeness depend upon positing or determining and being determined or reflection. Diversity is not just a relation of something and other. Likeness involves a comparison of different factors in which an identity is to be found. The comparison is external to the terms involved, which is to say that the character of the factors that are diverse does not depend upon their being compared with one another. They would be what they are whether or not they happened to be in relationship to what they were like or unlike. They do not owe their determinacy to that comparison. That they are like or unlike may depend upon some comparison; however, the comparison uses but is not constitutive of their respective identity and difference. What is like or unlike already has to have what it takes to be put in this relationship. It is not their relation to the other that provides their identity or their difference. That is provided through their own self-reflection, by means of which each has an internal differentiation through which it is self-identical. Only on the basis of diverse entities that are self-identical can there be things to compare in terms of likeness and unlikeness.

The equality and inequality of the comparison are relationships that go hand in hand. You cannot have one without the other, and Hegel suggests that this connection provides the basis for another kind of opposition where these relationships are essentially connected. That leads us to a diversity that is not really external, something Hegel calls “essential difference.”² “Essential difference” comprises the opposition of positive and negative. You cannot have one without the other, which might seem to take us back to the contrast of something and other, where being-for-other is really part of the character of something. How then does Hegel distinguish the relation of positive and negative from that of something and other? “Essential differ-

ence” comprises a relation of polarity, of which there are plenty of examples. The positive and negative are polar opposites insofar as the negative is the specific other of the positive and the positive is the specific other of the negative. Each is already mediated or posited by its counterpart. By contrast, something and other are merely what their counterpart is not. Any something can serve as the other of something else. That indifference is absent in “essential difference.” Here the otherness of the negative is mediated or posited by the affirmative character of the positive. Their difference is essential to each. Their respective identities reflect the difference in which they stand. The positive is reflected into itself in being reflected in its other.

This is what distinguishes opposition or essential difference from diversity. Here, that which is essentially different from something else is essentially differentiated from it. This is *its* other, not just *another* in general. Although something must stand in contrast to some other to be a determinate determinacy, any other will do. By contrast, the essential difference of positive and negative is such that there cannot be one without the other. This polar relation depends upon the identity of its factors.

The identity of the positive thus posits what it is not, and it is reflected back into itself by its relation to the negative. It affirms its own identity by excluding itself from what is specifically its opposite. The opposite, as opposite, is in the same position. For the negative, the positive is *its* other, not just *an* other. Whereas something relates to an other which need not be its polar opposite, the negative cannot help but be in relation to the positive, given its own identity.

Take the north pole on a magnet. It can be other to an LCD screen, as well as many other things, but it cannot fail to be in the specific oppositional relationship to its south pole, and vice versa. The north and south poles are reflected by one another because for each, its other is specifically related to it, so its very presence reflects the presence of its opposite.

The negative is just as self-reflected as is the positive factor. As equally self-reflected, they both exhibit an essential, intimate connection to their opposite. Nonetheless, Hegel argues that the relationship between the positive and negative turns into a contradictory relationship, where its own opposition collapses such that the opposed terms fall into their ground (p. 431). The source of this transformation is found in how the essentially opposed terms, the positive and the negative, are each other’s specific other in precisely the same way. Each opposite’s exclusion of its other reflects its very own identity, yet what is true of the positive is equally true of the negative. Accordingly, the essential opposites end up being the same, undermining their very own opposition. There is no way to distinguish them because they both do to their other what the other does to them. The positive reflects itself in excluding the other from it, and the negative does the same. It does not matter whether you call one or the other positive or negative. They end up

being really interchangeable. As a result, the very kind of difference that their own self-reflection depends upon collapses, and we are left with the same content on either side.

Hegel claims that this outcome is what gives us the relation of ground and grounded (p. 435). The erstwhile positive and negative are going to go to ground, and ground is going to exhibit what arises from the contradictory dissolution of polar opposition. Ground is initially characterized with regard to the relations of identity and difference that have underpinned the previous positings. Ground is described as being the identity of identity and difference into which the relationship of positive and negative has reverted (p. 444). The positive and negative were supposed to be essentially different, but they turn out to be identical. Essential difference and identity end up being merged with one another because the very way in which they are essentially differentiated from one another renders them identical. Ground exhibits this identity of identity and difference. In doing so, however, ground does not just involve identity. Ground also has a difference of its own precisely because it is the identity of identity *and* difference.

Ground is a very abstract determination with not much to it. Hegel gives its minimal specification: "Ground is the unity of identity and difference, the truth of what difference and identity have turned out to be—the reflection-into-self, which is equally a reflection-into-other, and vice-versa."³ Ground is that shape of essence involving the relation of ground and grounded. Hegel describes this relation as formal in character, and that formality resides in the conjunction of identity and difference between the ground and the grounded (p. 447). Ground and grounded exhibit identity insofar as they cannot be distinguished by their content. Ground and grounded have the same content, for what is in the ground is equally found in the grounded, but in a different form, as something mediated by the ground. There is nothing in the grounded that is not already in the ground from which it derives.

The ground of the grounded thus has some determinacy insofar as it plays the role of grounding the grounded. This determinacy is none other than the same determinacy that the grounded derives from its ground. The ground, however, has the added qualification mandated by its privileged role, that of grounding what the grounded is. This gives the determinacy they share a difference in form. What the grounded is is determined by or derivative of its ground. Consequently, the ground is reflected in the grounded, where it is at one with itself. Its content is there in what it grounds, but in a different form. This distinguishes the relation of ground and grounded from essence and illusory being. Essence does not have the same content as illusory being. Essence is simply what eliminates the latter's immediacy, rendering it null, without sharing in its given determinacy. By contrast, ground does not confront an illusory being in what it grounds. What is grounded is not thereby robbed of being. The grounded has an immediate being of its own. So does

the ground. They both have an immediate being, but the immediate being of the grounded is still determined by the ground. It derives from the ground.

The relationship of ground and grounded ends up transforming itself in a way that foreshadows how the Logic of Essence gives way to the Logic of the Concept. As we shall see, that move will occur when cause and effect revert to reciprocal causation and determined and determined are rendered one and the same. Here something similar takes place with ground and grounded, paving the way for the reciprocal conditioning of the factors of existence. Ground and grounded cannot help but switch roles. The grounded ends up grounding the ground because the ground cannot perform its defining function without a ground to condition. The ground cannot be the ground without the grounded. The grounded thus serves as the condition of the ground, allowing the ground to be a ground. Insofar as the ground and the grounded each perform both roles, they comprise an infinite series of ground and grounded, where each ground is grounded by some condition, while grounding something that grounds something else, which equally figures as the ground of something it conditions. This proliferating process, in which ground and grounded each figure in both roles, constitutes a unity of ground and grounded that as a whole is immediate insofar as it does not rest on anything outside itself. It presents a process whose components are at once conditioning and conditioned. This is what Hegel calls existence (p. 478).

In what, then, does existence accordingly consist? First of all, within the field of existence, nothing can just be a ground. What *exists* must be both ground and grounded at once, and that means equally that what it grounds and what grounds it will be both grounded and grounding. The totality of all this mutual conditioning is existence, where, instead of having something and other, we have a plurality of things that both are mediated by other things and mediate other things in turn. In this all-sided nexus of influence, each factor is determining and determined, reflected in its counterparts, just as they are reflected in it. Although each existing thing is both determining and determined, none is self-determined, since what each determines is not itself but another thing and what determines each thing is not itself, but something else.

Existence has an immediacy, and its component factors are in a sense coeval, since no one thing has any unilateral priority over its peers. Within existence, all factors are determined by mediating one another, which is very different from the contrastive relation of something and other or the limiting relation of finite terms. When we think of existence, we have to take care to see how the terms by which one existent is related to another existent differ from those that pertain to determinate beings as determinate beings.

Determinate beings, as such, have quality and are qualitatively differentiated. They have being-in-itself and being-for-other. They have determination and constitution. They have a limit and an ought. They have quantitative

determinations and measure, which relates quality to quantity. Here in existence, things are determined in a fundamentally different manner.

Hegel begins presenting the preceding development by titling the whole thing as “Essence Determines Itself as Ground” (p. 444). In ground we are dealing with a form of essence, and the question is what is different about this form. Hegel writes the following: “Essence, in determining itself as ground, proceeds only from itself. As *ground*, therefore, it posits itself as *essence*, and it is in positing itself as essence that its determining consists” (p. 445).

As ground, essence is positing itself as essence. To begin with, essence posited being, which rendered the latter illusory being. Here, however, essence is positing itself as essence, positing its very character as a determiner of something determined or as that which is reflected in something. Essence is here being posited by itself. By contrast, “Reflection is *pure mediation*, in general” (p. 445). In reflection, essence is in relation to itself by means of something else, which reflects it back to itself by exhibiting its mediating role. A determined determinacy shows that it is determined and thereby reflects the determiner. Here,

ground is *real mediation* of essence with itself. The former, the movement of nothing through nothing back to itself, is the reflection of *itself* in an other; but because the opposition in the reflection has not as yet any self-subsistence, the one that reflects is not a positive, nor is the other in which it is reflected a negative. Both are substrates, strictly speaking, only of imagination. (p. 445)

Earlier, what essence was reflected out of lacked subsistence. Now it has subsistence, for the grounded is something that is. It is not just illusory. Here, we are dealing with substrates that are not just in the imagination. As Hegel says, “Ground . . . is real mediation because it contains reflection as sublated reflection” (p. 445). Reflection is sublated in that what has been removed is the mere positedness of what is posited, because here what is posited has a reality or a real determinate being of its own.

As Hegel writes, “In accordance with this moment of sublated reflection, the posited receives the determination of *immediacy*, of an immediate that, apart from the relation, or its illusory being, is self-identical” (p. 445). Ground posits itself by having grounded something derivative of it, which exhibits the same content, something by which it is in identity with itself, but which, nevertheless, has an independent subsistence. The ground and the grounded both have being. They both are, but their relation is not just one where there is a limit of two finite entities. Ground and grounded have a specific relation where one posits the other and they have the same content, as positive and negative proved to have in the contradictory dissolution by which they went literally to ground. With positive and negative, there was an

essential difference that meant you could not have one without the other. Both were determined by and reflected in their counterpart, as opposed to being just immediately there, like something is there just as its other is there. Something and other both have determinate being, that immediate givenness.

In the *Science of Logic* Hegel puts existence within the big divide of Appearance (p. 499). Although the *Encyclopaedia Logic* treats existence as a separate section that precedes appearance,⁴ Hegel does not really change the succession of categories. He just groups them somewhat differently, because in both works ground is followed by existence.

Here in this first paragraph, he declares, “The *doctrine of being* contains the first proposition: being is *essence*” (p. 479). This is substantiated by the whole development of the categories of being, insofar as they pass over into one another and in so doing engender essence by turning out to be mediated by something that underlies the totality of being, which is what essence initially comprises. Hegel now characterizes the initial development of the categories of essence as follows: “The second proposition: *essence is being*, constitutes the content of the first section of the *doctrine of essence*” (p. 479). Here Hegel is referring to the argument that took us from the beginning of essence through ground. Ground comprises that threshold at which essence determines itself as having being.

What exhibits this is that the ground and the grounded both have being at the same time that the ground posits the grounded. In contrast to the relation of essence to illusory being, that of ground and grounded confers being and subsistence to both determiner and determined. As Hegel goes on to say, “This being into which essence makes itself is,” it turns out, “*essential being*,” and this gives us “existence; it is a being that has come forth from negativity and inwardness. . . . Thus essence *appears*” (p. 479).

Hegel elaborates on this development, writing, “Since this essence is ground, it gives itself a real determination through its reflection, which is self-sublating or which returns into itself” (p. 479). It returns into itself by removing the difference between ground and grounded. When they are united by each figuring as both ground and grounded, we get existence. The process of existence will then itself end up being posited. Appearance is going to be posited existence.

In existence we have things that are mediated by one another. Everything in existence is relative. Nothing existent is just immediate. Everything in existence is in relationships where it is both mediated and mediating. As a consequence, the things of existence are not merely qualitative or quantitative, nor matters of measure. They instead comprise a thing with properties. Hegel characterizes the relation of thing and properties in terms of a thing *having* properties (p. 487). A thing has properties in a way that is different from how something stands in relation to its quality. Significantly, in the *Logic of Being*, something did not have a plurality of qualities that belonged

to it. Rather, something was qualitatively different from something other. Admittedly, something had both being-in-itself and being-for-other and came to have both constitution and determination. Yet in each case, these qualifications were always in the singular—something did not have a plurality of constitutions or determinations. The thing is a substrate of properties, but in determinate being, no such distinction can be drawn. Rather, the being of something and its quality are immediately joined together. The being of something is bound up with its quality, because it is a determinate being and as a determinate being it has a determinacy that is its quality. Now, however, in existence, we have a thing that *has* a plurality of properties such that the thing is not immediately at one with its properties. There is a distinction of levels. The thing is the substrate of its properties. They belong to it. This, of course, opens up a possibility that is not there in the relation of something and its quality. Namely, a thing can lose a property or take on a new property without biting the dust.

The thing, to begin with, is simply that which has properties, and the properties are that which the thing has. What binds the properties together? The thing is just what has them. Is there anything about it that specifically relates it to those properties, which provides a ground for them? In a sense, the thing is their ground, but this is an immediate relation. There is no further mediating factor that tells us why the thing has its properties or why these properties have to be united in the thing. They just are what they are. On the other hand, they themselves are not things. They do not have properties of their own. They do not *have* anything. The thing is at one with itself or reflected in its properties, which are also that by which the thing is in relation to other things in the manner of the mutually determining relations of existence.

The properties themselves contain nothing that provides any ground for why they are together in the thing to which they belong. They are just diverse, with nothing about them that intrinsically relates them to one another. They are not in essential difference, such that they have got to be bound up together. They are together only insofar as they are in the same thing. The thing has them, but the thing has no determination other than having them.

You see this predicament exhibited in the history of philosophy in the early Empiricists' thoughts about perception. John Locke gives the relation a classic exploration.⁵ You have sensible properties united in a thing, but the thing is not itself perceived. The thing is not something of which we can have any cognition, if all our cognition comes through sense data. The thing itself is left an unknowable factor. There remains a further problem concerning the sensible properties. How do we know that these terms go together? What sustains their unity? They are just as well independent factors determined in their own right. Accordingly, they are independent matters, as Hegel puts it,

because no unification is determinately provided by the thing or themselves (p. 492).

The thing may be said to unify them by being the substrate that *has* them, but the thing has nothing about it that accounts for their unification or brings them together. It just *immediately* has them. It does not have a power to do so. Still, they are properties only insofar as they are connected with the thing. Nonetheless, they are just as much independent. There is nothing about the properties that gives them any kind of necessary content, and they themselves are not determinate things.

Hegel accordingly presents a further upshot of the thing-property relationship, which comes into play because the materials of which a property could be said to consist are indifferently determined. There is nothing about what they are that requires that they be bound together or that they be in relation to the thing. They are just material, and the thing is just the form that gives them their unity. We have the thing and its properties converting into form and matter, and this turns out to be the last determination before appearance.

There is an intimation of a transition made in section 130 of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, where Hegel writes as follows: "The Thing, being this totality, is a contradiction. On the side of its negative unity it is Form in which Matter is determined and deposed to the rank of properties,"⁶ where the form shapes matter into a unity and the matter is subservient to the form. The form is what determines matter and in this sense has priority over it. But "at the same time it consists of Matters, which in the reflection-of-the-thing-into-itself are as much independent as they are at the same time negated. Thus the thing is the essential existence, in such a way as to be an existence that suspends or absorbs itself in itself. In other words, the thing is an Appearance or Phenomenon."⁷ It suspends or is absorbed into itself. We came upon language like that once before.

Existence is the immediately existing domain of determined determinacies that are also determiners of one another. To call into question the immediacy of existence by treating it instead as appearance is analogous to what the ancient skeptics and modern subjective idealists did to the domain of immediate being by suspending belief in its absolute reality and relegating it to a mediated phenomenon. Just as the process of measure relations ended up getting absorbed into the total process that emerged as its mediating basis, ushering in essence, so the dissolution of each successive shape of existence has canceled its immediacy and rendered its sphere of relativity the appearance of an underlying foundation.

Just as phenomena retained the same content as what was taken to be immediate reality, so appearance retains the same content as existence, but as mediated or posited. What is different is that we are not talking about being being mediated. We are talking about existence being mediated. Here we have two kinds of immediacy or being: immediate being and existence. We

shall see that there are three forms of “being” that should not be conflated and whose differences have been variously acknowledged in the philosophical tradition. As Hegel notes, “besides immediate being and existence . . . being that proceeds from essence” (p. 481), there is another form of being that proceeds from the concept, objectivity.

We have encountered determinate being, and with it, reality, the being of quality. Existence is to be distinguished from both determinate being and reality, since existence pertains to the reflected nexus of relative things, determining and being determined by one another. Existence is more than reality because existence involves not just the being of quality, but determinacies that are determined by and determine something other than themselves. Objectivity will be something that is determined by the concept or that is conceptually determinate. You might think that every determinacy from being onwards is conceptually determinate, but something very particular is being suggested. Of course, we have yet to see what the concept is, but it is coming, and Hegel is providing us with anticipatory promissory notes based on what he has already thought through in the latter stages of logic.

Objectivity may lie ahead, but now we have come to appearance, and we need to get straight on what kind of categories come into play here. Appearance is existence that is mediated by something else that underlies existence. Existence becomes appearance so far as there is something that underlies it. This underlying foundation can be spoken of in its entirety as the law of appearance.

Hegel is going to speak further in this domain of appearance of the relationship of form and content, which is different from the relationship falling within existence of form and matter. Plato conceived of form and matter, as Aristotle does in certain contexts, such that matter is completely indeterminate. It is just a sheer potential, whereas form has actuality, because form is a principle by which matter gets determined. What results is a composite that has form and matter, where the form gives it its intelligibility, its unity, its nature, its essence. In connection with form, Plato will speak about what otherwise might be thought of as the universal as if were essence, related to an appearance. Has Plato failed to demarcate the concept from essence? When we address the *Logic of the Concept*, we will want to see what lies at stake in Plato’s conflation of form and essence and universal. In any event, for Plato, matter is unintelligible in its own right. There are no laws of matter. There are no principles of matter.

Aristotle, to some degree, accepts that view, but he modifies it when he speaks about proximate matter. The relation of form to proximate matter is more like the relation of form and content than the relation of form and matter. Proximate matter already has a form. After all, when you make a table, you make it out of wood, which is not just formless matter, but wooden material. The wood is now going to take on a new form, the form of table, for

example, but the wood is already formed, and formed such that it can be made into a table in a way in which Jell-O or air cannot. The form is such that only certain kinds of matter can take it on.

There is a connection between form and this appropriate, proximate matter that has more to do with the kind of relation between form and content than that between form and matter. We will have to see what all this has to do with appearance.

Chapter Seventeen

From Appearance to Actuality

The categories that Hegel presents in the *Logic of Essence* and elsewhere have been used by philosophers throughout the Western tradition, as well as throughout other philosophical traditions. These categories are used as distinct terms, but it is often difficult to see how they are distinguished. It is important to get clear on how Hegel differentiates these terms from one another and what benefits there may be in distinguishing them from one another, as opposed to conflating them.

Take, for example, “ground” and “grounded.” These terms are used in a specific way. They are distinguished from cause and effect and from substance and accident. All of these terms involve positing and positedness. Determination will not suffice as a characterization of positing, since determination is already at hand in determinate being, as the correlate of constitution. Positedness could be said to be mediated being. Positedness, however, is specifically mediated by a positor, which determines something other than itself that is minimally a determined determinacy without further qualification. Positing is the determining of determined determinacy, and a positor is a determiner of determined determinacy.

“Essence” is, in the first instance, nothing more than the positing of positedness, or that which mediates mediated being. Positing can take on further features, and distinguishing those different features is what is involved in trying to understand how ground and grounded are different from cause and effect. In all of these cases we have a determiner and what is determined by the determiner, but these poles get further qualified. The question is *how* they get further qualified. Essence may be, minimally speaking, that which mediates mediated being, but essence gets further characterized as reflection in general and as different forms of determinate reflection. These forms include identity, which is bound up with difference, and then diversity

and the opposition of positive and negative. These determinacies all involve reflection that gets determined in various ways, and this all leads up to ground, which involves both identity and difference, but in a way that differs from what surfaced before. What is grounded is different from illusory being, because it is a determinate being that has reality, even though it reflects what grounds it.

Hegel points out that “ground is not yet determined by objective principles of its own.”¹ That is, there is something formal about how ground relates to what it grounds. The relation of ground and grounded leaves undetermined their specific content. The ground/grounded relationship can be applied to a multiplicity of factors. In each case, there is a formal identity in that whatever is grounded exhibits the content of the ground. On the other hand, there is also a diversity between them, for they have to be distinguished. That diversity allows for the fact that the same ground can ground a plurality of different factors, just as a certain factor can have a multiplicity of grounds. That plurality and multiplicity makes problematic any attempt to argue on the basis of grounds. One may try to explain why something is the way it is by appealing to some ground, but the same ground conditions other things, just as other grounds can be found conditioning it. This is why, as Hegel points out, one can find a good ground for any action.² The abiding problem is that ground has something formal about it. The ground/grounded relationship in no way specifies the content of the terms in question. For this reason, ground, Hegel observes, is not active or productive. The grounded proceeds from the ground immediately, without any intervening activity or engagement in production. Accordingly, Hegel can say that “the ground is not yet determined by objective principles of its own, nor is it an end or final cause.”³

Why can ground not be an end or a final cause? We are going to encounter teleological determination, that is, ends and final causality, only when we move beyond the Logic of Essence and enter the terrain of the Logic of the Concept. Why this is so is indicated by anticipating the contrast between the ground/grounded relation and final causality or a *telos*. A *telos* involves something that follows from it, which might appear to resemble how what is grounded rests upon a ground. An end or final cause, however, involves a process that ends up realizing the end. To begin with, the end or *telos* is not yet realized. The end, as an end, is something that is going to get realized. The character of its realization distinguishes a *telos* or an end from the relation of ground and grounded, as well as from that of cause and effect.

Like grounded and grounded, cause and effect stand in a relation that is indifferent to their content. Whereas ground and grounded have the same content, whatever it might be, cause and effect have different contents, whatever these may be. The relation of ground and grounded does not tell you what content they have, whereas examining the contents of cause and effect does not tell you that they stand in a causal relation to one another. As Hume

points out, you cannot determine the causal efficacy of anything by thinking its concept.⁴ That is, an analysis of the content of a cause will not tell you what its effect will be, since the effect has a different content that does not lie in that of its cause. In this way, the causal relation is indifferent to the content of its factors.

In the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, the three broad divisions of the Logic of Essence are “Essence as ground of existence,” “Existence,” and “Actuality.” Cause and effect fall under “Actuality” insofar as cause and effect are both actualities. That is, cause and effect are independent substances. This is why in the relation of cause and effect what the cause produces is different from itself and only an accidental alteration of a substance that retains its own character. The content of the effect is not found in the cause. This is why Hume regards causality as merely a subjective custom, where repetitious experiences produce a feeling of anticipation of similar occurrences. The contents of cause and effect are completely indifferent to one another.

By contrast, what the realization of an end produces is a self-realization. The end realizes itself because the end result has the same content as the end. Unlike (efficient) causality, final causality is not indifferent to the content of its cause (the end). Admittedly, there is also a kind of identity in content between ground and grounded. The identity in the ground/grounded relation, however, has something more formal about it since ground and grounded can be applied to a multiplicity of contents and grounding does not generate the content involved. By contrast, the end actualizes itself through an intermediary realization process.

The end also has another feature that distinguishes it from ground and grounded. Unlike ground, the end is determined by an objective principle of its own since being an end is associated with the activity realizing the end. An end can be realized externally. Nonetheless, an end, as final causality, is something that realizes itself. The nature of the end is to realize itself. In that respect, the end has a productivity bound up with itself. It realizes itself, and what results is the same content—unlike causality, where the content of the effect is different from that of the cause.

Neither substance and accident nor cause and effect arise directly from ground and grounded. What does is existence, which comes to be when the relation of ground and grounded renders the ground grounded by what it grounds and renders what is grounded a ground of its condition. This switching of roles engenders an infinite series of ground/grounded relations, whose totality comprises an existence of factors that mutually condition one another. Unlike essence, which did not come into being but underlay the being it mediated, existence is the existing nexus of mediation, all of whose components are relative to one another, mediating and being mediated by one another. Each component is something that mediates its own constituents, a thing that unites diverse elements that, unlike diversity, are held together by a

substrate, the thing that has these elements as its properties. The unifying thing itself has no other determination than being that which holds them together.

What, then, *makes* the thing hold them together? It does not have in itself any active power to hold its properties together. It just *has* them. These properties are just as much independent because the thing is devoid of any principle that makes them its properties as opposed to the properties of something else. The erstwhile properties therefore end up being materials for which the thing is merely a form that, instead of underlying them, is something that externally comes upon them. Each such matter exists independently and then has form imposed upon it. Each such property of the thing thereby ends up operating in the same way with regard to one another. That is, being matter is the form common to them all. In this way, form and matter take on the same character. This paves the way for appearance, insofar as each factor ends up having its determining and determined roles undercut.

Now, instead of having a world of mutually conditioning things, we have a world of phenomena. The phenomena are in interrelation with one another, but their interrelation is not immediate, but mediated by an underlying determiner that, as such, does not appear. Hegel characterizes appearance as involving a relationship not of form and matter but of form and content.⁵ What is the content and what is the form that applies to appearance? In the relation of form and matter, matter was merely self-identical without any further specification. Matter was relatively indeterminate and only gained determinacy by being molded under form. Content, unlike matter, has specification, and the form is that which mediates it. The content is existence transformed into phenomena, and the form is, as Hegel puts it, a law of phenomena, an underlying mediation of the phenomena that does not itself appear (p. 500).⁶

Appearance is thus not a self-manifestation of essence, which Hegel will associate with actuality. Here essence remains behind a veil, for essence remains concealed as that which underlies phenomena. Essence thus has a distinct character of its own, comprising the nonappearing “law of phenomena,” the encompassing mediation of appearances, which applies to phenomena equally. This law of phenomena ends up being a kind of doubling of phenomena since in order to underlie all appearance, it must in some respect be reflected in the content. That means that essence can no longer be veiled but comes forth and appears in a world of phenomena that are themselves mediated and mediating one another.

Although the logic of appearance does not depend upon introducing a perceiver, you can regard the understanding, as it is characterized by Kant, as an awareness of appearances or phenomena, which are understood to be determined by a lawfulness that is not itself concretely perceivable.

Hegel conceives appearance to end up involving a co-relation between phenomena and their underlying law that is tantamount to the relation of

whole and parts (p. 513). To understand this outcome, we need to determine what is different between the relation of whole and parts and a thing and its properties. We use these terms all the time. Philosophers have racked their brains trying to figure out what are the relationships between a thing and its properties and a whole and its parts, and these relations often get identified with one another. What is it about the relation of whole and parts that would place it within appearance as opposed to existence?

There are some aspects in both relations that are similar. Just as the properties of a thing were diverse, so the parts of a whole are diverse. They both possess independent being, and this is why Hegel will distinguish a whole and its parts from an organism and its organs. What is distinctive about the relation of organs in an organism is something that Hegel will interestingly enough discuss in the *Logic of the Concept*. Organs fulfill different functions, but more than that is involved. After all, the parts in a machine perform different functions, but they can be disassembled without losing their character. There is something more emphatic about the unity of the organism and the organs. The organism sustains its organs and also brings them into being in its own ontogenesis. The organs cannot exist as such apart from the organism. You can rip the organs out of an organism, but they immediately start to lose their being as living material. Instead of participating in the self-sustaining living unity of the organism, they now become prey to external mechanical and chemical degradations and become something else. Parts do not have that character.

What, however, is the difference between parts of a whole and the properties of a thing? When Hegel conceives what happens to a whole and its parts, he does not describe how the parts become independent in the way in which the properties of the thing become separate materials, on which the unity of the thing is imposed like form on matter. Instead, whole and parts is followed by force and expression, and presumably the latter arise from how whole and parts operate, given what they are.

Like the properties of a thing, the parts of a whole do have an element of independence. The whole does not have any active principle for differentiating them and bringing them into being. The whole just immediately consists of parts, which have a diversity that the whole does not establish through any process of its own. The whole just has them, seemingly like a thing has its properties. Parts as such, however, are not diverse materials.

As Hegel writes in his *Encyclopaedia Logic*, "They are parts, only when they are identified by being related to one another; or, in so far as they make up the whole, when taken together."⁷ Nonetheless, the whole is negated in virtue of having parts, which are not differentiated by its unity. The parts have their unity in the whole, but the diversity of the parts is only overcome immediately by the whole, which has no intermediary process for incorporating them. Consequently, the relation of whole and parts presents a moving

back and forth. The whole is a whole by giving itself up immediately into parts, and the parts immediately negate their diversity in belonging to the whole. This can go on indefinitely, for the parts themselves can be divided into parts, each of which can be a whole divided into parts, which repeat the process. Whole and part each relate to itself in a negative way. The whole as whole divides itself into parts, whereas the parts as parts unite into a whole.

Taken together, the process of whole and parts amounts to a relation of force and its expression, where the force is that which posits the diversity that is its expression (p. 518). We speak of force quite commonly, especially when we are dealing with appearances. Take the form of consciousness that confronts as its object the domain of appearances that are governed by laws. How do laws operate? They operate in terms of forces, which have their expressions. Force posits things and in so doing gives expression to itself. Indeed, the expression is really all there is to identify a force. For example, in the force of gravity, we have things moving according to the law of gravity. Their lawful motion is the expression of the force of gravity. This force may be distinguished from their motions, but only as that which is expressed in them.

Force and its expression are nonetheless distinguished. In this respect, they have a kind of finitude. There is some separation between them, some limit. The difference between force and its expression is something that distinguishes their relation from the way an end realizes itself. Namely, force needs some solicitation, because force does not just realize itself, like a self-realizing end (p. 519). Something has to set it in motion in the way in which mechanical forces need something to set them in operation. What makes the working of force blind has to do with the difference between force and its expression. Similarly, the difference between cause and effect will allow Hegel to apply the term “blind” to (efficient) causality. What makes force, causality, and necessity blind is the difference in content between the determiner (be it force, cause, or necessitating condition) and the result (expression, effect, or necessitated event).

When you act on purpose, which is to say, when you realize an end, you are not acting blindly because the result of your action is prefigured in your aim. This is exhibited in the identity of content between your end and the realization you achieve by successfully acting on purpose. Your purpose has the same content as what you are intending to realize, so, in that regard, you are not acting blindly. You are attempting to realize precisely what you intend. If instead we are dealing with a determiner that is different in content from what it determines, the result is not given by that which does the determining. Consequently, one does not know what will result on the basis of scrutinizing the specific nature of the determiner.

Although there is a difference between force and its expression, force has a formality because there is no way of giving it any being independent of its

expression. Like the law of appearances, force is not itself an appearance. It is only something reflected in the appearances comprising its expression. Force does not have an existence of its own.

This distinguishes force and expression from cause and effect. One is tempted to locate the difference between force and cause in how cause precedes its effect, whereas force is just in its expression. There are, however, complexities concerning the precedence of cause, for one can ask, is a cause a cause before it has its effect? Kant takes up this question in his Analogies of Experience, pointing out that there are cases where the effect is simultaneous with its effect, as is the presence of a cannonball with the depression in the pillow on which it rests.⁸ Despite the lack of temporal precedence, you somehow know that the depression of the pillow is not what causes the cannonball to be there, but that the cannonball produces the depression of the pillow.

Temporal priority involves a natural rather than a logical succession, so the logical distinction between force and cause must lie elsewhere. The logical difference is found in how cause has an actuality of its own, whereas force has no separate existence from its expression. Moreover, whereas force needs to be solicited in order to operate, cause does not. It just posits its effect.

Contrasting the relation between whole and parts and between force and its expression, Hegel observes that there is something infinite about the relation between force and its expression insofar as “that identity of the two sides is realised, which in the former relation only existed for the observer” and that “the whole, though we can see that it consists of parts, ceases to be a whole when it is divided,”⁹ because the parts as parts are not the whole, but just separate parts. Force is only shown to be force when it exerts itself, so that in its exercise it only comes back to itself. Infinity had being-for-self as its outcome. Analogously, force expresses itself and its expression does not confront it as something other. Rather, force relates to itself in its expression since force is not force apart from its expression. Something similar operates with cause and effect. Even though the effect is different from the cause, the cause is also self-related in producing something different from itself, with an actuality of its own. The cause is only a cause by producing an effect. The effect thereby does in a sense cause the cause to be what it is. The cause, however, has produced the effect, so the cause has produced itself as cause in producing the effect. A cause that produces itself as cause is self-cause or *causa sui*.

Hegel argues that the cause-effect relation leads to a reciprocity of causes and effects in which there still is both a distinction as well as an identity of cause and effect (p. 569). Cause and effect swap roles, but only in determining their counterpart, not themselves. Nonetheless, this result will turn out to be what brings the Logic of Essence to closure. The closure will be achieved

by removing something that, so long as it is there, leaves us within the domain of reflection, the domain of determined determinacy, the domain in which the determiner is distinct from the determined. What eliminates reflection and the two-tiered relationships pervading essence is a removal of the difference between determiner and the determined. To escape the clutches of the Logic of Essence, the determiner has to become both determiner and determined, and the determined has to be both determiner and determined. Only then will the defining distinction between determiner and determined determinacy be removed. Once this occurs, the determination of determined determinacy will give way to self-determination, to which Hegel will link the concept and the universal.

Here we do not have self-determination, though there already is a certain equalization always breaking forth. Somehow, full equalization is never quite achieved until we come to what results from reciprocal causation. We will have to explore why that would be what will put an end to the travails of essence. With force and its expression, there is still difference, even if force ends up being related to itself in its expression. Even though force and expression contain a self-relatedness that exhibits something infinite, there is also something finite involved. That finite element is there because you still have throughout the Logic of Essence the divide that is the basis of reflection, the divide between what reflects itself in what it determines and that which is determined.

“Another proof of the finite nature of force,” Hegel writes, “is that it requires solicitation before it can put itself forth. That through which the force is solicited, is itself another exertion of force, which cannot put itself forth without similar solicitation.”¹⁰ We find forces that are elicited by other forces, giving us this kind of infinite regress in the mechanics of movement exhibiting the principle of inertia. The principle that something stays in motion or in rest until a force acts upon it signifies that motion is something external and that things do not move themselves. This is exhibited in mechanical situations of impact as opposed to gravitational attraction, where objects exert force and move themselves without being elicited by anything. Gravitational force does not need any solicitation, but the moving force of the impacting billiard ball has to be produced by some other force, such as your arm moving the cue.

Actuality arises by way of an identification of inward and outward. Inward and outward arise from force and its expression insofar as force and its expression end up having the same content, becoming something that has both an inward and outward dimension, which is just a difference in form. A distinction is being drawn in inner and outer, but one has to ask to what degree that distinction can sustain itself. Hegel presents actuality as arising when we have a unity of inward and outward (p. 528).

Actuality is also spoken of as a unity of essence with existence (p. 529). Appearance involves existence as well as something underlying it. Once existence and what underlies it become equalized, we have actuality, an existence that is only the manifestation of itself, rather than of a concealed other. The phenomena of appearance are mediated by something outside of them, but actuality involves a determining that is not generated by something outside of itself. Although this determining is wholly contained within actuality, it still does not involve self-determination. Even though actuality consists in just manifesting itself, it contains the difference between determining and the determined, and therefore still remains within the Logic of Essence.

The account of actuality has two parts. The first is a thinking through of actuality, possibility, and necessity, which is then followed by an unfolding of the substance and relations of substance, which take on the three forms. Substance first involves a relation between substance and its accidents, then a relationship between substances that figure as cause and effect, and then finally a reciprocity between substances in which they are both cause and effect of one another.

None of these relations involve self-determination and universality, particularity, and individuality, which become thematic in the Logic of the Concept. Why would that be the case? I mentioned earlier that Plato, like others after him, speaks about the universal as if it were essence. Similarly, Husserl speaks about essence in connection with pure possibilities that he associates with universality.¹¹

These questions become clarified by considering how possibility is connected with essence. Possibility is what Hegel begins with in thinking through actuality (p. 542). What does possibility have to do with actuality and its unity between essence and existence, between the inner and outer? Can one talk about possibility without bringing in actuality?

Here they are brought in conjunction with one another, for possibility concerns what can be actualized. The possible is what can become actual, and the process of moving from possibility to actuality has to do with what goes on in actuality.

Contingency comes into play, for contingency pertains to what is a mere possibility. Of course, if contingency is mere possibility, it stands in contrast to necessity, an actuality that is not mere possibility, an actuality that is not contingent on something else that may or may not be present. If we have possibility, in the sense of mere possibility, we are dealing with something that need not be, something that is contingent. If there can be possibility, an unrealized actuality, there can be contingency. You cannot have one without the other, and in this sense contingency is necessary.

Hegel characterizes necessity as being a process that involves the transformation of possibility into actuality (pp. 545–46). In this connection, Hegel introduces what he calls real possibility (p. 546). A common way of treating

possibility is to identify possibility simply with conceivability, where conceivability is formally restrained by the requirement of consistency. On this view, something is conceivable if it does not contradict itself. Of course, by now, one should wonder whether anything can be determined just by abiding by this requirement.

In any event, does mere conceivability really tell you whether something can be actualized? After all, whether something can be actualized may indeed depend upon its specific content and not just the form of not being self-contradictory. Not everything that is conceivable may be actualizable—for example, zombies.

There is endless chatter about zombies by contemporary philosophers who remain stuck in a dualist framework. They bring up zombies as a way of saying: look, the mind cannot just be the brain, because you can have a zombie, who is physiologically the same as you, and behaves in the exact same way, but does not have a mind. Well, is that really true? Are zombies really possible? If you think about the content of mind and its connection to animal life, it becomes very questionable whether an entity could do the same things as a lumbering, bloodthirsty person without having a mind. When you consider whether mindless things can behave just like human animals you must consider *real* possibility, namely what actual conditions must be present in order for something to be actualizable.

Real possibility depends upon the actual conditions that allow something to be actualized. If these conditions are absent, there is no real possibility. Thus, with real possibility, possibility shows itself to be attached to actuality. Indeed, real possibility could be said to be a part of actuality, whereby possibility is bound up with actuality. Then there is a kind of actuality that brings forth actuality. An actuality that brings forth actuality gives rise, of course, to a different actuality, but it still is an actuality.

There has to be some process by which the real condition gives rise to the other actuality. When that actuality has arisen, it has an immediate being that is no longer conditioned by anything. It just is, and it has that immediate being precisely by having an actuality based upon the elimination of the process that led to it. Here you have an actuality that is necessary, even though it issues from real possibility. It is an actuality that has arisen from actuality, enabling actuality to become something self-conditioned. This provides the threshold for substance, as that which has a necessary being.

Hegel initially determines substance very much as does Spinoza (p. 554). Substance is characterized in terms of having accidents and exhibiting necessity. Even though substance does not depend upon anything else, it is governed by its own necessity. Hegel therefore distinguishes substance from the concept, universality, and self-determination, for insofar as substance involves necessity in its relation between itself and its accidents, it is not self-determining. To put it in a different way, substance is not subject.

To the extent that substance only has accidents that are determined by its own necessity, substance can be termed the absolute (p. 554). It is not relative to anything else. Substance's necessitation, however, lacks any principle for arriving at the specific content of its accidents, which is why they are accidents, after all. They are accidents insofar as there is something contingent about their content. They are also different from substance itself, given that they are its own accidents. Insofar as they are different from the character of substance that posits them, their determination by substance is not self-determination.

Chapter Eighteen

Transition to the Concept

Let us look back at some of the moves in actuality that take us to the threshold of the concept and then see how Hegel himself focuses on the transition to the concept. I am employing the term “concept” instead of “notion,” which Miller, the translator of the *Science of Logic* uses, for two reasons. First, “concept” is the more usual translation of *Begriff*. Second, “notion” commonly has a psychological significance, designating a type of representation, which “concept” does not properly involve, being a logical determinacy.

Hegel recognizes that a proper deduction of the concept, which establishes what the concept is, cannot be based upon any appeal to our intuitions or our observations about concepts. Contemporary philosophers commonly make such appeals, presuming that we all have common intuitions and that these have ultimate authority. This approach falls prey to the dilemmas of foundationalism, for in appealing to intuitions, one privileges them as a foundation of justification, without being able to justify that privilege. This problem plagues the likes of John Rawls in his appeal to our common moral intuitions in practicing “reflective equilibrium,” as well as other legions of contemporary philosophers who appeal to intuition, whether they are dealing with aesthetics, epistemology, mathematics, or anything else. Indeed, we do have intuitions, and we can have intuitions about anything.

What characterizes having an intuition as opposed to having a concept of something? Intuitions are always used in more or less the same way. When people lay claim to intuitions, they are speaking about a certain kind of psychological instrument with a specific way of relating to its object. One has an intuition when one has a mental content by which one is in immediate relation to what it is about. Although many a philosopher, particularly contemporary philosophers, are all too happy to appeal to intuitions, women

have traditionally been castigated for being more intuitive and less thoughtful than men, with the understanding that intuition grasps its object without any mediation, without any reasoning. When one thinks something, one does not just take it in immediately, as in intuition. One does something to it, one conceptualizes it. Those who appeal to intuition think that if you do something to the content of your object, you are getting farther away from the truth. They presume that you are encountering the truth when you take it in immediately, just confronting what is immediately given.

Why should intuition's immediate apprehension have legitimacy? First of all, how do we know what is immediately given? How do we know that we all have the same common intuitions to which everyone is always appealing when they lay claim to intuitions? What gives intuition authority? Are we not starting with a fundamental assumption that we can depend upon intuition? Yet what certifies the truth of what we intuit? As Hegel never tires of pointing out, any content can be immediately taken in, which is why intuition can always be invoked by those who want to turn their backs on a mediated taking in of things. Those who appeal to immediate apprehension are rejecting reason, for when you conceptualize something, you do not just take it in as given. You transform what is immediately given and put it into a certain form.

The mediating activity of conceptualization is not just a positing of content. Positing a content does not do to it what the conceiving of content accomplishes. This is true even when philosophers appeal to intuition, for their appeal employs thought. They are thinking about how we should appeal to intuitions. They are not just intuiting. They are thinking that we should intuit and thinking about what we intuit. Philosophers are always making use of concepts, so they better legitimate their use of concepts.

Philosophers' recourse to concepts can, of course, be questioned in its own right, and indeed, philosophy cannot escape doing so if it is to overcome dogmatism. Nietzsche decried any privileging of thought and pointed to the futility of any self-critique of reason, noting how any examination of thought begs the question by employing thought for its investigation. Any critique of reason seems to fall prey to a vicious circularity, tellingly exhibited by how Kant undertakes his *Critique of Pure Reason* without providing any legitimation of the thinking he is employing.

There is another problem seemingly afflicting any reliance upon reason. As Nietzsche declaims, philosophers, who all rely on thinking, are just taking for granted that what is true is what is thinkable, that what is real is conceptually determinate.¹ What if the real is not conceptualizable? What if reality is individual and changing and opaque on both scores to the universality of thought? What is thinkable is ordinarily understood to comprise all those dead universals that just remain what they are. Thoughts are presumed to be rigid. They do not have any dynamic character. They just are what they are

and thus are governed by the principle of noncontradiction. Accordingly, they cannot lay hold of any kind of becoming. They cannot lay hold of anything individual. Individuality cannot be thought, but existence is individual. Reality is changing. For these reasons, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and their followers argue that we have to get away from thinking. In so doing, however, they are relying upon the very thinking they condemn, even if they present their thoughts in aphorisms à la Nietzsche or by impersonating fictitious characters à la Kierkegaard.² Somehow they cannot help themselves from using reason to bury reason.

Here, however, we have come to the point of finally getting at the concept in a discourse that has attempted to rely on no assumptions at all, let alone any assumptions about the special authority of thought. As we shall see, the concept is associated with a variety of different terms.

What are some of the terms with which the concept is associated? Not necessity itself, for necessity falls within the Logic of Essence. Instead, Hegel associates the concept with something that supersedes necessity, namely self-determination or freedom.

In conjunction with this, Hegel associates the concept with universality. One could say that the concept is the universal. After all, if we are addressing the concept as such, we are not considering particular concepts or particular universals, but the universal as such.

The concept or the universal is further connected with another crucial term: subjectivity. The Logic of the Concept is also called the Subjective Logic.

What then is the connection between the concept and subjectivity or the relation between the concept and freedom or the relation between subjectivity and freedom or between subjectivity and universality or, finally, between freedom and universality? Why does Hegel think all these things go together? And why does he think that none of these terms figure thematically within the Logic of Being or the Logic of Essence?

One might be tempted to think that at least some of these terms were already at hand in the Logic of Being, such as when the one and the many were determined. After all, it is not uncommon to encounter discussions of the universal that treat it as if it concerns the one and the many. Hegel, however, certainly does not view the universal as a matter of the one and the many. Similarly, one might think that the universal has something to do with essence and thus is already at play in the Logic of Essence. Plato, for example, often speaks about the universal as if it were a kind of essence that has appearances that resemble or reflect it. Hegel rejects these associations, both implicitly, by where he places the terms of the concept, and explicitly, with arguments that show why one cannot lay hold of the universal or freedom or subjectivity in terms of the categories of being or essence.

Before examining these arguments, it is important to mention two other terms that go hand in hand with the concept and with universality: namely, the individual and the particular. Many thinkers do not distinguish individual and particular, but just throw them together. Hegel will distinguish them, even though he will show that they are intrinsically connected to one another and to the universal. Indeed, as Hegel will argue, you cannot have the universal without both the particular and the individual, nor the particular without the universal and the individual, nor the individual without the universal and the particular. How these terms fit together will help clarify what subjectivity as well as freedom or self-determination have to do with universality.

Two more factors deserve mention. Hegel has employed reality in the *Logic of Being*. He has spoken of existence, as well as appearance and actuality, in the *Logic of Essence*. What he has not yet employed, but will use later in the *Logic of the Concept*, is objectivity and the Idea. Objectivity comes up only within the *Logic of the Concept*, where it will be contrasted with subjectivity, as well as involve the concept, universality, and freedom. The Idea involves both subjectivity and objectivity, and it will therefore only be at stake when both of these terms have unfolded.

The *Logic of the Concept* begins by addressing the concept and the processes of judgment and syllogism in which the concept gets determined by its own factors, the universal, particular, and individual. This results in objectivity, which involves the successive forms of mechanism, chemism, and teleology. Through teleology, concept and objectivity will become united, and what unites them will be called the Idea. The Idea is associated with truth, which will make its appearance in connection with the unification of concept and objectivity, rather than in connection with the unification of representation and appearance.

Since we readers of Hegel have some interest in philosophizing, which involves privileging thinking over other ways of accessing truth, it would be nice to know what it is about the concept and conceptual determination that is so special. How does the concept in its connection with subjectivity, freedom, and universality, particularity, and individuality have some special claim to truth?

It is significant that Hegel uses the expression, “the concept of the concept” (p. 596),³ to indicate the initial specification of the concept. He alludes to the fact that, in some sense, we have been dealing all along with what could be seen to be particular kinds of concepts: the concepts of being, the concepts of essence, and now concepts of the concept. We need to consider at some point along the way in what respect conceptual determination has been or has not been at play in previous sections, and if so, by what right.

First of all, where is the “deduction” of the concept to be found? It cannot lie in any appeal to things outside logical discourse, without reverting to dogmatism. Where then in logic is this “deduction” to be found? It must be

found in the development whereby the concept arises from preceding terms, which have their legitimacy only insofar as they arise ultimately from nothing at all, from an indeterminate starting point, where no assumptions have been made. The “deduction” of the concept will thus reside in the categorical genesis that issues in the concept. Since the concept arises out of the Logic of Essence, this genesis is tantamount to its “deduction” or validation. More specifically, the concept arises from what happens to the domain of actuality that goes under the heading of substance. Most proximately, the concept follows from the internal breakdown of reciprocity, which is the final element and consummation of the processes that substance involves.

Essence initially emerged as something that proved to be the ground of existence, but existence ended up itself being mediated by something underlying existence. Existence thereby gave rise to the domain of appearance, with force and its expression and then inner and outer. Throughout essence’s domain of positing, what posits and what gets posited always end up closing in on one another. This is partly because whenever we have something determined by a determiner, the determiner is the determiner only in virtue of what it determines. Hence, what it determines ends up occupying the same role it has. Hegel has attempted to show that when inner and outer end up being united by undermining their own distinction through their very own workings, we move from appearance to actuality. Actuality, as uniting inner and outer, unites essence and existence. So here we have something that no longer involves an appearance, which owes its determinacy to something that does not appear. Now we have an existence that still manifests or reflects something, but what it reflects is contained in existence, which thereby comprises actuality.

Actuality, however, is a process. In the first instance, actuality is possibility. Contemporary discussions that follow David Lewis in thinking about possible worlds tend to detach possibility from actuality. Possible worlds are imagined to be apart from actuality, as opposed to thinking of actuality having possibilities inherent in it. As Hegel argues, however, actuality in the first instance involves possibility, for there has to be something in which actuality is reflected and which would be posited by actuality. That requires that there be something that is possible, or could be posited, given what is actual.

By contrast, one could adopt the formal view that everything is possible that is noncontradictory, a view that has become the common way of construing possibility. Possibility is what is thinkable, given that thought is presupposed to obey the principle of noncontradiction. Equally, one might presume that possibility is whatever is imaginable. Just as one might imagine that there are zombies, one could imagine that everything is impossible. Simply having the formal character of being self-identical is not sufficient for being or becoming actual, because to be actual, there have to be conditions at hand

that can make the possibility possible. Without its conditions being actual, the possible really is not possible. Accordingly, there is real possibility, based upon conditions that are in actuality.

Contingency is thereby necessary in two respects. On the one hand, possibility mandates that there has to be something on which other things are contingent, actual conditions. There cannot be any real possibility without actual conditions. By the same token, if there are real possibilities, not all of which are realized, there also has to be contingency. Otherwise, actuality would have actualized itself without having undergone any kind of process of moving from the possible to the actual.

What happens when possibilities get realized? They are realized because of what is actual. Moreover, when they are realized we have an actuality that realizes its own possibilities. Consequently, this realization of possibility is no longer contingent, because actuality has actualized itself.

Here we are not dealing with modal judgments, judgments of whether something is possible, actual, or necessary. We are instead dealing with possibility, actuality, and necessity themselves and how these terms are connected to one another. Hegel suggests that necessity is entailed by the process of actuality that realizes what is possible. This involves an actuality that is not itself relative, but which is absolute. This absolute actuality is substance, the totality of actuality that has necessitated what is realized and is the establishing power by which what is actual is in virtue of what is. Still, there remains reflection, for there is still something from which actuality has to be distinguished in order for there to be actual actuality, even if actuality is not conditioned by anything lying outside it.

Possibility can be said to be real, a real possibility, not just an abstract possibility, which could be associated with anything. In a sense, abstract possibility has an identity, but just being self-identical does not mean that some possibility will have the conditions available for making it actual. Real possibilities will have conditions. This is what enables real possibility to lead to necessity. After all, if there is a real condition, that condition is sufficient for the realized being of real possibility. Here we have actuality undergoing a process of realization in virtue of what it is. It has posited something in which its own absolute positing is reflected. It is its own positing. It is not conditioned by anything else.

One typical way of thinking about necessity, which you find in Kant, associates contingency with necessity. Everything in the domain of experience, namely appearances, is governed by laws involving causality of a certain kind. Causal necessity here signifies that everything happens because of something antecedent. What occurs in experience is necessitated by what is antecedent, but what is antecedent is just as much necessitated by what comes before it, so its necessitating something else is contingent upon what brought it into being. Hence, as far as Kant is concerned, everything within

experience figures in this way as being both necessitated and contingent. The two go together.

When we are dealing with substance, the whole process is one in which necessity is contained within itself. The necessary makes itself the necessary by being the real condition of that which it actualizes. The field of necessity in general comprises a domain where things are subject to external determination, even though the whole domain of external determination is one in which the necessitating factors make themselves necessitating through their necessitating. In that regard, their conditioning role is reflected in what they produce, whereby the necessary becomes that which is because it is, but it is that only by conditioning something.

Substance thus comprises something that is not relative but absolute. It is absolute, however, only in reference to something that it posits. Substance contains something at a secondary, subsidiary level that it must posit to be what it is. Substance has accidents that it necessitates, subjecting them to substance's absolute power.

Hegel speaks about cause and effect on the basis of substance, as a relation between substances, whereas actuality and its processes of possibility, actuality, and necessity do not yet involve substance or relations between substances (p. 558). Why does actuality not yet involve such a relation and why should causality be a relation between substances?

Kant, of course, talks about causality as a relation between substances of cause and effect.⁴ The relation between substance and its accidents is not a causal relation, for the determination of its accidents is not an alteration of something else, whereas cause and effect involve separate independent entities. Cause and effect involve one substance acting upon another, where both have an independent being of their own, on which the cause-and-effect relationship is predicated. Causality does not involve something that is merely the appearance of something else. Nor does it involve something that is grounded by a ground, exhibiting a common content in a mediated rather than immediate form. The causal relationship instead involves separate substances, whose very independence is what makes causality so perplexing for the likes of Hume. Hume points out that when you examine the cause in its own right and think what it is, there is no way you can derive its causal efficacy. Since mere repetitions of similar occurrences cannot distinguish causal necessity from incidental association, Hume is led to base cause-and-effect relations upon a psychological habituation, generating expectations of some state of affairs following from another because we have observed similar things occurring before.⁵

Hegel explicitly distinguishes cause and effect from ground and grounded. Ground and grounded have the same kind of content, one in the form of immediate self-identity, the other in the form of being posited. Cause and effect involve entities that have specifically different, inherently unrelat-

ed contents. You can say that they are therefore substances in their own right, and their content or identity in no way depends upon one another. Nonetheless, there is some way in which the one determines the other so that what happens to it depends upon the former.

This involves more than simply finding one following the other, which is why causal relations cannot be established simply by observing how something succeeds another. In causality, one factor posits something about the other without making it cease to be a substance. The effect will remain a substance that will be passive with regard to the activity of the other. The cause will posit something about it without making it cease to be a substance. It will produce an effect that adheres in the substance.

To begin with, Hegel does speak about “substance” in the singular, and the relation of substance and accidents is one that involves no relationship between substances (p. 554). Substance here is absolute. It is not determined by anything else. It is only related to itself and yet it is related to itself in such a way that it reflects its absolute power in terms of something that it posits, something that is nothing more than an aspect of itself, an accident of itself. The move to causality rests on how the way in which substance determines its accidents involves substance’s relation to something that is akin to itself, which nevertheless is differentiated from it.

The relation of cause and effect, where one factor acts upon an other that undergoes some kind of alteration, involves substances, and not just something and other. Why were we not dealing with cause-and-effect relations when we were dealing with something and other? Why were we not dealing with cause-and-effect relations when we were dealing with ones that were repelling and attracting one another? In both cases there is no distinguishable effect whose content can be distinguished from that of its cause independently of their relation to one another.

Hegel maintains that cause-and-effect relations revert to reciprocity or, as he also calls it, action-reaction (p. 566). Why is that the case? Insofar as the cause proves to be a cause only through its effect, the effect ends up being the cause of the former’s causality, which ends up being an effect. Each substance ends up being both active and passive, cause and effect. The cause is at one with itself in virtue of a relation in which it just as much has its causality negated, becoming the effect of its effect. Because only insofar as there is an effect can the cause prove itself to be a cause, the effect just as much plays the role of being a cause and the cause just as much plays the role of the effect. Consequently, there is action and reaction necessarily on both sides of the erstwhile cause and effect. Each is acting with respect to the other and also reacting with respect to the other. Thus there arises a relation of reciprocity.

Hegel claims that reciprocity is going to give rise to the concept (p. 571). It is hardly self-evident that the concept should arise out of features that

appear barely tied to it in any obvious way. As we have seen, in causality, both substances presuppose one another in their distinctive roles. The cause presupposes something to act upon, whereas the effect presupposes its cause, even as it causes the cause to be what it is. Both cause and effect swap roles in their relation to one another and do it in exactly the same way. Each is both cause and effect of the other. Insofar as both sides operate in a way that turns out to be indistinguishable, what occurs on both sides is a unification of determiner and determined. It is not only that both sides figure in the same way, that they both take on the roles of being cause and effect, but in each of the roles, each factor contains the other in itself. That introduces a new situation where it is not just that some factor will determine something else and be determined by it in the same way. Rather, each factor's determining will itself be its being determined, and being determined will be to determine.

Moreover, since each substance has a character in its own right, being self-related and not determined in contrast to something else, what Hegel calls its being in and for itself is now united with its being posited (p. 585). Its very independence is just as much positedness and its positedness is just as much its being in and for itself. Reciprocity thus gives rise to the unity of positedness and being in and for itself. These two distinct specifications are revealed to be at one with one another. What has resulted is that whose being in and for itself is its positedness. How does this amount to the concept?

The Logic of Being has comprised the domain of logic in which what unfolds is determinacy, determinacy that is not yet not determined by some determiner, but just determinacy. The Logic of Being does involve determinacies that stand in contrast with one another, but they are all equiprimordial. They are all on the same level. In the Logic of Essence, by contrast, we have all the relations where a determiner exercises a primacy enabling it to determine something else, whose positedness reflects that determining.

One way of characterizing the domain of the Logic of the Concept is that here the difference between what determines and what gets determined is removed because the act of determining turns out to be equivalent to being determined, so we have an identity between determiner and determined. Self-determination consists in this identity since what it determines is itself, not something other in which it is reflected. Its determining is on the very same level as itself. Note that self-determination cannot be something that just is, that *just* is immediate. Self-determination does have immediacy insofar as by being determined by itself, it is not mediated by anything else. Self-determined determinacy is what it determines itself to be. As a whole, its process *is* at the same time that self-determination mediates itself.

In this respect, self-determination resembles being-for-self, which excludes relation to other and is therefore one. Self-determination, however, cannot be the one, for the one is not self-determined. The one does not have

subjectivity. In fact, nothing up till now has subjectivity. Substance does not have subjectivity, for subjectivity involves freedom and not necessity, not positing, not the kind of contrastive relationships of being.

What does self-relation not have that self-determination brings in? Self-determination is not self-identity, although obviously what is self-determined is self-identical and self-related in its distinctive process. Its distinctive process, however, is not reducible to either self-relation or self-identity. This is because self-determination involves a process of determination in which positedness and positing are completely united, in which, to use Hegel's jargon, positedness and being in and for itself are one and the same.

In this respect, self-determination has to differentiate itself. By contrast, the one is not self-differentiating. It is empty. It just has removed all contrast with something else, leaving the void. What is self-determining, however, is self-differentiating, and as *self*-differentiating, it remains self-identical in differentiating itself. Essence, as self-identical, had difference in it. Here, we have something that is going to be determining its own differentiation, and the differentiation is going to be itself. This differentiation in self-determination involves negation, insofar as the self of self-determination gives itself new determination that it does not already have. What is self-determined cannot just be static. It cannot just be immediate. It cannot help but involve a process. The process, however, will not be one that either makes a transition from something to something else or posits a determined determinacy that only reflects rather than is itself. In the Logic of Being, all of the terms underwent a transition into a different term. In the Logic of Essence you had at every juncture a positing and a positedness leading to a transformation involving a new positing and positedness. Now, in the Logic of the Concept, we are going to have development. Self-determination will *develop* itself.

This development will involve a differentiation, but it will be one in which there will be reason to speak about a self or subjectivity. Now, again, you might ask, what does this have to do with the concept? Or, ultimately, what does it have to do with universality, which Hegel has strictly avoided using in the preceding sections?

When we are talking about quality, in the Logic of Being, we are not talking about universality. We may be tempted to think about universality in that way, and we are going to see that Hegel will speak about quality in the discussion of certain particular forms of judgment in which universals have qualitative aspects. Nevertheless, universality is not quality. Quality is immediately tied to a determinate being. Its reality is confronted by its negation, rather than involving any particularization in a plurality of individuals.

Similarly, universality is not property, although one may be tempted to think that the thing and its properties involve universality, since properties are often spoken of as if they were universal. Properties, however, are just simple indifferent determinacies that belong to the thing, without thereby

inhering in a plurality of instances. Insofar as Hegel has not been speaking about universals in connection with quality or property, he also cannot be speaking there of particulars or individuals, both of which are commonly thrown around in reference to determinate beings and things.

You might think the one is an individual or maybe a particular, but, strictly speaking, it is not. The one, as a simple self-related entity, does not stand under any further determinacy that connects it to other ones, as universality joins individuals through their particularity.

Universality, which involves particularity and individuality, is going to be tied up with self-determination, with the active unity wherein positedness is being in and for itself or where determining is being determined and being determined is determining. We must investigate why this should be the case.

There is another key point that Hegel makes in his introductory discussion of the concept that deserves further examination. Hegel points out that when we are dealing with the concept or self-determination or subjectivity or universality, each of its differentiations is the totality (p. 599). What is the sense of this and why should this be? And why would this not be the case in the *Logic of Essence* or in the *Logic of Being*?

It will not be the case in the *Logic of Being*, where determinacy involves contrasts, such as between something and other or between different ones, quanta, or measures. There the differences have something external about them. The differentiations are not the determination of a self, a whole that is under way determining itself.

Similarly, differentiations will not be the whole in the *Logic of Essence*. Take substance and accidents: the accidents are not the totality. There is a strict difference in level between the accidents and substance itself. Substance's power lords over the accidents, but the accidents do not exert that power.

We are going to want to see how this relation of differentiation and totality exhibits itself in the relation between universal and particularity and individuality. The relation between the universal and the particular is not going to be like that between essence and appearance or between a law and what the law determines or between force and its expression or between substance and its accidents. The particular and individual are somehow going to be on the same level as the universal, so that we can speak about them as ingredient in something that is determining itself. The particular is going to somehow be the self-determination of the universal. We will want to think through how this would be the case.

Hegel points out that the concept, in its use and comprehension, exhibits some of the basic features of self-determination, as well as the unification of positedness and being in and for itself (p. 585). In conceiving something, one posits it in the form of thought. One does not just intuit it and take it immediately. In conceiving, the positedness is just as much the being in and for itself

of what is posited. That is, the conceptualization of what is conceived presents the factor that is conceived as it is in its own right. By contrast, other manners of taking in content, like perceiving, representing, or imagining something all determine the content by an activity that does something extrinsic to it, leaving us with an appearance or a phenomenon. Somehow the concept is such that the way it posits something is, at the same time, the independent being of that factor. The positedness in being conceptualized or conceptually determined is just as much what the content is in its own right. This presents a clue as to why the concept might have some special privilege in getting at objectivity.

Chapter Nineteen

The Concept

In considering the concept, we need to explore how and why it is associated with thinking, universality, self-determination, and subjectivity. All these terms have come before us through the elimination of the difference between determiner and determined, which has brought the Logic of Essence to a close and opened the domain of the Logic of the Concept.

Much traditional thought fails to connect the concept with self-determination, even though something of this connection has always been present in philosophy's attempt to call given opinion into question and think independently. Consider the predicament we would be in if the concept lacked autonomy and was not self-determining. This is, after all, how the concept is thought of by those who take the view that concepts are simply what they are, that they do not develop, that they do not determine themselves in any fashion, that they have a fixed character, and that all we can do is analyze them as they are given and see what they contain. If that is the case and if thought just thinks concepts, what can thought not do with regard to these concepts? What will thought be powerless to achieve if concepts lack autonomy or self-determination, if they are fixed and given in isolation from one another?

In that case, I can, of course, still connect concepts with whatever I please. I can connect them with objects. I can connect them with other concepts. My connecting of concepts, however, will not be doable solely by means of thinking. If thought consists in conceptualizing and concepts are rigid and fixed, thought cannot relate them on its own. I can only connect them by other, nonconceptual means, for all connection will be extrinsic to the concepts themselves. The connection of concepts will have no basis in the concepts themselves, in thinking, or in pure reason.

This externality applies with regard to both the connection of one concept with another and any connection between concepts and what are not con-

cepts, such as objects. Thought will not be able to establish any such connection if the concepts that thought thinks are rigid, fixed, isolated, and thereby governed by the principle of noncontradiction, according to which each is just what it is and nothing else. Not only will there be no way by means of thought of moving from one concept to another concept it does not contain, but thinking will be unable on its own to move from concepts to anything beyond concepts, to anything beyond the domain of thought. Left to inspect concepts individually, thought can only be analytic. Thought may be able to analyze what is present within given concepts and judge the consistency of thought determinations, but it can never independently establish the objective truth of any concept or synthetic conceptual connection.

Thought will also be unable to generate any concepts on its own, for if thought contents just are what they are, they can only be encountered as fixed givens that thought finds rather than creates. Accordingly, if concepts are not self-determining, one must forget about acquiring any objective truth through thought alone, forget about any philosophizing that obtains new wisdom. We must then forget about anything other than labors of analysis in the vein of so-called analytic philosophy, which relies either upon the given usage of linguistic communities to supply conceptual contents that we can analyze or upon experience to give us the opportunity to reflect upon the consistency of empirical science and do so-called philosophy of science. If we turn to thought itself, we can then only do formal logic, schematizing the form of a thinking devoid of any intrinsic content.

After all, if thought is a faculty of thinking concepts that are fixed in character, thought can only arrange them externally, if at all. Thought can then only engage in the formal reasoning, modeled by formal logic, where the relations of concepts are external to what they are, allowing thought contents to be replaced by variables and manipulated mechanically, in the manner of so-called artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence can externally manipulate terms, but it cannot generate them nor connect them to anything else with any authority. Information must be put in for processing, and only nonartificial subjects can judge whether the outputs have any objective truth.

The suicide that philosophy commits by regarding concepts to be devoid of self-determination is closely related to another primary problem that revolves around the connection of self-determination and universality. This is the long-standing problem of conceiving how the universal is related to the particular and the individual. The particular and individual fail to be distinguished by many thinkers because they lack the conceptual resources needed to distinguish particularity and individuality. As we shall see, their failure is closely linked to an inability to conceive how universality and self-determination go together.

Given the common inability to distinguish particular and individual, the problem at hand ordinarily revolves around connecting the universal to the particular. This problem is classically formulated by Plato as the problem of participation. In the *Parmenides* Plato dissects the problem with the so-called “third man argument.”¹ Here Plato seems to refute the very position that is ordinarily assumed to be the Platonic theory of participation. This is because the third man argument calls into question the “Platonic” conception of how the universal relates to the particular.

The relation between universal and particular is very different from the relation of something and other, a thing and its properties, the one and the many, substance and its accidents, and cause and effect. Somehow or other, the universal has to be present in the particular, but the particular is also differentiated from it. How, then, can we understand the universal’s presence in the particular in conjunction with its differentiation from the particular? Both must be held together, for the universal does not become something different in maintaining itself in the particular.

Ordinarily, when one speaks about a relation of the universal to the particular and the problem of participation, one usually thinks about a relation between the universal and a plurality of particulars. The universal is something that they share in common, although they are distinct. How can the universal be in them and yet not be what they are? It seems that we need a third term that is going to connect them. For example, following Plato, take the form of man and Socrates. To establish a connection between that form and Socrates, we seem to need some intermediary, a so-called “third man,” that is going to serve as their connection. But then it seems we need a further standard to determine whether this third term really does join the universal and the particular, because it is itself different from them both. Then, however, the same problem gets replicated, for how does the invoked standard provide its connecting service when it is different from the terms whose connection it supposedly confirms?

This “third man” problem revolves around the presumptions that the universal and the particular are independently given and that the universal does not differentiate itself, does not particularize itself. If the universal does differentiate itself into particulars, the problem plaguing participation would be removed. The solution to the problem of participation, which involves conceiving how the universal particularizes itself, is very much linked to thinking of the universal as self-determining. For if the universal is thought of as not being self-determining, it simply is what it is, which is not what the particular is. This leaves universal and particular stuck in a rigid difference, where there is a gap that has to be bridged, but cannot be bridged with the two terms in question.

We will need to see to what degree the relation of universal and particular involves a relation between the universal and the particular or a relation

between the universal and a plurality of particulars. Conversely, it is important to consider when it is appropriate to speak about a plurality of universals. In a remark that follows Hegel's initial account of particularity, he discusses the various ways in which previous thinkers have distinguished different kinds of concepts, such as Descartes's division of clear and distinct ideas (p. 613).² Hegel notes that we can consider every determinacy in logic as a concept, such that every logical determination comprises a different universal (p. 615). Hegel has been discussing all the logical determinacies that are encountered—being, nothing, becoming, and so forth—as though they were concepts. We have been dealing with the concept of such and such, and now we are about to address the concept of the concept. Hegel writes that “being, determinate being, something, or whole and parts, substance and accidents, cause and effect, are by themselves [merely] thought-determinations; but they are grasped as determinate *Notions* when each is cognized in unity with its other or opposite determination” (p. 607).

Such connection is something we have been following to the degree that this logical investigation has been showing how determinations give rise to other determinations, be it through transition, positing, or in this section, development. By giving rise to new determinacies, they end up being united with what is other than themselves. In this regard, we are grasping them in their concept by thinking them in their self-determination, in the way they develop themselves, cognizing them in how they unite with the new determinations that they generate. They relate themselves to something other than themselves, to which they are united in the course of the ensuing development. This reflects something distinguishing thought from mere representation, where intuitions are re-presented or symbolized in images. Thanks to the self-differentiation of concepts or universals, thought has the peculiar character of determining its own content.

Moreover, thought determines the content when one thinks something in such a way that its determination is what it is intrinsically, what it is in and for itself. The conceptualization of factors is equivalent to what they are in and of themselves, what they determine themselves to be, as opposed to what they appear to be by being posited by something else. Presumably, the autonomy of the logical development precludes any external method being imposed upon the subject matter, moving it around, connecting it, doing things to it. Instead, the autonomy of thought ensures that the subject matter moves itself. If the concept is self-determination, the subject matter that moves itself is a subject matter as it is in its concept or as conceptualized. By contrast, when a subject matter is represented, representation involves a different kind of activity, where a content given in intuition is then put into a different form: imagined, re-presented, and altered in some respect.

Insofar as the logical determinacies have autonomously developed themselves, we can speak of all of them being concepts. Further, these logical

concepts all have an *a priori* character. Developing immanently from indeterminacy, these logical concepts have arisen independently of observation. On the other hand, there are all sorts of so-called empirical concepts—family resemblances and the like. Hegel would deny that these are, properly speaking, concepts. They are not even truly universal, for their commonality depends upon particular representations that are given rather than generated in conceptual self-differentiation.

Hegel does, however, speak about different kinds of universals in these opening sections on the concept. In particular, he mentions two, which are distinguished from the universal as such or the concept as such. One of them is that which tends to be identified with the concept by those who think of reason as formal. This type of universal is the so-called abstract universal (p. 609). Its name indicates that you arrive at it by abstraction. You start with a plurality of givens and you pick out what they have in common, leaving out everything else about them. The content of the abstract universal therefore does not contain its particulars. Accordingly, there is no way you can move from the abstract universal to the particulars. The particulars are independently what they are in their given plurality. There is nothing about the content of the universal that determines how many particulars there are, nor what distinguishes them from one another. In thinking the abstract universal, everything distinguishing particulars from one another is left out of account. The thinking of abstract universals can in no way individuate the particulars, because everything that distinguishes them from one another is left out when their common shared universal is extracted from them.

If universality is identified with the abstract universal and thought is thereby identified with abstraction, one must succumb to the criticisms that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche make against philosophy. Thinking, incapable of grasping individuality, will leave out existence, as Kierkegaard maintains, and thought will be left with ghostly, fixed abstractions from which all becoming, all individuality, all reality is excluded, as Nietzsche argues. Insofar as most early modern thinkers and, to some degree, Kant, identify the abstract universal with universality, they have little to offer in reply to such derision of reason.

As we shall see, Hegel addresses the types of universals when he discusses the forms of judgment. This is because the forms of judgment are each going to involve a different type of universal, which is inherently related to a different type of particular, which is inherently related to a different type of individual. The abstract universal will be related to a certain kind of particular and a certain kind of individual.

There is another familiar type of universal that is privileged by the same early modern thinkers and their contemporary undertakers of philosophy who embrace the abstract universal. This type of universal is that of class. Classes are a kind of universal with a distinct formality similar in kind to that of the

abstract universal. Classes are distinguished from abstract universals in that the particulars of a class fall inside it, as members of the class, whereas the abstract universal inheres in its particulars, alongside all their other distinguishing features. Nevertheless, the class is formal, like the abstract universal, because the class by itself does not specify who its members are nor what individuates them from one another. For example, the class of all women does not tell you how many women there are or how to distinguish them from one another. Since class membership does not account for the individuality of class members, the particulars of a class are given with respect to the class unity, even though they are contained within it.

The particular and universal become more intimately connected in another kind of universal that Hegel mentions in these early discussions, which will become thematic in the determination of the different forms of judgment. This type of universal goes by the name of the “genus.” What is different about the genus in relation to its particulars from the relation of the abstract universal to its particulars or from the relation of the class to its members? The difference resides in what distinguishes the particulars of the genus as its “species.” The genus and species are privileged by the likes of Plato and Aristotle. Today, we tend to see the relation of genus and species employed primarily in biology, which significantly seems to lend itself to employment of this type of universality.

What is different about the relation of genus and species is that the genus necessarily contains its division into species. That is, the nature of the genus contains its differentiation into species. Its species are part and parcel of its character. For this reason, the unity of the genus is more concrete than that of either the abstract universal or the class. If you think the genus, you are thinking its speciation. One of the common examples that Aristotle gives of the genus and species relation is that of whole number and its specific kinds. The genus is whole number and the species that are inherent in whole number are odd and even numbers. They are built into it. Nonetheless, although the particulars of the genus are specified by its very identity, the same cannot be said for the individuals that make up its species.

Admittedly, species may have species under them, whose differentia are inherent in the species to which they belong. When you get down to the lowest species, which has no further species under it, this *infima* species is just composed of individuals. The unity of the *infima* or lowest species does not differentiate its members. Rather, the individuals of the *infima* species stand in relation to it as members of a class. Their unity in the *infima* species leaves undetermined their differentiation from one another. In other words, their individuality is something given with respect to the *infima* species.

The abstract universal, class, and genus are different kinds of universals, all of which will come up in the determination of the different forms of judgment that will follow the concept of the concept. As particular types of

universals, they are all going to contain what is built into the universal, even if they have aspects about them that are not determined by the unity of the universal as such. They are all going to have what will allow them to qualify as universals.

There is, however, yet another kind of universal that will follow from these three. Hegel does not specifically call it the concrete universal, but it deserves that name to the degree that its unity determines not only the differentia of its particulars, but their individuality as well.

An easy way of understanding the distinction of the particular and individual is the following account, which is not entirely equivalent to what will prove to be the original specifications of universality, particularity, and individuality. Namely, if you think of class as being a universal, its particulars are its members. They are all particular in the same way in that their particularity consists in belonging to the class. Their particularity, or class membership, does not distinguish them from one another. Given that it is questionable whether a class with one member or no members is really a class, rather than just that "member" or a void, there must be a plurality of members in order for a class to be. If the class or the universal depends upon a plurality of particulars and if particularity does not distinguish the particulars from one another, we have to have something in addition that differentiates them. The universal, which is that which is common to a plurality of particulars, cannot be unless its particulars are differentiated. Otherwise, their plurality collapses, and with it, the commonality of the universal. The differentiated particular is the individual. Accordingly, the universal cannot be without both the particular and the individual. There must, therefore, be a distinction between the particular and the individual, without which neither particular nor universal is possible.

The relation between subjectivity, self-determination, and the differentiation of universal, particular, and individual is illuminated by a passage in J. Melvin Woody's book *Freedom's Embrace*. He writes, "The category of substance requires that the identity of every entity be assured as given or determined a priori."³ Substance, as the outcome of the necessity of actuality, is absolutely just what it is. "On this assumption," Woody goes on, "all alteration and every alterable determination is *accidental*,"⁴ because anything that could be said to emerge from it is not itself contained in the substance. Substance's accidents may be subject to its power, but there is still something external and accidental about their content. Woody observes, "This alone rules out self-determination."⁵ As we have seen, substance provides no principle for determining what its accidents are. They are just there. They have an externality about them. This externality in the relation of substance and accident "implies that causation is not and *cannot* be a relation between consecutive states or moments of a single entity, but *must* be a relationship *between* substances instead."⁶ In other words, if these accidents

emerge from substance without any determining principle, they cannot provide the basis for causal relations. Causal relations operate between separate entities, and, “in effect, these categories stipulate that ‘entity’ shall be defined by self-identity and that all differences, even between states of a single entity, shall be produced by relations among entities.”⁷ So substances do not have any inherent development. Substances, to the extent that they are subject to alterations are subject to alterations from without and in that regard they themselves are defined by self-identity. There is nothing about them that produces any development. They are just what they are in virtue of being what they are.

As a result, “the identity of the substantial entity is prior, whereas causation, as a function of relations *among* such entities, is secondary, presupposing the *givenness* of substances.”⁸ That is why the relation of cause and effect follows that of substance and involves substances. Woody goes on to point out that “the case is altogether different with the categories of freedom,”⁹ which he speaks of in terms of freedom as it applies to real willing individuals. He continues, “In this case, the identity of the self is not given or assured. It is precisely that which has to be determined *by* the self. Consequently, choice must be prior to character. Character presupposes choice and must be viewed as resultant from relationships between choices.”¹⁰

Now, that does not mean that the self is devoid of character or determinacy. After all, there would be no actual *self*-determination if, as a result of self-determination, the self were completely indeterminate and choice were exercised anew as if *ex nihilo*. No, the self is something that is going to develop itself, and at any moment, it can develop itself on the basis of how it has determined itself. With respect to ourselves, to the extent that we have any kind of freedom, we are going to develop a character as a result of our choices. In acting, we take on a character as a result of our choices, which will be there and play a role in regard to what our choices are going to be at each step along the way.

“Correspondingly, the states of the self are *not* accidental to it.”¹¹ Whereas the changing alterations of substance were accidental to it, the states of the self, which are determined by itself, are constitutive of the very identity of the self. After all, what its states are, what its determinations come to be, is part and parcel of its identity as a self-determining entity. It does not have a given, antecedent identity. Since it is what it determines itself to be, its determinations are not accidental.

“Freedom requires that the ground of alteration of states of the self lie, not outside the self in other entities, but *in* the self as self-determining.”¹² These last two statements are equivalent. If the alterations of the states of the self are grounded in the self rather than in something else, then those states are not accidental. These contrasts are crucial for understanding how substance and accident differ from subjectivity and freedom. They clarify how the

transition from the Logic of Essence to the Logic of the Concept could be encapsulated as a development in which substance becomes subject.

The connection between subjectivity and the concept or universal is further indicated when Hegel points to the “I,” our “I,” as something that exhibits the features of self-determination (pp. 583–84). These features turn out to be, in the first instance, universality, particularity, and individuality. They figure in the “I” because the “I” has a unity that is self-differentiated, where the “I” remains at one with itself in its differentiation. It thereby gives itself its own character. Hegel here refers to aspects in Kant’s discussion of transcendental apperception that point to features of the concept and the genuine character of universality (p. 584). The whole idea of synthetic a priori judgment reflects what distinguishes the concept. Kant points out that the very possibility of philosophy, or of what one might call metaphysical knowing, depends upon there being synthetic a priori judgments.¹³ This is because philosophy is concerned with coming up with new knowledge based on thinking alone. Synthetic a priori judgments allow for different concepts to be in a necessary relation to one another, and necessary relations are recognized by Kant to be something only thinking, not experience, can provide. So, if thought can connect different concepts, thinking can not just be analytic but find an intrinsic connection between concepts that are different, where somehow what they are, their identity, yields a connection to something else.

Kant’s deduction of the categories of experience attempts to show that the unity of the “I,” the unity of self-consciousness, is such that that unity at the very same time establishes the objectivity of what that unity represents. This has something to do with the way in which the concept, or self-determination, involves a positing that is just as much connected with being-in-and-for-itself. Being-in-and-for-itself has to do with that which is determinate in its own right, what is objective rather than merely subjective, posited, or relative to something else. Hegel points out, however, that Kant’s way of determining synthetic a priori judgment and the unity of apperception does not provide a true understanding of the concept. The only way Kant provides for necessary connections between different concepts is by bringing in a third term, namely intuition as it operates within experience. So, we have to go outside of thought to find any necessary connections between concepts. Moreover, because intuition has ultimately a subjective character, we are left only dealing with appearances relative to our structure of knowing. So, what is posited by the conditions of knowing is still not what is in and for itself. It is still something relative to cognition. This is why objectivity is here a domain governed by necessity, rather than freedom. It has the relativity of always being conditioned.

Kant does, however, point to something that overcomes this limitation, the intellectual intuition or intuitive understanding he ascribes to God.¹⁴

Intellectual intuition resembles the concept and self-determination in the following way. Intuition is in immediate relationship to what is intuited. In intellectual intuition or intuitive understanding the act of intuiting or conceiving is equivalent to the independent being or existence of what intuition or conception posits. These two things go together, connecting positing and being-in-and-for-itself.

Turning to the whole development before us, we find the whole domain of self-determined determinacy to be divided in a threefold way. To begin with, there is subjectivity. Within subjectivity we find first the concept, then judgment, and finally syllogism. These make up the domain of what is characterized as subjectivity.

Subjectivity is followed by objectivity, which will issue from syllogism. Objectivity develops into three successive forms of objective process: mechanism, chemism, and teleology. This development is followed by the Idea, which will be associated with truth insofar as it involves a unification of subjectivity and objectivity. The Idea will sometimes be called a subject-object or in some way or other a unification of concept and objectivity. That unification involves in the first instance, life, then knowing truth and willing the good, and finally the Absolute Idea, which will bring the whole work to its consummation.

One thing about the move to objectivity warrants preliminary notice. Hegel distinguishes objectivity from reality and existence in an important way. Unlike reality, objectivity does not involve contrast with other coeval terms. Nor is objectivity a field of existence in which terms are relative to one another. Objectivity will instead be something determined only through itself and will be something that could be said to be in and for itself. It will be something that is what it is in its own right.

It turns out that this is really what can be the genuine object of truth. In seeking truth, we want to know really what is, not what is relative to something else, not what is a mere appearance, but what is as it is intrinsically determined. Interestingly enough, such a thing, which is determined in and through itself, is going to incorporate the kind of determinacy that the concept has—that is, the kind of determinacy that self-determination has. If we really want to get at what is objective, we are thus dealing with something that is not opaque to conceptualization.

If conceptualization is intrinsically autonomous or self-determined, it is going to have an intrinsic connection to what is objective, if what is objective is not what is relative but what is in and of itself. For that reason, we will be able to get at truth that involves a correspondence of concept and objectivity. We will not have the limitations of matching our representations to appearances, which may provide us with a correctness between these subjective terms and something phenomenal. Instead we will have something that could

really succeed as a correspondence theory of truth. These are the challenges that stand before us.

Now it is time to turn to the concept, the first part of what will go under the name of subjectivity. Hegel briefly encapsulates the divisions of the subject, first pointing out that, at the beginning, we are dealing with the concept as formal, as immediate, as beginning (p. 599). "In the immediate unity," he writes, of the concept, which has just arisen from the collapse of the distinction between determiner and determined, the "difference or positedness is itself *at first* simple and only an *illusory being*, so that the moments of the difference are immediately the totality of the Notion and are simply the *Notion as such*" (p. 599). Beyond this lies judgment, where the moments of the concept have some externality. They are different from one another and are in an external connection in judgment, insofar as judgment is understood as the relationship in which the moments of the concept are external to one another, as distinct terms immediately related through the copula. Judgment, however, is not just a proposition connecting terms of any character. Rather, judgment is going to be logically understood as the way in which the individual gets identified with the universal or the particular, enabling the terms of the concept to get determined by one another.

This determination is immediate, because judgment connects its terms by a copula expressed by "is," where one term simply is the other. In this way, a concept is going to be determining itself immediately by its own elements. This immediate connection is then going to supplant itself and generate a relationship where the concept mediates itself by its own terms. This occurs in syllogism, where instead of the "is" connecting the terms, one of the other moments of the concept will connect these other terms, so that, for example, the individual will be connected to the universal by means of its particularity.

It is important to remember that the Logic of the Concept deals with the concept per se. One could substitute self-determination per se, or the process whereby positing is in and for itself. Hegel spells out the governing features of what follows, writing that this universal concept, the concept per se, "which we have now to consider here, contains the three moments: *universality*, *particularity* and *individuality*. The difference and the determinations which the Notion gives itself in its distinguishing, constitute the side which was previously called *positedness*" (p. 600). The removal of the difference between determined determinacy and determination achieved by the closure of the Logic of Essence does not eliminate determination. Rather, what used to be positedness is now something that will have to go by a different name because it has a different character. This is because, as Hegel goes on to say, positedness now "is identical in the Notion with being-in-and-for-self" (p. 600). Certain features follow from this, features that could not be encountered earlier. Generally, each of those moments by which the concept deter-

mines itself “is no less the *whole* Notion than it is a *determinate* Notion and a *determination* of the Notion” (p. 600). This entails a threefold specification.

First, each of the moments, each of the differentiations that crop up in self-determination is the whole concept. How will it be the whole concept and why should that be? With self-determination, each of its determinations is a determination of itself. The self that thereby determines itself is the whole, and Hegel uses the term “totality” to describe it (p. 600). The concept, or self-determination, is something that is a totality. Its own determinations are each the whole because each one is the self, which is in virtue of what it determines itself to be. The determinations are what the self is.

At the same time, however, there is another side to what is at hand. The moments or determinations of the concept are each not only the whole concept, but also a determinate concept. Why speak of each as a determinate concept? How can it be that the moments of the concept per se or the determinations of self-determination per se are determinate concepts or determinate self-determinations? The answer is simple enough: Insofar as these determinations are differentiations of the concept or what is self-determining itself, they are both the concept and a determinately determined concept. They are distinguished from the unity of the concept to which they all belong as determinate realizations of the concept, that is, as determinate concepts.

The concept thereby becomes a determinate concept. Its own moments emerge as determinate concepts. Accordingly, if the moments or aspects of the concept per se are universality, particularity, and individuality, these are no less the universal concept, the particular concept, and the individual concept. They are each determinations of the same unifying self, which, after all, is determining itself. So, universality, particularity, and individuality are going to be contained by the concept itself in a way that is different from how properties are had by a thing.

Hegel mentions by way of anticipation the three terms of universality, particularity, and individuality, but he tells us in the next paragraph that what we have in the first instance is the pure concept or the determination of universality (p. 601). The Logic of the Concept begins with universality. Note what Hegel here calls universality. He could have just called it universality, but he calls it instead the universal concept or alternately the concept (p. 601). Likewise, when he introduces particularity, it just as much is called the particular concept (p. 605). When Hegel introduces individuality, he uses the term “the individual,” instead of the individual concept (p. 616), and we will see whether there is a reason for that.

So we begin with universality or the universal concept. Hegel immediately points out that “the pure or universal Notion is also only a *determinate* or *particular* Notion, which takes its place alongside other Notions” (p. 600). How is the universal concept only a determinate or particular concept? Remember, each of the moments of the concept is itself a determination con-

cept. Each is a particular concept. The universal concept turns out also to be a particular concept. It may turn out that it is also individual. Indeed, if each of these moments—universal, particular, and individual—are determinate concepts, one could say that the particular is something universal. Since the particular applies to them all, the particular will be also universal. Then, by uniting universal and particular, the particular will turn out to be individual.

The same transformation applies to the individual. It is a particular concept, but it is also something that all of the moments are as differentiated particulars. They are all individual. The individual is thus universal. What we see is that each of these terms of the concept cannot help but take on the character of all the others and turn out to be the totality of the whole relationship.

Remember, here we are dealing with self-determination. Self-determination is at one with itself in determining itself. It has to give itself a new determination, it must differentiate itself. It does not do so, however, in virtue of a contrast with anything outside itself. Nor does it do so in terms of reflecting itself in something that is on a different level than itself. Self-determination only communes with itself, and the self it communes with is such that it must develop and differentiate itself. It has to determine itself to be what it is, to be a self.

As Hegel writes,

Because the Notion is a totality, and therefore in its universality or pure identical self-relation is essentially a determining and a distinguishing, it therefore contains within itself the standard by which this form of its self-identity, in pervading and embracing all the moments, no less immediately determines itself to be only the *universal* over against the distinguishedness of the moments. (p. 600)

Even though the concept is at one with itself in its differentiation, it is at the same time the universal in contrast to its own moments. It thereby renders itself a moment of itself, an aspect of itself confronting the other aspects of itself. This is going to lead to the concept being posited as a particular or determinate concept distinct from others. Then, thirdly, this is going to lead to individuality, which will lead to judgment.

To clarify how the universal concept operates, Hegel spends much of his time contrasting it with other determinations. He contrasts universality with being, quality, and reflection. He remarks that “*Being*, in its transition into essence, has become an *illusory being* or a *positedness*, and *becoming* or transition into an *other* has become a positing; and conversely, the *positing* or reflection of essence has sublated itself and has restored itself as a being that is *not posited*, that is *original*” (p. 601). What emerges from reciprocity has something original about it, which Hegel puts in the following way: “The Notion is the interfusion of these moments, namely, qualitative and original

being is such only as a positing, only as a return-into-self, and this pure reflection-into-self is a sheer *becoming-other* or *determinateness* which, consequently, is no less an infinite, self-relating *determinateness*” (p. 601). The concept retains an originality as well a positedness. How can it have both? The concept is a sheer becoming-other, yet it still remains at one with itself. To the extent that the concept is self-determining, it remains self-related in its determination, for it is determining itself, not something other. Where does the originality come from? What Hegel is referring to here involves a kind of absolute self-identity that is fundamentally different from identity as it applies to essence. Identity as an essentiality involves the reflection of essence in difference. The difference of essence is an inner differentiation, but it retains the difference in level that renders the difference a reflection of essence rather than a self-positing, where positor and posited are one.

The differentiation or becoming that is involved in the concept is a self-repulsion. It is not something that arises in virtue of anything else. The universal remains at one with itself in its differentiation. This differentiation is still going to count as the particular. For its part, the particular is going to be different from other types of differentiation. The particular is going to be “the native, immanent moment of the universal. . . . The universal is not in the presence of an other, but simply of itself” (p. 599).

To begin with, Hegel speaks of *the* particular. He does not speak of a plurality of particulars. The particular is a differentiation of the universal, by means of which it is at one with itself. In virtue of this its differentiation, the universal yields species of itself in the plural. They are really like species and not just members of a class in that they are determined by the very nature of the unity of the universal.

What are the species of the universal that become its particulars in the plural? Hegel lays them out, writing: “The particular is the universal itself, but it is its difference or relation to an other, its *illusory reference outwards*; but there is no other present from which the particular could be distinguished, except the universal itself” (p. 606). The particular is not something or other, contrasted to whatever it is not. Nor is the particular a quantitative determination, indifferent to its quality and in continuity with other magnitudes. The only thing that the particular is in contrast with is the universal, but the universal has here determined itself “and so is itself the particular; the determinateness is *its* difference; it is distinguished only from its own self. Therefore its species are only (a) the universal itself, and (b) the particular. The universal . . . is itself and its opposite. . . . It embraces its opposite and in it is in union with itself. Thus it is the totality and the principle of its diversity” (p. 606), because the diversity consists of the universal and the particular. These are its species. These are the particulars so far inherent in the concept, not anything else.

So, to begin with, we just have particularization. Particularization involves the differentiation of the universal into universality and particularity, into determinate concepts, the universal and the particular. We need to see where this is going to lead and what individuality is in distinction from particularity and individuality.

Chapter Twenty

From Concept to Judgment

“Subjectivity,” the first of the three major sections of the Logic of the Concept, thinks through how the concept engenders judgment and then how judgment develops into syllogism. Hegel indicates why these initial developments warrant being grouped under the heading “Subjectivity,” writing as follows:

At first . . . the Notion is only in itself or implicitly the truth; because it is only something inner, it is equally only outer. It is at first simply an immediate and in this guise its moments have the form of immediate, fixed determinations. It appears as the determinate Notion, as the sphere of the mere understanding. Because this form of immediacy is still inadequate to the nature of the Notion, for this is free, being in relation only with itself, it is an external form in which the Notion cannot count as a being-in-and-for-self, but only as something posited or subjective. The Notion in the guise of immediacy constitutes the point of view for which the Notion is a subjective thinking, a reflection external to the subject matter. This stage, therefore, constitutes subjectivity, or the formal Notion. Its externality is manifested in the fixed being of its determinations each of which appears independently as an isolated, qualitative something which is only externally related to its other. (p. 596)¹

The terms that Hegel here employs involve much of what he had to say in characterizing the abstract universal, the abstract particulars, and the abstract individuals that the understanding makes use of as if they were definitive of thought. What is striking is that Hegel here seems to be speaking about not just the abstract universal but the entire treatment of concept, judgment, and syllogism within “Subjectivity.”

All of it deserves the characterization of being subjective, Hegel is suggesting, because concept, judgment, and syllogism involve a formality due to the immediacy and rigidity of their determinations. This seems to go against

the whole nature of what distinguishes the Logic of the Concept, and Hegel himself admits that these aspects do go against the free character of the logical subject matter at hand. Nevertheless, at the outset, the concept or self-determined determinacy emerges with something about it that is immediate, formal, and subjective in ways that will be discarded as it develops.

Hegel begins to characterize the concept as it first arises, noting, "The Notion is, in the first instance, *formal*, the Notion in its *beginning* or the *immediate* Notion" (p. 599). Note the two terms that go together: formality and immediacy. "In the immediate unity, its difference or positedness is itself *at first* simple and only an *illusory being*, so that the moments of the difference are immediately the totality of the Notion and are simply the *Notion as such*" (p. 599).

Hegel is here pointing at aspects that crop up in the initial development of universality, particularity, and individuality. The simple character of difference, the kind of illusory being affecting it, the way in which the differences are immediately the totality of the concept, are all indicative of how universality, particularity, and individuality first emerge. Universality involves in its own character itself, particularity, and individuality. Particularity turns out to involve itself as well as universality and individuality, just as individuality will be the totality, encompassing itself, particularity, and universality. They each become the whole, and what characterizes the initial determinations of the concept, or self-determination, is the threefold character on display.

Hegel describes the subsequent development of judgment in the following way:

Secondly, however, because it [the concept] is absolute negativity, it sunders itself and posits itself as the *negative* or as the *other* of itself; and further, because as yet it is only the *immediate* Notion, this positing or differentiation is characterized by the fact that the moments become *indifferent to one another* and each becomes for itself; in this *partition*, its unity is still only an external *connection*. As such *connection* of its moments, which are posited as *self-subsistent* and *indifferent*, it is *judgment*.

In the concept's initial determination, the differentiation involves a simplicity or illusory being insofar as the various moments of the concept do not yet take on an independent character and stand in an external relationship. That first happens in judgment. Judgment consists in a process of determination, a development, a self-determination, where the aspects of the concept have taken on an independent subsistence, yet still enter in a relation to one another in which they are going to be determined by one another.

It is important to keep in mind that self-determination has arisen out of something else. It has emerged from the Logic of Essence, which culminated in the undermining of the difference between determiner and determined or, most immediately, between cause and effect, where the resultant reciprocity

collapsed into an identity of determiner and determined, or, as Hegel also puts it, an identity between positedness and being-in-and-for-itself.

Although this identification of determiner and determined immediately presents self-determination, this debut of self-determination cannot be what self-determination properly is. Self-determination is what determines itself, but here it has not yet determined itself to be anything. Instead, self-determination has arisen from something else, which eliminates itself in giving rise to self-determination. This emergence stamps self-determination with an immediacy reflecting that it is the outcome of something other than itself, which has passed from the scene. After all, the immediacy of self-determination, of the concept, is not a reversion to being, to what is indeterminate. Although self-determined determinacy arises with the given character of being that which is self-determining, it is now poised to set out and be what it determines itself to be. Given its emergent identity, it cannot help but engage in determining itself.

This provides the Logic of the Concept with a starting point of universality, where universality is this entity that is at one with itself in virtue of setting about determining itself. It has not yet given itself any determinacy, but it is not indeterminate. We are not dealing with being. Rather, we confront something that has emerged from essence as what is as much determiner as determined.

Hegel begins with universality as that unity poised to determine itself and determine itself in a particular way. As such, there is not much more to be said about universality, except to contrast it with other kinds of identities. Universality is not being. Although universality is not just a simple empty indeterminacy of being, universality does have a kind of indeterminacy, for universality has not yet determined itself. Nonetheless, universality is that which will determine itself and thus it is not just being.

On the other hand, universality is not just essence, as Plato suggests by characterizing universality as a form that appears in sensible phenomena. Essence, too, began as something that really had no determinacy other than being that which negates being. Essence, however, came to further determine itself in virtue of its different types of positing. At the outset, essence is that which is going to mediate something that reflects it, something that, in a sense, is at a different level from it. Essence's determinacy, once it becomes something that is at one with itself and has identity, is different from what it posits.

Here, the determinacy that the universal will be giving itself is not an illusory being but particularity. Particularity is the determinacy of the concept in the first instance. It is the determinacy that universality has as something that is at one with itself by differentiating itself. In particularizing itself, universality does involve a negation of itself by becoming other than what it is at the outset. The self-determining character of the universal mandates that

what the universal determines is its own development, rather than the determination of something else. Particularity is not the determination of something other than the universal determines. Particularity is rather the universal or the concept itself.

That is why, of course, every determination of the concept is the determination of the whole. Every determination is the determination of the concept, rendering it a determinate concept. Because of this special relationship to the concept of the universal, particularity is not just otherness or difference.

Particularity is the differentiation of the universal. The universal is at one with itself in the particular, even though it is its differentiation. Nonetheless, the moment there is the differentiation of particularity, the self or the concept, which in the first instance is just universal, now stands in relation to particularity. The universal relates to particularity as something distinct from it, even though particularity is the concept's own differentiation. *Both* the universal and the particular now comprise the differentiations of the concept.

The concept has given itself these distinct moments. It has two species: the universal concept and the particular concept, or universality and particularity. These are the concept's initial species insofar as they comprise the particular specifications that are inherent in its self-determining unity. They are built into the very process of the concept, understood as self-determination.

Universality comes first because particularity issues from the concept that is about to determine itself. Particularity is not just a determination, like quality or quantity. Particularity is a determination of the universal, of that which is determining itself. For that reason, particularity depends upon the universal, that which is on the verge of determining itself. And nothing can prevent the universal from determining itself, for that is what it does in order to be what it is. Logically speaking, at the start you have not the particular but the universal. It has not yet determined itself, but it is immediately going to do so. Then you have its differentiation, the particular or particularity.

The universal in the first instance is the universal concept, because every determinacy of the concept is a determination of the whole. Universality or the universal concept, however, immediately leads to particularity or the particular concept. Thereby particularity differentiates the concept into two concepts—on the one hand particularity, on the other hand universality. Hegel maintains that this differentiation leads directly to individuality.

What is individuality supposed to be, and how does it come from the differentiation of universality and particularity? One could characterize individuality as an absolute determinacy. It is determined in and of itself and could thereby be said to be unique. It is also spoken of as the unity of the universal and the particular, being at one with itself in its own differentiation, rather than deriving its identity from any other source. If the individual owed its identity to its contrast with something else, it would just be the other of

another something and fail to retain any unique individuation. If the individual owed its identity to some separate determiner, it would have nothing to distinguish itself from any other posit of that positor. Instead, the individual is that which has determined itself, the universal that has particularized itself, or that which is determined in and through itself. The individual is also spoken of as the totality, because it contains the other elements. Individuality contains universality and particularity in their unity.

Now, it turns out, as Hegel shows in making his way through these determinations, that each of these concept determinations takes on the determinations of its counterparts. The universal becomes a particular determination as one of the determinations of the concept in its process, side by side with particularity. Individuality becomes particular as well, being one concept determination besides the universal and the particular. Particularity is thereby something that all of them share and, in that sense, it has universality. On the other hand, they are all individual, because all, in containing the others, are totalities themselves. They are each the whole concept: universal, particular, and individual.

Now, earlier I had spoken of universality, particularity, and individuality in a way that is much more familiar. I was relying upon the way in which these terms are found in a particular type of universality, particularity, and individuality that Hegel characterizes under the heading of the abstract universal. Hegel speaks about the abstract universal at times in a pejorative way, as if it represents a mistaken view of the universal. It is, Hegel never tires of pointing out, the kind of universality that the prephilosophical understanding occupies itself with and to which certain philosophers have reduced thought.

Nevertheless, the abstract universal is a type of universality, and we are going to see that it becomes developed and examined when the different forms of judgment arise out of the determination of individuality. What will distinguish the different forms of judgment from one another are the different kinds of universals, particulars, and individuals that figure within them. One of them is the abstract universal, and the abstract universal is the kind of universal you get at through abstraction. You find a plurality of given individuals, and in them you find something they share in common, which you extract. This extracted content is the abstracted universal, which is shared in common by given individuals as the common quality that inheres in them all. What is characteristic of this kind of universal is that it does not tell us anything else about the individuals that it inheres in. We do not know what other features they have. We just find the abstract universal to be something they happen to share in common.

When we think about the abstract universal, we need a plurality of particulars in which to find this universal commonly instantiated. In order for there to be a plurality of such instances, it is not enough for there to be particularity. In order for there to be particular cases, the particulars have to be distin-

guishable from one another. Otherwise they coalesce into one, and we do not have particulars, but just a “particular” with a quality that is not even a universal. The type of universal that is abstracted has to be found in a plurality of instances, but for the instances to be plural, they cannot just share the feature of embodying, or being an instance of, the common universal. They also have to be differentiated instances, and that is one way of thinking about the individual.

Note that these individuals, these particulars, and these abstract universals all have aspects external to one another. The particulars have other features that have no relation whatsoever to the universal they share. What individuates them from one another has nothing to do with what they are in common or what they are as particular. All these particulars are given externally, independently of the extraction of the universal. This appears to be very different from what we find when we think about the universal as something that determines itself, that gives itself a particularization. The universal then becomes an individual that is determined in and through itself.

Is there then really a connection between the features of universality per se, particularity per se, and individuality per se and universals, particulars, and individuals as we commonly encounter them in experience, where they count as abstract universals extracted from given individuals, sharing features?

As Hegel point outs, in order for the universal to be the universal, it also has to be determined (p. 601). It also has to have a kind of differentiation to be a universal. After all, even in the case of the abstract universal, the universal has a specific character in order to be found among the plurality of particulars. They also are at one with that universal in having that determination. The notion of something *having* a determinacy, of course, takes us back to the Logic of Essence, to the existence of things with different properties. Significantly, Hegel will emphasize that when we are dealing with the conceptual relation of judgment, we are not dealing with “having” but a relation expressed by “is.”²

In any event, how do we manage to get individuals that can be discriminated particulars, so as to comprise a plurality of individuals? What gives them their individuality? Is it really going to depend upon being determined in and through itself? Can individuality owe its identity to anything else?

We have seen how things can be determined not in and through themselves but by other things. For example, something is determined as such by an other. Things that exist are determined relative to other things, which mutually influence one another. Causes determine effects, which enable causes to exhibit their causality. Are any of these relationships to something else sufficient to make something unique? Can something achieve individuality through any relation to other?

The relation of something and other in general has proven to be insufficient to individuate either. As we have seen, the other is also a something, and the something is also an other. Determination by negation ends up leaving reality and negation ultimately equivalent, such that the contrast of something and other ends up leading to self-relation and the one. Something and other are thus not individuals, at least not in virtue of their mere contrast with one another. This is the problem with Saussure and Derrida,³ who want to rely upon negation of this sort as if it were the source of individuation. Yet, if something is what it is only in terms of what it is not, an endless dissemination results, where what something is not owes its character to what something else is not ad infinitum. You keep on searching and searching, but you never find any individuated factor. Everything is just a something or an other, or rather, both a something and an other.

If instead you think of individuation as that which is determined in and through itself, the individual is not relative to anything, but absolutely determinate. When something is relative to something else, there is no guarantee that it is unique. Other things can be relative to the same factor. Other effects can have the same cause. Other phenomena can be the appearance of the same essence. Likewise, other things can share the same set of properties, which is why, contra Bertrand Russell, no array of definite descriptions can ever guarantee that we are dealing with something unique. If, however, we are dealing with something that is determined in and through itself, what it is cannot be duplicated by anything else. It is the one and only particularization of its unity. So, here we have an individual that can be spoken of in terms of universality and particularity. The universality in question, however, is concrete, for its very own identity engenders the entirety of the determinacy of its particularization. It exhibits a thoroughgoing self-determination.

This does not mean that there cannot be any kind of individuality that will not depend upon relation to other for its own identity. In *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*,⁴ Hegel himself thinks through different spheres of right in which individuals determine themselves as different kinds of agents—as property owners, as moral subjects, as spouses and parents, as members of civil society, and as citizens—only by interacting with others. Individuality per se, however, depends upon the universal and the particular. Admittedly, since each factor of the concept takes on the determinations of the whole, the universal and particular turn out to be individuals themselves. This leads to judgment, where individual factors of the concept are determined in terms of one another in an external relation.

It must be noted that individuality is not opaque to universality or thought, provided one thinks of the universality that is at one with its particularization. Then, we are in a position to fathom how self-determination can go hand in hand with conceptuality and conceptualization, as well as why

self-determination or freedom requires universality, particularity, and individuality as its constitutive terms.

This comprehension can be achieved in two directions. On the one hand, one can consider what terms are required to conceive self-determination. The *Logic of Being* will not be a likely source, for there we do not have entities determining themselves in any respect. Instead, we there encounter determinate beings immediately related to one another and exhibiting contrasts in virtue of that. The terms that came up in the *Logic of Essence* are not going to do for freedom either, because they always involve terms by which something is determined by something else. Here, in the *Logic of the Concept*, we are looking precisely for the terms by which something is determined by itself. Universality, particularity, and individuality may just be what are needed.

On the other hand, one can focus on conceiving the relation of the universal, the particular, and the individual, and in so doing, we may well find ourselves encountering connections involving self-determination. None of these connections are self-evident, nor are they connections that have been made very explicitly by any other thinkers. Nonetheless, in the *Logic of the Concept*, these connections are very much on the table, and we want to think about them as we move along.

Now, as we move through the distinctions of universality, particularity, and individuality, we face the question of whether they lead to what Hegel claims they engender, and that is judgment. If they do lead to judgment, why do they lead to judgment in the specific way in which Hegel determines judgment? Judgment is obviously one of the topics that logic addresses when logic is undertaken as a formal discipline. It is important to see how Hegel's account of judgment differs from that which formal logic provides. Admittedly, here under the rubric of subjectivity, Hegel addresses precisely those topics that formal logic considers—namely concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, or forms of inference. Is there any difference in how the *Logic of the Concept* develops these topics?

Judgment can be more narrowly thought of as something that involves thinkers manipulating terms in certain ways. One might be tempted to think of judgment in these psychological or linguistic modalities. Here, however, we are dealing with judgment logically, not in respect to its psychological or linguistic embodiment. Hegel points out that judgment can also be exemplified in the composition of an objective entity, so long as it involves factors that are connected in the way in which judgment connects terms (pp. 626, 627). Here, we are examining the connection of judgment *per se*. Judgment involves terms in a connection and it is a process, because judgment does something. Minimally speaking, judgment specifies its terms in a certain way, setting them in a certain relation. What are the characteristic terms and what is the specific relation they are given in judgment?

On the one hand, judgment relates subject and predicate, and it does so by means of a copula, expressed by “is.” This relation involves an immediate connection, an immediate identification. The subject is the predicate. The “is” does not provide any further grounds for the connection it makes. It just immediately identifies subject and predicate. That is, of course, one of the reasons why judgment cannot possibly be a satisfactory vehicle for philosophical argument. The form of judgment provides absolutely no justification for the connection it makes. It just does it immediately by itself without further ado.

Although judgment identifies subject and predicate, they carry with them a certain difference. They are not the same kind of term. The predicate appears to be a universal, whereas the subject seems to be an individual. The subject gets identified with something, the predicate, obtaining further determination. The subject, however, is not completely indeterminate to begin with, for it has enough determinacy to be distinguishable from the predicate and to hold the place of subject.

On the one hand, subject and predicate seem to be separate terms, which the judgment connects immediately. This connection appears to be something that is done externally to the terms involved. The connection is something in addition to the terms. Thereby, it seems that it must be done from without and is a connection that is not intrinsic to them.

On the other hand, the “is” of judgment seems to signify that the connection made is intrinsic to the subject and predicate. The act of the judgment posits that the connection is not something external but something endemic to the terms involved. The subject *is* the predicate. It is not just happenstance that someone ascribes the predicate to the subject. No, the subject *is* the predicate. The relation has something objective to it, although it retains something subjective to it, in that it involves two separate terms whose connection by judgment does not provide any basis for connecting them. In this regard, the connection is not something objective to them, but something external to them or subjective. Still, the “is” posits a connection that is putatively intrinsic to them.

If the predicate, in the first instance, is just the kind of universal that is given independently of the individual, that is, the subject, the judgment posits that the universal inheres in the subject. The subject is an individual, however, whose individuality cannot be exhausted by that predicate. The subject has a plurality of indefinitely other determinacies, which allow the predicate to be something that inheres in an individual.

Alternately, one might think of the predicate as being something under which the subject is subsumed. If the predicate subsumes the subject, it subsumes others as well, not just that individual. These are different kinds of relationships.

One might also consider the relation of subject and predicate as if it were a grammatical form. To ward off a reduction of judgment to this characterization, Hegel pointedly distinguishes propositions from judgments. Propositions can immediately connect subject and predicate, but they are not necessarily judgments. The fundamental difference Hegel points to to distinguish propositions from judgments is that a proposition need not posit anything universal about the subject (p. 626). A proposition can just posit something individual about it, like “Joe is twenty-two years old today.” That is not quite a judgment, logically speaking. It is a proposition, because a judgment, as Hegel defines it and as we generally understand it, is something in which the terms in question exhibit the different determinations of the concept.

The terms in question are going to be, on the one hand, individual or particular, and they are going to be identified with something universal or sometimes something particular. What is going to characterize judgment in distinction from mere propositions is that we are going to have determinations of the concept determined by one another immediately. Judgment is thus a further process of self-determination involving universality, particularity, and individuality, one in which they are determined by one another.

The form of judgment presents in the abstract the following possibilities: We could have the universal determined by either the particular or the individual, and then all the other permutations, where the particular is determined by the universal or individual, and where the individual is determined by the universal or particular. Judgment, however, is not going to involve every single permutation. It turns out to involve only those permutations in which, as Hegel puts it, the subject could be regarded as being more determinate and less abstract than the predicate (p. 627). So we can have the individual and the particular determined by the universal or the individual determined by the particular.

As we shall see, there are going to be other ways in which judgment ends up getting differentiated. Namely, judgment is going to get differentiated into different forms of judgment in terms of what kind of universal and what kind of individual and particular enter in. Hegel points out that these are going to get grouped in ways that incorporate logical divisions encountered earlier (p. 630). To begin with, there are going to be judgments that exhibit determinations from the Logic of Being. Even though judgment involves relationships in which one concept element is determined by another, they are still going to incorporate relationships that fell within the Logic of Being. There will also be judgments that are determined by features of the Logic of Essence and of the Logic of the Concept. The development of judgment will thereby fall into a fourfold division, which will take us through the types of judgment, with Hegel employing pretty much the names that Kant had used in his table of judgments (p. 630).

Judgment comprises a further self-determination of the concept, which initially emerged from the equalization of determiner and determined in the final stages of the Logic of Essence. In judgment, the concept gets to be determined by itself. This is achieved insofar as judgment has the different factors of the concept be determined by one another. In order to get into judgment, Hegel suggests that all we need do is follow out the development of individuality (p. 622). That development should issue in the first form of judgment, in which the individual is determined to be in immediate identity with the universal. The universal in question turns out to be an abstract universal. How does this follow from the concept of the concept and its concluded determination of universality, particularity, and individuality?

First of all, what is the outcome of universality, particularity, and individuality? Each of the terms ends up being the totality, insofar as each ends up taking on the determinacy of the other moments. Moreover, insofar as each ends up being individual, each could be said to be determined in and of itself. Individuality is the totality comprising the particularized universal. It is a self-determined entity, yet it is just as much a moment related to other such moments, the universal and the particular, each of which is the totality and yet equally connected, being related to one another by the universal on whose differentiation they depend.

What results is a plurality of individuals. So, we might think that we are going to be facing three terms—universality, particularity, and individuality, each a totality unto itself, as well as an element of the concept. They are all immediately connected to one another, for they are all united in the self-identical self that is under way determining itself. So it might appear that we are going to have a threesome in which all three concept factors are immediately connected to one another. Judgment, however, is going to involve a twosome connecting, to begin with, the universal and the individual in immediate identity. How is that the outcome of the process of the individual?

Hegel presents individuality arising out of the self-differentiation, or particularization of universality. He writes, “Individuality is not only the return of the Notion into itself; but immediately its loss. Through individuality, where the Notion is *internal to itself*, it becomes *external to itself* and enters into actuality” (p. 621). How is the concept internal to itself in individuality?

Remember that one of the leitmotifs of this first section of the Logic of the Concept is that each of the elements of the concept is the whole concept. Or, if you want to speak in terms of self-determination, the determinations of self-determination are the self itself. Each of them is the self, the whole, but they are equally in it, so we have the self within itself.

That is one of the leitmotifs. The other is that the determinations are all moments that take on the character of all of the other moments. On the one hand, the concept is within itself in the individual, which is the totality. On the other hand, the concept becomes external to itself and enters into actual-

ity. In what respect do the moments of the concept now become external to what contained them and acquire an actuality, where they account for their own existence? Well, remember, the individual is determined in and through itself. For that reason, it has a kind of immediacy. It stands on its own. Consequently, each of the terms has become a self-subsistent whole. The concept has given rise to a plurality of concepts, each of which is an individuality in its own right. Thereby the concept has become external to itself, because they are each the concept itself. "In this way," Hegel goes on to say, "the individual is a qualitative *one* or a *this*. With this quality it is, first, repulsion of itself from *itself*, whereby the many *other* ones are presupposed; *secondly*, it is now a negative relation towards these presupposed *others*; and, the individual is in so far *exclusive*" (p. 621).

All of this echoes what we came upon earlier with something more minimal, namely the plurality of ones. Individuals are ones in a certain respect, but they involve something more, which has to do with universality. Universality is not in the picture when we are dealing with ones. You cannot, however, keep universality out of the picture when you are dealing with individuals. As Hegel notes, "Universality, when related to these individuals as indifferent ones—and related to them it must be because it is a moment of the Notion of individuality—is merely their *common element*" (p. 621). Universality is their common element, insofar as universality remains at one with itself in this its differentiation. So it remains the underlying unity, the common element for all of its factors. As Hegel continues, "When one understands by the universal, that which is *common* to several individuals, one is starting from the *indifferent* subsistence of these individuals and confounding the immediacy of *being* with the determination of the Notion." This, in a sense, is "the lowest conception one can have of the universal" (p. 621), but it turns out this is how the universal relates to individuals, once individuality has set itself free.

Hegel writes that "the Notion, as this relation of its *self-subsistent* determinations, has lost itself; for as such it is no longer their *posited unity*, and they are no longer present as *moments*, as the *illusory being*, of the Notion" (p. 622), as they were when they were differentiations that really were not something differentiated from it. It was at one with them. It was contained within them. It had this kind of simple unity in the determination of the self. "But" they turned out to be "subsistent in and for themselves" (p. 622), because each was the whole. So, "as individuality, the Notion in its determinateness returns into itself, and therewith the determinate moment has itself become a totality. Its return into itself is therefore the absolute, original *partition of itself*, or, in other words, it is posited as *judgment*" (p. 622).

The concept is here differentiating itself in a way in which it is dividing itself into self-subsistent factors—the individual on the one hand and on the other hand that which is in common relationship to each individual, the

universal, which provides the connecting thread. This gets us to judgment because judgment is a relationship where we have individuality immediately being at one with universality. That is the starting point of the development of judgment.

Throughout, what is under consideration is judgment as logically determined. We are not addressing judgments that are filled by empirically given contents. The forms of judgment may be exemplified by empirically given contents, but here we are not dealing with the ascription of a specific predicate to a specific individual. We are instead examining either individuality per se or a kind of individuality to which either universality in general or a kind of universality is ascribed. We are always going to be dealing at that level of generality, where these kinds are going to be built into the nature of the argument. Through each judgment's act of relating, the terms involved are going to end up being transformed, which will set up a new relation, a new judgment, until, at some point, we are impelled beyond the domain of judgment into the domain of syllogism. In syllogism, two concept terms will be connected by means of a third. In the most basic case, the individual will be connected to a universal by means of particularity.

Hegel initially characterizes judgment as a positing of the determinate concept by the concept itself. Judgment is a "*determining* of the Notion by itself" (p. 623). In this connection, Hegel emphasizes that in judgment the subject does not *have* the predicate. Rather, in judgment the subject *is* the predicate. The Logic of Essence contained a thing and its properties, where the thing *has* properties. This relationship is very different from that of the universal and particular in judgment. The properties of a thing are not particulars, and they are not particulars because of what "has" as opposed to "is" signifies. The relation between the thing and the properties is different from that between the universal and particular. A proposition may state that this chair *has* such and such properties. Judgment proper specifically requires a relation of universal and particular or individual in which they are determined by one another. Whereas a thing, as underlying substrate, has no determinate connection to the properties it "has," which thereby become independent "matters," the individual "is" implicitly at one with itself in the universal. That is, the determination in judgment is a self-determination.

Insofar as judgment involves the positing of the determinate concept by the concept itself, it involves determinate concepts. These are logically determinate concepts, not empirically determined concepts. These logically determined concepts are the kinds of concepts that are a priori, for their character is determined by the nature of the concept. The concept is going to determine its own generic varieties in this process.

To keep the logical character of the treatment of judgment on track, Hegel emphasizes once more the distinction between propositions and judgments. He writes,

We may take this opportunity of remarking, too, that though a *proposition* has a subject and predicate in the grammatical sense, this does not make it a *judgment*. The latter requires that the predicate be related to the subject as one Notion determination to another, and therefore as a universal to a particular or individual. If a statement about a particular subject only enunciates something individual, then this is a mere proposition. For example, "Aristotle died at the age of 73, in the fourth year of the 115th Olympiad," is a mere proposition, not a judgment. (p. 626)

Further, Hegel notes,

This signification of the judgment is to be taken as its *objective* meaning, and at the same time as the *truth* of the earlier forms of the transition. In the sphere of being, the object *becomes* and *others itself*, the finite *perishes* or *goes under* in the infinite; in the sphere of Existence, the object *issues from its ground* into Appearance and *falls to the ground*, the accident *manifests* the *wealth* of substance as well as its *power*; in being, there is *transition* into an *other*, in essence, reflected being in an *other* by which the necessary relation is revealed. This movement of transition and reflection has now passed over into the original partition of the *Notion* which, while bringing back the individual to the *in-itself* of its universality, equally determines the universal as something *actual*. (pp. 627–28)

So there are two sides. The individual is brought back to its universality, the individual has the universality that is ascribed to it, but equally the universal is made actual. The universal is now attached to the individual. "These two acts are one and the same process in which individuality is posited in its reflection-into-self, and the universal as determinate" (p. 628).

There are two things going on, and Hegel is pointing out by way of anticipation that, as we look at judgment, we are going to be seeing how both sides of the judgment undergo development. Something is going to be happening to both sides. The individual that is being predicated is going to be determined in a certain way, and the predicate is going to be determined in a certain way. Hegel goes on to say, "The identity just demonstrated, namely, that the determination of the subject equally applies to the predicate and vice versa, is not, however, something only *for us*" (p. 628). It is going to be "posited in the judgment" (p. 628), and we are going to see how this operates.

Our next task will be to comprehend what are the forms of judgment and how they arise out of one another. In so doing, we must focus on how they involve different kinds of universals, different kinds of particulars, and different kinds of individuals. In this connection, we need to consider what each of these different kinds of judgments can provide, keeping in mind that different philosophers have limited reason to certain kinds of judgments, thereby limiting what thought can know.

Chapter Twenty-One

Judgment

The development of judgment arising from the concept may or may not completely converge with how judgment happens to have been treated within our philosophical heritage or any other particular cultural setting. We cannot just take judgment as we find it, relative to all sorts of things. To conceive judgment systematically, we must follow through how judgment gets determined in a discourse that takes nothing for granted.

On Hegel's account, we have arrived at the point where universality, particularity, and individuality have achieved their initial determination as basic elements of self-determined determinacy, of what is called the concept or of what also might be called universality in general. All three are components of the concept, and all equally take on the determinacies of the other components. Universality, particularity, and individuality have each shown themselves to be what the other two are, and in doing so, they have further proven to each be the whole. This is as expected, for if we are dealing with self-determination, every determination is a determination of the self. It is the whole that has determined itself. Individuality is that in which this totality is present insofar as here we have the universal that has particularized itself and therein remained at one with itself. Thereby we have something that is determined in and through itself. Its determinacy is self-determined. Because it is self-mediated and is not mediated by anything else, it has a kind of immediacy. What we have is individuality, this independent totality, which is equally in relationship to universality. Individuality is immediately in relation to universality because universality engenders individuality and individuality is universality.

This provides the starting point for the development of judgment, which can be thought of in the typical terms of a relationship between a subject and a predicate. The subject can be considered to be given as that which is going

to be determined by the predicate. In this respect, the subject has to have some definiteness to start with to be a subject liable to determination. On the other hand, a predicate has to have a given character of its own to be predicated of a subject. Thus, the predicate is in some respect given independently of the subject, even though their connection is affirmed through the relationship of judgment.

These initial determinations of judgment end up constituting a specific kind of individuality and a specific kind of universality, which have arisen as the outcome of the determination of universality, particularity, and individuality *per se*. The universal has here become an *abstract* universal, because it is in relationship to an individual totality that is determined in and through itself and, in that respect, has an independence vis-à-vis this universal. The universal is contained in the individual, but the individual has other determinations as well.

To get at a conception of what judgment is, we cannot rely upon empirical examples because it is not clear that what is encountered is incidental or generic to judgment. Instead, we need to get at the universal determination of judgment, that is, its conceptual determination. Only getting at its universality can determine what all examples or particularizations must have in order to count as instances of judgment. We want to get at judgment in its own right, not as it is relative to other factors. We do not want to get at it as it happens to be spoken of in any particular linguistic community. We do not want to get at it as it happens to be thought by people who have a certain gender, race, or any other contingent identity. We want to get at it as it is determined not from without but as it is in itself, as it is in its own right.

Note how these things go together. Universality will lay hold of only that which is part and parcel of the factor. In thinking the factor we are getting at what it is in its own self. We thus have here a conjunction between universality and individuality, where conceptualization gets at what the factor is in its own right. In thinking the universal of judgment, we are thinking something that is determinate, that is going to have a unique determinacy that will make it judgment as opposed to anything else. Hence, it will have to have individuality, but an individuality that is conceptually determinate, an individuality that is universal, which provides what judgment is *per se*. Thus, if we think of judgment in general as involving a relationship of subject and predicate connected by a copula, we want to get at the subject *per se*, not a particular subject, but the subject in general and the predicate in general.

What is the subject in general? Well, the subject, to begin with, is something that has to have some givenness in order to have something predicated of it. It has to be something that is determined in its own right yet be equally something that is awaiting determination. The determination that it is awaiting, via the predicate, is going to be a universal and not merely an individual determination. Because the predicate has an externality to the subject, it is

not just in this subject. The predicate will potentially be in other things as well and thereby have that commonly extractible character that will make it an abstract universal.

Keep in mind that we are dealing here with the determination of the subject by universality in one form or another. Throughout the development of judgment on which we are now embarked, the predication of the subject will involve universal or conceptual determinations. It will also involve some kind of self-determined determinacy. Both will go together.

One might wonder whether in laying out what judgment is in general or what judgment is in and of itself, we are making judgments and thereby fall prey to a vicious circularity. Of course, if conceptual development is autonomous, it is something that is determined by itself. In the case at hand, does that mean that we make judgments of judgment in thinking through its self-development?

We have been looking at the concept of the concept, because as Hegel has pointed out, all of the logical determinations can be looked upon as being concepts. The logical determinations are concepts in that we are getting at them in their universal determinacy and not in their being relative to any particular thing. We are getting at being as such, and the same thing could be said of any other logical determinacy. We are also getting at them as they are in and through themselves, because we are looking at determinations as they develop themselves. That is another way of saying that we are getting at them as a concept. So we have the concept of the concept.

Now we are dealing with the concept of judgment, the universal determinacy of judgment. Is that provided for by a judgment? None other than the examination of judgment will indicate to what extent judgment is adequate to provide the determination of itself or anything else. It is probably apparent that the account of judgment does not consist in a judgment any more than the account of anything, philosophically speaking, consists in a judgment. The account may employ judgments as elements or components, but it is not going to be restricted to connecting a subject and a predicate.

We are going to see that something similar is going to apply to syllogism. Syllogism will not be sufficient to account for anything. It may play a subordinate role in certain accounts, but it cannot account for itself.

What is it about judgment that indicates its inadequacy? Think of its basic form. We have terms being distinguished. On the other hand, they are being identified. The identification is not the same thing as the identity that we find in essence, and it is certainly not the same thing as having a property. It is something that involves the kind of identity of universality. The relationship of the terms in judgment is immediate. Their identification is in the form of being. It is not in the form of conceptual determination itself, which involves self-determination. The connection is instead just an immediate, bare assu-

rance. For this reason, judgment cannot alone suffice as an argument establishing any truth.

Throughout judgment, a unity is at hand expressed by the copula. The unity relates terms involving individuality as well as particularity. Hence, the connection in judgment is not a matter of just identity and difference. The unity does not concern how a whole has parts or how a thing has properties. In judgment, we are dealing instead with how a universal has particularity and thereby individuality. The forms of judgment will comprise the different ways in which this unification occurs in an immediate fashion.

This is another way of saying that here we are dealing with conceptual determination, which, after all, is what philosophers engage in. Whereas propositions just state something particular about some subject, such as “George Washington visited Williamsburg when he was thirty-seven,” judgments universally determine the individual, thereby particularizing the universal.

The development of judgment will be systematic to the extent that it follows out how the forms of judgment emerge first from the concept and then from one another in succession. What provides closure to this development and secures that all forms have been accounted for is the emergence of a form of judgment that results in a determination of the individual by the universal that eliminates the defining relationship of judgment. What would thus be superseded is the immediate connection of individual and universal expressed in the copula. The forms of judgment then come to closure and certify their totality insofar as a form of judgment emerges within which the terms in question are no longer immediately related, but where instead the individual is connected to the universal by means of another component of the concept, the particular. When this occurs, the bipolar relation of judgment is supplanted by the threefold relation of syllogism. Then the individual is determined by the universal through the mediation of the particular. To be nonarbitrary, this move from judgment to syllogism should arise through the development of judgment itself.

Now, as you know, the forms of judgment are presented in several ways. To begin with, judgment is presented as exhibiting a relationship in which the universal determination of the individual takes on features of the Logic of Being. This form comprises so-called qualitative judgment. Qualitative judgment is also identified as a judgment of *existence* (p. 630).¹ The term Hegel gives us is judgment of *Dasein*, determinate being, which fits within the Logic of Being and the account of quality. Miller, the translator of the English edition of the *Science of Logic*, employs “existence” instead of determinate being, which is systematically misleading insofar as existence is a category of the Logic of Essence.

Qualitative judgment involves the categories of quality, qualitative difference, and determinate being, even though what its judgment does is deter-

mine the individual by the universal. Qualitative judgment gives rise to judgments in which categories from the Logic of Essence come into play. This involves two forms of judgments—first of all, the so-called judgments of reflection, which also have been called quantitative judgments, and then, secondly, judgments of necessity. The latter will then give rise to judgments of the concept, where the relationship between universal and individual will exhibit a conceptual relationship as opposed to a relationship involving aspects of being or aspects of essence (p. 630).

Each form of judgment will involve its own kind of universals, as well as its own kind of individuals and particulars. All three go together, for how a universal is of a specific type is determined by how it relates to its particularization and the individuality to which it is connected.

As mentioned earlier, different philosophers and philosophies have tended to privilege certain forms of judgment, and thereby they have privileged the type of universality these involve. They “privilege” them usually in the sense that they only acknowledge those kinds of judgments and those kinds of universals while leaving all the rest out of consideration. It is important to see how this involves a truncation of conceptualization. By limiting conceptualization to certain forms of judgment, thought is equally restricted to certain forms of universals, which can only apply to certain kinds of particulars and certain kinds of individuals.

The first form of judgment is qualitative judgment, and in a sense, it comprises the minimal determination of judgment *per se*. Qualitative judgment contains the subject and predicate relation without further qualifications. The subject is an immediately given individual to which a given universal is ascribed. The universal is just as immediately given as the individual. Such a universal is what Hegel calls the abstract universal. He points out that sensuous qualities are examples of this kind of abstract universal (pp. 632, 633). The immediate individual is the individual of which abstract universals are predicated or is that in which abstract universals inhere.

What is it that makes the universal of qualitative judgment abstract and allows it to be exemplified in a sensuous quality that could be predicated of an immediately given thing? Hegel offers “The rose is red” as an example of a qualitative judgment and points out that those who can make such a judgment are not worthy of any great respect (p. 657). It does not take much conceptual prowess to judge that a rose is red. The universal of qualitative judgment is abstract in that it is indifferent to the other features of the individuals in which it inheres, allowing it to be extracted while leaving all else unperturbed. For this very reason, the abstract universal cannot just be attached to a single individual but is just as readily attached to other things, to other individuals. This is because the individuals in which the abstract universal inheres are not otherwise individuated by that universal. That universal and its inherence in them is completely unrelated to what other qualities

they have. It leaves that indeterminate, which is why it can be possessed by indifferently manifold examples.

That indifference says something about the individual in question. It indicates that the individual of which abstract universals are predicated has a unity that does not necessitate its own differentiation. It has qualities that are indifferent to one another, and it is not clear which if any of those qualities need inhere in it for it to be the individual that it is. Nonetheless, it is an individual. As such, it must in some respect be determined in and through itself to be a unique individual, especially when its abstract qualities can be shared by other things. Its individuality cannot reside in having those qualities precisely because other things can have them.

If we think of thought as only being capable of coming up with abstract universals, can we know in advance of observation, that is, *a priori*, what qualities anything has? If all concepts are just abstract universals, then the universal has no inherent connection to this individual as opposed to any other individual. Nor can the universal then have any connection to anything else about the individual in which it inheres. Since thinking this universal in connection to the individual leaves completely undetermined everything else about it, we cannot know what the individual is unless we leave thought behind and turn to observation.

Empiricists, not surprisingly, think of the universal as abstract and thus consider reason completely powerless to tell us anything about reality, other than perhaps the existence of self-consciousness and God, if we take the classic case of Locke. Accordingly, empiricists account for the genesis of concepts in terms of picking out shared sensible features from the manifold properties that different observed things are found to have. That genesis through abstraction is why we can call such a concept an abstract universal. It is abstracted from what is given, a given manifold, without there being any necessary relationship between it and what else is in the manifold or between it and that individual as opposed to any other individual in which it might inhere. The abstract universal is just found to be in those things that happen to share it.

The judgment that predicates abstract universals of an individual is thus dealing with an individual whose manifold properties have no intrinsic connection to one another or to that individual. The judgment simply expresses the brute, contingent identity of it. Nonetheless, even though the terms involved do not have an interpenetrating identity, the qualitative judgment is a universal determination, which, in a sense, is striving for that kind of interpenetration. The judgment is affirming that the subject *is* the predicate. Well, if the subject is this given individual and the predicate is this abstract universal, the identity that this judgment expresses is just as much false. The subject is *not* the predicate, because the subject is necessarily other things besides the predicate, just as the abstract universal inheres in other things as

well. The qualitative judgment may initially comprise a positive judgment, affirming that the given individual is the abstract universal. Yet the very terms in which this positive judgment consists just as much render it a negative judgment, since they equally exhibit how there is a disparity between the given individual and the abstract universal. How then has the individual ended up being determined as a result of this development?

At this juncture,² Hegel briefly mentions two peculiar kinds of nonjudgments. One is the so-called identical “judgment,” which states that the individual is just the individual. It can hardly qualify as a judgment because it just expresses an identity that does not exhibit any differentiation. The second is the so-called infinite “judgment.” This states that something is not something else to which it has absolutely no relationship. An example of an infinite judgment is the proposition, “This book is not an elephant.” That is not a judgment, properly speaking, because a judgment involves some kind of universal determination, which here once more is lacking.

So the question is, Where does qualitative judgment lead? Does it really go to where Hegel takes us, to what he calls the judgments of reflection? What is the judgment of reflection? If you look at Hegel’s account of the judgment of determinate being or quality, he characterizes this form of judgment in terms of the nature of the universal and individual at play. He also speaks about the relation in question as one of inherence, because qualitative judgment presents the individual as having a multiplicity of given differentiations, one of which alone is extracted to the exclusion of all the rest, rendering that abstract universal something that inheres in an individual with other features besides (p. 631). By contrast, Hegel maintains, the judgment of reflection is a judgment of subsumption (p. 645). In this form of judgment the universal by which the individual is to be determined is one encompassing a plurality of individuals, thereby setting them in relation to one another. The subsumption of the individual under this universal has something to do with the reflection of essence. This is exhibited in the examples that Hegel provides. These examples involve predicates different from that in the qualitative judgment “The rose is red.” Hegel mentions judgments such as that an herb is medicinal, useful, and so forth, where the predication sets the individual in a relationship to others (p. 643).

Examples cannot adequately capture this or any form of judgment, since we need to think what determines it *per se*. When Hegel proceeds to conceptually specify the judgments of reflection, he presents a series of judgments in which quantitative distinctions are brought to bear. To begin, there is singular judgment, in which *this* individual is determined to fall under the universal (p. 645). This singular judgment is followed by a particular judgment that affirms that *not this* individual *is* this universal, but instead *some* are (p. 645). This particular judgment is then followed by a judgment of allness—that *all* individuals are determined by the universal (p. 647). In

effect, these three successive judgments involve a universality that functions as a class. This is because in the singular, particular, and universal quantitative judgments, we have a universality that applies to a plurality of instances in their relationship to one another. It comes out of what has occurred in the preceding development of qualitative judgment, once the individual has been determined to not be the abstract universal. In a sense what results is something Hegel characterizes as predicating particularity to the individual (pp. 640, 645).

How does particularity get involved, when judgment proceeds as a determination of the individual by the universal? To predicate particularity of the individual is tantamount to saying that the individual has been determined as an instance of the universal. That, of course, has occurred through qualitative judgment. By having an abstract universal predicated of the individual, the individual becomes an instance of the universal and thereby now stands in relationship to all the other individuals that fall under that universal. Thereby the erstwhile inhering abstract universal now takes on the character of something under which the individuals are subsumed.

Once this individual is determined by such a universal that inherently relates the individual to others, that is, that determines it to belong to a class, something else automatically follows. Namely, not just *this* individual is so determined, but *some* individuals are determined by this universal. Since the individual is subsumed under a universal to which others belong, the moment a singular judgment is made to the effect that an individual belongs to the class, more than one individual must also belong, which is to say that *some* individuals belong. That some belong does not mean that all belong, nor does it specify who belong. What does follow is that if just some individuals are members of this class, then some are also *not* members of this class.

The judgment that some individuals are not members of this class, however, just reiterates the judgment that some individuals are members of this class. This is because if some are not members, others are. Something more must be at hand to judge specifically that “*not some individuals* are members of this class.” To deny that some are members without affirming that some are members is achieved only by judging that *all* individuals are members of the class. Only if all are members, are just some not members.

Here in judgments of reflection or quantitative judgments we have a universality under which a single individual, some individuals, and finally all individuals are subsumed. This universal is not an abstract universal but a class. What characterizes class vis-à-vis the members of the class? They indeed are subsumed under it. They fall within in. How they fall within it is crucial to distinguishing judgments that pertain to one, some, or all members of a class from the judgments of necessity that follow from them. Class membership does not dictate how many members there are or what distinguishes them from one another. For example, take the class of unmarried

men. Conceiving that class does not determine how many bachelors there are or what other groups they fall under. Their plurality and further differentiations are simply given with respect to their class membership. Here again we have a type of universality that leaves undetermined both the particularizations of its members and their individuality. For that reason, if thinking were limited to this kind of universality, it could not do very much. Thought would leave everything else about class members undetermined, leaving all further knowledge dependent upon observation.

Quantitative judgment or judgment of reflection cannot, however, confine reason to thinking abstract universals or classes. Something happens when the judgment is made that all individuals are members of a class, something that transforms the nature of universality that determines individuals. This is because the universal quantitative judgment, the judgment of "allness," establishes a direct relationship between the individuality of the individuals and the universality that is ascribed to them. Once all individuals are members of a class, the individual *necessarily* has this universality in its own individuality, not just by belonging to a group, not just through its relation to others. The connection between the individual and the universal is now inherent in the individual itself. The individual is necessarily what this universal is, and therefore the development of judgment has given rise to judgments of necessity.

Let us recap the development by which judgments of reflection generate judgments of necessity. First one individual is subsumed under the universal, a universal that sets it in relation to others, namely a class. That entails that some belong to this universal, which equally entails that some do not. What enables some not to belong in general is the judgment that all belong to the universal. If just some in particular do not belong, then some others will still belong, leaving the particular judgment in place. Only when all belong, do some in general not belong. When, however, all belong, the relation of the individual to other class members falls out of the equation, because now the individual as such has this universal character in virtue of what it is as an individual.

Thereby the development of judgment arrives at what Hegel presents under the heading of judgments of necessity (p. 650). The judgment of necessity is, in the first instance, the categorical judgment, where the universal that is predicated of the individual determines the substance or nature of the subject. Now what is predicated of the individual is something that pervades it in its entirety, unlike an abstract universal that happens to inhere in it, touching only one aspect while leaving every other aspect a matter of indifference. Qualitative judgment leaves unspecified the other features of the individual, just as does class membership, which still leaves undetermined what distinguishes one member from another, as well as who they are.

In categorical judgment the connection between universal and individual is rooted in the individual itself, in its own defining nature. Hegel points out that a reflective judgment, such as that gold is expensive, rests on an external connection between gold and our wants and costs.³ The gold remains the same even if the external relations were altered and the price ceased to be dear. The character of being a metal, on the other hand, constitutes the substantial nature of gold, apart from which it, and all else that can be predicated of it, would be unable to subsist. Gold's metallic nature pervades it, and for that reason the judgment that gold is metal holds necessarily. Here we are dealing with universal specifications that necessarily pertain to this kind of individual, whose nature is directly connected to the universal in question.

In the judgment of necessity, the universal immediately invests the individual. As such, both the universal and the individual take on a specific character, different from that of the universal and individual in the judgments of determinate being and of reflection. In the judgment of necessity, the universal figures as a genus and the subject it determines figures as a species. The special character of the genus-species relation is exhibited in the example Hegel repeatedly employs to embody the judgment of necessity: "Gold is a metal." Here gold is a species of metal, where metal is its genus.

Now, gold is necessarily a metal. That gold is a metal completely pervades its being as gold. That can be true only because of the special relationship between genus and species. The universal that is the genus contains in its own identity its differentiation into species. Consequently, what distinguishes its species from one another is dictated by the unity of the genus. The genus is thus more concrete than the abstract universal, which leaves undetermined what distinguishes its instances from one another. This is why the genus does not inhere in its species. Rather, the genus invests the entirety of the species, because the identity of the universal contains its speciation. It concretely determines the specific difference of its species. For that reason, one can deduce particular consequences from the genus, which allow judgments to be made in an *a priori* fashion about its species. No such deduction of particular determinations is possible with either of the less concrete types of universals, abstract universals or classes. In their case, no *a priori* judgments can be made concerning what is particular about what they inhere in or subsume. Only observation can inform one about the differentiations that abstract universality and class leave undetermined.

Judgments of necessity do have limitations, which Hegel points out (p. 651). On the one hand, the genus does not contain any process whereby it generates or produces its species. It has them immediately, and the species themselves immediately belong to the genus. On the other hand, the species themselves have individuals that fall under them, but the differentiation of individuals in the species is not determined by their membership in the spe-

cies. The species is in relation to its individuals like a class is to its members, even though the genus's relation to its species is fundamentally different from class membership. Unlike the class-member relation, the genus immediately entails the particular species or the specific difference that it has, which allows for certain *a priori* judgments. Hegel points out that judgments of necessity have a certain connection to substance, but that more than substance is at stake (p. 650). Although necessity figures in substance, there is a relation to accidents that are simply had by the substance, leaving their differentiation unspecified. The necessity in actuality did give rise to substance as that which is absolute, but it still left substance reflected by accidents whose specific character does not determinately reflect the necessity to which they are subordinate. By contrast, the genus determines the differentia of its species, and they are therefore not its accidents.

The genus-species relation may specify the form of universality and individuality distinguishing judgments of necessity, but it is far from clear how relations of genus and species give rise to the three successive forms of categorical judgment, hypothetical judgment, and then disjunctive judgment. Each of these forms involves terms of relation that seem to be of a very different character. At face value, categorical judgment involves relations of substance, hypothetical judgment involves causal relations, and disjunctive judgment involves relations of reciprocal determination. How then can they retain any abiding connection to the genus-species characterization of universal and individual?

Categorical judgment certainly expresses necessity in affirming that the species is in its genus—for example, that gold is a metal. That follows necessarily. On the other hand, the genus has other species. That the categorical judgment connects the genus with *this* species as opposed to another species is therefore not mandated. In this respect, it is hypothetical that one species be identified with the genus by the judgment. Accordingly, although the unity of species in the genus is necessary, the judgment exhibits that the presence of each is itself contingent.

This double-edged predicament, expressed in hypothetical judgment, also sets the stage for disjunctive judgment, which presents the relation of the species to their genus in their entirety. That one species may be connected to the genus equally entails that the other species are as well, since they make up the rest of the genus, whose differentiation is necessary.

In the disjunctive judgment the universal, or genus, is affirmed to be either this subject or that subject or that subject and so on, but not endlessly. There is something determinate to the array. It has a necessary closure, which is what comprises the identity of the universal. When Hegel expresses the disjunctive judgment with the formula that the universal is A or B or C or D, the differentiation is necessary, exhibiting the relation of genus and species where the genus necessarily differentiates its species (p. 653). Properly

speaking, disjunctive judgment asserts that the genus is this species or that species or that species, until all its species are exhaustively listed.

Disjunctive judgment thereby identifies the universal that has a certain necessary differentiation with its complete differentiation, consisting of all the particulars of which it is composed. Hegel maintains that this identification results in the judgment of the concept, where what characterizes this last form of judgment is that the predicate consists in an identification of universality with its particular determination (p. 657). That identification or conformity of universal and particular is what is going to be ascribed to the individual in the kind of judgments that follow. The first of these judgments of the concept is the assertoric, followed by the problematic, and finally the apodictic.

To clarify what is at stake in the judgments of the concept, Hegel gives certain examples of the kind of predicates that are involved. They are not predicates that predicate the genus of a species, nor are they abstract universals or class memberships. Because the judgments of the concept predicate the correspondence of the particularity and universality of the factor involved, the examples all involve ascriptions of some normative character. Hegel mentions judgments that something is true or that it is right or that it is beautiful (pp. 657–58). None of these judgments are equivalent to identifying the genus of some individual, or what class it belongs to, or what abstract universal inheres in it. This reflects that none of these factors is sufficient to give the individual normativity. Because in each case a normative evaluation is involved, Hegel can duly observe that judgments of the concept require a more developed capacity of judgment than that required for making a qualitative judgment such as “The rose is red” (p. 657). To make a judgment of the concept, it is necessary to determine whether something is of such a character that its particular determination has a universal character. Is it beautiful? Is it good? Is it true? Does it involve the correspondence between universal and particular that can give the individual a normative value?

The immediate, minimal determination of the judgment of the concept consists in an assertoric judgment that simply asserts that the individual has a particularity in accord with the universal. Because this correspondence is just asserted or taken as immediately given, the individual in question is just a given individual whose normativity is not thereby judged to rest upon any particular determinacies. The assertoric judgment just affirms that the individual is true, right, or beautiful, without specifying how it warrants the normative correspondence predicated of it. The individual is just ascribed immediate correspondence. Yet, if what is asserted is valid, there must be some correspondence between the particular determination of the individual and a certain universal. The assertoric judgment, however, does not specify what is required for its claim to hold, even though it raises the standard that must be met by affirming a normative correspondence that must rest on the

particular character of the individual. Accordingly, what assertoric judgment affirms is not upheld by what it provides. Whether the individual has normativity all depends upon the individual's particular composition, which assertoric judgment leaves unspecified. Therefore, the individual may or may not be good, right, or beautiful.

Consequently, assertoric judgment results in problematic judgment, according to which the individual may or may not have normative value, involving the conformity of its particularity and universality. Although problematic judgment issues from the questionability of assertoric judgment, problematic judgment indicates what alone will remove the doubtfulness of whether the individual can have normativity. The reason that assertoric judgment fails to ground what it affirms is that just being a given individual does not itself supply that specific particularity that enables the individual to conform to the universal. By expressing this problem, problematic judgment effectively reveals that what is normatively universal is an individual with the proper particular character.

That revelation is precisely what apodictic judgment affirms. A judgment is apodictic by affirming that an individual with a particular character is normatively universal. What makes this kind of judgment apodictic is that it exhibits a necessity with an objectivity that was lacking in assertoric and problematic judgments. In previous judgments there has always been an aspect of subjectivity in the sense that the terms have a connection asserted about them whose ground is not fully present in them themselves. Here in apodictic judgment, the basis of the connection is completely present in the individual, thanks to the particular character that the individual is identified to have. Whereas before the connection always rested upon nothing but the "is" of the copula, here a particularity is at hand that mediates the individual with the universal.

Now, instead of the immediate connection of the judgment being what links subject and predicate, what connects the individual with the universal is that the individual has the particular character given it in the judgment. This particularity is contained on both sides of the apodictic judgment. It is the particularity in the individual, because the individual here is specified by the apodictic judgment as being an individual of such and such a character. It is also the particularity contained in the universal, for the normativity predicated of the individual involves the correspondence between the universal and that particularity. The connection is therefore within the terms themselves.

Apodictic judgment thereby brings closure to judgment. This is because the subject has come to contain within itself, through its own particular constitution, what unites it with what is being predicated of it. The normative universal to which the individual is identified contains the same particularity that the individual is specified to have. What now connects the two erstwhile sides of judgment is no longer just the immediate unification of the copula,

the “is,” but the third term of the concept, particularity, which both the normative individual and the normative universal share. Instead of the bipolar relation of judgment we now have the individual connected to the universal by means of the particular.

Judgment has thereby given rise to syllogism. The connections of syllogism have something more objective about them than those of judgment, insofar as the connection of individual and universal is mediated by the third factor of particularity that is contained within syllogism. Nonetheless, as we shall see, there is still an aspect of externality that reflects an abiding “subjective” element. Namely, although the terms that are united are indeed connected by means of a concept component, particularity, the individual and universal it connects are still different from it. The development of the forms of syllogism will come to its own close by eliminating that difference. The elimination of the difference between the universal, particular, and individual as they figure within syllogism will remove all trace of what Hegel identifies as the subjectivity marking the subjective logic. With this elimination, the subjective logic of concept, judgment, and syllogism, brings itself to an end and leads into the logical domain of objectivity.

Chapter Twenty-Two

From Judgment to Syllogism

The subjective logic, with its development of the concept, judgment, and syllogism, is the part of the *Science of Logic* that most resembles what ordinarily gets treated in the study of formal logic. It is worth looking back upon Hegel's account of judgment and reflecting on what is different about his treatment.

To begin with, whereas Hegel examines the very significance of the copula and how it arises from the determination of the concept, the copula is simply taken for granted in formal logic. The same can be said about judgment in general, as well as the distinct forms of judgment. Whereas Hegel attempts to show how they emerge systematically, formal logic takes them up as given data of thinking. The Logic of the Concept instead follows out the development of the forms of judgment from an initial determination of judgment, which itself arises out of the specification of concept. Since the different forms of judgment follow from one another, the order of their emergence is not arbitrary but is tied to what they are.

This developmental character of the forms of judgment is indicative of how they have a content of their own and are hardly purely formal. The form of each is related to its content, and indeed each form is particularly appropriate to a certain kind of content. What distinguishes these form-specific contents is not empirically given differences but rather the differences in the type of universal, particular, and individual that figure within each type of judgment. For this reason, Hegel's treatment cannot and does not employ the variables, the p's and q's that formal logic turns to, to schematize what it takes to be the form of thought. In formal logic, everything is completely substitutable, since it deals with forms of reasoning that have no connection to any specific content.

There is still an important sense in which the investigation of judgment and syllogism in the *Logic of the Concept* is formal. Hegel is not here dealing with empirically given judgments or syllogisms. Instead, he is unfolding a specification of judgment that is not relative to any observations but should be completely unconditioned and presuppositionless. What is at stake is a genuinely universal account of the subject matter as it is determined not by something else or by some arbitrary standpoint, but in and through itself.

We do not encounter *p*'s and *q*'s, but we do come upon *U*'s and *P*'s and *I*'s filling the contents of both the forms of judgment and forms of syllogisms. We are dealing with universals (*U*'s), particulars (*P*'s), and individuals (*I*'s), because these are the specific contents that always figure logically in judgments and syllogisms. It is possible that different universals, different particulars, and different individuals can be substituted for the different *types* of universal, particular, and individual that distinguish each form of judgment and provide exemplifications of these different forms. These may provide illustrations of the determinations at issue, but they cannot substitute for the systematic development. That development concerns the a priori forms of universality or the a priori determinate concepts or determinate universals, which are each connected with a certain a priori type of particularity and a certain a priori type of individuality. These are the distinctive contents that are what they are by figuring in the relationships of the different types of judgment.

Why would it be that the particular types of universals, which are what they are in being the universal of a certain kind of particular and a certain kind of individual, would have their determination in the development of judgment? Why would the connecting of subject and predicate that judgment performs have anything to do with the specification of different types of universalities?

Judgment would have no role to play in that specification if the universal is universal independently and apart from the particular and the individual. If, however, the universal is inherently what it is in particularizing itself, whereby individuality is established, then the universal is going to be bound up with the relations of these terms. Since judgment relates universal and individual by particularizing the universal, the different types of judgments are going to be specifications of different types of universals.

This is going to carry over into syllogism, insofar as syllogism both contains judgments within itself and arises from the development of judgment. Whereas formal logic schematizes the forms of inference using *p*'s and *q*'s, the systematic account of syllogism will differentiate its forms with respect to the type of content of the terms they relate. The relations between the terms of syllogism are not separate from the content of these. The different relationships of inference are bound up with certain kinds of contents,

and that is because the contents relate themselves in virtue of what they are to the other terms.

Nonetheless, there is a definite overlap between how Hegel develops the forms of judgment and how the tradition of logic identifies them. Kant, for example, lays out a similar division of forms of judgment in his Table of Judgments in his *Critique of Pure Reason*.¹ Unlike Hegel, however, many modern as well as ancient thinkers tend to restrict reasoning to only some of the forms of judgment and only some of the forms of syllogizing. As a result, the reality they conceive becomes limited to those entities that are determinably the corresponding kinds of universality, particularity, and individuality to which they restrict judgment and syllogism.

The type of universal that figures in the first form of judgment, qualitative judgment, is the abstract universal, whereas that figuring in the second form, quantitative or reflective judgment, is class. What Hegel characterizes as understanding as opposed to reason proper restricts itself to judgments that are qualitative and reflective, limiting its thinking to abstract universality and class. The abstract universal is found in what Hegel calls given “marks.”² These marks comprise features common to those individuals from which they can be abstracted. That the abstract universal can be abstracted from individuals tells us that they have other features that are left behind. Moreover, the external character of the process of abstraction ensures that what is extracted has no necessary connection to what is left behind. For that very reason, finding an abstract universal inhering in some individual does not tell you anything else that holds true necessarily for that individual. If you want to know more about the individual, you will just have to observe it as it appears.

Here we have an individuality that itself is of a certain type. Hegel characterizes it as a kind of immediate individuality, as something singular (pp. 631–32).³ This type of individual has manifold features without any principle uniting them in one. They comprise a given manifold, in which one can pick out different features without encountering any necessity to their combination. This type of individual has a manifold like the sensible manifold given to sensation.

This immediate manifold just happens to have a lot of features, which are not themselves mediated by any principle unique to that entity, binding them into one. In dealing with this kind of immediate individuality, tied to a certain kind of universality, we are also dealing with a certain kind of particular. Namely, the particular in question is an instance of an abstract quality. As instantiated, the abstract quality can in principle be found in other entities that otherwise have nothing to do with it. The particular of the abstract universal is thus in no further necessary relation to the other particulars sharing this mark.

Not surprisingly, the kind of universality exhibited in qualitative judgment is that to which empiricism restricts thought. Since empiricism presumes that all knowledge derives from what is given to sensation in the sensible manifold, it is only natural that abstract universals become its favored form of thought. They, after all, are the kind of universals that are found in such a givenness by way of abstraction. Accordingly, the kind of judgments one can make on this basis are judgments of determinate being, qualitative judgments such as "The rose is red." The rose, however, is not red, because the rose is equally other things besides that single mark.

The next kind of universal, which is found in quantitative judgments or judgments of reflection, is one under which individuals are subsumed rather than one that inheres in a plurality of individuals. This subsuming universal has a relational character insofar as it relates individuals to those others that fall under the same universal. Quantitative judgments exhibit this insofar as they specify a universal under which one, some, or all individuals fall. This relational universal is class.

No individual can be judged to be good, right, or beautiful in virtue of sharing in an abstract universal or in virtue of belonging to a class (other than the class of the good, the right, or the beautiful). Class membership does not differentiate the individuals of the class. Who they are as individuals and to what other groups they belong is left undetermined. The universal of class does not differentiate its members in any necessary way. By contrast, necessary, categorical judgments, such as "Gold is a metal," do involve necessary differentiations insofar as the universal they involve is that of the genus, whose unity specifies the genera of its species. For example, it is not necessary that the class of University of Georgia students happens to have any specific individual in it, but gold cannot fail to be a metal. Class membership does indeed unite the members of a class under something to which they all belong, but thereby they belong to something that otherwise leaves unspecified everything else about them. For that reason the judgments that are made on the basis of class membership have a certain limited character as a tool for uncovering the nature of things.

The emergence of class from abstract universality is exhibited in how any abstract universal converts into a class universal. The qualitative judgment "The rose is red" cannot help but set the stage for judgments about a class of red things. This is because once red inheres in an individual as an abstract universal, that individual is related to all other individuals who share in that abstract universal. This subsumes them all under the class of what is red, as well as other classes such as that of red plants, red flowers, and so forth. In this way, the abstract universal converts itself into a class universal. Once a universal inheres in an individual, it, as universal, inheres just as much in something else, connecting these individuals to one another, as members of

an emergent collectivity. In that way the immediate individual ends up belonging to classes, a multiplicity of classes.

By the same token, one can follow out how the final judgment of class membership leads to necessary judgments involving genus and species. This final quantitative judgment is that of allness, whereby all individuals fall under a certain class. When all individuals belong to a class, they are no longer related to the class in virtue of their relation to others. They belong to the class just by being an individual. That means that the universal under which they had been subsumed has a direct connection to their individuality. Then, there is something very necessary about their connection to this universal. Consequently, what has emerged is a judgment of necessity involving a very different kind of universal, a universal that is inherently related to what falls under it, unlike the universal of class, which need not have the particular members it subsumes. For example, some individuals will cease to be students at the University of Georgia, whereas gold will always be a metal. This new kind of universality cannot be escaped, because it directly lays hold of the individual.

Of course, the individual in question is a certain kind of individual. It does not just have marks it shares with others, nor does it just belong to classes, exhibiting corrigible family resemblances. Rather, this individual has a necessary nature.

This can be seen in examining the example that Hegel employs to illustrate the categorical judgment, the first form of judgments of necessity. His example of gold that is metal is not just determinate like a rose that is red is determinate. In determining a rose to be red (granted that not all roses are red, which would make red part of a rose's nature), one is doing something different from judging a rose to be a flower. Gold that is a metal, like rose that is a flower, is a species of a genus. As a genus, metal necessarily lays hold of the nature of its species, among which is gold. There is a necessary relationship between the genus and the species because the genus is the kind of universal that necessarily contains the differentia distinguishing the particulars that follow under it.

The relation of genus and species came up early on when Hegel first developed particularity or the particular concept in his initial exposition of the concept of the concept. When universality as such differentiates itself, the resulting particularity ends up having a necessary differentiation of its own. To begin with, this differentiation consists in the universal and the particular, which comprise the initial particularizations of universal. With the emergence of individuality, the universal has a threefold particularization, namely the universal concept, the particular concept, and the individual concept. What makes these particularizations forerunners of the genus-species relation is that they are mandated necessarily by the concept, which affirms its unity in these three species of itself.

The genus is the type of universal that has a necessary differentiation, consisting in its species. The limitation of genus and species is that the necessary differentiation stops here, at the level of the species. The individuals that make up the lowest subspecies are not differentiated by the latter's unity and instead fall under it like members of a class. We see this with the example of gold, which is a species of metal. Gold may necessarily be metal, but there is no necessity that gold take the shape of a ring, as opposed to a bracelet, an ingot, or any other realization. There is nothing about the genus of metal that requires that there be rings of gold or of any other metal.

Nonetheless, genus and species do involve a kind of universality that has a necessary particularization and that allows for necessary judgments, as well as necessary inferences or syllogism. These can be derived from the species being of things, insofar as this species being is a nature with necessary connection to the genus. Although necessary judgments of subspecies are also possible, when it comes to getting down to individuality, as it falls under the lowest species, there judgments of necessity cannot penetrate.

As a result, if reason were restricted to genus and species, as occurs with the ancient philosophers, thinking would be powerless to deal with individuality. The universality of genus does have much greater necessity than either the universality of class membership or the universality of abstract universality, which most modern and contemporary philosophers privilege. Conflating reason with the thinking of genus and species still leaves individuality outside conceptual grasp, opening the door to the belittling of reason by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, who both regard the individuality of actuality to be opaque to thought.

Hegel demonstrates, however, that judgment is not limited to qualitative judgments, quantitative judgments, and judgments of necessity. There are judgments of another sort, involving a kind of universality different from abstract universality, class, and genus. These are judgments of the concept, including in succession assertoric judgment, problematic judgment, and apodictic judgment.

What provides the transition to judgments of the concept is the result of the third form of the judgment of necessity, disjunctive judgment. It is important to remember that in all of these judgments we are not just dealing with p's and q's, or just with individuals, particulars, and universals in general. We are dealing with specific *types* of universality, and here in disjunctive judgment we are dealing specifically with genus and species. In disjunctive judgment we have the genus on one side of the judgment connected by the "is" to its species. For example, we have "metal is gold or brass or copper or lead, and so on."

What does disjunctive judgment do that brings closure to judgments of necessity and moves us to the final type of judgment, the judgment of the concept? One must keep in mind that judgments do do something. The terms

on either side of the “is” do not retain a simply given and fixed character, to which the “is” does nothing. No, something happens in and through judgment. There is a movement of determination here, and it has a transformative result.

The disjunctive judgment equates the genus on one side and its species on the other, but the genus does not exhibit any process whereby the latter emerge as its differentiation. There is just the genus, then the copula “is,” and finally its speciation. By affirming this speciation as one with the genus, the disjunctive judgment determines a universality that is put in identity with its necessary particularization. Hegel maintains that this sets the stage for judgments of the concept because the predicate in judgments of the concept is the correspondence of particularization and universality that disjunctive judgment posits (p. 657). In judgments of the concept, the individual will be determined as that correspondence or identification of particularization and universality. This is what Hegel has in mind by judgments of the concept, and they warrant labeling as normative judgments since these all attest to an individual’s conformity with a universal standard. Accordingly, the examples Hegel gives for judgments of the concept are not “The rose is red” or “Gold is a metal,” but “A theory is true” or “An agent is good” or “An artwork is beautiful” (pp. 657–58).

Truth, right, and beauty all involve correspondence with a universal norm that an individual ought to have by possessing a specific constitution or particularity. To say something is good amounts to judging that its constitution accords with the practical universal. The universality in a judgment of the concept must itself be concrete enough to require that particular content for its fulfillment. Hegel will thus describe the universality in judgments of the concept as being a concrete universal.

Significantly, no individual factor is determined in accord with the concrete universal simply by having a property inhere in it. No factor is going to exhibit the concrete universal simply by being a member of a class or simply having a species being. In judgments of the concept, we are dealing with an even more determinate universality, for the universal norm is going to be determining the individual as well as the particular. By being judged to be normative, the individual is going to be determined in its unity with this conformity of particularization and universality.

To begin with, however, the judgment of the concept takes up the given individual and ascribes to it the unity of normativity. This is the assertoric judgment, and as Hegel points out, what the assertoric judgment asserts is a normative character that cannot reside in the individual just being an individual. An individual may be good or bad, because conformity with a norm depends upon the particular constitution of the individual.

For just that reason, the assertoric judgment ends up being problematic, giving rise to the problematic judgment: The given individual may or may

not exhibit the correspondence of a particularization that fits this kind of universal. The concrete universal that is asserted has a very specific fulfillment, which depends upon the constitution of the individual. The problematic judgment thus indicates that the individual is normative, e.g. good, right, or beautiful, if it has the right kind of constitution. Affirming this with regard to an individual is precisely what apodictic judgment does. Apodictic judgment judges that the individual with the right constitution is normative. As Hegel points out, apodictic judgment has an objective character because the particular constitution on which normativity rests is provided for in the judgment (p. 662).

What often confuses matters is that apodictic and categorical judgments are both spoken of as involving necessity. What is the difference between categorical and apodictic necessity? The difference has something to do with the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity.

Hegel, of course, calls the section of the *Science of Logic* addressing concept, judgment, and syllogism the “Subjective Logic.” Something subjective runs through these determinations. In what sense, however, are we dealing with a subjective element in the accounts of the concept, judgment, and syllogism? Generally speaking, the concept is identified with self-determination and subjectivity, as well as with universality. Subjectivity would thus seem to be indissolubly linked to conceptual determination in the most positive manner. Hegel, however, also speaks about concept, judgment, and syllogism as all involving a certain kind of deficit that renders them subjective in a less affirmative way. In fact, Hegel suggests that objectivity will emerge only when that deficit removes itself and the subjectivity pervading the subjective logic overcomes its own “merely” subjective character.

Objectivity, however, is not the end of the story because objectivity, even though it has something that subjectivity lacks, cannot be what it is apart from involving what subjectivity has to offer. That leaves objectivity not yet at the point of what Hegel will call the Idea or truth, which will unite subjectivity and objectivity and bring the whole development of logic to an end.

At various junctures in the exposition of the various forms of judgment, Hegel will remark that there is something “merely” subjective about them that diminishes as we go along. This “mere” subjectivity has to do with the extent to which terms can be substituted or, in other words, with a lack of intrinsic connection. Judgment retains something merely subjective in that its connection does not account for everything in the terms it relates, leaving them and their relation less than completely objective.

When we come to the last stage of judgment, apodictic judgment, something occurs that brings judgment to the point of overcoming itself and developing into syllogism. This will not remove what is merely subjective, but it will bring conceptual determination further along toward objectivity.

In characterizing apodictic judgment, Hegel gives as examples “The house constituted so and so is *good*, the action constituted so and so is *right*” (p. 661). As he explains, the subject of the apodictic judgment “has within it, first, the universal, what it *ought to be*, and secondly, its *constitution*; this latter contains the *ground* why a predicate of the Notion judgment applies or does not apply to the *whole subject*” (pp. 661–62). Although all judgment operates with the presumption that the subject has what is asserted in the predicate, here the immediate connection of the copula is buttressed by the mediation of a particular constitution that can secure it. For this reason, Hegel maintains that “this judgment, then, is *truly* objective; or it is the *truth of the judgment* in general.” What makes it the truth of judgment in general is that, as he explains, “subject and predicate correspond to each other and have the same content” (p. 662). How can both have the same content, a content Hegel describes as “itself the posited *concrete universality*” (p. 662)? They can because now, for the first time, the predicate is such that it can cover everything that is in the subject, and the subject is such that it possesses everything that is predicated of it. This judgment

contains, namely, the two moments, the objective universal or the *genus*, and the *individualized* universal. Here, therefore, we have the universal which is *itself* and continues itself through *its opposite* and is a universal only as *unity* with this opposite. A universal of this kind, such as the predicate *good*, *suitable*, *correct*, etc., is based on an *ought-to-be* and at the same time contains the *correspondence of existence* to that *ought-to-be*; it is not this *ought-to-be* or the *genus* by itself, but this *correspondence* that is the *universality* which constitutes the predicate of the apodictic judgment. (p. 662)

It is important to see how the predicate is distinguished in the apodictic judgment. The predicate is not just one term of the universal or the concept. The predicate here contains the connection or the unity between the universal and its particularization or between the universal norm and the constitution that corresponds to it. In a sense, this predicate contains what judgment heretofore has contained, because judgment has been a posited unity of two terms. Now the predicate itself is just that unity.

In effect, the predicate has become like a judgment, and the same thing is true of the subject. As Hegel points out, “The *subject* likewise contains these two moments in *immediate* unity as the *fact*.” The original German word translated as “fact” is *Sache*. It is hard to come up with a very good translation for what the *Sache* is, but here it consists in an individual that is conceptually determined, through and through. This fact or factor is subject to an apodictic judgment because it contains a particularization that is determined by that concrete universal.

As a result, as Hegel writes, “we now have before us the *determinate* and *fulfilled* copula, which formerly consisted in the abstract ‘*is*,’ but has now

further developed itself into *ground* in general” (p. 662). This has happened because in the apodictic judgment the subject is an individual that has the particular constitution that the universal ought to have as its concrete particularization. Both sides of the judgment that straddle the “is” are themselves like judgments, one of which has the individual and its particular (the individual with its normative constitution) and the other of which has the particular and the universal (the concrete universal which contains its particularization). Both are necessarily connected to one another through the particular constitution that binds the individual to the universal. The individual and the universal are no longer connected just by an “is.” There is a mediating term, comprising a third term of the concept, particularity.

Since the erstwhile judgment no longer immediately connects subject and predicate, but instead joins them by means of the particular, a new relationship has emerged in which the individual is determined by the universal through the particular. This is syllogism, where the abstract “is” of the copula has become “fulfilled” insofar as subject and predicate have each become tantamount to judgments connected to one another by the particularity they share. Now the subject and predicate both have the relation of judgment inside them because they are each the correspondence which the copula effects. For this reason, they no longer need the copula to join them. They are already joined in virtue of their content, which is why a certain element of what could be considered subjectivity is removed. So long as the connection of individual and universal was made by something extraneous to them, namely by the “is” of the copula, there remained an aspect of their content that was not grounded in them themselves. Something else had to provide for their relation, and that is what judgment does. Apodictic judgment, however, has removed the need for that. It has thereby removed the need for judgment itself, which rests on the separation of its terms and the fact that they have to be brought together in an external way.

So Hegel offers his condolences, remarking, “Thus the form of the judgment has perished; first because subject and predicate are *in themselves* the same content; secondly because the subject through its determinateness points beyond itself and relates itself to the predicate” (p. 663). Judgment depended upon the difference between subject and predicate, which is why equating them with one another required a separate move, provided by the copula “is.” Now, however, the terms do the relating themselves. The subject does not need the copula to be connected to its predicate. The same thing is true of the predicate, for “thirdly, *this relating* has passed over into the predicate, [that] alone constitutes its content” (p. 663). Its content is the relating “and is thus the *posited* relation, or the judgment itself” (p. 663). The content of each term has become the relating. It is what the judgment posits.

Judgment has thereby transformed itself into what constitutes syllogism. Syllogism can be thought of in two ways that really converge. One can think

of it as a series of judgments, linked together as a major premise, a minor premise, and a resulting conclusion. This presents three successive judgments. Once more, these are to be construed not with p's and q's, but with types of universals, particulars, and individuals. The major premise is then, "The universal is the particular," the minor premise is "The particular is the individual," and the conclusion is "The individual is the universal."

Another way of thinking about syllogism is that it comprises the determination of the individual by the universal by means of the particular. That determination is what results from apodictic judgment, which ended up relating the individual and the universal through a particularity.

Moving now into syllogism, the first thing we have to confront is why we arrive at the syllogism Hegel presents us with. Not surprisingly, this first form of syllogism is characterized as the syllogism of determinate being, in which the universal, particular, and individual are of the same kind as those we encountered in the judgment of determinate being (p. 666).

One might think it strange that syllogism should begin with the abstract universal. The whole move to syllogism occurred by moving beyond the abstract universal, as well as beyond class and genus, to concrete universality. Concrete universality contains its particularization and applies to an individuality that contains the particularization that binds it to the universal. Why should syllogism now take us back to abstract universals and immediate particulars and individuals? Why should the most concrete, objective judgment revert to a formal thinking, this time in the form of a formal reasoning or syllogizing rather than in the form of formal judging? Why do we not instead begin with a syllogism involving a concrete universal?

This question becomes all the more disturbing in light of how Hegel differentiates the forms of syllogism. If you look at how syllogism is developed, there is a striking difference with how judgment has been developed. Although there is an obvious parallel between the forms of syllogism that Hegel presents and the first three forms of judgment, this parallel disappears when we turn to the last form of judgment, the judgment of the concept, and look for any counterpart among the forms of syllogism. The first form of syllogism, that of determinate being, closely parallels the judgments of determinate being. The second form of syllogism, which comprises a syllogism of reflection, obviously parallels the judgments of reflection, and the third form of syllogism, which comprises a syllogism of necessity, equally parallels the judgments of necessity. What is missing, however, is any fourth form of syllogism that would parallel the judgments of the concept. Instead, the development of syllogism achieves closure with its third form, the syllogism of necessity. That form brings syllogizing to an end, removes the last remnant of "mere" subjectivity, and develops into objectivity.

We need to ask not just why syllogism does not begin with the concrete universal, but why there are no syllogisms of concept.

The starting point in the development of syllogism presents a form of syllogism that is most familiar, beginning as it does with an immediate individual connected to an abstract universal by way of an immediate particularity. Here, the inference involves a series of qualitative judgments. Hegel gives as an example: A rose is red, red is a color, rose is a colored thing. As Hegel points out, the linkages in this syllogism of determinate being allow for a range of substitution at each stage.⁴ One can conclude about the rose, in virtue of its being red, not just that it is colored, but anything else that might be associated with the mark of being red. This is because red is itself connected to other universals that are equally abstract and thereby connected to indefinitely many other terms. As red, the rose might symbolize revolution, or it might just be something that angers a bull. Just as there are all sorts of other things that can be concluded about the rose because it is red, there are equally all sorts of things that can be concluded about the rose because it is just a colored thing. This indefinite range of possibilities renders the particular connections of the syllogism of determinate being subjective in the sense that it is arbitrary that this specific line of inference be followed. There is no objective necessity that these connections have to hold sway in place of others.

Why should we be faced with this subjective license, this most substitutable, formal reasoning, when we have just come out of the apodictic judgment, which is the most objective judgment of all? The answer lies in remembering that in apodictic judgment, the subject and the predicate are like judgments themselves. In a sense, they contain two terms. They contain the individual and the particular on the one hand and the particular and the universal on the other. Does, however, either subject or predicate contain any mediation between those two parts? No, the two pairs of concept determinations, individual and particular and particular and universal, are just immediately given together. They are immediately united, just like the immediate individual, the immediate universal, and the immediate particular. This is why the syllogism that arises from apodictic judgment is a syllogism of determinate being or a qualitative syllogism.

Hegel begins by showing how this syllogism transforms itself, focusing on the immediate individual, which has a plurality of features, which themselves can fall under multiple universals which contain all sorts of other things. The individual is connected to the particular, the particular is connected to the universal, and by means of the particular, the universal and individual are connected, all of which can be schematized as *I-P-U* (p. 673). With this result, it turns out that the individual and particular are equally connected to one another by means of the universal. Since the individual has been determined to be the universal and the particular is the universal, the resulting connection of the particular and the individual through the universal

engenders a different kind of syllogism that can be schematized as *I-U-P* (p. 673).

Now, however, with the particular and individual connected and the individual connected to the universal, the particular and universal have become joined by means of the individual, producing yet another kind of syllogism that can be schematized as *P-I-U* (p. 674). So the syllogism of determinate being entails three series of syllogisms, each allowing an indefinite range of substitution for the individual. It does not have to be a rose, since there are other things that are red. Likewise, the connection to color can be concluded from other colors besides red. In any event, what figure as the major and minor premises turn out to be conclusions of the other forms of syllogism that result. As a consequence, all the terms of these three syllogisms end up being mediated by one another.

This leads to the syllogism of reflection, whose terms are mediated by one another in the same way as are the terms of the judgment of reflection. The syllogism of reflection will give rise to the syllogism of necessity, but the latter will not produce any syllogism of the concept, but develop into objectivity.

It remains to be seen why this is so. It is worth noting, by way of anticipation, however, that objectivity will still be characterized in terms of universality, individuality, and particularity, even though it removes the deficit that left concept, judgment, and syllogism merely subjective. This will prove to be of great significance, because objectivity will turn out to be specifiable in terms of the concept. As conceptually determinable, objectivity will not be alien to reason, granted that reason can be associated with the concept.

The overcoming of subjectivity will have to do with the fact that the terms that are mediated are no longer external to their mediation. Instead, they will be solely self-mediated. They will not depend on anything outside themselves in the way that, in judgment, the terms are connected by the "is." This development will take us to the threshold of something that can be called objectivity, something that is going to be determined in and of itself and be completely independent. Objectivity is what it is without owing its mediation to anything else.

Although judgment may be merely subjective in light of the external connectedness of the "is," judgment still has an aspect that is objective. Namely, by connecting subject and predicate through the copula, judgment also determines its connection to be an independent connection insofar as it is supposed to be intrinsic to the terms involved. In syllogism, where the "is" has been removed, the connection of individual and universal now involves particularity, the other element of the concept. There is still a difference between the terms that are mediated and what mediates them. This remaining difference between the extremes and the middle term of the syllogism is what the whole form of syllogism depends upon. So as long as the extremes are

connected by means of the middle term and that middle is distinct from them, there is a discrepancy. The identification that is being concluded by the syllogism still depends upon something different from itself—namely, the middle term.

The development of the forms of syllogism is going to progressively remove that discrepancy. The emergence of objectivity is going to revolve around the middle term somehow becoming indistinguishable from the extremes. That will eliminate the remaining residue of so-called subjectivity.

Chapter Twenty-Three

Syllogism

It is hard to get away from jargon, especially if you do not know what it means. You know what it means if you can dispense with it. That independence from particular words is what separates philosophy from poetry. There is and can be no expression to which philosophical thinking is restricted. Philosophical argument can always be reformulated in other terms within the same language or in a different language. Any attempt to condition reason by language or any particular linguistic convention falls prey to the epistemological foundationalism for which the *Science of Logic* is the primary antidote.

With this in mind, let us survey briefly what happens in the development of syllogism and then focus on the transition to objectivity that results from disjunctive syllogism. In this connection, it is important to answer the question of why there is not a fourth form of syllogism, namely a syllogism of the concept. Why is it that whereas judgment develops into four forms, each involving a different kind of universality with associated types of particularity and of individuality, syllogism develops into only three forms: syllogisms of determinate being or quality, syllogisms of reflection or class membership, and syllogisms of necessity involving genus and species?

On the face of it, if there is no place for any further form of syllogism, it is because syllogisms of necessity, which culminate in the disjunctive syllogism, come to eliminate the relationship constitutive of syllogism, namely, the distinction between the extremes and their middle term. This resolution needs to be examined.

The development of syllogism has begun with the syllogism of quality or of determinate being, in which an immediate individual is connected to an abstract universal by means of an abstract particular. Hegel pointed out that this relationship of the factors of the concept has something about it that

could be considered subjective. This subjective element is exhibited in how the syllogism of quality allows for the substitution of different individuals, particulars, and universals. To illustrate how such substitution is connected to the abstract universality that figures within syllogisms of quality, Hegel offers us the example of a rose that is red, red that is a color, and a rose that is therefore concluded to be colored. Hegel points out that this kind of concluding, where the immediate individual and the abstract universal are connected by means of the particular, readily allows for other options.¹

Two aspects allow for different universals being associated with a particular individual in this kind of syllogism, permitting the same form of inference to arrive at multiple conclusions. First of all, the syllogism of quality involves an immediate individual, the kind of individual in which abstract universals inhere. Multiple conclusions can follow precisely because the presence of an abstract universal in such an individual tells us nothing else about it other than that besides that mark of this abstract universal, the individual contains other determinacies. The immediate individual is a given manifold, whose multiple contents have no necessary connection to one another. This means that the immediate individual is related to different particulars. The rose is not just red. The rose has a certain weight, has a certain location, and can have other colors in other parts of it. It also has a certain aroma, taste, texture, and so on. All sorts of multiple features can be found.

Just as these multiple features have no necessary connection to one another, they themselves can fall under multiple universals. Red is not just a color but the symbol of the Georgia Bulldogs, communist revolution, Coca-Cola, and so forth. Consequently, multiple connections can be made through each particular feature of the immediate individual. Which connection is made by the syllogism of quality is therefore not objectively necessitated, but merely one option that just happens to be inferred. What is objective or intrinsic to the syllogism of quality is that whatever figures within it is a determinate content that will have indeterminately many kinds of connections, allowing indefinitely other conclusions to be drawn.

Insofar as the terms in the syllogism could just as well have other connections, the connection made is not wholly intrinsic to them. It depends upon something apart from what they are. What they are does not dictate that just these terms have to fit together in this relationship, because there are other options.

Moreover, as we have seen, the syllogism of quality allows for each of its terms, the individual, the particular, and the universal, to occupy successively each position in the inference. When the individual and universal get connected by the particular through major and minor premises connecting the individual and the particular and the particular and the universal (*I-P-U*), the universal serves to connect the individual and the particular (*I-U-P*), which then enables the individual to connect the particular and universal (*P-I-U*). In

each case, the successive forms conclude a relationship that served as a premise in the other forms. With all the factors ending up occupying all the different positions in the syllogism, they all end up being mediated by one another. As a result, the middle term is not an immediate given, but grounded upon the mediation provided by its counterparts.

This leads to another kind of syllogism, the syllogism of reflection, in which the universal no longer operates as an abstract mark, but as a class, where the individual, particular, and universal all operate on the basis of class membership. The syllogism of allness exhibits what has changed. Here the major premise would be, for example, "All metals conduct electricity." You have here the class of metals related to a specific feature, conducting electricity. The minor premise states, for example, that gold is a metal. From this one can conclude that gold conducts electricity. Hegel points out that this syllogism suffers from a deficiency involving a certain kind of circularity (p. 688).² Namely, the major premise with which one began, that all metals conduct electricity, really presupposes the conclusion. The problem revolves around the character of class unity, where the universality of class membership leaves undetermined what distinguishes its members. If class were a genus, which necessarily determines the differentia of its species, the differentia of conducting electricity would be necessarily entailed by class membership. Then, the fact that a metal, such as gold, actually conducts electricity would not be needed in order to establish that connection. The connection would be built into the way in which the genus necessarily mandates the differentia of its particularization. Class membership, however, does not differentiate the particular groupings that fall within it, nor does it specify how they are distinguished from one another. That all metals conduct electricity is thus not something given by the being of the metal, if metal is just a class. Rather, that metals conduct electricity is something contingent that just happens to be found in the particular existence of the members of the class, captured by finding what they are and what properties they share in common. Accordingly, in the familiar emblem of the syllogism of allness, "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, ergo Socrates is mortal," the major premise ("All men are mortal") is something that really is based upon the individual it supposedly determines.

The syllogism of allness therefore ends up turning into a syllogism of induction. The syllogism of induction begins with the listing of the individuals that have some feature in common. On that basis, it can be inferred that something identified as a member of that class of individuals has that feature. As Hegel points out, there is still something about this syllogism that is subjective (pp. 690–91). Just as there is something not fully objective about the syllogism of allness, which concludes a connection not really inherent in class membership, so the syllogism of induction depends upon something that makes its conclusion contingent. Namely, induction rest upon a particu-

lar given sample of examples to draw a conclusion that has the form of universality. Consequently, as Hegel goes on to show, the syllogism of induction really amounts to a syllogism of analogy, where what holds in some particular case is presumed to hold of something similar (pp. 691–92).

Hegel exposes the pitfalls of the syllogism of analogy with the following example (p. 692): The earth is a heavenly body, and the earth is inhabited. Well, the moon is a heavenly body. By analogy, we conclude that the moon is inhabited. This patently nonobjective result reflects the problem of induction. Induction makes a claim that applies universally to the members of some group of which the given array of observed individuals is presumed to be representative. They, however, are not necessarily representative, because group membership does not carry with it any necessary particular features. It is just a brute fact that those members we have encountered so far happen to share something in common, but there is no guarantee that other members of the class will have that feature. Thus, when we conclude something on the basis of induction, what we really are doing is concluding something on the basis of analogy. We are saying that all other cases are going to be like these. What applies to earth, however, namely that it is currently inhabited, need not apply to other heavenly bodies, since being a heavenly body here comprises a class membership without further necessary specifications.

Nonetheless, the judgment of analogy treats individual members as if there is a necessary connection between belonging to this class and having certain differentia. In so doing, the syllogism of analogy is really requiring the terms in question to have something they do not necessarily possess so long as they remain factors that fall under a class, as opposed to a genus. What the syllogism of analogy therefore demands is that they really be species of a genus, because species of a genus do have differentia that are necessitated by their belonging to the genus. That necessity is still lacking with analogy, which is why it lacks objectivity.

More objectivity is found in the connection that the syllogism of analogy effectively makes a prerequisite for successfully concluding: a connection necessitated by the nature of the terms. In that case, as Hegel observes, there is less room for substitution (p. 695). The syllogism that thereby issues from what is implicit in the syllogism of analogy is the syllogism of necessity, whose initial form is the categorical syllogism, which incorporates categorical judgments.

In categorical syllogism, what is concluded is necessarily related to the species being of an individual. First, a particular differentia is identified as inherent in a genus. Then an individual is identified as a member of that genus, allowing for the necessary conclusion that this individual has that differentia. Although this conclusion has a greater degree of objectivity, there is still something lacking that reflects the abiding subjectivity of syllogism in general and signals that the relationship is not fully self-determined.

Even in categorical syllogism, where the terms have a certain intrinsic connection, they are still connected in the conclusion by means of something distinct from them, namely the middle term. As in every syllogism, the unity of the extremes is mediated by the middle term. Admittedly, in categorical syllogism this mediation is such that there is little room for the substitution that figured in the syllogisms employing abstract universals or class membership. Nonetheless, the distinction of the middle term from the extremes signifies that the conclusion is not fully self-determined but rests upon an external factor. In a certain respect, just the very fact that what mediates the conclusion is a middle term makes that mediation external. The middle term unites the extremes, but it is something different from them. The connection of the extremes is thus achieved not by themselves but by something else, and that something else (the middle term) determines or mediates something different from itself.

This external determination happens in varying degrees in each form of syllogisms. The development of these forms progressively removes the discrepancy between the three terms. They become more and more like one another, until disjunctive syllogism renders them completely identical. At that point, the extremes are no longer being determined in terms of one another by means of something else, a third term.

Judgment also involved two terms that were being connected by something different from themselves, namely the copula "is." That copula is not a specification of the concept, but merely a matter of being, of sheer immediacy. This indicates that there is a lack of a fully autonomous determination of the factors involved. Note how these things go together. So long as there is a deficit in the self-determined character of the determination—that is, so long as what gets determined is mediated by something different from itself or distinguishable from itself—there is something merely subjective about the connections being made, that somehow they depend upon something extraneous or external to the factors involved. The factors do not connect themselves up. If they fully connect themselves up, if they fully unite themselves, they do so in a fully self-determined way. Then their connection has a kind of objective necessity, because what they are necessarily binds them together. Objectivity is lacking as long as their connection depends on something else, nothing more than the immediate assertion of the connection, as in judgment, or a different concept determination, as in syllogism. As long as there is a distinction between the terms and what determines them, their determination is not fully self-determined, nor fully objective.

On the one hand, the Logic of the Concept is a domain of self-determined determinacy. It has arisen through the self-elimination of the two-tiered framework of the Logic of Essence, which resulted in what does the determining and what gets determined becoming the same. On the other hand, even though this equalization has occurred, there is still a dimension of

externality at hand. At the outset, the externality was present in how the identity of determiner and determined has not been determined by itself, but has been determined by the collapse of the difference between cause and effect in reciprocity. That collapse is what results in the immediate givenness of self-determined determination or the universal concept. From that point, the concept proceeded to determine itself in the way in which the universal differentiated itself, engendering particularity, in unity with which it gave rise to individuality. Because individuality has its own self-subsistent character and each of the factors of the concept had individuality, they acquired a degree of independence, even though they were all held together through the unity of the universal. In being all connected to a universal, they gave rise to judgment. In judgment, determinations of the concept were determined by one another, but the distinction between the terms and the immediacy of their connection reflected an externality, or subjectivity, in their determination. Syllogism replaced the immediacy of the copula with another term of the concept, enabling the mediation of concept terms to be more a matter of the concept itself. Still, the difference between the middle term and the extremes exhibited a residual subjectivity that now stands ready to be overcome.

This subjectivity should not be identified with knowing. The concept may be connected to self-determination and subjectivity, but self-determination and knowing are not one and the same any more than subjectivity and knowing are interchangeable. So far, we have not come to the logical specification of knowing. The *Science of Logic* will arrive at that development of knowing, but that does not occur in the subjective logic. We do not encounter the category of knowing in the determination of concept, judgment, or syllogism. We also do not come upon knowing proper in the development of objectivity, which will divide itself into determinations of mechanism, chemism, and teleology. Rather, we are going to find knowing taken up within the account of the Idea. There knowing will come into play as a relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, or concept and objectivity. Knowing is going to require those factors, which is why it cannot yet figure in the subjective logic of concept, judgment, and syllogism.

Self-determination is thus not self-knowledge, even if knowing may involve self-determination as it figures in both subjectivity and objectivity. The subjective logic does address self-determined determinacy, based upon an emergent unity of determiner and determined. Hegel here attempts to explore what that is and what it involves. One thing it does not immediately involve is knowing. Nonetheless, Hegel also points out, by way of anticipation, that all of logic's previous determinations can be regarded as determinate concepts. Given the connection of the concept to self-determination, their determination seems to involve self-determination. That could appear bizarre, since self-determination only emerges with the concept. On the other hand, it could appear inevitable. Early on Hegel pointed out that what the science is

only becomes manifest at the end, for only at the end do we know what the presuppositionless beginning is the beginning of (p. 72). Only at the end do we know what the determinations are determinations of, and they become determinations of something to the extent that they become moments or components of something that incorporates them in its own self-development. This helps us to see that self-determination cannot be at hand at the outset. It has to go through stages where it is not yet self-determined, because it cannot be what it determines itself to be at the beginning of the process of determination. Since it is going to be what it determines itself to be only at the outcome of its process of determination, along the way will be specifications that are not yet self-determined, even if they are way stations or components of that which is determining itself to be self-determined. This has important implications for when we need to impute knowing to any of this.

Logic, as a science, involves a certain kind of knowing, namely, philosophy. Since what the science is can only emerge at its conclusion, the self-thinking cognition of logic will only become thematic at the end. To arrive at determinations that involve knowing could be said to require the emergence of other factors, chief among them truth. It may come as no surprise that Hegel introduces the Idea in connection to truth because the Idea is going to involve a unity of subjectivity and objectivity, or, one could say, of concept and objectivity. Earlier Hegel distinguished correctness from truth and spoke of how truth involves the correspondence of concept and objectivity, whereas correctness involves the fit of representation and appearance. Because correctness consists in the match between subjective representation and phenomena, it cannot qualify as truth. Truth will instead require a correspondence between conceptual determination and objectivity. Unless we get at objectivity rather than appearance, we are in no position to get at truth. This will prove to have to do with the way in which objectivity is going to involve something that is fully self-determined, fully determined in and through itself, and not determined to be what it is relative to external factors of any sort.

This distinguishes objectivity from determinate being, which is in virtue of what it is not; from appearance, which is determined by something essential; and from existence, in which what exists is determined by other things and determines other things in turn. If objectivity were determined like determinate being, objectivity would be in virtue of what is not objective. Could something determined by what is not objective be a candidate for truth? Similarly, if objectivity were determined like existence, or like appearance, or like anything else falling under the domain of essence, objectivity would be determined by a ground that is not objectivity and therefore not objective. So what kind of objectivity would this positedness be? If we really want to get at what is objective, what is not relative, not externally determined, but what is genuinely what it is in virtue of itself, we then must grasp what has a

fully self-determined unity of its own. It may then be no accident that in order to get at how things are in and through themselves, we need to use a conceptualization with the same kind of autonomy.

The last syllogism, the disjunctive syllogism, finally ushers in objectivity. The disjunctive syllogism itself issues from the hypothetical syllogism. The hypothetical syllogism, like hypothetical judgment, is tied to the type of universality of genus and species. The hypothetical judgment revolves around how in genus and species, the individual that exhibits their intrinsic connection itself contains an aspect of externality, reflected in how the individuals of the species are not differentiated by its unity. The genus necessarily involves certain differentiations in its species, but the actual existence of individuals belonging to those species remains contingent.

In the hypothetical syllogism, the actual existence of the individual is conditional, but if it exists, the differentia it exhibits derive necessarily from its genus. That is, *if* there is an individual of a certain species, it will possess the differentia mandated by the genus.

When we come to the disjunctive syllogism, we are dealing with a syllogism that is going to put the syllogism to rest. It is going to undermine syllogism, even while being a form of syllogism. Since disjunctive syllogism is still a syllogism, it has to have extremes that are connected through a middle term, and these three factors have to be distinguished. They have to be determinately different in some respect in order for their relationship to be a syllogism. That difference is present, so long as you can distinguish the extremes and the middle term.

Disjunctive syllogism contains this difference insofar as its component parts have at least the semblance of separation. Hegel gives two alternate descriptions of the disjunctive syllogism, but it really does not matter which is employed. According to one version, you have “*A* is *B* or *C* or *D*,” exhibiting the genus’s necessary differentiation of its species. Then you have a middle term, presenting an exclusive identification, where “*A* is not *C* or *D*.” On this basis, you conclude, “*A* is *B*” (pp. 701–2).

As a result of the syllogism, *A* is identified as just being *B*. In a sense, *B* is the same thing as “*A* is not *C* or *D*.” Moreover, *B* is also what “*A* is *B* or *C* or *D*” turns out to be, because *B* is what *A* is established to be through the workings of the disjunctive syllogism. So what happens in the disjunctive syllogism is that all of the terms end up being identical. In fact, each of the terms presents a connection that is the same connection.

The disjunctive syllogism thereby obliterates the defining form of syllogism. The alternate extremes have ceased to be distinct from one another and from the middle term allegedly connecting them. Indeed, each term contains the connection of the whole syllogism, for what is concluded is already comprised by each extreme. Or, to put it otherwise, the extremes no longer

depend on something outside them for their determination. They each are the same totality, the same universal with its necessary differentiation.

This self-elimination of the form of syllogism could be said to comprise the deduction of objectivity, provided of course, that the externality of that form presents the last residue of “mere” subjectivity whose overcoming leaves us with objectivity.

Hegel recounts the moves that make up this deduction. Describing disjunctive syllogism, he writes,

But the middle term is the *universality* that is *pregnant with form*; it has determined itself as *totality*, as *developed* objective universality. Consequently the middle term is not only universality but also particularity and individuality. As universality it is first the substantial identity of the genus; but secondly an identity that *embraces within itself particularity*, but a particularity *co-extensive with this identity of the genus*; it is therefore the universal sphere that contains its total particularisation—the genus disjoined into its species: *A that is B and C and D.*” (p. 701)

As he points out, “*A* is subject not only in the two premises but also in the conclusion” (p. 702). In each part of the syllogism, “*A* is either *B* or *C* or *D*,” “*A* is neither *C* nor *D*,” and “*A* is *B*,” we are dealing with *A*. One could say that *A* is being concluded with itself. We really do not have different terms being mediated by a third. We have *A* being mediated by itself so as to determine itself.

“In the first premise it is a universal, and in its predicate, the *universal* sphere particularised into the totality of its species” (p. 702)—that is, *A* can either be *B* or *C* or *D*. “In the second premise it appears as *determinate* or as a species” (p. 702)—so you have *A* is not *C* or *D*. “In the conclusion it is posited as the exclusive, *individual* determinateness.” There you have “*A* is *B*.” But “it already appears in the minor premise as exclusive individuality” that says “*A* is neither *C* nor *D*.” In the conclusion, *A* is “positively posited” (p. 702) as what it is. *A* manages to mediate itself by being the universal sphere of its own particularization and its own determination as an individual.

By so positing “the unity of the mediating and the mediated . . . the disjunctive syllogism is equally *no longer a syllogism at all*.” Why is it no longer a syllogism? “For the middle term, which is posited in it as the totality of the Notion,” namely universality, particularity, and individuality, “contains itself the two extremes in their complete determinateness. The extremes, in distinction from this middle term, appear only as a positedness which no longer possesses any determinateness peculiar to itself as against the middle term” (p. 702).

As a result of what the disjunctive syllogism concludes, its three terms are established to have the same content, each involving the same totality of

universality, particularity, and individuality. As Hegel concludes this concluding of inference, “In this way then the *formalism of the syllogistic process*, and with it the subjectivity of the syllogism and of the Notion in general, has sublated itself” (pp. 702–3).

Here two things are being associated: the formalism of the syllogistic process and subjectivity. Throughout, Hegel has been inveighing against the most formal kind of syllogizing, the most formal kind of judgment, the formal understanding, the formal reasoning of formal syllogizing, and generally the formalism of formal logic, which makes use of those forms. What connects formalism with subjectivity is that formal thought does not entail any particular content. Whatever content enters in is there not because of the form but because of something else, something extraneous to the object at hand. Syllogism remains caught in formalism to the extent that its form, the connection of the extremes by a middle term, does not account for all aspects of its content and does not entail the content that gets manipulated in this manner when it enters into the process.

That externality, that heteronomy of formalism, is what Hegel associates with subjectivity. Syllogism necessarily entails subjectivity and formalism because it entails some externality between the form and the content, just as judgment does with its immediate connection by copula. As Hegel remarks, “This formal or subjective side consisted in the fact that the mediating factor of the extremes is the Notion as an *abstract* determination, and this latter is *distinct* from the extremes whose unity it is” (p. 703).

The mediating factor is an abstract determination even though it is a determination of the concept. Throughout, concept, judgment, and syllogism have involved universality, particularity, and individuality, which do have an inherent connection. Nevertheless, here they operate in a way in which there is something abstract about them, manifest in how what mediates the terms is different from them, in how the connection is different from what gets connected. That difference is constitutive of an abiding formalism.

“In the consummation of the syllogism, on the other hand, where objective universality is no less posited as totality of the form determinations,” Hegel writes, “the distinction of mediating and mediated has disappeared. That which is mediated is itself an essential moment of what mediates it, and each moment appears as the totality of what is mediated” (p. 703). We will need to examine these connections, because they are going to be emblematic of objectivity.

Chapter Twenty-Four

Objectivity

In considering what objectivity is, it is important to note the difference between two terms that are not always distinguished by translators but which Hegel makes a point of distinguishing very carefully. One is *Gegenständlichkeit*, to which *Gegenstand* is related. The other is *Objektivität*, to which *Objekt* is connected. Just as *Gegenständlichkeit* and *Objektivität* are indiscriminately translated as “objectivity,” so *Gegenstand* and *Objekt* are indiscriminately translated as “object.”

Gegenstand is specifically the object of which a conscious subject is aware. When something is in the form of *Gegenständlichkeit*, it is in the form of being represented by a subject. Hegel makes a point in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* of speaking about what is for consciousness as being a *Gegenstand*, an object confronting consciousness, which is in the form of *Gegenständlichkeit*, where it is represented by consciousness as something that is relative to the opposition of consciousness within which it figures.

Objektivität, on the other hand, has no reference to being an object of consciousness. It does, however, stand in contrast with *Subjektivität*, but subjectivity, or *Subjektivität*, should not be conflated with consciousness or with a knowing standpoint. Subjectivity may indeed be something that a knowing subject exemplifies. In Hegel’s preliminary remarks about the concept, he associates the concept with subjectivity and also speaks about consciousness as being something that exemplifies the concept (p. 583).¹ Nonetheless, in logical investigation, subjectivity, like objectivity, is presented as a determinacy that may have realizations in actual knowing selves, in animals, in body politics, and in all sorts of other things.

The relationship of *Objektivität*, or objectivity, to subjectivity is rooted first of all in how objectivity arises. Hegel characterizes the development from the concept to judgment and then to syllogism as involving subjectivity.

Subjectivity has transformed itself into objectivity through the culminating form of syllogism, which does something through its concluding, through its mediating of its extremes, that overcomes the whole framework of syllogism. That occurs in the disjunctive syllogism, and what results is something that Hegel sees fit to call objectivity.

In this sense, objectivity could be said to be produced by a self-annulling transformation of subjectivity. That self-annulling of subjectivity, however, also signifies that objectivity carries within itself contents that are specific to subjectivity. Objectivity is going to be built out of conceptual determinations that have ended up determining themselves with regard to one another in a certain way that engenders something deserving of the name "objectivity."

Even though objectivity is going to incorporate specifications of the concept—that is, specifications that involve universality, individuality, and particularity—it is going to have removed the merely subjective aspects that those terms have in the preceding developments with which the concept begins its logical career. Accordingly, objectivity emerges from the transformation of subjectivity, and it contains aspects of subjectivity. It contains the same elements that involve subjectivity, and it involves the same terms that are specific to conceptual determination.

Objectivity is also going to be distinguished from what Hegel will call the *Idee* or "Idea." We are going to see the whole domain of objectivity transforming itself into the Idea and thereby removing something that is merely objective. This emergence of the Idea is going to involve a unification of subjectivity and objectivity, which Hegel not surprisingly associates with the determination of truth. Interestingly enough, what falls under the heading of the Idea is, in the first instance, life, then knowing and willing, and finally the absolute Idea.

Under objectivity itself, we start off with mechanism, proceed to chemism, and then arrive at teleology. All of these topics are considered to be objective, and we need to consider what that signifies. First of all, it means that they are not going to be merely subjective. They are instead objective, and objective in a way in which nothing in the Logic of Being or the Logic of Essence can be objective. So here we are dealing with matters that are not just reality, which we encountered in the Logic of Being. Reality does not need the concept for its specification. Reality is just the being of quality, standing in contrast to negation, which is the nonbeing of quality. The being of quality does not of itself require the concept, for all reality involves is determinacy, not self-determined determinacy. Conversely, the concept, which is associated with self-determined determinacy, presupposes reality. This is because there must be determinacy before there can be determinacy that is determined by a determiner or determinacy that determines something else, or finally, a determiner that determines itself. Thus, the Logic of Essence presupposes the Logic of Being, just as the Logic of the Concept

presupposes the Logic of Essence. Before there can be self-determination, there must be determinacy that is determined. Accordingly, although essence and the concept may presuppose reality, reality itself does not require self-determined determinacy or universality or conceptuality for its being.

Objectivity further depends upon subjectivity developing itself and providing the elements of universality, particularity, and individuality, as well as judgment and syllogism. We must establish why mechanism, chemism, and teleology require the conceptual determinations of universality, particularity, and individuality, as well as have something to do with self-determination.

Hegel is going to distinguish objectivity from existence, actuality, substance, and causality, and it is important to understand why none of the forms of objectivity are reducible to any of those determinations. Somehow objectivity has something more that can only be or be conceivable with the conceptual resources that subjectivity provides. You do not need universality, particularity, and individuality to have substance, actuality, existence, a thing and its properties, or cause and effect, but you do need them here in objectivity. Why would that be?

Objectivity obviously has a special stature. It possesses a special independence, a nonrelativity. Objectivity stands on its own. It is self-subsistent, unlike appearance or phenomena. Objectivity is determined in its own right, in and through itself.

The term "objectivity" can be applied to all sorts of things, as Hegel points out (p. 709). We can speak about a work of art being objective insofar as it has an independence that makes it worthy of being regarded irrespective of what interests and desires one might have. The work of art is not of instrumental value. It is not just something making a political statement that could be made otherwise without reliance upon the work of art's individual configuration. Somehow the work of art has something unique to offer and is determined fully in its own right. You can see that there is an aspect in which this objectivity of the artwork has some connection with self-determination, as opposed to being determined by other things, being relative to other things. It also has a special kind of unity for which individuality is essential.

If universality, particularity, and individuality are tied up with self-determination and conceptual determination, then what has the stature of being determined in its own right, of being independent, of not being relative, will be something conceptually transparent. This is because the principle of conceptualizing, the concept, has the kind of self-determined determinacy that is shared by what can be independent, as opposed to what is posited by something else.

You may remember that Hegel spoke about the concept being something that will be able to get at what is determined in and for itself (p. 585). In objectivity we have something that is supposed to be determined in and for itself. That self-sufficient independence may be precisely what makes objec-

tivity the proper object of knowledge. After all, what do you really want to know? You want to have knowledge. You do not want to “know” phenomena. You do not want to “know” what is relative. You want to know what is in and through itself. You want to know what is objective. It may be that what is objective, precisely by having that independent character, will not be foreign to thought. Knowing objectivity will involve putting it in relationship to the concept, something that is not objective but subjective. Knowing will properly involve getting at a correspondence between concept and objectivity, because that will be when we are getting at what really is worth speaking about as truth, as opposed to the correctness that consists in correlating subjective representations (in the pejorative “merely subjective” sense) with phenomena, which are relative to something else.

Knowing, however, will not be “merely” subjective, however, for objectivity, through its own workings, is going to put itself in relation to subjectivity. That will occur through teleology, where a subjective element will separate itself out of objectivity and yet stand in relation to objectivity.

To understand objectivity as it is immediately determined, it is necessary to take into account how it has arisen out of subjectivity. The concept itself arises out of something that is not self-determined, that involves a determination of something by something else, but that process ends up removing the distinction between its factors, the determiner and what is determined. Cause and effect cannot maintain their difference. They revert to reciprocity. Eventually, one comes to an equation between what determines and what gets determined, resulting in self-determination. Self-determination, however, has thereby not arisen from its own self-determining. It has arisen from the collapse of the defining two-tiered structure of the Logic of Essence. Consequently, we have self-determination *immediately* at hand, as opposed to being mediated by its own process. Although the concept, or self-determined determinacy, is going to be what it determines itself to be, it has not yet done that. It cannot immediately do that. Its determination of itself by itself has to make use of relationships that are not fully self-determined.

We see this at each stage along the way leading to objectivity. We see it in judgment, where the factors of the concept are determined by one another. The individual is determined by the universal, but it is determined by the universal in virtue of something else that does not itself factor in the concept—the immediate connection of the copula “is.” It then turns out, through the working of judgment, that this immediate connection is overcome, such that the individual and universal get determined by one another by means of another conceptual determination, the particular.

In this emergence of syllogism, there is still a difference between what mediates the extremes and what gets mediated by that middle term. Thus, even though in syllogism the factors of the concept—universality, particularity, and individuality—are determined by one another, so that here the con-

cept is determining itself through its own elements, it is still doing so in a way in which there remains a distinction between what gets determined and what does the determining. There is still a distinction between the extremes and the middle term. The middle term mediates them, and what gets mediated is different from the middle term.

This signifies the persistence of something subjective, in the pejorative sense. Although this subjective element gets reduced more and more as you go along, there is still an aspect of what gets determined that is not fully determined by its mediation. The terms that are connected to one another are not exhaustively determined by the determining that is under way. To some degree, the connection is conditioned, because it could have been a different connection. There is something nonobjective about the relationship, because the relationship is not fully self-dependent. There is an externality, which could be a logician who happens to select this p (or I) and that q (or U) as opposed to some other or who happens to select a rose and red as opposed to some other entity or feature.

The possibility of doing this is built into the relationship because the terms that are being connected are different from their connection. They do not connect themselves. Their connection lies outside them. Their determination is thus not fully self-determined. Objectivity lacks that externality, which gets removed by what occurs in the final form of syllogism. This is also why there is no room for any further form of syllogism, for any syllogism of the concept, even though there are judgments of the concept.

As Hegel has shown, each of the terms of the disjunctive syllogism ends up having the exact same content (p. 703). When we affirm that A is either B or C or D or E , and then say that A is not C or D or E , and conclude that A is therefore B , A is established to be just that at every juncture of the inference. Each of these three parts of the syllogism is identical, so the extremes are not different from the middle term. Each part of the syllogism is itself the totality. It is the universal with its complete particularization, an individual mediated by itself. It has been determined to be what it is by itself because the middle term is the same as itself. As Hegel puts it, "In the consummation of the syllogism . . . where objective universality is no less posited as totality of the form determinations, the distinction of mediating and mediated has disappeared. That which is mediated is itself an essential moment of what mediates it, and each moment appears as the totality of what is mediated. . . . Thus the Notion as such has been realized; more exactly, it has obtained a reality that is *objectivity*" (p. 703).

In what sense has the concept been realized? The concept is that which it determines itself to be. Here we have that achieved. We have that which is the totality of universality, particularity, and individuality having determined itself by itself through the disjunctive syllogism. What has resulted is something determined by itself without relying upon anything external. The erst-

while extremes and middle terms have turned into totalities that side by side are each of that character.

Objectivity, minimally speaking, involves these totalities. The term “totality” refers to something that is comprised of a universality that has particularized itself on its own, through itself, and given itself its own individuality. It is something determined in and through itself. For just that reason, it stands in a completely external relationship to other totalities that are of the same sort. Here we have entities that are of such a character that what they are is in no way determined by their relationship to anything else. Their external relations have no bearing upon what they are in themselves.

Objectivity in the first instance is therefore mechanism. It is a freestanding reality, made up of entities whose relations to one another have absolutely no bearing on what they are because they are completely determined in and through themselves. The only relations they have to one another are such that these relations can have no impact upon their respective individualities. That situation is precisely what defines mechanism. Mechanism comprises the kind of reality whose factors are individuated completely independently of their relations to one another. As such, mechanism can be exemplified not only in external motion of matter but also in mental phenomena such as rote memory. Hegel speaks about rote memory literally as mechanical memory (p. 711). This kind of memorization is mechanical insofar as it takes no notice of the meaning of the words it remembers. All that is attended to is their order, an order completely external to their significance. The same externality is exhibited in physical examples of mechanism, such as the law-governed motion of matter that applies whether the matter is a book or a feather or a rock. Such physical mechanical relations have no bearing on *what* the things are that they involve. Mechanism pertains to them only in respect to their determination in space and time as bodies with mass. This is the common physical field of purely mechanical relationships.

Still, here we are dealing with relationships of entities that are individuated. They have to be already individuated because their mechanical relations do not account for their individuality. Insofar as mechanistic relationships do not provide for the individuation of the factors they externally determine, things cannot merely be mechanistically determined.

This is the ultimate stumbling block of those who want to reduce reality to mechanism. Such mechanistic reduction tends to make use exclusively of a determinism of efficient causality. That excludes freedom and right. It also excludes final causality and any place for purpose.

Mechanism involves a process whose factors are what they are completely independently of the process. The factors thus have a nonrelative existence of their own. They are determined in and through themselves and yet, because of just that, they have to be in a relation to others that has a purely external and mechanical character. The determinism to which these factors

are subject must be of the kind of causality that has nothing to do with what kind of thing something is. Hume, who identifies causality in general with that operative in mechanism, thus famously observes that we cannot deduce the causal relationships of things by thinking what they are, by thinking their concepts. There can be no a priori knowledge of the causal efficacy of anything.

Mechanistic determinism involves the causality by which a thing will be determined by something else in a manner that is completely indifferent to their respective natures. Each factor will be so determined by something else. Nothing will be self-caused.

This mechanistic determinism might seem to have very little to do with monads, but Hegel points to Leibniz's concept of monads as a paradigmatic embodiment of mechanism. The monad is very different from an atom, and Hegel maintains that the objects in the objectivity of mechanism are much more like monads than atoms.

Leibniz's monads have a very special relationship between their individuality and their universality or their concept. Everything about the monad is necessarily entailed by its concept. The monad is exhaustively determined by its concept, by its identity. Everything about it is necessary to it. Everything that could pertain to it is inherent in it.

The monad is thus precisely that which is completely determined in and through itself. Its universality is exhaustively particularized in itself. The monad's identity is so thoroughly particularized in itself that it accounts for everything about it. This is precisely why nothing outside the monad can have any effect upon it. Since what the monad is in itself determines everything about it, all external relations must have no impact upon its nature.

When Leibniz further characterizes the completely self-mediated, concrete unity of the monad, he identifies it in mental terms, as something that represents, because only mental unity or apperception lacks the externality that has no place in the monad. Only mental unity cannot be broken down into anything more elemental.

Clearly, Leibniz's monads are very much like objectivity, which involves a plurality of objects, each of which is determined in and through itself. The object is in an external relation to others, but their relationships have no bearing on what each of the objects is. Their relationships thus have a purely mechanical, external character.

This is just what objectivity in the first instance involves. The monad captures the other side of the object that the proponents of mechanistic determinism neglect. These proponents affirm that everything is really governed by efficient causality, whose external determinism relates to things as matter in motion. They do not account for how there are individual bodies in the first place.

Hegel tries to develop mechanism in a complete manner, conceiving what kind of relationships are entailed by this freestanding, independent objectivity. He develops a succession of different forms of mechanism, which end up engendering a process called “chemism.” Chemism is obviously a term that lends itself to chemical relationships in physical reality. Hegel, however, is using the term “chemism” logically, and therefore it can be applied to things that you do not study in chemistry class but you might study in German literature, reading Goethe’s *Elective Affinities*, or in psychological studies dealing with a chemistry between individuals. Objects still figure in chemism, but now they are further determined. In chemism, unlike mechanism, the relationship between objects does depend upon what they are. Here we are dealing with objects that are tensed or primed to react with one another, given what they are. There is now something relative about them, such that only objects of a certain kind, with a certain kind of chemistry, will interact with another.

What generally happens in a chemical relation is thus very different from what happens in mechanical relations. For example, when one billiard ball hits another, it does not enter into a chemical relationship. For chemism to occur, the factors have to be specifically different from one another. Moreover, their interaction produces something that is different from both of them. What objects chemically coalesce into is something that then can become reduced to separate chemical components. Both sides of the chemical relationship depend upon something else to get the process under way. The two primed factors do not of themselves coalesce, nor does their product of itself get reduced into separate components. Some third factor, some catalyst, must intervene to bring the appropriate objects into a chemical relation. They have to be brought together, just as the product into which they get neutralized must encounter something else to separate out again what was neutralized. Chemism is thus a process that independently neither initiates itself nor renews itself nor comes back to where it began.

These features distinguish chemism from teleology, as well as from life. They also distinguish the relationship of chemical bodies from the relation of something and other or the relation of positive and negative. Insofar as chemism is a relation of objects, which involve universality, particularity, and individuality, Hegel employs judgments and syllogisms to characterize chemical process (p. 730). In that chemism involves objects that are individuals, they are not just something and other, determined through their contrast to one another. Each chemical object has a nature of its own determined in and through itself. As individuals, they cannot fail to exhibit universality and particularity in their relationships. This is true of objects in mechanism as well as in chemism.

Similarly, although there are features in these processes of objectivity that seem to bring into play relationships from the Logic of Essence, such as

causality, neither mechanism nor chemism are causal relations. Chemical objects are not something and other, nor are they polar opposites, like positive and negative. Even though they are tensed or primed to determine themselves in relation to one another, they have an independence that polar opposites lack. Positive and negative cannot be without the other. Different chemical bodies can, however, be without one another. They can be separated, and they do not have to be in relation to one another. Chemical objects are not like something and other, either, because their identity does not depend upon the other factor. Rather, based upon their respective independent identities, there is a specific external relationship into which they can enter. The chemical object can be without entering into any of its possible chemical relations because it does not bring itself into those relationships. There is still something external about them, even though they are tied to the individuality of the chemical object. There is an externality pervading mechanism and chemism, although Hegel will show how the development from mechanism to chemism to teleology involves a progressive inwardizing or subjectivizing of objective process.

Already, there is a certain internalization operative in chemical process. Even though chemical reactions are external to the factors involved and depend upon externalities or catalysts, they nevertheless reflect what the factors are individually.

To understand the progressive development of this internalization, it is important to keep in mind that there are two senses of subjectivity. One is the subjectivity of the concept, reflected in its *self*-determined character, and the other lies in an externality and contingency opposed to the autonomy of the concept. Hegel points out that “a similar twofold meaning also appears for objectivity” (p. 709). In one sense, objectivity stands opposed to the concept as “the *being that is in-and-for-itself*.” On the other hand, objectivity “stands opposed to the $I = I$ which in subjective idealism is enunciated as the absolutely true; in that case it is the manifold world in its immediate existence with which the ego or the Notion only engages in never-ending struggle” (p. 709). The former sense is what is truly objective, and Hegel confirms this in writing that “the cognition of truth is placed in cognising the object as object, free from anything added by subjective reflection,” just as “right conduct” consists in “obedience to objective laws that are not subjective in origin and admit no caprice and no treatment that might overthrow their necessity” (p. 709).

At the very beginning of the development of mechanism, Hegel makes use of syllogism to characterize the object, reflecting how objectivity both emerges from syllogism and incorporates its relations as elements of a new domain irreducible to subjectivity. He writes, “The object is, as we have seen, the *syllogism*, whose mediation has been sublated [*ausgeglichen*] and has therefore become an immediate identity” (p. 711). Remember, the media-

tion of the middle term has become equalized with the extremes, resulting in an immediate identity. What has been concluded is no different from what is in the major and minor premises. Accordingly, what has emerged is “in and for itself a universal—[not a] universality . . . in the sense of a community of properties, but a universality that pervades the particularity and in it is immediate individuality” (p. 711). The universality that “pervades the particularity and in it is immediate individuality” is very much what Leibniz has in mind when he speaks about the monad being something whose individual existence is completely determined by its concept. Since monads can therefore not affect what they each individually are, they can only be subject to mechanical relations with other monads, where they interact in a completely external manner.

The object cannot have the kind of characteristics that are attributed to entities in the Logic of Being and in the Logic of Essence. As Hegel notes, “In the first place therefore the object does not differentiate itself into *matter* and *form*—a matter as the self-subsistent universal side of the object and a form as the particular and individual side” (p. 712). The object cannot be divided up into something that has distinct aspects of form and matter because the object has an individuality that is completely determined in and through itself. By contrast, what consists of form and matter has a form that is not unique to it but can be separated from its individual matter and imposed upon some other material. For this reason, whatever can be differentiated into form and matter cannot really count as an object in the strict logical sense.

Insofar as form and matter are not intrinsically connected, whatever is composed of form and matter owes its existence to an exercise of making that externally imposes the form upon the matter. The composite of form and matter cannot be responsible for its own being since it is made of factors (form and matter) that are not inherently connected to one another and do not connect themselves to one another. Form and matter thus apply to an artifact that has to be made by an artificer.

Objects are not of that character. Objects do not owe their existence to something else. They are not posited by something. They are completely self-subsistent. Therefore not only are they not determined in terms of form and matter, but objects cannot be considered things with properties, or wholes consisting of parts, or substances with accidents, or entities exhibiting any other relationships of essence. As Hegel explains, properties, parts, accidents, and the like “are separable from the thing or the substance, whereas in the object the particularity is absolutely reflected into the totality” (p. 712). The object is something that is completely self-determined. “In the parts of a whole, there is indeed present that self-subsistence which belongs to the differences of the object, but these differences are themselves directly and

essentially objects, totalities, that are not, like parts, determined as such in contrast to the whole” (p. 712).

Although the object is determined in and through itself, Hegel points out that “the object is . . . in the first instance *indeterminate*, in so far as it has no determinate opposition in it” (p. 712). As the outcome of disjunctive syllogism, “it is the mediation that has collapsed into immediate identity. In so far as the *Notion is essentially determinate*, the object possesses determinateness as a *manifoldness* which though complete is otherwise *indeterminate*, that is, *contains no relationships*.” There are no “*sides* or *parts* that may be distinguished in it,” and any attempt to do so is the work of “an external reflection” (p. 712).

Nonetheless, the object is not an atom, because the object is still a totality. Our challenge is to understand how the object can have something indeterminate about it even though it is a totality, even though it is determined in and through itself.

Chapter Twenty-Five

Mechanism, Chemism, Teleology

Objectivity stands midway between subjectivity and the Idea, and objectivity is going to comprise the development that bridges these domains. Obviously, there is some controversy regarding what are the fundamental processes of objectivity, as well as what objectivity is. Further, there is also debate concerning whether it is possible for objectivity to contain mechanism together with chemism and teleology. It often is presumed that mechanism is incompatible with teleology, not to mention with chemism. Hegel will show, however, that teleology can fit together with both mechanism and chemism, encompassing both as elements of its own process.

As objective processes, mechanism, chemism, and teleology all involve objects. This is important in a nontrivial sense, for if one takes these developments seriously, then not only are mechanism, chemism, and teleology inconceivable without dealing with objects, but objects are inconceivable without being determined by the factors of the concept: universality, particularity, and individuality.

In Hegel's account of all three processes of objectivity, syllogism figures prominently. Each form of objectivity involves a particular way in which something that has universality is mediated with something that has individuality by means of particularity. Nonetheless, these objective processes do not just incorporate subjective syllogism per se. Here syllogism structures relations of objects and the processes that pertain to them.

Mechanism leads to chemism and chemism generates teleology, and how all this occurs is bound up with the way in which the syllogistic relationships of these forms of objectivity transform themselves. On the one hand, teleology will arise from the processes of chemism, which are characterized by three sets of syllogisms. On the other hand, both mechanism and chemism end up being incorporated as constituents of teleological process. Teleology

not only involves a relation to objects, which are already mechanistically and chemically determined, but the teleological process makes use of mechanism and chemism as part of its very own workings. Teleology, far from being incompatible with mechanism and chemism, cannot be what it is apart from them. Since teleology must incorporate mechanism and chemism, they cannot be incommensurate.

When Hegel introduces teleology as the third and final form of objectivity, he is presenting something that is often thought of as only one type of teleology. Hegel himself uses the term “teleology” to characterize life, but life will require the outcome of *this* teleology of objectivity to present what the Idea will initially comprise.

The teleology that falls within objectivity, rather than in life, cannot be distinguished by appealing to design. Teleology of any sort always involves design, in the sense of an end. Instead, it is better to differentiate the former teleology as external teleology, or what might also be spoken of as finite teleology. External teleology is contrasted with internal teleology. Internal teleology is something that Hegel discusses under the heading not of teleology proper but of life, which falls under the Idea.

What distinguishes external from internal teleology is how the end stands in relationship to its realization. In external teleology, the end stands over and against an objectivity to which it is external. Moreover, the process of its realization is something external to the end, which finally emerges as a product of the teleological process. By contrast, in internal teleology, the translation of the end from its “subjectivity” to its “objectivity” takes place within the object in which it is realized, or the object in which it is realized contains the process by which it is realized.

Internal teleology is usually ascribed to life, insofar as life is something that realizes itself within itself. Life essentially reproduces itself as the end of an activity in which it consists. Characteristically, one finds that in the living thing, its elements are organs that are both means and ends at the same time and serve in both capacities precisely because they are constituents of something engaged in reproducing itself. I do not mean reproduction in the sense of procreation, where an organism will reproduce offspring. I mean reproduction in the sense of the self-sustaining ongoing life process. This process is something for its own sake. It is continually realizing itself as the end of its process, which is an economical way of describing what it is to be alive. By contrast, external teleology is best exemplified by what is not alive but what is an artifact. Artifacts are products of an exercise of external teleology, where something is produced by a process of making that is guided by a design that is going to be realized in a product. The end of external teleology is realized by means of some kind of instrument, which will be applied to some material so as to impose the end upon it. Categories of form and matter, as we have seen, often enter in when one thinks of an artifact and its manu-

facture. We will need to consider whether the teleological process of the third form of objectivity will require appeal to form and matter, which seem at odds with the concrete universality of objectivity.

If external teleology, or teleology *per se*, involves the process whereby an end realizes itself, and if that involves a middle term comprising the means with which the end realizes itself in an object that it presupposes as something it is going to realize itself in, then the whole process depends upon the means being employable as an instrument to the end. What also has to be presumed is that the object is susceptible to being determined by the end. Otherwise, the process would not be possible in general. This consideration raises the question of how objects in general can be determined by ends. What is it about the process of objectivity that permits the determinability of an object by ends that are external to it? Do mechanical and chemical processes themselves provide all that is necessary for external ends to be realized in objects?

The key point is that mechanism and chemism both subject objects to determination from without. This external determining inherent in the two basic forms of objectivity opens the door to teleology. Basically, what allows for an end to be realized in an object is that the object be susceptible to being determined from without. That, of course, is precisely the situation that objects find themselves in within mechanism and chemism. This external determinability also allows for the employment of chemical and mechanical processes to realize ends, especially if the realization of ends operates as an external process.

Now, admittedly, objects have something about them that is completely independent and determined in and through themselves, even while they are subject to relationships that partially determine them, without, however, affecting what they are as individuals. When Hegel lays out the different forms of mechanism, he begins with a formal mechanical process (p. 716).¹ This involves communication, understood as a determining of objects in a manner that is completely indifferent to what they are, in and of themselves, while being something that they undergo in common, as in motions or words that get communicated from one to another. What is distinctive about communication is that it leaves the objects as they are. Motion gets communicated from one object to another, while both objects remain the same.

Matters might appear to get more differentiated when Hegel speaks about real mechanism, where what gets communicated gets distributed among the objects with respect to their own individuality (p. 718). This involves a particular distribution, as in action and reaction, which brings into the equation what is specific to the objects. Still, real mechanism is a process that occurs from without, being externally generated.

The final form of mechanism comprises a system of external relationships of objects determined in terms of a centrality that exhibits a lawful unity,

where the system as a whole is determinative of objects' external relations to one another (p. 721). This is still a form of mechanism, even though it no longer depends upon completely external impulses and the like. Although this is a system of mechanistic interaction that exhibits as a whole a kind of self-determination, it still operates externally upon the objects it involves. Even though the system has a law unto itself, whereby it moves itself, the motion of each object is determined by other objects and, in particular, by their center of "gravity." Hence they are not interacting in a way in which they are self-determined. Rather, they remain other-determined by the terms of the system, which still leaves their individuality unperturbed. Once again, the system does not generate them as individuals. Their individuality is just there.

In chemism, objects have more of an intrinsic relationship to one another. There is something about them that governs what happens to them as objects. Chemical objects have an affinity for one another. If they are brought together, they will coalesce and neutralize one another. Their process thus presupposes that they have been kept apart, as well as that they have to be brought together externally. The chemical process does not get going of itself. It has to be brought into play by something that allows the chemical objects to be brought together, an external catalyst. When they are brought together by the catalyst, they form a neutral product different from what they are. This neutral product, however, contains the possibility of reverting to them. That is, the neutral product can conceivably be reduced to the chemical components that make it up. This does not happen on its own, because it requires something else to decompose the neutral product, which may or may not return to the same chemical objects from which it arose.

Of key significance is that the chemical process is neither self-initiating nor self-renewing. By contrast, life, which is presented as the outcome of the teleological process, is self-renewing. When we arrive at the Idea, we will have to consider how life can so operate and how its self-renewing process can involve mechanical and chemical processes as constituent elements.

Now, at the threshold of teleology, we face the general problem of how mechanism and chemism can play a role in constituting processes of a very different character. On the one hand, the processes may involve teleology of an external form and, on the other hand, the processes may involve internal teleology, such as characterizes life.

Both cases are facilitated by how mechanical and chemical processes depend upon something external to the objects involved. What occurs is not fully self-determined, for even though what happens in chemical reactions depends on what the chemical objects are themselves, it remains conditioned by some other factor. Consequently, what happens is not a self-realization. It is instead a process in which objects coalesce into something else or break down into other chemical objects.

When we come to external teleology, we are dealing with a process that still consists of definite stages. The teleological process begins with the subjective end, proceeds to the means for its realization, and then concludes with the product of the process of realization—the realized end.

What is the subjective end in and of itself? One could think about it more concretely than logical investigation allows and imagine an actual agent that has an end in mind and then chooses to act upon things to realize that end. Here, however, what is at stake is just the logic of the end and its realization.

First of all, what is the end? If one refers to the end as something a subject represents in the course of employing some means to realize it, then one is no longer just speaking about the end itself. We must consider the end in itself, apart from any agent, even though we may find teleological process exemplified when we have a real agent involved in the production of artifacts. That context, which presupposes nature and the reality of living agency, is not part of logic.

All that is logically at hand is what emerges from chemism. In developing the transition from chemism to teleology, Hegel presents three different syllogisms having to do with each aspect of chemical relationships, one involving how the tensed chemical objects coalesce in a neutral product, another comprising the process by which they are reduced, and then the last encompassing the whole sequence of neutralization and reduction as a unitary process that returns to its point of departure. He claims that through these, some of the externality and conditioned character of the chemical process is overcome (pp. 732–33). In order for any chemical process to occur, the given presence of the tensed, opposing chemical objects and of a suitable catalyst have to be presumed. The twofold process of neutralization and reduction ends up removing that presupposition by producing it as an outcome of this whole process. This is because the whole two-sided process results in the point of departure insofar as each tensed opposed chemical object is generated by the process itself. In that sense, they are no longer really external to the process, for the process itself accounts for them. Chemism has proved to be a process in which they are determined to figure as they are.

Moreover, there is a unity to what occurs in the unfolded process of chemism. This unity differentiates itself into the elements of the process, undergoing a kind of particularization, and the process is at one with itself by so realizing itself. Chemism, by comprising a unitary process that realizes itself in and through presupposed external objects that then get posited through the process, sets up the situation of teleology, which begins with what can be called a subjective end (p. 733).

The subjective end is not just a cause, although teleology will often be spoken of as a final cause, one cause among others. Hegel has developed cause and effect in the *Logic of Essence*. Here, in the logic of objectivity, he presents the end as very different from a cause. Of key significance is that in

cause-and-effect relationships, the effect is not only other than the cause, but it is something in which the cause expires. In terms of content, cause and effect have no intrinsic relationship. Nonetheless, Hegel did point out that implicitly the cause does close with itself in the effect. This is something that only becomes clear when causality reverts to reciprocity. Namely, in producing the effect, the cause has produced itself because without the effect, the cause cannot exhibit its defining efficacy. In this respect, the effect causes the cause to be a cause, leading cause and effect each to occupy both roles of the causal relationship.

What is distinctive about teleological process is that the outcome is what is at the beginning, or to put it succinctly, the end is the beginning. Unlike cause and effect, the beginning and end of teleology involve the same content, for the process consists in the end realizing *itself*. Since the content remains the same, what occurs is a change in form.

This change of form is not a change from potentiality to actuality. Hegel developed these terms in the *Logic of Essence* in connection with the process of actuality. The process of the realization of ends is different in character. It revolves around the distinction of subjectivity and objectivity. What occurs in the teleological process is that the end is, in the first instance, subjective, and it is going to objectify itself. The end is going to make itself objective, for it is merely subjective to begin with.

Now, what does it mean for the end to be subjective, and what does it mean for it to be objective? Do we have to appeal to a willing agent to make sense of the subjectivity of the end?

In conceiving the end, Hegel characterizes it as involving not just a move from subjectivity to objectivity, but also the specific terms of the concept. The content of the end involves universality, particularity, and individuality. These terms play a constitutive role in the process by which the subjective end becomes objectified.

Further, it is important to keep in mind that the end is not merely subjective. It is also intrinsically going to be objectively realized. Now, given what has been developed, what is an objective realization? It is not just self-realization, because it is a process specifically involving objects and their determination. The end is going to realize itself in an object and by means of objects. The objects involved already have their own determinacy as objects. Further, what is merely subjective is not yet an object. The end that is subjective is thus not yet an object. The question is: What is it?

An end as an end might be spoken of as a purpose or as an intention, but the logic of ends and their realization does not involve bringing in a will, with all its natural and psychological baggage. This is why purpose can apply to plants, for plants have something purposive about the way they develop, without having a will.

More generally, an end has the character of being self-realizing. The end is not something that figures as an end owing to antecedent causes. This is true even with external teleology because the externality refers to the relationship between the end and the object in which it is realized. The process of realization characteristic of an end is not predicated upon some antecedent state of affairs.

The move toward the realization of the end is something inherent in the factor that operates teleologically. There is therefore no reason to appeal to something else. So, if we are speaking about something that exhibits teleological determination, such as living things, that they realize certain ends is not dependent upon some separate cause that acts upon them. It is just intrinsic to their nature that they engage in this kind of process.

The subjective end is therefore not something that is going to be moved to realize itself by something else. It is going to be self-determining, and that is one reason why teleology must fit within the Logic of the Concept, to the extent that the Logic of the Concept is the logic of self-determination. Although this gives the end a subjective character in the sense of being self-determining, the end is *merely* subjective insofar as it is yet to achieve its objective realization. It has yet to be realized in the determination of objects. The end is subjective in that it is such as to precipitate its objectification, because it is not yet objective. As a subjective end, the end is not yet a determination of anything objective, and for that reason it is only going to achieve realization by confronting objects that can be made to accord with its content.

The subjectivity of the end thus involves the convergence of several things. We have something that is going to move itself, to realize itself, to somehow proceed from a lack of objectification to an objectification that will occur in objects by means of their transformation. This will occur not because of anything external, but the end will do it on its own. But if the end is going to be able to do this, why does its realization not occur immediately? Can it immediately take hold of an object and determine it and give it its determination, that is, communicate its determination to the object without any intervening process? If so, is the subjectivity of the end immediately canceled, so that teleology is left with no *process*, no *realization* separate from the end?

Obviously, Hegel does not present the realization of the end as something that occurs immediately, which is why this whole process gets developed in terms of syllogisms, whereby individual objects get determined by something that is going to be universal, closing with itself in different stages. The realization of the end is only going to occur by means of an intermediary stage. Now, why can it not occur immediately?

One reason is that the object through whose transformation the end achieves realization is external to the end. It is an independently given object.

Moreover, objects are determined in and through themselves. They are not posits. Teleology is not a relation of the Logic of Essence, where a ground determines something it grounds or a cause posits an effect. If ends are to be objectified, then they are realized in something that has an independent being.

Nonetheless, teleology is a process where an end realizes itself in virtue of itself, not because it has been determined to do so by anything else. The end, however, is not a subjective end to begin with if it is already objectified. The end as such has a process built into it. Otherwise it is not an end. The teleological process has to have a beginning and an end even if the end is in the beginning and the beginning is in the end because the same content is going to be contained in the achieved realization.

If the end immediately realized itself in an object we could not speak of its being subjective at the start. It would be immediately objective. If, however, the end is objective immediately, it cannot be a subjective end and there can be no teleological *process*.

For there to be any teleological process, there must be a way in which objectivity gets determined by something subjective. The subjective end is going to do two things. It is going to just as much transform itself as transform the object. Both end and object are going to lose their one-sided character, and they are both going to become subjective as well as objective. That is the result to which the whole teleological process is moving. There cannot be a process, however, if the end could immediately be objective. The end would just be objective and not subjective.

Although the end must be mediately rather than immediately realized, there is a contingent element, which has to do with the content. The end as end does not carry with it any necessary content. What the end is is contingent.

Similarly, the end is finite. This is because the end, as subjective, confronts an object that is distinct from it. The subjective end cannot be equal to the object, because then there would be no process. The end would already be realized. The object the end confronts must be something different.

The external determinability of objects is built into their immersion in mechanism and chemism, both of which subject objects to determination from without. Even though what happens to objects in chemism reflects what they are, it depends on externalities, reflected in the need for catalysts. Consequently, what can be done to objects, as factors in which ends are realizable, is a function of how they are mechanically and chemically determinable. Objects' mechanical and chemical being allows them to be subject to further determination in principle. They are inherently malleable. They are inherently susceptible to being determined by something external to them. This makes it possible for the subjective end to be realizable in objects.

Whatever the content of the end, although it obviously must be different from the object, it will be in principle susceptible of objective realization.

How this objective realization occurs is bound up with the character of the subjective end. Its very nature is such that it is not going to realize itself in an object all by itself, immediately. The subjective end can only be realized in an intermediate way. The very difference between the end and the object calls for some way of mediating them because the teleological process is concerned with uniting them. The whole process is about the end becoming objectified, the object taking on determination of this end. The end is subjective both as self-determining and as yet to be objectified. Both aspects figure in the intermediary process by which it achieves fulfillment.

This intermediary process is that of the means. Minimally speaking the means is another object that will serve as the instrument for realizing the end. The subjective end cannot itself provide something objective with which to realize itself in the object. The means must lie outside the subjective end in an object capable of engaging in an objective interaction with the object in which the end will be realized.

Hegel points out that the employment of an object serving as a means seems to present a dilemma (pp. 743–44). The object that serves as the means is not the end itself. The end, as subjective, cannot realize itself immediately and for this very reason requires a means to enlist in its realization. How then can the end *immediately* subordinate the means to its service? Does the recourse to the means just beg the question by taking for granted that the end can immediately lay hold of an object? Is the relationship between the subjective end and the means not the same thing as the relationship between the end and its realization?

The end seems to be directly informing the means, in order for it to act as the means. How can it do so, if the end cannot directly inform the object in which it will be realized? If the end can immediately inform the means, then why can it not immediately inform the object? On the other hand, if the end cannot immediately inform the means, its relation to the means has to be mediated. Then, however, it would require something nonsubjective, objective to serve as its means to subordinate the first means, and we seem to enter an infinite regress, where every enlisted intermediary requires a further mediation to be employed.

This problem arises, however, only so long as one presupposes that the relation of the end to its means is equivalent to its relation to its object. Can they be the same, however? Is the end objectifying itself in its means? Presumably it is not. The means is doing something different from just being the realization of the end. The means is not itself the realization of the end, but rather something that will facilitate its realization, something that has to be enlisted to realize the end.

The end has something about it that is self-determining. The end is not caused to seek its realization. It does that immediately by itself. On the other hand, the end has to go outside itself in order to be able to realize itself. That is the rub. That is what makes it finite. Its process of self-realization depends upon something external. This residual dependence will prove to have something to do with why teleology lies within objectivity and not within the domain of the Idea.

So, the end must make use of something external and objective. Further, the end somehow has to be able to act immediately upon the means, because if it cannot act immediately upon the means, it succumbs to an infinite regress precluding its realization. On the other hand, the end's immediate use of the means cannot be its own objectification, because if it were the end would cease to be a subjective end. It would just immediately be objective, and there would not be any process whatever.

Somehow the nature of the means is such that it is an object that is immediately subsumed, or made subordinate, to the end, without being equivalent to the objectification of the end. The means' subordination consists of a process that Hegel compares to a syllogism, because in it factors (the end and its realization) are connected by means of something else (the means) (p. 746). The subjective end gets unified with the object, by means of the means.

Now this involves the means acting upon the object. By themselves, the means and the object are both just objects, and the relationships they can have to each other as objects are merely mechanical and/or chemical relations. Here, however, their relations are going to be further mediated by the end, the subjective end, which is subordinating their interaction to its realization. The end's subordination of their interaction to its own realization still involves the relation of these objects to one another. Accordingly, the end will realize itself through the mechanical and chemical processes of its means' operation upon the object.

How can the end realize itself through a mechanical or chemical process, when mechanical and chemical relations between objects do not involve one object realizing itself in the other? After all, when one object interacts with another, neither undergoes a transformation in form from being subjective to being objective. There might be communication of an external alteration like motion. They might act and react. Likewise, if means and object interact chemically, instead of one realizing itself in the other chemical object, something else comes out of the reaction that is different from both of them.

If that is the case, how can there be the kind of closing of the subjective end with itself in its realization, where the same content loses its subjective form and becomes objective? How can that possibly occur through a mechanical or chemical relation between objects?

Hegel describes the answer in terms of “the cunning of reason.”² This might appear inscrutable, but it is hard not to have experienced just this—realizing an end by making use of mechanical and chemical processes, even though those processes by themselves do not do what the end does in relation to its product. Objects in mechanical interaction do not impart an end to one another, nor do chemicals when they react with one another. In neither case do the same contents reappear. When objects act mechanically, they may communicate something that is indifferent to their contents, or one may cause the other to undergo a change that has nothing to do with what it is, causing it to move this way or that way. Likewise, in chemical reactions, the objects undergo a transformation in content and do not come out the same.

Nonetheless, the whole relationship of the teleological process manages to end in the objective realization of the end that is in the beginning. Moreover, the different components of the process end up overcoming the externality that still defines their operation. Hegel notes that in the end, the product turns out to be really no different than the means and the means to be no different than the product (pp. 752–53). As you know, from reading Kant or even Aristotle or whoever talks about organisms, when you speak about life, it is typical to speak about how the organs of the organism serve as both means and ends of each other, enabling the living thing to comprise a process whereby it realizes itself. Moreover, the process whereby the organism realizes itself is just as much the end as the means, because the life process is what the life process produces and it is a means to its own end.

In light of this projected outcome, we will need to examine how the end can realize itself by enlisting mechanical and chemical processes and how this process has as an outcome something that sets up a unification of subjectivity and objectivity that takes us into a different domain, the Idea, whose first form is life.

Chapter Twenty-Six

From Objectivity to Idea

Objectivity is a domain of what could be said to be determined in-and-through-itself, of what is not dependent upon mediations that are different from what is mediated. Under its heading we have three types of process: mechanism, chemism, and teleology. Mechanism, to begin with, is characterized by being the totality consisting of factors subject to relationships that are completely external to them. The flipside of that externality is that these factors, the objects, are completely indifferent to what occurs in mechanism. Their mechanistic relations do not in any way determine what they are. What happens to them is, by the same token, the kind of relationships that can occur only to entities that have a completely independent, self-subsistent character that is in no way affected by the processes to which they are subject.

The process itself does not require something outside it to determine it. Mechanism proceeds on its own, without appeal to any ground or foundation. It operates with respect to factors that are objects in the sense that what they are is not relative to other things or to any standpoint or perspective. The very self-subsistence of the factors is bound up with their being objects in a mechanical relationship with one another, because the only relationships they can have with one another are ones in which the relata are indifferent to what occurs to them.

That is exhibited in the most formal kind of mechanical process, where Hegel speaks of a communication in which all the objects are subject to a process they share in common and what is being communicated among them is completely external to the objects. It does not in any way affect what they are, nor does what they are affect what gets communicated. With regard to the process of mechanism, the objects in themselves are equally indeterminate. They are self-subsistent and indifferent to what happens to them. Be-

yond that, nothing more necessarily pertains to them. They are just objects, without further qualification.

Hegel implies that chemism arises from mechanism to the extent that the self-subsistence of objects is posited by the external relations in which they are immersed (pp. 725–26).¹ Mechanism is just that process whose factors can be what they are because mechanistic relations leave objects free to be determined in and through themselves. In no way does mechanism otherwise determine its objects qualitatively.

In chemism, the self-subsistent factors, chemical objects, are nevertheless primed to relate to one another. Something external, however, must intercede for that to happen and enable them to coalesce with one another. On that condition, the chemical objects enter a process that unites them in a neutral product. In that unity their differences are removed, and the unity that is achieved is not equivalent to the process of their coalescence. The resultant unity then requires something external for it to be reduced into chemical objects that are susceptible of being neutralized once again.

At the very end of the discussion of chemism, Hegel intimates that chemical process ends up producing its own starting point, insofar as the reduction of the neutralized product separates out chemical objects that are poised to unite, returning to the threshold of the original process of neutralization. Chemical process thereby results in the factors that it had presupposed. Its outcome is the external factors and their external relationships, but with the difference that the whole process is poised to realize itself on the basis of its own operation. Hegel suggests that what we now have as the result of chemical process is the situation where a self-realizing unity is what it is in virtue of determining an external objectivity that serves as a means to its own realization (pp. 732–33). This is the situation of teleology, where we have an end that is subjective insofar as it opposes an externally given objectivity in which it is poised to realize itself. Its realization will consist in making itself objective, in some way establishing an objectivity that will bear its imprint.

The subjective nature of the end is of key importance in distinguishing teleology from the Idea and the latter's first form, life. Life and the Idea in general are identified as involving the unification of subjectivity and objectivity. Life in particular is characterized as having an end that is not subjective but objective. It is important to examine the nature of the subjectivity of the end in teleology and try to understand how that subjectivity renders teleology a process that is still only objective.

Decisive for rendering the end of teleology subjective is that the objectivity in which it will be realized is something separate from it, given apart and independently of it. This opposition makes the end merely subjective, rather than objective. Nonetheless, as end, it is something that is to realize itself in objectivity. As a subjective end, however, the objectivity in which the end is

to realize itself is an objectivity that is not determined by the end. It is an objectivity that is indifferent to the end.

On the other hand, the subjective end is further distinguished in connection with how it is finite. One aspect of the end's finitude is that it stands over and against that in which it is going to be realized. The objectivity it confronts is its beyond. Moreover, the objectivity in which the end is to be realized is an objectivity that does not yet realize the end. This means that the content of the given objectivity is different from the content of the subjective end. The content of the subjective end is itself something given, insofar as no particular content is automatically bound up with being the end. All that is guaranteed is that the end, as something that is going to realize itself in objectivity, must have some determinacy. The determinacy is something immediately given, and therefore this determinacy is itself limited and finite. What we know for sure is that the determinacy of the end is not what objectivity itself already is. The content of the end must be something other than that.

Nonetheless, that the subjective end is something that is to be realized in objectivity says something about objectivity. Even though the objectivity to which the end stands in relation is indifferent to it, it has to be susceptible of being determined by the end. What ensures that objectivity is going to be susceptible to determination by an end, by something it is not already determined by? What makes that possible? The answer lies in the character of objectivity, which has been parading itself in mechanism and chemism. Objectivity is precisely that which is subject to external determination. The subjective end is going to be determining objectivity externally. Insofar as objectivity is precisely that which is determinable externally, it cannot resist determination by the end. The end is implicitly nothing other than the external determinability of objectivity. In this respect, the subjective end presupposes its own realization, for the objectivity it confronts is already that which is determinable by it, or, in effect, already determined with regard to it.

Now, as Hegel points out, the subjective end as such requires a means to realize itself (p. 743). This means is different from the end. There is, of course, another possible relation of means and end besides the one in which they are separate from one another. Means and end might not be different. If means and end are nonseparable, there is something to be done for its own sake, something that is its own process of realization. Here, however, we are dealing with a process that falls within the orbit of objectivity. It is a process that is not alien to objectivity precisely because it is external to objectivity and that is exactly what objectivity is susceptible to, external determination. Still, as we have seen, the subjective end requires a means because it is subjective and not immediately realized. Because it cannot immediately objectify itself, its objectification must occur by means of something else.

The relation of the end to the means must itself be immediate. Otherwise, we have an infinite regress, where another means is always needed to mediate between the end and its means. Since there is a direct relationship between means and end, the relationship of the subjective end to its realization occurs by means of a third term, the means. Hegel points out that this comprises a formal syllogism (p. 743). Formal syllogism consists of formal judgments like "The rose is red." It allows for substitution because it involves immediately given universals, particulars, and individuals that have all sorts of extraneous features with regard to one another. Consequently, the middle term in the formal syllogism can lead to many other conclusions besides the one that happens to be given by the syllogism. Just as different things can be connected by the same middle term, this middle term can be connected to many different things. The middle term does not have any exclusive intrinsic relationship to either of the extremes. This lack of intrinsic connection applies to the relationship of the subjective end, its means, and its realization. Because each of these factors are external to one another, there is room for substitution. By contrast, when something is for its own sake, where means and end are one and the same, once the means is present, you are sure of getting to the end. If the means is different from the end, you might arrive at something else. The same means might be a means to other things. There might also be other means to get to the end besides this means. There are all these possibilities precisely because the subjective end, its means, and its realization are different from one another.

The subjective end is going to be using some objects as its means to act upon given objectivity and thereby realize itself. The realization of the end will thus occur through an external relationship of objects producing the objectified end. The realized end is thus going to be produced by mechanical or chemical processes, since they comprise the fundamental external relationships of objects. Here, these processes are subordinate to the realization of an end.

The question is: What allows them to be subordinate? What allows the realization of an end to supervene upon mechanical and/or chemical processes so they can facilitate something that they themselves do not achieve on their own? Teleological process involves a self-realization, in which the end supplants its subjectivity with an objectivity, closing with itself in its product. By contrast, any mechanical or chemical process results in something very different from its starting point. In teleology, the end that is at the start turns up at the end as well. How can that occur by making use of the external relationships of mechanism and chemism? How can an objectivity consisting of objects that are susceptible to mechanical and chemical relations nonetheless realize ends and exhibit teleological determination?

The solution is exhibited in any process of making where tools are employed to produce something, guided by some design. Subordinate mechan-

cal and chemical processes are enlisted to manufacture a product, which gives the design an objective embodiment. Each particular mechanical or chemical process that is employed involves external determination rather than self-realization. That externality is appropriate, for they are subject to the design. They are employed to accomplish something that is not intrinsic but extrinsic to them. That can always be done because the processes employed are by nature always externally determined.

The realized end produced by the mechanical and/or chemical interaction of means and object is something that is both subjective and objective in that it contains the same content as the subjective end that guided its production. The product, however, is still just an object. It has issued from a process external to it, and it is susceptible to further external determinations, including serving as a means in some other realization of an end. The product is thus *just* an object. This applies to all artifacts, which in principle are subject to further mechanical and chemical determination, as well as to further employment in external teleological process.

This is also why one can always ask what the product of an external teleological process is for. Even though it has realized some subjective end, it can just as well serve as a means to something else. It is not intrinsically for any one end, because the end it realized has been realized completely externally.

Further, the realization of the subjective end extinguishes the process by which it has been achieved. There is no self-renewing activity because the product is just an object that is just as susceptible to external determination as any other object. The object can serve as a means to another end, just as a means can be the realization of an end.

Hegel claims that the whole teleological process ends up being something like a disjunctive syllogism, where all the parts of the process end up being the whole (pp. 749–50). That is, through the outcome of the process, the means and end lose their difference, leaving the product and its process of realization no longer distinct. This leaves the self-realization of the end and objectivity no longer distinguishable.

What is it about the means that could make it equivalent to the realization of the end, rather than just an intermediary step that allows for the realization? In a nutshell, the means is not really a means unless it realizes the end. So the means is in a sense the realization of the product, because it is not a means unless it is actually doing what it should be doing, which is realizing the end. In this respect, the means really is the product. Similarly, the very starting point to the whole process sets up the realization of the end because the indifferent objectivity, which is presupposed as being susceptible of determination by the subjective end, is its realization. The objectivity opposing the subjective end is in itself determinable by subjectivity and thereby objectifies that determinability. Conversely, the realized end is itself an object

immediately available as a means toward the realization of some other end. With these identifications, we have reached the threshold of the Idea.

The Idea is presented under the rubric of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, or truth. It is also presented in terms of the unity between end and independently given, externally determined objectivity, where the end is immediately the independent, external objectivity and the external objectivity is the realization of the end.

First of all, why would truth enter in connection with the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and not in connection with what fell within logical subjectivity (concept, judgment, and syllogism) or logical objectivity (mechanism, chemism, and external teleology)? The Idea as a whole contains life to begin with, then cognition, which is divided into definition, division, and the Idea of the good, and finally the absolute Idea. The Idea of truth specifically figures within cognition. Nonetheless, truth can be generally associated with the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, particularly if one takes into account how Hegel contrasts truth with correctness. He speaks of truth as involving the identity of the concept and objectivity, as opposed to correctness, which consists just in the conformity of representation with appearance. If we really want to encounter truth, we need to address the objectivity that is in conformity with the concept.

The concept exhibits self-determination and universality. Objectivity exhibits self-subsistence and independence. Obtaining truth, comprising the identity of concept and objectivity, involves conceptualizing that which is immanently conceptualizable, that which exhibits itself the independent determination in-and-through-itself that the autonomy of concepts allows to be thought. This is why truth deserves to be spoken of as involving the identity of subjectivity and objectivity.

The Idea's unification of subjectivity and objectivity is going to develop into different forms, each of which are processes. Life, the first of these processes, is such that it cannot be merely subjective or merely objective but requires for its determination an immediate unity of subjectivity and objectivity. Cognition will comprise a process uniting subjectivity and objectivity in a subjective manner, whereas the Idea of the good will involve a unification of subjectivity and objectivity in an objective manner. The absolute Idea will involve a final, ultimate unification, which will be both subjective and objective in form.

In proceeding, we need to conceive what differentiates these successive domains of the Idea, of truth, of that which unites subjectivity and objectivity. The starting point is life, which is initially determined as the outcome of and in contrast to external teleological process. Life comprises a process that still involves ends and means, but in a way in which means and ends are no longer separable.

In what respect does life present us with something in which means and ends are united or where the end is no longer subjective but objective or where objectivity is the realization of ends? How can this comprise life? What is life *per se*?

To begin with, life sustains itself. As such, life is for the sake of its living. Its life process is a means to maintaining itself. Life is thus a means to itself. Life is thereby an end in itself. As self-sustaining, life already objectively realizes what its process is going to continue realizing. Life does not involve a subjective end confronting an opposed objectivity in which it is going to realize itself. Life is an end that is always already realized, and its realization consists in the further engagement of its self-realizing process. The objectivity that life always has is an objectivity in which it realizes itself, an objectivity that is the process of its self-realization.

Life, as an end in itself, is internally purposive. It does not serve some end that is specified apart from itself. Life is its own purpose and in being internally purposive, it is something that cannot be static. Life must continually engage in the process of positing itself as the product of its own existence.

Here we must restrict ourselves to thinking about life logically. We do not want to think of it in natural terms. The category of life can be thought apart from its natural embodiments, which is shown by how organic unity can apply not just to plants and animals, but to, perhaps, a work of fine art or the division of powers within the state.

Hegel does here characterize life with respect to a body and soul. Logically, life's body is its manifold objectivity, which is informed by a unity of a particular kind, a unity that is never just subjective but always self-realizing and already realized. The soul of the organism is a soul in neither the disembodied Christian or Platonic sense. It is not a self that can be spoken of as existing apart from objectivity. The soul that is logically contained in life shares much more in common with Aristotle's conception of the soul as the principle of life. Aristotle applies this to all natural life, so the soul in question will inform plants as well as animals. It will comprise the animating unity that universally pervades the living thing by being the process that continually renews itself in informing this self-subsistent objectivity.

The logical unity of life might seem similar to the *conatus* of which Spinoza speaks. Spinoza, however, applies the self-sustaining drive of *conatus* to all things while also conceiving them to be determined by efficient causality, while ruling out any role for final causality.

Life, however, necessarily involves purpose, but an end that is not subjective. Life's end is an objective end for it is an end that realizes itself only on the basis of already being realized. The life process realizing this end is always pursued by a living thing that is, of course, already alive. Its life process is to perpetuate or sustain itself, and it can only do so on the basis of being alive. Nonetheless, life has an objectivity that contains different factors

that have a certain immediate externality to one another. Namely, life consists of an objectivity that contains mechanical and chemical relationships, but these are now subsumed within a life process that is continually sustaining itself.

Whatever is necessary to the life process *per se* should apply to anything that qualifies as being alive, and Hegel's exposition can be judged according to whether it can apply to all things that are worthy of exhibiting the category of life. Hegel divides the development of life into three successive sections.

The first is titled "The Living Individual" because life is immediately a living individual (p. 764). The living individual in its own right involves its own internal process. This comprises in general organic unity, the internal process of the organism.

Then Hegel presents as a second necessary aspect of the development of the living thing what he calls "The Life Process" (p. 769). This involves the living organism not as it operates inwardly, but as it sustains itself in relationship to what is outside it. A generic term that covers this dimension of life is "metabolism." Metabolism comprises the particular life process by which the living organism sustains itself by relating to its environment.

Insofar as the living thing has an individual objectivity, it cannot help but be in relationship to other objects, be they living or not. The living thing can be in mechanical and chemical relations to other objects. In fact, as Hegel will point out, when the living thing loses its life, it then becomes just an object subject to mechanical and chemical processes. It loses the life process, which consists in large respect in resisting the kind of external determination that things are subject to in purely mechanical and chemical interactions. This resistance is due to the life process being one in which the living thing sustains itself as a living being. The question that metabolism revolves around is how the living thing can sustain itself in relation to what is outside itself.

Metabolism provides for the third process, which goes under the heading of "The Genus" (p. 772). This is a process whereby the living thing reproduces itself—not in the sense of sustaining itself as an individual but as reproducing itself as a genus, giving birth to other organisms of the same kind. Interestingly enough, Hegel will suggest that the genus process will set the stage for cognition. Before considering how that can be, we need to look at the process of the living individual, of the organism, and how the organism is in-and-of-itself.

When Hegel goes about describing the living individual in its own organic unity, he ends up presenting arguments that to some degree refer to the other processes of metabolism and reproduction, while also using terms that seem to lack the appropriate universality. He speaks, for example, under the heading of "The Living Individual" of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction (p. 768). Although all three really pertain to the two sections that follow,

sensibility and irritability are functions that ordinarily apply not to life in general, but to animal life in particular. Sensibility refers to sentience, which is distinguished from the localized sensitivity of plants. Similarly, irritability refers to the way a sentient organism will respond on the basis of its sensibility to its environment and move itself accordingly so as to sustain itself. Plants as well as single-celled organisms are sensitive to their environment in various ways and they do respond. Plants have tropisms, for example. Still, there is something different about the localized sensitivity of plants and the centralized sentience of animals, just as the localized response of tropism differs from the unified self-movement of the entire animal that irritability entails. It thus appears that Hegel is employing characterizations that are supposed to pertain to life in general but appear at times only to pertain to a specific form of life, animal life.

A basic point that does apply to life as such has to do with the composition of organic unity. Hegel observes that the living thing or the organism has an objective externality, but it does not have parts in the way in which a whole has parts. It has what our translator describes as “members” but which might be more familiarly spoken of as “organs” (p. 766). There is something specific about the way the organism is composed that has to do with the very nature of the subjective/objective character of life and how it involves an objective rather than subjective end. Organs are very different from the parts of a mechanism or the elements of a chemical compound, which can be reduced and separated out. What is distinctive about organs reflects how the organism involves an internal purposiveness or a unification of subjectivity and objectivity.

The organs of the organism may undergo some mechanical and chemical process, but their unity is distinguished by several obvious features. In an artifact, like a watch, the parts are united by an agency lying outside the artifact, an agency that acted to construct the artifact out of preexisting components. Precisely because the unity of mechanism is external to its elements, the parts must already be at hand apart from the whole in which they are put together. Moreover, the individual character of the parts remains intact before their assemblage. Their mechanical functioning may wear them down, but their external connection is otherwise indifferent to their individual existence. By contrast, organs do not exist apart from the organism and remain what they were. As Aristotle observes, you can certainly rip off the hand of someone, but it does not remain a hand properly speaking. Deprived of life, it now becomes unresistingly subject to the external processes of mechanism and chemism, which destroy its prior active integrity. In the organism, organs serve both as a means and end to one another. The working of each is necessary for the working of the other organs, which themselves contribute to the other organs in turn. They each serve as a means to the continuance of their counterparts, whose own functioning is necessary to their own function-

ing. In serving one another they thereby serve themselves by upholding the whole to which they belong. Moreover, they contribute to the very coming-into-being and repair of one another. Unlike a mechanism, the whole organism is born from other living things and grows into being. It is not assembled from preexisting parts by some external maker.

The unification of means and ends in the organs sustains the unity of the organism, which itself consists of this specific complementary differentiation of the organs. The organs sustain not only one another but also the whole to which they belong. The organs do not have an existence apart from the whole but grow into being with the organism's own development. The organism thus has a very concrete unity. The living whole determines the individual being of its components in a very exhaustive way and continually sustains them and ultimately itself.

Organic unity is not a chemical process, even if there may be chemical processes going on within the living thing. Chemical processes involve objects coalescing and losing their character and others separating into different things. By contrast, the organs sustain themselves in complementing the functioning of one another. Moreover, chemical processes do not renew themselves, whereas the life process is continually renewing itself. For this reason, metabolism is not simply a mechanical or chemical process, even though it may employ mechanical and chemical interactions with the environment.

The living organism will interact with other objects. As external to them, its interaction will involve mechanical and/or chemical processes. Nonetheless, metabolism is not just a mechanical pulverization and chewing, nor just a chemical neutralization and reduction of nutrients. Metabolism is undertaken by the living thing in virtue of its distinctive life process, not due to extrinsic conditions. Moreover, in metabolism, the living thing assimilates external material. This assimilation is distinctly different from a merely mechanical or chemical process. First of all, it is determined internally, because this assimilation is part of the organism's self-realization. Its self-sustaining life process involves doing what it does to this external material. The organism does not assimilate the external material because of some impetus that is externally applied to it. What it does is intrinsic to what it is, because the organism is inherently purposive. Further, what gets assimilated becomes part of the living thing. Some of the external material may be expelled as waste, but some of it is integrated into the living thing. It thereby becomes alive, taking on a completely different character than it had before. Now it becomes integrated into an organism, where its very structural material is bound up with all the other parts of the organism in a reciprocal means-end relationship where it now participates in the self-sustaining activity that no mechanical or chemical relation can independently duplicate.

Nevertheless, there are mechanical and chemical processes going on in the organism. How can this be occurring while the living organism is doing something that has a self-sustaining character, where means and ends cannot be distinguished, and where the indwelling end is objective and not subjective? How can all this be occurring by means of mechanical and chemical processes? Once more, what makes all this possible is that chemical and mechanical processes are subject to external determination. Consequently, they can always be made subordinate to determination of a different sort.

Integrating mechanical and chemical processes within itself and interacting with objects in its environment, the organism remains a self-sustaining individual. It comprises an objective end, because it is realizing itself on the basis of having already been realized. The living thing goes on sustaining itself as a living thing by incorporating material, making it part of its living self, while preventing itself from being subject to external determination. All this might seem to go against the law of thermodynamics regarding entropy. According to this law, complexity should diminish. Things should become less and less complex and more and more disorganized, yet the living thing makes a career of resisting entropy and maintaining its own order. The organism is self-ordering, so as to sustain its order and not allow itself to be decomposed. When it dies, it then becomes subject to those processes of disorganization, but so long as it is alive, it resists the law of entropy. How then can organisms sustain themselves without overthrowing thermodynamics? They can resist entropy so long as nature as a whole is not alive. Provided nature contains nonliving objects, subject to the principle of entropy, thermodynamic laws can be globally obeyed, even while living things resist the specter of death in their corner of natural existence.

The last dimension of life, which incorporates and presupposes the individual organism and metabolism, is the process of the genus—reproduction. Generally speaking, conceptions of life perennially recognize the same three processes: the organic unity internal to the individual organism, the metabolism by which the living thing sustains itself in relation to what is outside it, and finally the reproduction of the genus.

Reproduction can, however, be thought of in various ways. One can think of it as involving sexual reproduction, but observation suggests that this is not necessarily its exclusive form. Does the genus necessarily enter into reproduction, whether reproduction occurs sexually or not? When modern biologists such as Ernst Mayr speak about genus, they treat genus as something determined by which organisms can reproduce with one another.² That is what establishes the identity of a genus. The fact that there are limitations on which organisms can reproduce with one another thus seems to be what allows for there to be *geni* in the first place. Is there, however, a conceptual necessity for reproduction to issue in *geni*? We will have to consider whether Hegel helps us answer this question.

Chapter Twenty-Seven

From Life to Cognition

All the stages of the Idea involve a unification of subjectivity and objectivity. This unification is difficult to comprehend, particularly since it never consists in a stable, quiescent entity into which subjectivity and objectivity have been neutralized. Instead, we are contending with different types of processes going on between subjectivity and objectivity.

Hegel points out the salient features that distinguish the Idea from other kinds of unifications that have earlier been encountered (p. 758).¹ The Idea involves truth insofar as it contains a corresponding of concept and objectivity. Further, Hegel observes, the Idea does not involve a unity of concept and reality, but “the more specific one of the unity of *subjective Notion* and *objectivity*.” This is because the concept “as such is itself already the identity of itself and *reality*; for the indefinite expression ‘reality’ means in general nothing else but *determinate being*, and this the Notion possesses in its particularity and individuality” (p. 758). The concept has reality because it is determinate. What distinguishes the concept from any determinacy within either the Logic of Being or the Logic of Essence is that it is self-determined. Since the concept is determined in and through itself, it has reality intrinsic to it. The concept cannot fail to have determinacy that is. The concept gives itself its own determinacy and consists in the process of doing that. The Idea is something more, something that also involves more than just objectivity. Objectivity also has a reality and, indeed, contains in a certain respect the determinacies of the concept. “*Objectivity*,” Hegel writes, “is the total *Notion* that out of its determinateness has withdrawn into *identity* with itself” (p. 758). Objectivity involves conceptual determination that has overcome the merely subjective character of involving mediation that is not identical with what is mediated. Although the concept is that which is determined by itself, the concept’s emergence from the Logic of Essence leaves it something that,

to begin with, has not yet given itself its reality. Instead, it owes its immediate determinacy to antecedent developments. Nonetheless, what it is is something that is going to progressively overcome that residue of givenness for which it is not itself responsible.

"Now," Hegel states, "the Idea has shown itself to be the Notion liberated again into its subjectivity from the immediacy in which it is submerged in the object" (p. 758). What is this immediacy encountered in objectivity, which arises with the removal of the subjective element that resided in an abiding difference between conceptual factors and their mediation? After disjunctive syllogism removed the difference between its middle term and extremes, objectivity emerged as a completely self-mediated totality. Objectivity, however, still involves a plurality of factors, a plurality of objects, that are in external relationships completely indifferent to what each is in and through itself. Insofar as these relationships involve external determinations, their determining might be said to lack subjectivity. They lack subjectivity not in the sense of being contingent, but in lacking the form of a subject. A subject is not just a substance or a thing. A subject, minimally speaking, is a self, and a self is determined in and through itself. Mechanism and chemism determine objects in ways that do not involve self-determination, even though the objects themselves are self-subsistent entities.

Subjectivity, however, is going to reappear in the external determination of objects with the emergence of teleology, which will bring objectivity to its limit. In teleology, what externally determines objects is something subjective that, as subjective, involves a kind of self-determining. The self-determining or self-realizing of the end still involves a relationship to something external to it, the object in which it is to realize itself.

Consequently, teleology does not contain the kind of identity in which the immediate being of objectivity is itself already something involving subjectivity. Here subjectivity and objectivity do stand in relation, but their unification is something that will be the outcome of teleology, engendering a self-unifying process that has its own immediate being in life.

To understand why objectivity emerges with a plurality of objects in external relation, it is helpful to reflect upon the outcome of the concept of the concept. The initial determination of universality, particularity, and individuality ended up involving a relationship between its factors, each of which acquired an independence insofar as all the terms proved to be individuals themselves. Their individuality stood in immediate relation to a universality that connects them all. Judgment comprised this emergent relationship.

Similarly, disjunctive syllogism results in an equalization of its three elements, the two extremes and the middle term. They all turn out to be what the syllogism is as a whole. They each thereby comprise a self-mediated totality involving universality, particularity, and individuality. In that respect, they are indistinguishable, but on the other hand they are external to one

another precisely because they are intrinsically determinate and are immediate insofar as they are no longer mediated by something else. This is why objectivity emerges with a plurality of objects.

The Idea arises in a somewhat analogous manner. Namely, objectivity is overcome when the different parts of the teleological process end up being identical, with means and end ceasing to be distinguishable from the process of the end's realization. A unity has resulted from the process of external teleology, in which something subjective distinguishes itself from objectivity at the same time that the objectivity from which it distinguishes itself is its own self-determination, where the objectivity's being posited by subjectivity is just as much the independent being of that objectivity. So not only is it already realized, but its realization is the very urge for further self-realization. There is still a process built into this outcome of external teleology.

As Hegel clarifies, "The subject does not possess objectivity in an immediate manner, for if it did it would be merely the totality of the object as such lost in objectivity" (p. 758). If the subject were immediately objectivity, we would just have objectivity. Rather, "objectivity is the realisation of the end" (p. 758). In order for objectivity to be the realization of the end, as something in unity with subjectivity, there has to be a process of realization. For that reason, the different forms of the Idea are all going to involve subjectivity and objectivity in a relationship that is going to involve a unification through a process. These forms of the Idea will be distinguished by different ways in which subjectivity determines the objectivity with which it is united. The first form is life; the second is cognition, which involves a theoretical and a practical shape; and finally the absolute Idea. Since what logic is can only be discovered at the end of its development, we know that whatever is the culmination of logic is going to be the categorization of what the logic is about or of what logic is the self-determination or self-constitution. At that final threshold we are going to encounter what has been under way developing itself from the starting point of being.

That culminating determinacy is the absolute Idea, and we want to see how it ends up involving the kind of cognition that could be tantamount to the science of logic. This should enable us to understand in what way logical knowing has been at hand throughout. Logic must, at some point or other, treat cognition itself. It has to come up with cognition's categorization, for cognition cannot be taken for granted. We are close to the point at which cognition will become thematic.

Hegel characterizes the Idea as it first arises as something that is "only immediate," and that is "only in its *Notion*," only in its concept (p. 759). When Hegel characterizes cognition, the second form of the Idea, he does so by describing it not in terms of the concept, but in terms of judgment. Hegel writes, "In its *judgment*, the Idea is *cognition* in general" (p. 775). This might suggest that the absolute Idea will involve the syllogism of the Idea.

In characterizing the first stage of the Idea, life, Hegel observes that the Idea as life is not only immediate, not only just in its notion, but the objective reality it involves “is not yet liberated into the Notion, and the latter does not exist explicitly *for itself as Notion*” (p. 759).

What occurs in cognition, by contrast? Is there any sense in which, in cognition, objectivity is liberated into the concept, or, alternately, the concept exists exclusively for itself as concept? Cognition, to begin with, is going to involve a conceptual determination of objectivity. This determines objectivity in a very specific way. After all, cognition is concerned with getting at the truth. Cognition involves both a relation to its object and a transformation achieving a certain unification of subjectivity and objectivity. The transformation in question achieves this unification in a conceptual determination. Cognition is, in the first instance, an activity of theorizing, of conceiving. What brings concept and objectivity together in cognition is an alteration of conceptual determinacy arriving at truth. The search for truth is the attempt to get at this unification in theory, where the concept determines itself so as to be in unity with what objectivity is in and of itself. The required transformation takes place on the side of subjectivity, which is what makes cognition a theoretical process. In other words, in cognition, the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, of concept and objectivity, occurs first in a subjective form, through an alteration in the content of concepts enabling them to correspond with the given determinacy of objectivity. Thereby truth is theoretically obtained.

Significantly, Hegel presents cognition as something distinct from the absolute Idea, which is that in which logical science really consists. Cognition is therefore not equivalent to philosophical knowing. Admittedly, cognition is presented as having two broad forms—one that is theoretical and another that is practical. In both cases, cognition involves a process where subjectivity and objectivity are unified. In theoretical cognition the unification takes place in a process transforming subjectivity, whereas in practical cognition, the unification takes place through a process transforming objectivity. On these terms, theory and practice are fundamentally distinct from one another.

Theoretical cognition takes objectivity to be true insofar as its activity of theorizing involves subjectivity transforming itself so as to conform to objectivity. On these terms, the search for truth presupposes that objectivity is already conformable to conceptual determination, since otherwise no conceptual alteration could correspond with objectivity. This presupposition contrasts with that underlying external teleology, where the subjective end, as subjective, carried with it the presumption that objectivity itself was inherently malleable or determinable by something outside of it, by subjectivity. In theoretical cognition, the subjective element of conceptual determination has to be such that it can accord with objectivity. Cognition has to involve a

conceptuality that is commensurable with objectivity, just as objectivity has to be something that is conceptually determinable or true objectivity.

In external teleology, subjectivity realizes itself in objectivity and arrives thereby at a unification of subjectivity and objectivity. Nonetheless, the realization of the end is neither an arrival at truth, the goal of theoretical cognition, nor an arrival at the good, the goal of practical cognition. Why this is so, needs to be unraveled, together with why cognition is not the absolute Idea of logical science.

Of key importance is the separation between theoretical and practical cognition, the first of which is spoken of as cognition and the other as volition. The two processes are different from one another, they proceed separately, and each aims at achieving something that confronts it as a goal. Cognition and volition are both finite, and their finitude has to do with how their theory and practice are distinct from one another, and how that distinction is connected with how both aim at goals, the truth and the good respectively, that are not already present in their processes of cognition.

We might look upon theoretical knowing as passive, as being acted upon by the object. As Hegel points out, however, cognition involves an urge to truth, and in this respect, it is not something that is really receptive (pp. 783–84). Cognition involves a self-determination, a self-modification on the part of and within subjectivity. This is why we are dealing with the concept and conceptual determination. Cognition, as a self-activating process involving an urge to get at truth, is not going to involve mere sensibility, which might be regarded as primarily receptive. Cognition is instead going to involve theorizing, that is, conceptualization aiming to accord with objectivity. Since the concept or universality involves self-determination, theoretical, conceptualizing cognition can be a process that is not caused by anything outside itself. Precisely because it employs conceptual determination, theorizing is autonomous.

What distinguishes external teleology from cognition, both theoretical and practical, is that the subjective end that was going to be given objective realization was a contingent, merely finite content. Teleology concerned its realization no matter what it was. The pursuit of truth and the pursuit of the good are fundamentally different from teleology because they both involve a content that is not conditioned or merely finite. The content of both truth and the good requires the Idea, for in each case what is sought is a unification of subjectivity and objectivity. In teleology, the aim is merely subjective and contingent.

Like teleology, cognition does involve an urge, a striving to realize something not yet at hand. What cognition seeks, however, already involves the Idea. Hegel does not characterize the subjectivity and objectivity in cognition as just subjectivity and objectivity. He further characterizes them as the

subjective Idea and the objective Idea (p. 783). The process of cognition is going to connect them and not just subjectivity and objectivity.

Theorizing involves the subjective Idea and not just subjectivity insofar as the conceptualization it engages in is inherently at one with objectivity and thereby in a position to transform itself such that its determinations will be those of objectivity. Conversely, the objectivity it conceptualizes is inherently true objectivity, an objectivity that itself will conform with the concept. On these bases, cognition determines itself to conform to true objectivity.

Practical cognition involves the converse transformation, which unifies the subjective Idea and the objective Idea by means of an alteration of objectivity. The good is not the realization of any subjective end, but the alteration of objectivity to make it accord with what it universally should be. Here objectivity is made true by a subjectivity that is in accord with truth.

Nonetheless, both of these complementary processes are characterized as finite. They are finite to the extent that theoretical cognition is merely theoretical and not also practical, and practical cognition is merely practical and not also theoretical. This finitude is exhibited in what each realizes.

In identifying the finitude of cognition, it is important to realize that cognition is not equivalent with philosophical knowing or logic or what has been going on in the *Logic* itself. This difference is manifest in how Hegel speaks of cognition being either analytic or synthetic, whereas later he points out that logical knowing can be neither just analytic nor just synthetic, but only both at once.

The finitude of cognition is evident in several respects. As Hegel observes,

While the Idea is indeed the free Notion that has itself for object, yet it is *immediate*, and just because it is immediate it is still the Idea in its *subjectivity*, and therefore in its finitude in general. It is the end that has to realize itself, or it is the *absolute Idea* itself still in its *manifested* aspect. What it *seeks* is the *true*, this identity of the Notion itself and reality, but as yet it is only seeking it; for it is here in its *first* stage still *subjective*. Consequently though the object that is for the Notion is here also a given object, it does not enter into the subject as an object operating on it, or as an object having a constitution of its own, or as a picture thought; on the contrary, the subject converts it into a *determination of the Notion*. It is the Notion that is active in the object, relates itself to itself therein, and by giving itself its reality in the object finds *truth*. (p. 782)

Cognition is finite in the sense that it has something that limits it—namely the object, which is something given to cognition. Moreover, cognition seeks something that it has not yet achieved: truth. In both respects, cognition confronts something beyond. Consequently, the self-determination of cognition is a finite “urge to *truth* in so far as truth is in *cognition*, accordingly to

truth in its proper sense as *theoretical Idea*. *Objective* truth is no doubt the Idea itself as the reality that corresponds to the Notion, and to this extent an object may or may not possess truth; but, on the other hand, the more precise meaning of truth is that it is truth *for* or *in* the subjective Notion, in *knowing*" (p. 784).

The cognition of truth involves the judgment of the concept because in it, the predicate is not just a universal, but rather the correspondence of the individual with the universal (p. 784). It thus always has a normative aspect, assessing how the object conforms to truth or what is good or what is beautiful. Nonetheless, the employment of such judgments cannot overcome the limitations imposed by the finitude of cognition.

The limitations are limits upon the self-determined character of cognition's quest for truth. Because the object cognition addresses is given independently of it, the object has a given determination, a given character of its own. Cognition's subjectivity is going to be determining itself so as to accord with the true object, but cognition can only rely upon its own conceptual determinations, which still remain different from their object. Precisely because cognition is engaged in arriving at truth in theory only by employing concepts in respect to a given content, it is not going to be able to arrive at the unity it is aiming for. All it can achieve is a *subjective* unity of concept and objectivity because its product is theory and just theory.

Theory is not true objectivity, but the Idea in a subjective form. Theory is the unity of concept and objectivity in a still subjective form, whereas the true objectivity it is trying to capture has its own form, which is different. That discrepancy is also present in the fact that the object is something given to it with a content that cognition cannot exhaustively capture. Cognition is subjective, merely conceptually determinate, whereas the object as given has another dimension to it that cannot be fully grasped in the transformations that subjectivity operates on itself.

Hegel characterizes the resulting process of cognition as being in the first instance analytic. As he points out, many look upon analytic and synthetic cognition as exhausting the possible options. There is a widespread presumption that cognition is either analytic or synthetic and that it is merely a subjective matter whether we begin with one or the other (p. 786).

Hegel, however, points out that analytic cognition comes first because synthetic cognition presupposes the results of analytic cognition (p. 793). Analytic cognition is characterized by confronting a given objectivity and attempting to lay hold of it by modifications of conceptual determination that are found to lie within that given objectivity. Cognition, as analytic, confronts an immediately given object and takes it as given. In so doing, cognition is passive to the extent that it presupposes the object, but cognition must determine itself to get at what the object truly is. Analytic cognition will use its own determination, conceptual determination, to arrive at the truth of the

object. In other words, cognition is going to conceptualize the given object by immediately discovering conceptual determination within it, which it is going to give itself by making it its theory of the object. In that way, cognition determines itself so as to get at true objectivity. In so doing, cognition does not rely upon some other mediating factor given apart from the object to guide its theorizing. Rather, cognition conceives what it finds in what is given, and its concepts are just determinations of what it has discovered the data immediately to be.

As Hegel notes, it would be a mistake to imagine that all that is happening in analysis is an importing of determinations from the object into subjectivity (p. 788). That is just as one-sided as saying that the determinations are simply imported into the object, as opposed to being abstracted from it. Rather, both are involved.

This is ignored by the guiding thread of Kant's notion of cognition, according to which we can only know what we put into the object. Of course, if that is the case, the object becomes a subjective construction. Cognition, as a form of the Idea, is trying to get at truth, not appearance or some subjective construct. This is the case, even though the finitude of cognition may prevent it from obtaining what it seeks, just as the finitude of volition may prevent it from attaining the good.

The predicament of cognition is defined by how the given object it seeks to conceive has its own individuality. That means that the object has a multiplicity of independently determined features. Cognition confronts this individual manifold in the given and tries to put what it finds in the form of a concept. The concept will be at one with itself in this found content, which is to say, it will conceptualize it. It will somehow take this content and put it in its own unity. This will involve giving that content universality. The universality in question will be that of abstract universals, for cognition is picking things out of what it finds, abstracting them for conception. Cognition may also involve the universality of class determination by finding concepts under which found individuals fall.

One might wonder why this activity should be described as analysis, since it seems to rely on induction, which Kant, for example, associates with synthetic knowing. Cognition here takes objects given to it and attempts to determine that content in terms of subjectivity, in terms of the unities of concepts. Although the objects could be exemplified by objects of sense perception, Hegel points out that they could also be exemplified by mathematical contents. As he notes, many think that mathematical analysis arrives at knowledge through proofs of theorems, which he distinguishes from problems. What distinguishes the proof of theorems from problems is that it involves something synthetic. Analysis more properly deals with mathematical problems, such as "What is two plus two?" The terms of the problem provide everything needed for its solution. One just has to go and do the

needed operations. This, Hegel claims, is an analytic cognition. One has a given and one goes about conceptualizing it, putting what one finds in this form (pp. 789–90).

Hegel accordingly criticizes Kant's claim that mathematical knowledge is synthetic (pp. 790–91). Kant maintains that mathematical knowledge is not only synthetic but also a priori, since it has universality and necessity that induction can never establish. Kant argues that mathematical propositions such as "Five plus seven equals twelve" are synthetic. Supposedly "five plus seven" is a different concept from "twelve," and the twelve with which five plus seven is equated is not something that one could know simply by analyzing what was in five and seven.²

Hegel counters Kant's argument by pointing out that five plus seven and twelve have the same content, but only a different form. Whereas the content has been unified in twelve, "five plus seven" expresses the urge to unify that same content. Hegel points out that this is really just a problem, not something requiring any external mediation involving synthesis. The numbers are just determinate amounts where one just adds one and one and one and one, and one just stops arbitrarily after one has added five and then again after one has added seven. The solution can be reached by continuing the same operation with the same amounts without need of any further mediating term.

Chapter Twenty-Eight

The Idea of Cognition

Objectivity is not merely subjective, but it is not both subjective and objective. It is not the Idea. To comprehend the Idea, it is important to identify what objectivity lacks that the various forms of the Idea have, as well as to identify the difference between objectivity and subjectivity.

In respect to cognition, it is necessary to consider how objectivity comprises the kind of entity to which theorizing will direct itself in its pursuit of truth. Crucial in this regard is that cognition has to operate under the assumption that the entity it seeks to know is conceptually determinate, that is, conceptualizable, theorizable. Because objectivity both arises from subjectivity and contains the factors of the concept, it is in principle transparent to conceptualization.

What is at stake in the Idea of cognition is not the psychology of knowing, which presupposes logic, nature, and the living animal self, but the logic of theorizing. This logic of theorizing is not the logic of philosophizing. Here in the Idea of cognition we are dealing with an urge to know that is structurally inadequate to arrive at the truth that it seeks. The limits of this theorizing are exhibited by how theoretical cognition is exemplified by the opposition of consciousness, which must be overcome for philosophy to be possible.

The basic feature of cognition that is exemplified by the opposition of consciousness is rooted in how cognition arises and is distinguished from life. Life and cognition, as stages of the Idea, involve different ways in which subjectivity and objectivity get unified. Life, which logically results from the realization of subjective ends, comprises a process whose starting point is the immediate unification of subjectivity and objectivity. Life only operates on the basis of itself, and thereupon it proceeds to sustain and renew itself. Cognition is different. Hegel presents cognition as resulting from reproduc-

tion, the self-sustaining not of the individual organism, but of the genus (p. 774).¹ Through reproduction, the life process takes on a character that cannot be produced by the individual organism alone. Like the selfish gene conceived by Richard Dawkins,² something sustains itself in reproduction that is different from the individuals who engage in propagation. Whether reproduction be asexual or sexual, it enables the life process to separate itself out from the individual organism. Insofar as individual organisms die as well as give rise to other individuals, they maintain the unity of a genus or species being that pervades them all. In this process of reproduction, the individual organisms do not relate to their own universality. They are just individuals, and through reproduction they relate to their offspring and, if reproduction is sexual, to their sexual partners. Nonetheless, through their reproduction, the life process takes on a universality of its own, distinguished from the actual individuals it pervades. This universal of the genus remains self-identical in the comings and goings of its individual members. Hegel presents this outcome as the starting point of cognition. The key development is the opposition between the universality of the species being of life and the individuals it determines. Cognition, whether theoretical or practical, always starts from an opposition between subjectivity or conceptual determination and objectivity. They are opposed, however, as elements of a process that consists in a unification of them, in which the unification is the end of that process, a goal not yet at hand.

Due to this governing opposition, cognition as theoretical opposes practice, just as cognition as practical opposes theory. Both are distinguishable because they proceed from the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity and take the unification of them as their goal, achieving that unification in subjectivity or in objectivity, respectively. The unification can be spoken about broadly as truth. Truth can be uncovered theoretically, or it can be realized practically.

In theory, subjectivity undergoes a conceptual determination by which it becomes at one with objectivity and becomes true. There is, however, something flawed about the truth that can be theoretically achieved, given theorizing's starting point and how its unification of subjectivity and objectivity takes place. Truth depends upon correspondence between theory and its object. Theory, however, so long as it remains theoretical, can never be the same as the object. In theorizing, subjectivity is supposed to make itself conform to the object. What does that amount to? Obviously something is lacking in the conceptual determining of theorizing that does not fully match the object in its opposition to the theorizing about it.

A similar discrepancy haunts practical cognition, whose practical transformation of objectivity is supposed to accord with conceptual determination. The activity of practical cognition, action (*Handlung*), will only be at play insofar as the transformation of objectivity has not yet achieved its

unification with subjectivity. Action expires when the transformation is achieved. The process of transformation eliminates itself with the advent of its product. So, the whole enterprise of practice presupposes that it has not achieved its goal. This way of thinking about practice is what Hegel considers to be the paradoxical plight of Kantian ethics, for which one is only in a position to be moral, to engage in moral conduct, so long as the good has not been realized (p. 820). If the good is realized, there is no place for moral action. As long as moral conduct concerns a good that has not yet been achieved, it falls into this dilemma. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* will challenge whether this is the proper way of conceiving ethics.

The fundamental problem is that both forms of cognition confront an objectivity given independently of their activity. For this reason, both theoretical and practical cognition are finite. They have a limit. They are not just relating to themselves, even though their whole enterprise operates under the assumption that theory and practice can lay hold of what they address. There can be a search for truth and a pursuit of the good, provided objectivity is not resistant to the conceptual determining that theory and practice pursue in their corollary ways. In cognition, the unification of subjectivity and objectivity starts from the opposition of the two, whereas in life, the life process proceeds upon the prior realization of what it does. By contrast, in cognition, either theoretical or practical, the unification of subjectivity and objectivity is a goal yet to be achieved. In both cases of theory and practice, the goal is a subjective end. This is presumed to be the situation of all cognition by those who absolutize the opposition of consciousness. The opposition of consciousness is the psychological standpoint that always regards its mental content as being about something independently given, where obtaining truth is always a matter of managing to make mental determinations conform to what is given, which counts as the standard of truth.

There is, however, a difference between the opposition of consciousness and the logic of cognition. For example, when Hegel develops analytic cognition, the first kind of cognition, he points out that it is not the same thing as description. Even though analytic cognition immediately *theorizes* about what is given, it is not engaged in merely describing what it confronts. Certain types of consciousness, such as sense certainty, perception, and understanding, are not explicitly theoretical in character. They employ mental representations to represent what they confront, but they do not engage in a *conceptualization* of the given. Representing the given is not the same thing as theorizing about what is. When analytic cognition theorizes about what is given, it is not just describing what we experience. Induction, after all, is always trying to get at what is universal in the given. Conceiving the universality uncovered in experience is not the same thing as describing appearances. Description can just be a matter of representing what is intuited, what is sensed, which is not equivalent to putting it in a universal, conceptually

determinate form. Cognition concerns not correctness, but truth, which consists in the relationship between subjectivity, understood as conceptual determinacy, and objectivity. This is not equivalent to representing correctly, that is, providing representations that fit appearance. Even though theorizing operates immediately, at least in its analytic operation, it does not simply take in what is there in the way in which describing acquaints you with what appears in all its multiplicity.

Analytic cognition immediately theorizes about the given. Its immediacy distinguishes it from synthetic cognition. Analytic cognition deals with objects that are immediately given. These can be actual concrete individual objects encountered in experience or mathematical objects that have been formed up by a certain abstraction that generates mathematical problems. In either case, cognition concerns itself with finding what is there. This element of finding, however, is not just a matter of description. As Hegel notes, analytic cognition involves both an aspect of positing and an aspect of presupposing. Although analytic cognition seeks the truth of the given, its theorizing does not just represent the given. Psychologically speaking, in theorizing one thinks the given, one conceptualizes the given. That is what it means to theorize about it. One puts the given in the form of the concept, as in induction, one puts the given in a universal form. Given the opposition under which cognition operates, the universality in question can only be a certain kind of universality, namely, abstract universality. Since analytic cognition reflects upon a given material, which is already independently determined, its conceptualizing consists in picking out distinguishing marks that it finds in the given. This abstracting generates abstract universals that inhere in the given in such a way that they leave everything else about the subject matter undetermined. Since this theorizing conceives the given with this particular form of universality, the truth it obtains is limited.

Cognition in general might be said to be subject to Nietzsche's broadside against philosophy in general, which accuses theorizing of always presupposing that what is true is what is universal. The type of universality that analytic cognition embraces is susceptible to Nietzsche's more specific accusation that universality always leaves out what is subject to change, what is individual. That is the case if the universality at issue does not differentiate itself, does not individualize itself, does not exhibit a proper self-determining character, but is instead just an abstract universality. The theorizing that limits itself to analysis of the given, to generating abstract universals, can never get at what is, insofar as objectivity is individual.

Besides positing the given in the conceptual form of abstract universality, analytic cognition presupposes the given and that its positing will conform to the given. Theorizing should not be changing the given. Although it posits the given in conceptual form, it is not turning objectivity into a subjective positing. Analytic cognition is instead communicating conceptual determina-

tion to the given, so as to leave it as it is. The concept is not foreign to the objectivity it opposes, so conceptualization need not alter the latter.

The only kind of conceptual determinations that cognition can employ in its immediate opposition to the given are ones that necessarily leave out precisely what gives the given its individuality. Analytic cognition's search for truth thus has something vain about it, even though it operates under the presumption that there is an underlying unity of subjectivity and objectivity.

Analytic cognition pushes beyond itself, however, to the extent that, as Hegel claims, its defining theorizing inherently leads to synthetic cognition (p. 793). Analytic and synthetic cognition first emerge as separate stages in the subjective unification of concept and objectivity. As we shall see in the development of the absolute Idea, the self-knowing of logical science will end up combining both analysis and synthesis, as well as theory and practice.

Synthetic cognition is first distinguished from analytic cognition by starting with the given universal rather than with the given individual. Insofar as synthetic cognition begins with the universal, it depends upon analytic cognition to provide the given universal with which synthesis can proceed.

Analytic cognition solved mathematical problems by confronting the given individuals, which provided everything needed for a solution. Contrary to Kant, the solution to the problem "What is five plus seven?" requires no more than an exercise of analytic cognition, since all that is necessary is conceiving what is at hand. Five and seven each provide the units and the operation with which twelve is obtained. All one need do is repeat the operation of addition that has been stopped arbitrarily, after being done five and seven times (p. 791).

By contrast, synthetic cognition proves theorems by beginning with given universals, the axioms of the proof, and then supplementing them with a construction allowing the theorem to be proved. What makes the proof of theorems synthetic rather than analytic is that the conclusion cannot be gotten from what is immediately at hand. A mediation is required, and synthetic cognition will supplement given conceptual determinations with something more that can make them true.

Analytic cognition paves the way for synthetic cognition in virtue of how it conceptualizes the given. Analysis always involves putting the given in the form of abstract universality. The given already has a particular content and that content has to be mediated to be particular. Analytic cognition calls for some mediation to ground the particular content of the individuals it subjects to conceptualization.

Synthetic cognition always involves the furnishing of a mediation for its conceptualizing. Instead of determining concepts that immediately conform to the given, synthetic cognition begins with given universals and then supplements them with particulars that enable the universals to lay hold of individuals and conform to objectivity.

Hegel differentiates synthetic cognition into three successive forms: definition, division, and the proving of theorems.

Like judgment and syllogism, definition does not concern p's and q's but terms that are more conceptually specific. As a form of cognition, definition involves overcoming subjectively an opposition between the concept and a self-subsistent object. Definition is concerned with conceptually determining given individuals. How do we go about defining the individual? That is the thematic problem of the first form of synthetic cognition.

Hegel distinguishes definition from description. Definition does not provide enough to describe something, whereas description is insufficient to provide what defines an object. Description simply represents the given object in its particularity, something that can be provided by nonconceptual terms, such as images. Definition, by contrast, conceives the individual's genus and species. Definition, unlike analytic cognition, employs the universal of genus, which, unlike the abstract universal, has an inherent differentiation.

The call for definition is perennially found in Socrates's favorite question, What is x? What is justice? What is the genus and species of the interrogated factor? The problem is that definition begins with given individuals. Given natural objects present manifold features, leaving open which are necessary to its genus and which are incidental.

Take the example of *Homo sapiens*. As a concrete natural thing, the human being presents a daunting challenge as an object of definition. By contrast, an artifact like a chair seems much more amenable to definition. It has a function, reflecting the form it embodies thanks to an antecedent act of making informing the material of which it is composed with a design fitting its function. As an artifact, the chair has an antecedently represented design or form, by which the chair can presumably be defined as one exemplar of a form that could be embodied in any other instance of its kind. Whatever we make, whatever we produce as an artifact has a universal form imposed upon its material, a form that can have multiple embodiments, all of which could be said to have the same design. Thereby they are all intelligible as one of a kind that can be defined.

What distinguishes different chairs, that is, what is individual about this chair as opposed to that chair, is irrelevant to its function. That individuality may be important for its description, but it plays no role in its definition.

Mathematical objects are also eminently definable. A triangle, for example, is an abstract object, constructed in geometric representation, in contrast to triangular things, which have all sorts of extraneous physical properties. This allows the species being of the triangle to be fully exhausted by defining it as a three-sided figure.

Definition runs into problems when its object is a given individual, which better qualifies as a self-subsistent object proper than an artifact constructed

in matter or imagination. The given individual object has a multiplicity of properties, which immediately confront synthetic cognition. Definition depends upon determining the genus and species of the individual, which requires distinguishing necessary from incidental features in the individual. How can that differentiation be made when the object is something independently given, rather than something we make, physically or mathematically?

There is a need to pick and choose which features belong to the genus. In the case of a human being, is the earlobe an essential differentia? Not if you were born without ears. The general problem is that the given object does not offer any principle for determining which of its features is essential or not (p. 798). One could appeal to induction and see what properties are permanent as opposed to those that are transient, or alternately see what properties are shared by all observed putative members of the genus. In both cases, what has so far been perceived as universally the case need not be so perceived in the future or elsewhere or in past testimony that has yet to be encountered. There is also the problem that there are individuals who are not fully perfected and have not fully realized their species being. There are people born without a brain. There are some among the brained who have not read Hegel's *Science of Logic*. Where do we look to resolve the issue and complete the definition?

In these circumstances, definition is inherently problematic. Definition may not be problematic when it deals with something that is merely posited. If, however, definition is used to get at truth and truth is concerned with what is objective and generally self-subsistent, then definition cannot overcome subjective arbitrariness.

To succeed, definition must do what division aims to accomplish. Not surprisingly division and definition often proceed together. For example, many of Plato's later dialogues engage in very elaborate divisions as a way of defining objects. As Hegel points out, the difficulties of definition lead in the direction of division, since defining something requires distinguishing between what does and does not fall under a universal species (p. 800). Division attempts to move from the universal to its necessary particularization. The problem division faces is that the universal from which it starts, as something given, does not contain the generation of its particularization. Consequently, the division cannot be found in and thereby deduced from the universal, as analytic cognition might enterprise. Synthetic cognition must add the sought-after particularization, but to do that, it must go beyond the given universal. As an exercise of cognition, the particularization must be located by confronting objectivity and uncovering its particularization as it falls under a universal. The challenge synthetic cognition here confronts is to determine that the proper divisions have been made and that they are complete.

This challenge cannot be successfully met within the framework of division. The stumbling block remains the external relationship that cognition has to objectivity, even though cognition proceeds with the certainty that objectivity can be conceptualized and that conceptual determination can accord with objectivity and become Idea, the unity of concept and objectivity. The given individuality of the object still lies beyond exhaustive conceptual determination, leaving every division left with some remainder. Theory can never become fully self-reflective in division because the independent individuality of the object remains independent of and external to the activity of theorizing by division. The inability to render the individuality of the object into a division leaves synthetic cognition less than fully autonomous. It is not just passive since it does not just describe what is. Cognition by division is engaged in conceiving, not just imitating objectivity.

Synthetic cognition still wants to address the given and make itself conform to the given, but conforming to the given is not something completely immanent to its operations of division. Cognition has to look outside itself to find whether its object is fully divided in forty-seven rather than fifty-seven species. Either number might just hold for the time being. Moreover, cognition might find something that does not quite fit its taxonomy, and the scheme of division will have to change. How can synthetic cognition ever know that its division sets the proper boundaries for the particularization of the universal? Any taxonomy of given objectivity is plagued by these uncertainties. The truth aimed at by cognition by division is inherently elusive.

Hegel claims that when synthetic cognition engages in proving theorems, it takes in charge the individuality that eludes division (p. 807). Nonetheless, he points out that theorems provide varying degrees of determination to what they concern. In Euclidean geometry, the classic example of cognition by theorem, certain proofs only partially determine what they are about, whereas others more thoroughly determine their object.

The Pythagorean theorem is a case in point of the more exhaustive synthetic cognition by proof. The theorem allows any triangle to be determined in its complete individuality by its two sides and the angle between.

Theorems are distinguished from definitions and divisions by being proven. Whereas definitions are just affirmed and divisions are just divided, theorems are arrived at through proof. The proof determines the individuality of the object through a unification of the universal with its particularization. The proof supplies the particularization that is required, because the universal is not immediately connected to either. The theorem will connect the universal with its particularization, and its connection will be mediated by the proof. All this proceeds in terms of the opposition of cognition to objectivity. The particularization that must be supplied is still found in objectivity, rather than being simply inherent in the universal. This is why the proof of the theorem is not analytic but synthetic. It does not involve a deduction from

what is already at hand in the universal. The synthetic character of the proof is exhibited in the way in which Euclidean geometry proves its theorems. It provides a particularization of universals by going beyond them. These universals are the axioms, the given principles that are taken up to begin with. They themselves are, with very few exceptions, theorems that have been proven. They ought to be, since, as Hegel notes, they are not just tautologies, but contain a difference and therefore need some mediation to be unified.

The theorem cannot be proven from the axioms just by inspecting what they contain and immediately analyzing what is found. Rather, a mediating factor not contained in the axioms must be supplied. This is provided for by a construction. If what should be constructed were mandated by the axioms themselves, there would be no need for the construction, since the axioms would dictate what follows. The construction is thus different from what the axioms entail. When cognition engages in construction, it introduces difference and thereby is synthetic. What justifies the construction is what results from it, namely, the proof of the theorem.

The completed demonstration of the theorem, achieved through the mediation of construction, provides a grounding lacking in definition and division. The demonstration of theorems may be synthetic cognition's most sturdy accomplishment, but it still exhibits the limitations of synthetic cognition. This limitation is displayed in the necessity that proof provides for the theorem. Necessity came up in the *Logic of Essence*, preceding freedom and the concept, which emerged together. The truth produced by synthetic cognition takes the form of necessity. This itself indicates that truth has not been fully obtained, or, in other words, that concept and objectivity have not become wholly adequate to one another.

In this connection Hegel observes that Jacobi pointed out that so long as cognition arrives at results that are necessitated, what it ends up knowing always has the form of being dependent or externally determined (p. 816). That defeats the purpose of cognition, because cognition seeks what is true, what is as it is determined in and through itself, not what is dependent and relative. Cognition seeks the truth of objectivity, but if the true is known in the form of necessity, it lacks the independence of what is determined in its own right.

By imposing the form of necessity upon its object, the conceptualization of synthetic cognition equally diverges from the proper form of the concept, whose universality is self-determining insofar as it particularizes itself. Due to this discrepancy, which the externality of analytic cognition equally bears, synthetic cognition cannot be philosophy. This is why Spinoza's system does not strengthen its philosophical standing by presenting itself in the form of a series of proofs of theorems. It may be that Spinoza's philosophy has something going for it completely independently of the form in which it is presented. Nonetheless, the synthetic cognition it relies upon for its demonstrations

both presupposes definitions and axioms and operates with a necessity indicating that the connections are imposed upon the terms involved, instead of being intrinsic to them.

To obtain the genuine adequation of truth, the externality of necessity must be supplanted by a more immanent determination.

Chapter Twenty-Nine

Truth and the Good

What would be the predicament if truth did not contain, as part and parcel of itself, the knowing of truth? If the knowing of truth were not part of truth, could truth be known? Knowing would once more confront the truth as something independently given that it opposes.

This situation is precisely what is exhibited psychologically in the opposition of consciousness and logically in cognition, both theoretical and practical. Daunting limits have been shown to plague finite cognition, the cognition that opposes objectivity either as something to conceptualize adequately or to make true practically. These difficulties indicate that somehow the knowing of truth has to be part and parcel of the truth.

Another way of thinking about the problem is this: If the knowing of truth were outside the truth, it would be alien to truth and could not have any truth. Moreover, if knowing were not part of the truth, one could not know what knowing is in truth. It would be untrue, incapable of exhibiting the unity of concept and objectivity.

How then, can knowing fit in the truth, and where is knowing going to fit as an object in the course of knowing the truth? Can it surface before logical investigation comes to an end? What would happen if that were the case and true knowing were to somehow emerge before logic reaches its self-knowing consummation? In that case, the knowing of truth would be thematized before other logical truths are determinable, and these would be given apart from the knowing that conceives them.

Once more, knowing would be different from the truth, because there would be truths outside of the knowing of truth. These would confront true cognition as independent givens. Those determinacies that emerge after the knowing of truth arises as an object could never be known because the

knowing of truth would already be determined before the full truth has been delivered.

Consequently the knowing of truth not only must be part of truth, but it cannot arise as a topic anywhere else than at the end of logic. Otherwise there would be matters outside the knowing of truth that are still held to be true, destroying the unity of knowing and its object that enables logic to surmount the dilemmas of the opposition of consciousness. What alone can bring closure to the unfolding of truth is the knowing of truth that is part of it.

Generally speaking, philosophers of truth are going to be in trouble if they cannot account for their own knowing of truth as part of the truth. This trouble goes right back to the problem of thinking about knowing as being distinct from its object. It gives us a clue, however, about what will emerge as the culmination of this long enterprise that Hegel has pioneered. The culminating truth of logical investigation will turn out to be a kind of self-knowing of truth, a self-knowing of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, of concept and objectivity. This will reveal what it is that has been under way determining itself throughout logic, and it will provide the key to how the development from being or indeterminacy turns out to be a science of logic after all, a true conceptualizing of true conceptualizing.

In the opening pages of the *Science of Logic*'s final section, concerning the absolute Idea, the cognition that has just been developed is referred to as a searching cognition (p. 824).¹ This is because that cognition is finite due to confronting something other than itself, an object comprising something beyond cognition's own limit. Searching cognition addresses the given, even though it is itself a conceptual determining that is implicitly the Idea. The theorizing of finite cognition is not just a determining of a concept because theorizing aims at the truth, at arriving at a conceptual determination that conforms to objectivity. Finite cognition proceeds from an urge that consists in a self-determining that remains theoretical to the extent that its determining occurs within subjectivity. It is searching for the truth insofar as its conceptual determinations aim to be determinations of true, conceptually determinate objectivity. The unity of concept and objectivity that it seeks is determined subjectively, as alterations of conceptual determination in face of a given objectivity that has an individuality of its own.

Although theoretical cognition is concerned with getting at truth, its enterprise is a searching because it proceeds from the opposition between the subjective and the objective. It is therefore searching for a unity of concept and objectivity that it has not yet obtained. The truth is for it a goal. There is thus an element of teleology present in its searching. There is an end that is being sought, and this end is to be realized with a certain aspect of externality because it confronts objectivity as something given. The given is what has to be known and put into conceptual form. Cognition's conceptualizing may, to start with, be universal, but otherwise it does not have in itself the determina-

cy it seeks. It is going to get its determinacy from elsewhere and determine itself in respect to what are allegedly found determinations. Cognition is going to conceptualize what is taken to be determined in and through itself.

At the very end of synthetic cognition, where the searching knowing engages in proving theorems, something happens that brings this enterprise of merely theoretical cognition to a conclusion that sets the stage for another kind of cognition, a cognition that is practical. This practical cognition might better be called practical understanding rather than practical reason because it too involves an opposition between subjectivity and objectivity. It can be called a practical cognition because it is still concerned with truth, the unity of concept and objectivity, although it seeks to realize that unity not subjectively but objectively, by making the given conform to the true concept.

In theoretical cognition, the obtaining of truth involves having conceptual determination take on the given determinacies of what is objective. Since, however, theoretical truth is realized in conceptual determinations that remain merely subjective, there is a failure to achieve a complete correspondence. The correspondence retains a merely subjective form, leaving it one-sided.

In practical cognition, truth is still at stake, but truth is no longer something to be discovered. Truth, the conformity of concept and objectivity, is here something to be achieved practically. Truth is to be made by transforming objectivity. The goal of this practice making objectivity true is the good. The pursuit of the good thus involves truth, but in a different, objective form.

Both theoretical and practical cognition, that is, both theory and practice (understood as distinct, one-sided endeavors), involve processes for unifying subjectivity and objectivity. Their processes thus involve the Idea or truth. In theorizing, the unifying process takes place in the conceptualizing, with given objectivity providing the standard to which theory must conform. In practice, the unifying process takes place in action that will alter objectivity to make it true, to make it what it ought to be. The good, what ought to be, here counts as true objectivity, not the realization of a merely arbitrary end. For practical cognition, objectivity as it is immediately given is not truthful, is not what it ought to be. Immediate objectivity therefore needs to be made truthful, to conform to subjectivity, to realize the good. Here, in effect, truth resides in subjectivity, which provides the measure for altering objectivity. The modification here takes place not in conceptual determination but in objectivity in accord with what is in subjectivity.

The activity of practice is not creative because it presupposes given objectivity, just as does theory. There is a difference, however, in how objectivity is presupposed. Whereas theoretical cognition presupposes given objectivity as the measure of truth, practical cognition presupposes given objectivity as not being truthful, not being what it ought to be, not thoroughly conceptually determined but still conceptually determinable. Here in practice,

subjectivity already possesses the content that is truthful. It does not have to fill itself with a content it finds elsewhere, in given objectivity. Rather, practical cognition already has a conceptual determination that is objective, but it confronts an objectivity that has an immediate givenness that does not conform to that. So there is a practical discrepancy. In theorizing there is a different discrepancy, one between a yet-to-be-determined conceptuality and the given it confronts. In both cases, a correspondence is called for to overcome the disparity.

In the case of theoretical cognition, what counted was an objectivity that was already truthful, already susceptible of being conceptualized. Theorizing was just a matter of filling subjectivity with the conceptual determinacies that are found in objectivity.

Practical cognition presents the opposite situation. Here, the subjective element has a determination that is true. It has individuality, a universality that has particularized itself and is itself a freestanding totality. It therefore does not need to find its content elsewhere. Nonetheless, it confronts an objectivity that does not correspond to it, which therefore is not what it ought to be.

In certain respects practical cognition resembles external teleology, where a subjective end realized itself in an opposing objectivity. It is difficult to see where the difference between the two processes resides. It seems that practical cognition puts us back in the situation of external teleology, which ends up bringing us face-to-face with the logic of life.

Hegel's discussion of the transition from theoretical to practical cognition sheds important light on how the latter's pursuit of the good is different from teleology. The transition takes place in a way that resembles the transition from necessity to freedom. In proving theorems, theoretical cognition arrives at a content that has the form of necessity conferred upon it thanks to the mediation that is supplied by the proof. This gives cognition a content where the universal has necessarily particularized itself. In that respect, it has an individuality, a concrete content such as it did not have before. On the other hand, in it, cognition still faces something external.

How is this process different from that of an end realizing itself? As Hegel points out, it does have considerable similarities to teleology (p. 819). Both involve a syllogism with two stages serving as premises for the result. In the syllogism of teleology the end is realized through a relation of the subjective end to its means and then by a relation of the means to the object by which the end achieves objective realization. The first relation involves an immediate communication, whereby the subjective end immediately enlists the means for the sake of its own realization. The other relation involves one object acting upon another object, by means of which the end gets realized. What sets up the transition to life is that the product of the whole process

ends up being just like the means. The realized end is an object that could just as much serve as a means to other things.

Practical cognition is different in two respects from teleology. One salient feature has to do with how the individuality of the good compares to the abstract character of the subjective end of teleology. The subjective end is abstract in that it can be realized in any number of objects and its realization can occur through different means.

The good at which practical cognition aims is something very different. Although in the abstract, the good might be considered an end, not all ends count as the good. The good has a special significance, reflecting how its realization is a process internal to the Idea, unlike that of the subjective end in teleology. Hegel does say that “the syllogism of immediate *realization*,” of the good, “is altogether the same as the syllogism of *external purposiveness* considered above; it is only the content that constitutes the difference” (p. 819). He notes, however, that there is a crucial difference in regard to the character of the respective results (p. 820). As Hegel writes, the good “comes upon the scene with the worth of being absolute, because it is within itself the totality of the Notion, the objective that is at the same time in the form of free unity and subjectivity” (p. 818). By contrast, “in external as in formal purposiveness”—that is, teleology—the end “was an indeterminate finite content in general” (p. 819). The subjective end was just any finite content that is going to be realizing itself in objectivity. The good “is finite too” because it is separate from the process of realization that aims at its achievement. The good would be infinite if the process of the good operates on the basis of its prior realization. In that case it would not be conditioned, for it would operate on the basis of itself, not something other. In Hegel’s ethics, the *Philosophy of Right*, he will characterize ethical community as an institution of actual freedom that will surmount the framework of practical cognition, with its concern for realizing a good that is not yet actual, but only something that ought to be. In the ethical communities of the free family, civil society, and self-government, action will aim for a good that is already realized in the institutional framework that such action sustains as the precondition for its own operation. Such action will only aim at something that is already realized because what it is realizing is a good that contains the activity of its realization within itself. This is most familiar in our exercise of political freedom. As a self-governing citizen, one engages in specifically political activities that have as their end the realization of political freedom, but can only be undertaken insofar as political freedom is already realized in standing institutions of self-government. One realizes self-government by acting within a preexisting democratic state. One cannot engage in self-government unless there is already a constitutional order of the right kind to allow one to participate in this type of activity.

This way in which the ethical good contains the activity of its own realization bears some resemblance to life, in that life continually sustains itself. Hegel will speak of the logic of life playing a part in what constitutes the process of the absolute Idea. Here, however, a different situation is at hand because the good that is finite is something that is not yet realized. Practical cognition pursues the good only insofar as it is not already actualized in given objectivity. The good is an end that has a subjective character, which is why its pursuit resembles to some extent the logic of external teleology. The practical urge to do what is good aims at a good that is yet to be realized because it is not contained in the activity of its realization. If the good were so contained, the pursuit of the good would proceed within an objectively existing good. Instead, the good of practical cognition is only realized after the activity of bringing the good into being has extinguished itself by altering objectivity.

The pursuit of the good can only be engaged in insofar as objectivity is not yet good. If objectivity is good, there is no room for doing good because of how this good is characterized. It is not like the good of ethical community, whose very process, for example, the political activities of citizens of the emancipated body politic, always proceeds on the basis of the prior realization of self-government.

Here in practical cognition, the good remains a finite ought to be, even though it is considered absolute, even though it has the concrete character of being something that is not just any determinate finite content, like the subjective end of external teleology. Although the good is treated as absolute, it nevertheless is finite because it has a subjective form of being an end confronting a given objectivity that faces it as an inessential, immediate givenness that ought to be transformed to accord with the good.

The good is not any determinate finite content like an end in general, but more specifically comprises something that, although it is finite, is at the same time an absolutely valid content. What does it mean to be an absolutely valid content? Well, the good is not relative to anything. It is absolute. It is determined in and through itself, rather than being determined in respect to any given. Practical cognition is not like theoretical cognition, which determines itself in view of what is given to realize the Idea in subjectivity, in a theorizing that conforms to objectivity. In practice, the content of the good does not need to be determined by anything from without, nor does it have to be modified in any respect. It itself is Idea, the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, which ought to be realized in an objectivity not yet exhibiting that unity. The pursuit of the good just has to make given objectivity conform to it, thereby making that objectivity true, which is to say, making it good. Unlike the subjective end of teleology, the good implicitly involves the Idea, containing in itself a unity of conceptual determinations that are genuinely objective facing an objectivity that counts as not being genuinely true.

As a result, the conclusion of the pursuit of the good is different from the result of external teleology. Hegel characterizes the difference in the following way: “The finite end in its *realization*, all the same, gets no further than a *means*; since in its beginning it is not an end already determined in and for itself”—like the good—“it remains even when realized an end that is not in and for itself” (p. 820). As Hegel observed, “The conclusion or the *product* of the purposive act is nothing but an object determined by an end external to it; *consequently it is the same thing as the means*” (p. 749). Like the means, it is determined by something external to it. “In such a product, therefore,” he continues, “*only a means*, not a *realized end*, has resulted, or the end has not truly attained an objectivity in it. It is therefore a matter of complete indifference whether we regard an object determined by an external end as a realized end or only as a means; the determination here is relative, external to the object itself and not objective” (p. 750). It is not objective because the nature of its realization is such that it could just as well be a means to something else. By contrast, the good is not something merely instrumental. It is for its own sake.

What then does the realization of the good by practical cognition amount to, given that the good is absolute, not relative to anything else, and possesses a universal content that does not depend upon anything outside of it? Kantian ethics maintained that morality is universal in that what is universal is not relative to anything particular. Since Kant regards all determinate ends as relative to desire, the only content that is nonrelative is the lawfulness of moral principle.

To do good is not to make a wish, but to will, to confront given objectivity and attempt to make it conform to what ought to be. This involves realizing what is absolute in a specific way, relative to what is given. This makes the process of doing good finite and subjective. Here the subjectivity of the good has a content that is not merely abstract and contingent, like the subjective end in teleology. The content of the good is necessary and determinate. It is still a finite content because it does stand bounded by an objectivity that does not conform to it. Moreover, it can be realized only by incorporating the process of external teleology, using objects to work upon objectivity, albeit to realize a nonarbitrary normative content. Consequently, the process of realizing the good is subject to externalities of all sorts.

Further, as Hegel points out, because the good has to have a definite content to be realized in given objectivity, it is subject to encountering other particular goods, each of which claims to be absolute (p. 820). Once more subjectivity and finitude enter in, despite the fact that what is being pursued is inherently truthful and absolutely imperative.

Finally, the objectivity that receives determination from the pursuits of the various goods is still objectivity. Objectivity, however, as such, is not the good, but what ought to be good. The pursuit of the good uses what is not

good to achieve the good, and what it accomplishes is a particular transformation that cannot measure up to the absolute end it seeks. The pursuit of the good, owing to its abiding subjective and finite character, turns into evil. Each good is liable to enter into conflict with the realization of other goods, since none is the one and only universal good, although each claims to be. Every realization of the good is just an individual realization, not a truly universal realization. Each engagement of practical cognition, of finite practice, transforms only some part of objectivity. Consequently, no matter how practical cognition strives to realize the good, all objectivity will never be good. Every achievement of the good leaves the good still to be realized in an objectivity that does not fully conform to it. Practical cognition ends up always replicating the situation from which it proceeds, where practice confronts an immediate objectivity deviating from what ought to be.

When Hegel refers to evil and discusses it at greater length in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*² and also in his *Philosophy of Right*,³ he is speaking about a kind of moral situation, which, unlike ethical community, is somewhat akin to this logic of practical cognition. It has to do with how a pursuit of a good that is an ought to be is just as much a pursuit of evil due to the subjective element that makes it liable to come into conflict with other pursuits of the good. Owing to the finitude of the content of each good, there is no means of resolving their conflict.

The result of practical cognition therefore has an unsatisfactory aspect. On the one hand, every realization of the good is partial and finite and subject to conflicting with other realizations of the good. On the other hand, since the good can only be pursued so long as it is not realized, the pursuit of the good undermines its own endeavor.

Despite all these limitations, Hegel nonetheless claims that the realization process of the good provides a transition to the culminating determination of logic, the absolute Idea (pp. 821–23). Just as the realization of external teleology led beyond objectivity to the Idea in its immediate configuration as life, so the realization of the good leads to a new level of determinacy overcoming the limitations of cognition. What results is a process that no longer has the one-sidedness that Hegel ascribes to both theoretical and practical cognition. This result, the absolute Idea, thereby involves a unification or merging of the theoretical and the practical. Hegel will also characterize the absolute Idea as merging life and cognition (p. 824). These two ways of characterizing the absolute Idea shed important light on what distinguishes it from all preceding determinations.

On the one hand, we have the merging of the theoretical and the practical. In the theoretical realization of the Idea, the unity of subjectivity and objectivity occurs in subjectivity, in the conceptual determining whereby theory makes itself conform to objectivity in the pursuit of truth. In theorizing, conceptual determination modifies itself to accord with given objectivity, so

the unification takes place on that one side of subjectivity. In practice, by contrast, the unification of subjectivity and objectivity, of concept and objectivity, takes place through transforming objectivity to accord with the good. The unification here occurs in objectivity, not in subjectivity. Each realization of the idea is one-sided in that the unification of subjectivity and objectivity occurs either in subjectivity or in objectivity, but not in both at once.

The absolute Idea is somehow going to comprise the process whereby the idea is realized just as much subjectively as objectively. Both will occur inextricably bound to one another. The opposition between subjectivity and objectivity made the pursuits of truth and the good both finite and rendered them aiming at a goal that is not at hand. Somehow or other, the absolute Idea will involve a process unifying subjectivity and objectivity both subjectively and objectively, and do so such that what is realized is a unification that is already at hand.

In that regard, the absolute Idea will involve something akin to life. It will, however, involve not just life, but also something present in cognition. Whereas Hegel characterizes life as the Idea in its immediate form, he identifies cognition as the Idea in its mediated form. In cognition, the Idea will start with an opposition of subjectivity and objectivity and produce their unification as a result of its mediation. In life, the Idea is in itself, whereas in cognition, the Idea is for itself. Hegel characterizes the absolute Idea as a unification of life and cognition, because in its process, the Idea will be both in and for itself (p. 824). We need to fathom what these terms mean, how they apply to what emerges from practical cognition, and how all of this provides a consummation of the logical development.

Hegel begins to characterize the absolute Idea by contrasting it with the opposition of theory and practice in finite cognition. He writes,

What is still lacking in the practical Idea is . . . that the moment of actuality in the Notion should have attained on its own account the determination of *external being*. Another way of regarding this defect is that the *practical* Idea still lacks the moment of the *theoretical* Idea. . . . In the latter there stands on the side of the subjective Notion . . . only the determination of *universality*; cognition knows itself only as apprehension, as the identity—on its own account *indeterminate*—of the Notion with itself; the filling, that is, the objectivity that is determined in and for itself, is for it a *datum*, and what *truly is* is the actuality there before it independently of subjective positing. (p. 821)

That is the situation of (finite) theory.

For the practical Idea, on the contrary, this actuality, which at the same time confronts it as an insuperable limitation, ranks as something intrinsically worthless that must first receive its true determination and sole worth through the ends of the good. Hence it is only the will itself that stands in the way of attainment of its goal, for it separates itself from cognition, and external reality

for the will does not receive the form of a true being; the Idea of the good can therefore find its integration only in the Idea of the true. (p. 821)

What is Hegel getting at when he says that the will itself stands in the way of the attainment of its goal? How does the will treat objectivity such that it stands in the way of the good's own realization? Namely, practical cognition treats objectivity as external to what is good. Finite practice cannot be what it is without relating to objectivity so as to prevent objectivity from being what it ought to be. If instead, practice wants to realize the good, it has to treat objectivity in the way that theory treats objectivity, as something that is true and in and for itself, independently of how it is posited.

Hegel claims that the transition from practical cognition to the absolute Idea is one by which the positing activity of practice somehow relates to objectivity as true, as something that is inherently in accord with its own positing activity. This equally overcomes the limitations of theoretical cognition, because its finite theory had the problem of being empty in itself and pursuing an activity that remains merely subjective.

Hegel maintains that practical cognition is going to make this transition itself in terms of a syllogism of action. "One premise is the *immediate relation of the good end to actuality* which it seizes on" (p. 821). The good end relates to objectivity so as to realize itself. "The second premise directs it as an external *means* against the external actuality" (p. 821). Following the logic of external teleology, the good communicates itself to objectivity, which becomes a means to its realization. As Hegel writes, "For the subjective Notion the good is the objective; actuality in its existence confronts it as an insuperable limitation only in so far as it still has the character of *immediate existence*, not of something objective in the sense of a being that is in and for itself; on the contrary, it is either the evil or the indifferent, the merely determinable, whose worth does not reside within it" (p. 821). The means confronts an objectivity that is not already in accord with the good, being either evil or indifferent. It has, however, "already been sublated by the practical Idea itself; the first premise of the latter's action is the *immediate objectivity* of the Notion, according to which the end communicates itself to actuality without meeting any resistance and is in simple identical relation with it" (p. 821).

How has the objectivity confronting the good already been overcome? It has been overcome according to the same logic by which, earlier on, the means in external teleology was itself the realization of the end, because, after all, a means is a means only insofar as it realizes the end. Similarly, here "all that remains to be done is to bring together the thoughts of its two premises. To what has been already immediately accomplished by the objective Notion in the first premise, the only addition made in the second premise is that it is posited through mediation, and hence posited *for the objective*

Notion. Now just as in the end relation in general, the realized end is also again merely a means, while conversely the means is also the realized end, so similarly in the syllogism of the good, the second premise"—namely, where the good realizes itself through its means—"is immediately already present *implicitly* in the first" (pp. 821–22), because, again, the means is only a means insofar as it realizes its end. "But this immediacy is not sufficient, and the second premise is already postulated for the first—the realization of the good in the face of another actuality confronting it is the mediation which is essentially necessary for the immediate relation and the accomplished actualization of the good" (p. 822).

This syllogism contains two processes. We have the good relating to its means, where it immediately communicates itself to its objectivity. Second, there is the realization of the good by means of that mediation. The first immediate realization of the good in the means is necessary for the accomplished actualization of the good. This presupposes, however, that the immediate use of the means is instrumental, that it does realize the good. In other words, the immediate realization of the good in the means is mediated by the realization of the good in objectivity. If that is the case, then the whole process of the realization of the good achieves something analogous to what happened to external teleology whereby it resulted in the internal teleology of life.

Originally the realization of the good was a goal that would come into play only after the process of realizing it had come to an end. This was because the process of doing good only occurs insofar as the good has not been done, only insofar as the good has not been realized. Since doing good always occurs insofar as the good has not been realized, it never realizes the good. The doing of good, always occupied with what ought to be but is not yet actual, can never realize the good as long as its activity is in operation.

Nonetheless, the first part of the realization process, where the good immediately takes hold of its means, turns out to rest upon the accomplished realization of the good because the means is not a means unless it *is* instrumental to realizing its end. Consequently, the pursuit of the good turns out to be something that always operates on the basis of its realization.

Hegel lays this out, writing, "In other words, the activity in the second premise produces only a one-sided *being-for-self*, and its product therefore appears as something *subjective* and *individual*, and consequently the first presupposition is repeated in it" (pp. 822–23). If the realization of the good lays hold of just a part of objectivity, a finite content, that leaves an objectivity still confronting the good as something lacking conformity with what ought to be. "But this activity is in truth no less the positing of the *implicit* identity of the objective Notion and the immediate actuality" (p. 823). That is, the process of practical cognition reveals that objectivity is in some respect already good or that the good has already been realized.

This latter is determined by the presupposition as having a phenomenal reality only, as being intrinsically worthless and simply and solely determinable by the objective Notion. When external actuality is altered by the activity of the objective Notion and its determination therewith sublated, by that very fact the merely phenomenal reality, the external determinability and worthlessness, are removed from that actuality and it is *posited* as being in and for itself. (p. 823)

Now objectivity has this character conferred upon it. “In this process the general presupposition is sublated, namely the determination of the good as a merely subjective end limited in respect of content, the necessity of realizing it by subjective activity, and this activity itself” (p. 823). This is the presupposition of the whole situation of practical cognition, that the good is something merely subjective and limited with respect to content because it faces an objectivity that does not yet embody it. Thereby, it has to be realized subjectively by something outside of objectivity, whose activity it requires. This mediation is “sublated” or overcome in the result.

The mediation is this activity by which the good is to be realized. With its realization, the activity is removed. The result is an immediacy that is not merely a restoration of the presupposition of practical cognition. Rather, it is its accomplished sublation or overcoming because it has removed the situation from which it resulted. “With this, the Idea of the Notion that is determined in and for itself is posited as being no longer merely in the active subject but as equally an immediate actuality” (p. 823). To the extent that there is a realization of the good, there is an immediate actuality that is truthful, “and conversely, this actuality is posited, as it is in cognition, as an objectivity possessing a true being. The individuality of the subject with which the subject was burdened by its presupposition, has vanished along with the presupposition” (p. 823).

We no longer have a subjectivity that confronts an objectivity—neither a subjectivity that is universal but devoid of truthful content, getting it from what is given, nor a subjectivity that takes its own content to be truthful but not objectified, confronting an objectivity that has to be transformed. Both of these conversely one-sided forms of the Idea have been removed. “The individuality of the subject with which the subject was burdened by its presupposition, has vanished along with the presupposition; hence the subject now exists as *free, universal self-identity*” (p. 823). Why has this occurred? Because “the objectivity of the Notion is a *given* objectivity *immediately to hand*, no less truly than the subject knows itself as the Notion that is determined in and for itself” (p. 823). Through the realization of the good, the subjectivity that already had truthful content in it, rather than the emptiness of the cognition that strives for truth, confronts an objectivity that is truthful.

Accordingly in this result *cognition* is restored and united with the practical Idea; the actuality found as given is at the same time determined as the realized

absolute end; but whereas in questing cognition this actuality appeared merely as an objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion, here it appears as an objective world whose inner ground and actual subsistence is the Notion. This is the absolute Idea. (p. 823)

We need to explore what we have here uniting the theoretical and the practical, how it involves a truth that is engaged in knowing itself, and how this ends up converging with the entire content of the logic. Hegel is going to tell us that this unification of theory and practice, which is also a unification of life and cognition, where the Idea is in and for itself, is going to turn out to be what he calls method, the method of everything that has been logically developing. This is a very special kind of method. It is not a method that is external to the content that it orders. Its ordering is inherent in the content, yet it involves a kind of cognition as well. We will have to see what this involves and how it turns out to be what logic itself is all about.

Chapter Thirty

The Absolute Idea

The absolute Idea brings the *Science of Logic* to a close. To help understand how this is so, it is worth reflecting once more upon how the comprehension of truth, the knowing of the unity of concept and objectivity, must fall within truth itself, and where in the truth it is contained. This is equivalent to reflecting on how the Idea must turn out to be a knowing of itself and where in the development of the Idea the self-knowing of the Idea is contained. The knowing of the truth cannot lie outside the truth for the simple reason that if it did, that knowing would not itself be true. So, somehow or other, the determination of truth has to incorporate the knowing of truth. Moreover, that cannot occur before the completed determination of truth, because if the knowing of truth came before the exhaustive determination of truth, the knowing of truth would be what it is before all of the truth is accessible.

The knowing of truth thus has to come last in the determination of truth. This seems to present a daunting difficulty. If the comprehension of truth is part of the truth, but arises only as the last dimension of the truth, at the very end of the development of truth, there seems to be a distinction between this knowing of truth and everything that went before. It then seems that the knowing of truth is something distinct from its object, and logic falls back into an opposition of consciousness, where knowing and its object are at odds with one another, separated by having different contents. If this is so, logic would lead back to the very predicament that precludes logical investigation as well as philosophy in general. The overcoming of the opposition of knowing and its object, however, is what provides logic with its starting point. This itself indicates that the knowing of truth not only must fall within the truth and come at the end of truth but also that it must be such as to encompass the whole truth and somehow coincide with the entirety of logical devel-

opment. We will see this proviso coming to fulfillment in how the absolute Idea brings logic to closure.

In Hegel's introductory reflections on the idea of logic, he indicated that it is impossible for logic or philosophy to have its method in hand at the outset. To do so would be question begging since at the start, philosophy can have no valid concept of what it is or of what a science of logic is or how philosophy must begin as a science of logic. The very idea of science cannot be present at the outset of philosophical or logical investigation, since if it were, it would immediately entail an opposition between method and subject matter and the problems that involves. Instead, Hegel pointed out that what the science is and the method of science will both themselves be the final result of the science, bringing it to a close (p. 43).¹

In starting out with being, logic began with no determinacy of method, of subject matter, or of knowing. To begin with, science was not part of the subject matter that was developing itself. Cognition did not become part of the subject matter until a certain stage late in the *Logic of the Concept*, and even then that cognition was not philosophical cognition. If it were, we would have come across the method of logic before logic came to its end.

Logic started with a beginning that could not have any content and that could not rely upon any procedure to move it along. Logic had to be self-developing, but the self in question could not be at hand until the very end, when it would finally reveal its identity by having completed its own development. That completion would then transform what had been occurring, rendering it a development *of* the subject that reveals itself at the end.

At the start, the "beginning" was not even a beginning but just indeterminacy. That it be a beginning depends upon there being something that begins. Matters do get qualified fairly soon. Indeterminacy, being nothing, which engenders becoming, gave rise to determinacy and something. That allows *us* to look back and regard indeterminacy as a determinacy distinguishable from other determinacies to which the ensuing developing puts it in contrast. The process itself does not as yet set being, nothing, and their succession before us. Each determinacy stands alone, having displaced its predecessors, rather than standing in contrast to them, which would allow indeterminacy to be a determinacy in and of itself and not just for us.

The development does not yet provide anything of itself that would allow being, nothing, becoming, and the other determinacies to count as the *concept* of being or the *concept* of nothing, and so on. Since the concept has not itself emerged, none of these determinations can count as conceptual determinations. Hegel does point out at various junctures that they are concepts, but that is something that they will have to prove themselves to be at some stage in the development to come. For the determinacies to prove themselves to be conceptual determinations, the development itself will have to show

that these determinacies turn out to be moments of conceptual determination and engender a logical determinacy that itself contains this comprehension.

Now, whatever will be developing itself in logic will include it as its own development, and the development will have to be a self-determined development. Since the development cannot be determined by any external factor nor be the development of any given substrate, it could be said to comprise self-determination. Indeterminacy or being will thereby be the beginning of self-determination. That identification, however, still does not yet bring us any kind of knowing. Self-determination of itself may end up getting identified with the concept. It may end up getting identified with universality, particularity, and individuality. But even those determinations by themselves do not bring us to knowing until we come to the point of having before us subjectivity in contrast to objectivity and ways of relating conceptual determination to objectivity, one of which will be theoretical cognition. All of these matters have shown themselves to be part and parcel of the development, a development that allegedly is not taking anything for granted.

Now we are at the very end, an end characterized by arising through the overcoming of the difference between theoretical and practical cognition, an overcoming of the opposition between the subjective idea and the objective idea. So, at the very outset of this final chapter, the absolute Idea at which we have arrived is characterized in terms of the unity of theory and practice and also of the unity of life and cognition. On this basis, Hegel then identifies the absolute Idea as the method of logic (p. 825).

The unification of theory and practice has presented a corresponding which, on the one hand, involves a conceptualization that has the determination of what is in and through itself, what is in and for itself, what is unlimited and not relative to anything else. On the other hand, this stands in relationship to something that, through the realization of the good, has turned out to be an objectivity that is equally determined in and through itself, and not relative to anything else. Moreover, the process by which conceptualization determines what is other than itself is now inherent in the process of what is independently in and for itself.

So Hegel can say that we have something that resembles life, in that life was a process that resulted from the realization of external teleology to comprise a process of realization that operates on the basis of what it realizes. Just as life exhibited the internal teleology of an internal self-realization, so here we have something that, as a result of the realization of the good, realizes itself on the basis of its realization.

The absolute Idea also involves, however, an opposition between conceptual determination and objectivity that is not found in life, but first emerged from the reproduction process of the genus as theoretical cognition. Here, too, there is an element of cognition, but cognition no longer faces an independent given. Because the process of cognition is now in unity with that of

objectivity, cognition now is dealing with itself and comprises a type of self-knowing. Back in the introduction, Hegel had spoken of method as the self-knowing of logic, and now he characterizes the absolute Idea as method.

What does the absolute Idea as method signify? Hegel does speak of the method as a form (p. 825), but the question is: Of what is it the form? One is tempted to say that method is the form of all determinacy of any sort. What allows the method to apply to all determinacy? What has emerged as method is a self-knowing that is equally a knowing of a self-constituting of objectivity that is conceptually determinate. If method is thereby the form of all determinacy it cannot be an external method such as one finds in finite cognition, which confronts an independent given.

The standard way of thinking about method conceives of method in terms of a syllogism, where we have knowing on one hand and the object of knowing on the other, and the method is the middle term that joins knowing and its object. In that case, the method has its own determinations in order to be a distinct middle term. We found this when we were dealing with finite cognition. Cognition had an array of determinate methods, which were applied to its given objects. Analysis, definition, division, and the proving of theorems all were enlisted. These methods were all distinct from their object, and they were employed to enable the knowing subject to fill itself with content.

Method here does not comprise a determinate instrument for joining knower and object of knowledge. First of all, the whole development from being has been disproving that method by proceeding without any opposition of knowing and its object. Logic from beginning to end operates on the very basis of the removal of any opposition between knowing and its object, even if subjectivity, objectivity, and their various relations emerge as logical determinacies along the way.

Accordingly, if method here is to be characterized as a form, it will have to be an absolute, not a relative form. A relative form is relative to contents that are given independently from the form. Here the method is instead not forming anything given or external to it.

In what sense, then, is the absolute Idea a form, and if it is a form, what is its content and the relation between the two? The content is everything that has, presumably, arisen up to this point. The whole preceding development of determinations is the content that is known at the culmination of this process, and yet somehow the knowing accomplished by the method cannot be a knowing of something different from itself. Somehow the method's knowing of itself comprises form that is not external to what it forms. As Hegel puts it, the form in question is immanent to the content. So, the content itself will have to constitute a knowing of itself. The form will then be the knowing that knows itself in this content from which it is comprised. To the extent that this is so, the logic will achieve closure.

Hegel observes that now all there is left to be done is to examine this form, which is completely inherent in the development of the entire content (p. 826). That entire content is self-ordering, and its self-ordering has turned out to comprise the process of a truth (the Idea) that knows itself without qualification. In that respect, the method comprises the logic of truth *per se*.

The method on the one hand is universal. It is universal by comprising the true conceptualization of the entire logical development, thereby knowing itself in everything it conceives.

On the other hand, the method is also particular in that it is different from the universal or the concept, even though it involves the concept. Hegel pointed out that the concept, as it initially emerges from the Logic of Essence, is first given and determinate, even though this is the concept of the concept. It is not yet the concept knowing itself. The concept as such does not involve cognition at all, which involves a relation of concept *and* objectivity. The method, however, does involve knowing, and somehow its knowing can be identical to the object it knows, because it is a knowing of knowing. This takes us back finally to the idea of logic. Logic constitutively has this reflexivity. Logic, minimally speaking, is a valid thinking of valid thinking or a true conceptualization of true conceptualization.

So method is something different from the mere concept. It has something particular about it in its contrast to the universal concept. Nonetheless, its particular character involves being both the logic's final determination and the logical determinacy that encompasses everything that has preceded it.

By being encompassed by the method, everything that precedes the method takes on a new character. Hegel proceeds to show this by thinking through how the method takes us back to the beginning of logic to determine it as it is now encompassed by the method (p. 827). The beginning now proceeds in a different manner from how being was immediately nothing and nothing was immediately being, engendering becoming. Now, as encompassed by the method, being is the beginning of what has begun and revealed itself to have begun and finally knows itself to have begun. Initially, by contrast, being was just being and not even a beginning. Now being is the beginning of the self-constitution of the absolute Idea. That is, the beginning is now known to be the beginning of logic. As such, the beginning will be determined in the way in which the totality of determinacy that includes knowledge of itself is fundamentally specified. Because what develops is ultimately conceptually determined, the development, as grasped by the method, is going to be determined in terms of the basic factors of the concept: universality, particularity, and individuality.

Hegel accordingly goes back to the beginning and observes that the starting point, being, can now be conceived to involve an immediate universality (p. 828). Because being has turned out to be the beginning of true conceptualization that grasps itself as such, being is an immediate universality that has

yet to determine itself in any fashion. In that respect, it is just this completely empty, simple self-relation of being, which is at the same time the starting point of a whole that, having developed itself, has now rendered its starting point a beginning.

Instead of following out being that is nothing, nothing that is being, and becoming, the next determination of the method as it comprehends logical development is the particularization of the immediate universality of the beginning (p. 830). This is not just a negation of being because the development of the logical totality that is here beginning is conceptually determinate. As such, and as self-determining, the development involves universality, particularity, and individuality. The second moment in the development from being is therefore to be described in terms of particularity. After all, it is a differentiation of the subject that is developing itself and thereby going to remain self-identical in its development. So the moment something new emerges, it has the character of a particularization of the totality that is in the process of developing itself, a totality of determinacy that includes the knowing of itself as the totality of determinacy.

As a consequence, the development is next going to involve individuality (p. 837). In the process of individuality, the method combines its universal unity with the particular difference of the development's determination. At this point, as Hegel notes, the method reaches a turning point where it expands to take on all the content and becomes the entire system of determinations (p. 838). This expansion signals the arrival at the end of logic. Even though the identification of the method with the whole content might appear to be a separate determination, it takes into itself everything that has preceded it so that the self-knowing of logic does not fall back into a difference between knowing and its object.

There is, however, something that now complicates this final development. Although the method brings logic to a kind of closure, this closure is also a new starting point (pp. 843–44). This double sense of the logic's consummation bears some resemblance to the double significance of the outcome of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where the arrival at Absolute Knowing signaled both the self-elimination of the opposition of consciousness as well as the indeterminacy from which logic can proceed. Here the advent of the method brings the totality of determinacy to know itself in a way in which there is no distinction between its conceptualization and its object. Once more we have something that is completely immediate. The self-knowing process of the logic as absolute Idea is not mediated by anything else, but is at one with itself in its internal process of corresponding. So the completed logical totality has, as a whole, being or the form of immediacy. The outcome of the method is the totality of self-determined determinacy, which turns out to involve a knowing of itself. As the self-knowing Idea or unity of subjectivity and objectivity, it is the totality of truth, which includes

a knowing of the truth. Because this fully constituted totality has emerged as purely self-determined or self-mediated, it is in the form of being. Therefore we now have something that comprises the completed self-thinking of logic with an additional determinacy—the form of immediacy. This happens automatically with the concluding of the logical development.

Hegel identifies the resulting determination as the minimal reality of nature, of nonlogical determinacy (p. 843). Its advent allows the preceding development of determinacy to be in contrast a development of mere logical determinacy, of mere thought determinations.

One might have been tempted to regard the preceding development of the totality of determinacy that ends up knowing itself to be philosophy in general. That development may be a self-knowing of truth, without further qualification. This, however, is not a knowing of everything. It is not philosophy in its entirety, but only the science of logic. The consummation of the absolute Idea is therefore the point of departure for a further development of specific domains of truth and specific philosophical disciplines of truth, the first of which is going to be nature and philosophy of nature, to be followed by something that incorporates nature, namely mind or spirit. Hegel will therefore distinguish between the science of logic and nonlogical science, calling the latter *Realphilosophie*, the philosophy of what is real in the sense of being nonlogical. *Realphilosophie* will consist of the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit.

At certain junctures, when Hegel is first sketching out the absolute Idea, he identifies it as a pure form, to which other determinacies will be added so as to comprise what could be considered nature or spirit. He points out, however, that in the ensuing development of philosophy in its totality, something similar will occur to what occurs here at the very culmination of logic. That is, the totality of the different forms of truth and the different true realities will have to involve a reality that knows the whole as well. It will be treated last, and it must come last insofar as it conceives all the preceding domains in their truth. This consummating nonlogical reality, in which nonlogical reality knows itself in its totality, which incorporates logical determinacy, is philosophy itself as an actual cultural factor.² Hegel will also acknowledge art and religion as cultural realities that provide comprehensions of reality in its spiritual totality, but only philosophy will do so with the self-developing conceptual determination that can alone adequately lay hold of real, nonlogical objectivity. Philosophy does not confront nonlogical reality as something it opposes, but rather stands within reality, as a real cultural part of what is not just logical determinacy. Philosophy is that part of what is nonlogical that allows it to know itself in a real way, rather than in terms of the pure way of the logic of truth. Still, there will be a return to logic because philosophy will include logic as a part of itself. Philosophy as a cultural

reality will involve logical investigation, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of mind or spirit.

None of this will involve a return to the dogmatism of finite cognition, which turns to investigate nature or rational agents as if it confronts something given, apart from thought. Instead, these further spheres of philosophy will operate on the basis of what logic has provided, the presuppositionless development of determinacy that ends up providing cognition of itself. They will rely upon this in conjunction with the further determinations that get added to it in *Realphilosophie*.

Let us return to the text and see to what degree the above arguments are confirmed. Hegel introduces the absolute Idea, writing that “the absolute Idea has shown itself to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical Idea. Each of these by itself is still one-sided, possessing the Idea itself only as a sought-for beyond and an unattained goal” (p. 824).

Here, however, the process of this realization operates on the basis of its actuality. So, in this respect, Hegel observes, “The absolute Idea, as the rational Notion that in its reality meets only with itself, is by virtue of this immediacy of its objective identity, on the one hand the return to *life*” (p. 824). It is a return to life insofar as it is not confronting something external to itself but acts upon itself, just as life is always perpetuating itself, realizing itself on the basis of its own given reality.

Nonetheless, the absolute Idea does not contain just a process like that of life. It also “contains within itself the highest degree of opposition” (p. 824). The absolute Idea contains “the free subjective Notion that is for itself and therefore possesses *personality*” (p. 824). That is, there is subjectivity present that is involved in knowing itself and realizing itself at the same time, thereby doing what was separated when theory stood distinguished from practice. Remember, the theorizing of finite cognition is not at the same time practical. It operates subjectively, determining itself to be in accord with what is given.

Practical cognition attempts to realize what was given in itself and what stands opposed to it, but now we have something that is going to realize itself in something that is itself independently realizing itself. Both sides will be independently developing themselves and being at one with one another. For this reason, “the absolute Idea alone is *being*, imperishable *life*, *self-knowing truth*, and is *all truth*” (p. 824).

Hegel then adds, “It is the sole subject matter and content of philosophy” (p. 824). This might suggest that we are dealing with philosophy as a whole here. Hegel will, however, indicate that the absolute Idea is the culmination of the science of logic, which will be contrasted with other parts of philosophy. Hegel makes this clear in the next paragraph, noting that, since the absolute Idea “contains *all* determinations within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularization, it has

various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to cognize it in these" other various shapes of the absolute Idea (p. 824).

We have the absolute Idea itself, which is what has just arisen, and then we have particular shapes of it: "Nature and spirit are in general different modes of presenting *its existence*, art and religion its different modes of apprehending itself and giving itself an adequate existence. Philosophy has the same content and the same end as art and religion; but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute Idea, because its mode is the highest mode, the Notion" (p. 824).

Hegel clarifies the distinction between what the absolute Idea is with regard to being self-knowing truth and these other spheres of truth that philosophy will address when it conceives nature and spirit, including in the latter religion, art, and philosophy. As he writes,

The *logical* aspect of the absolute Idea may also be called a *mode* of it; but whereas *mode* signifies a particular kind, a *determinateness* of form, the logical aspect, on the contrary, is the universal mode in which all particular modes are sublated and enfolded. The logical Idea is the Idea itself in its pure essence, the Idea enclosed in simple identity within its Notion. (p. 825)

Among cultural realities, philosophy will be able to address the pure truth of the logical Idea, insofar as philosophy relies exclusively on conceptual determination. Art, by contrast, addresses truth by employing intuitable or, as in the case of literature, imaginable representations. Religion's quest for truth will depend upon representation, involving narrative and other depictions. Like art, religion presents what is true in a form that may not be sufficient to provide the certainty that can be secured by conceptual determination.

What would conceptual determination bring with it, even if, to some degree, its contents could be presented in other ways? In asking this, we are really raising the question of why philosophy should have any privileged role to play for getting at truth. After all, philosophy relies upon thinking, upon conceptualizing, and by now we should have some idea of what concepts can deliver, given all the sweat and tears that have been expended in following where concepts take us.

First of all, representation, which art and religion both rely upon, does not develop itself, whereas conceptual determination has proved to be self-developing. What does not develop itself is dependent on what lies outside it. By contrast, thought can be fully self-responsible in that it is generative of what it conceptualizes. Logic at least has tried to present how conceptual determination can be of that autonomous character.

Obviously, Hegel polemicizes against those who want to say that no, conceptual determination is always reducible to formal universality, that concepts are always arrived at by reflecting upon the given. He has instead

presented a universality that is concrete, that can be an absolute method that is the immanent soul of the subject matter because the universal is pregnant with content. In other words, thinking by itself can arrive at truth, as opposed to having to rely on representations or any other sources.

How philosophy could be in a position to legitimate itself is crucially supported by the autonomy of conceptualization, the way in which conceptualization can have an inherent connection to objectivity, and the way in which the correspondence of conceptual determination and objectivity can be something that is not external to either but immanent to both.

What, after all, can connect concepts with truth? The position that concepts in themselves are empty, that the truth of concepts lies outside in the given, which we encounter in finite cognition, leaves our thinking irrevocably subjective. Is conceptual determination merely subjective, however, or can conceptual determination turn out to be objective? Can the correspondence of thought and objectivity, of concept and objectivity, turn out to be not dependent upon anything else but inherent in the very character of objectivity and conceptualization itself? Then alone can philosophy escape the charge that Nietzsche makes against it, who treats the universal as being abstract and formal, as devoid of any individual contents, as lying outside of all process and change. Otherwise thought is condemned to be a ghostly cobweb, whose abstractions never take hold of a true reality that is always changing and subject to process and life.

It would, however, be a mistake to restrict autonomy to philosophy and to rob art and religion of any autonomy. This should be evident from how self-determination arises with givenness from the outset, from which it progressively frees itself through its subsequent development. Art and religion may not be free of the form of representation and the immersion in givenness that involves, but the absolute claims they both make are indicative of how each strives for truth without qualification. Neither art nor religion could stand to be merely relative, dependent endeavors, nor should their strivings be so regarded.

Hegel writes that the absolute Idea itself has for its content namely this, that the form “determination is its own completed totality, the pure Notion. Now the determinateness of the Idea and the entire course followed by this determinateness has constituted the subject matter of the science of logic, from which course the absolute Idea itself has issued into *an existence of its own*” (p. 825). The absolute Idea has arisen as a particular existence, as a particular category or determinacy. “But,” as Hegel goes on to say, “the nature of this its existence has shown itself to be this, that determinateness does not have the shape of *content*, but exists wholly as *form*, and that accordingly the Idea is the absolutely *universal Idea*” (p. 825).

Hegel is here describing the way in which the absolute Idea is the method, a determinacy that encompasses all the preceding logical determinations in

its comprehension. Although it arises as a specific category at the very end, it does not remain one content among others. It is not going to stand next to the other categories in a relation of diversity or difference. The absolute Idea is method because it is absolutely intensive—it informs all the other logical determinations, rather than lying outside of them. For this reason, “what remains to be considered here is not a content as such, but the universal aspect of its form—that is, the *method*” (p. 825).

Hegel’s description of the absolute Idea as method has precisely to do with how this final determination does not stand outside the other determinations, but invests them all. This is required, if the absolute Idea is to be a self-knowing that encompasses the entirety of logic. Hegel suggests as much, writing that the

method has emerged as the *self-knowing Notion that has itself*, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, *for its subject matter*, consequently as the pure correspondence of the Notion and its reality, as a concrete that is the Notion itself. Accordingly, what is to be considered here as method is only the movement of the *Notion* itself, the nature of which movement has already been cognized; but *first*, there is now the added *significance* that the *Notion is everything*, and its movement is the *universal absolute activity*, the self-determining and self-realising movement. (p. 826)

This does not signify that all determinacies are getting reduced to this one factor. It is very much a “totality,” a concrete universality that encompasses all logical determinacy. The absolute Idea as method

is therefore *soul and substance*. . . . It is the method proper to every subject matter because its activity is the Notion. This is also the truer meaning of its *universality*. . . . It is both the manner peculiar to cognition, to the *subjectively* self-knowing Notion, and also the *objective* manner, or rather the *substantiality*, of *things*—that is of Notions, in so far as they appear primarily to *representation*. (p. 826)

Imbued with this encompassing universality, the method does not confront an other. It is not a content, but an absolute form. For just this reason, however, it is more than the concept in general. Hegel therefore notes that “*secondly*, is indicated the *difference* of the *method from the Notion* as such,” that is, “the *particular* aspect of the method” (p. 826). On the one hand, the method does not stand opposed to any of the other contents. But on the other hand, it is thus not identical to the concept, which only involved universality, particularity, and individuality, and not the relation of itself to objectivity. The method conceptualizes everything that falls within logic, and what falls within it is inherently conceptually determined. Hence, as Hegel writes, “The method is this knowing itself, for which the Notion is not merely the subject matter but knowing’s own subjective act, the *instrument* and means of the

cognizing activity, distinguished from that activity, but only as the activity's own essentiality" (p. 827). So we are not dealing with a method that is that intermediary between a subject and object distinguished from it or from one another. Instead, all three are intimately united.

Now Hegel turns back to the beginning to show how the method encompasses the logical development, ordering it in terms of the factors of the concept. He remarks, "Thus what constitute the method are the determinations of the Notion itself and their relations, which we have now to consider in their significance as determinations of the method. In doing so we must first begin with the *beginning*" (p. 827). Now the beginning will be rethought in terms of universality, and then particularity, and finally individuality, because, after all, being has turned out to be the beginning of the self-development of the truth that includes the knowing of itself, involving a conceptual determination that is in accord with objectivity. This is the beginning as it is encompassed by conceptual determination.

Being is thereby going to involve a concrete development, for it is the start of the constitution of the whole. That totality is at one with itself in determining itself. It has universality, but its determinations are the particularizations of that reality. The development is thus determined by the method as the particularizations of that encompassing totality.

Accordingly, as Hegel points out, the development is both analytic and synthetic at once, in contrast to finite cognition that was either analytic or synthetic, but not simultaneously both (p. 830). On the one hand, the development is analytic because it is all contained within the encompassing subject that pervades everything and constitutes itself in pervading everything. Nothing in the logical development ever stands outside it nor moves beyond it. On the other hand, the development is equally synthetic because it is developing. It is determining itself, as opposed to remaining inertly fixed. The logical totality has to differentiate itself and thereby become other to itself. In becoming other to itself, however, it is still at one with itself, for its character is to be self-determining. As such it has to determine itself, because ceasing to do so would annihilate itself. For these reasons, the development cannot fail to be analytic and synthetic at once.

In what follows, Hegel discusses the different aspects of the logical development in terms of the three moves that are necessary to comprehend its basic form—namely, the universality, from which we begin but which has yet to develop itself; second, its differentiation, its particularization; and third, the way it remains at one with itself in its differentiation, exhibiting individuality.

Hegel discusses how this aspect of individuality enables the method to absorb the content into its own unity (p. 836). Taking the differentiation of determinacies into itself, the method thereby expands itself into a system (p.

838). The resulting self-knowing totality does not stand over and against anything else but is purely self-related and self-differentiated (p. 840).

Finally, on the concluding pages, Hegel describes how the logical totality gives itself the form of being, of immediacy, precisely in virtue of completing its own self-mediated, self-comprehended self-constitution (pp. 842–44). Engendering a determinacy beyond logic by adding being to logical totality, this transition provides the only nondogmatic access to something more than merely logical determinacy. With the science of logic thereby achieving closure, the stage is set for philosophy to move beyond the thinking of thinking to the systematic conception of nature.

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Notes

1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), book 1, chap. 2, 982b27–28.

2. THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC

1. A. V. Miller, the translator of Hegel's *Science of Logic* (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), uses the term "notion" to translate *Begriff*, which is ordinarily translated as "concept." Little is gained by translating *Begriff* as "notion," for with "concept" one can make use of verbal forms like "conceptualize," "conceptualization," and so forth, which are not as easy to put into "notionalizing" or "notionalization." So I will employ "concept" rather than "notion."

2. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

3. R. G. Collingwood points this out in his *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 1995), pp. 129–130.

4. Plato, *Meno*, in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), 80d.

5. Plato, *Meno*, 81a–d.

3. WITH WHAT MUST THE SCIENCE BEGIN?

1. See Carl Rapp, *Fleeing the Universal: The Critique of Post-Rational Criticism* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 271–73.

2. Rapp, *Fleeing the Universal*, p. 272.

3. Rapp, *Fleeing the Universal*, pp. 271–72.

4. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

5. William Maker, *Philosophy without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), pp. 71–82, 86–93.

4. BEING, NOTHING, AND BECOMING

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

2. Hegel, “Remark 1: The Opposition of Being and Nothing in Ordinary Thinking,” in *Science of Logic*, pp. 83–93.

3. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A592/B620–A602/B630, pp. 563–69.

4. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), book 4, chaps. 4 and 5, 1006a1–1011a1.

5. FROM BECOMING TO DETERMINATE BEING

1. G. W. F. Hegel, “Remark 3: The Isolating of These Abstractions,” in *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 93–103. Page numbers in parentheses in the text refer to *Science of Logic*.

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), §257, pp. 33–34.

3. Hegel, “Remark 4: Incomprehensibility of the Beginning,” in *Science of Logic*, pp. 103–5.

4. Hegel, “Remark: The Expression ‘To Sublate,’” in *Science of Logic*, pp. 106–8.

6. DETERMINATE BEING

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

2. I have substituted “determinacy” for Miller’s “determinateness” throughout.

3. See in particular Meditation III of Descartes’s *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1993), pp. 24–35.

4. See Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye in collaboration with Albert Riedlinger, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 115, 120.

7. SOMETHING

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

8. FINITUDE

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5:122–23, in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 238–39.

9. INFINITY

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), §257, pp. 33–34.
3. See Immanuel Kant, “The Transcendental Aesthetic,” in *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A22/B37–A32/B49.
4. See B. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Proposition 14ff, in *Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2002), pp. 224ff.

10. BEING-FOR-SELF

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. See G. W. Leibniz, *Monadology*, in *Philosophical Essays*, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1989).
3. See Plato, *Parmenides*, in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), pp. 137c ff.

11. THE ONE

1. See Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, trans. Michael Friedman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chap. 2, 496–523, pp. 33–61.
2. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), §262 and the Remark to §262, pp. 44–46.
3. G. W. F. Hegel, “Remark: The Kantian Construction of Matter from the Forces of Attraction and Repulsion,” in *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 178–84. Page numbers in parentheses in the text refer to *Science of Logic*.
4. See Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, chap. 2, 496–523, pp. 33–61.

12. QUANTITY

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

13. FROM MEASURE TO ESSENCE

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

14. ESSENCE

1. This revised version appeared in 1832.
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, being part 1 of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 166.
3. Hegel, *Logic*, p. 165.
4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), A201/B246, p. 311.
5. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

15. ESSENCE AS REFLECTION WITHIN ITSELF

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

16. FROM REFLECTION TO EXISTENCE

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, being part 1 of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), §119, p. 171; see also Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 424.
3. Hegel, *Logic*, §121, p. 175.
4. Hegel, *Logic*, §123, p. 179.
5. John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 216, 228–29.
6. Hegel, *Logic*, §130, p. 185.
7. Hegel, *Logic*, §130, p. 185.

17. FROM APPEARANCE TO ACTUALITY

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, being part 1 of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), §122, p. 179.
2. Hegel, *Logic*, §122, p. 179.
3. Hegel, *Logic*, §122, p. 179.
4. David Hume, *An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), pp. 84–89.

5. Hegel, *Logic*, §133, p. 189. See, by comparison, G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 455, 500.
6. Page numbers in parentheses refer to Hegel, *Science of Logic*.
7. Hegel, *Logic*, §135, p. 191.
8. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), A203/B248, p. 312.
9. Hegel, *Logic*, Addition to §136, p. 194.
10. Hegel, *Logic*, Addition to §136, p. 194.
11. See, for example, Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).

18. TRANSITION TO THE CONCEPT

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, "'Reason' in Philosophy," in *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1990), pp. 45–49.
2. See Kierkegaard's central work, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. David F. Swenson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), which he attributes to Johannes Climacus.
3. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
4. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A205–6, B250–51, p. 313.
5. Of course, in so doing, Hume begs the question by presupposing a psychological causality.

19. THE CONCEPT

1. Plato, *Parmenides*, in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), 132e–133a.
2. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
3. J. Melvin Woody, *Freedom's Embrace* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), p. 191.
4. Woody, *Freedom's Embrace*, p. 191.
5. Woody, *Freedom's Embrace*, p. 191.
6. Woody, *Freedom's Embrace*, p. 191.
7. Woody, *Freedom's Embrace*, p. 191.
8. Woody, *Freedom's Embrace*, p. 191.
9. Woody, *Freedom's Embrace*, p. 191.
10. Woody, *Freedom's Embrace*, p. 191.
11. Woody, *Freedom's Embrace*, p. 191.
12. Woody, *Freedom's Embrace*, p. 191.
13. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A10, B18–19, pp. 132, 145–46.
14. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B145, p. 253.

20. FROM CONCEPT TO JUDGMENT

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, being part 1 of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), §166, p. 231; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 626, 628.
3. Derrida presents this flawed view in his essay "Différance," in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1–27.
4. G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. N. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

21. JUDGMENT

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, being part 1 of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), §173, p. 238; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 641–43.
3. Hegel, *Logic*, Addition to §177, p. 242; see also Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 651.

22. FROM JUDGMENT TO SYLLOGISM

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A70/B95, p. 206.
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, being part 1 of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), §165, p. 230.
3. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
4. Hegel, *Logic*, Addition to §183, p. 247; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 671.

23. SYLLOGISM

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, being part 1 of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), Addition to §183, p. 247; G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 671.
2. Page numbers in parentheses refer to Hegel, *Science of Logic*.

24. OBJECTIVITY

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

25. MECHANISM, CHEMISM, TELEOLOGY

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, being part I of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), §209, p. 272.

26. FROM OBJECTIVITY TO IDEA

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. Ernst Mayr, *The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 45.

27. FROM LIFE TO COGNITION

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B15–16, p. 144.

28. THE IDEA OF COGNITION

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

29. TRUTH AND THE GOOD

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 383–409.
3. G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. N. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §139–140, pp. 167–84.

30. THE ABSOLUTE IDEA

1. Page numbers in parentheses refer to G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

2. This is barely intimated on the final page, but confirmed in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* and the corresponding published lectures. See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 844.

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